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We examine characteristics and correlates of households in the United States that are most likely to have children at risk of inadequate nutrition - those that report very low food security (VLFS) among their children. Using 11 years of the Current Population Survey, plus data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), we describe these households in great detail with the goal of trying to understand how these households differ from households without such severe food insecurity. While household income certainly plays an important role in determining VLFS among children, we find that even after flexibly controlling for income-to-poverty rates some household characteristics and patterns of program participation have important additional explanatory power. Finally, our examination of the NHANES data suggests an important role for both mental and physical health of adults in the household in determining the food security status of children.

We use laboratory experiments to examine the impact of appeals to social norms on the compliance decisions of individuals. We test the effects of two main types of social norms: "descriptive norms," or the type of behavior that is typical or most frequently enacted, and "injunctive norms," or the type of behavior that "constitutes morally approved and disapproved conduct". In addition, for injunctive norms, we introduce approval‐framed and disapproval‐framed injunctive norm messages. Our results indicate that normative appeals generally have a modest and positive impact on tax compliance, if not always statistically significant. The magnitude of both approval‐ and disapproval‐framed injunctive norm messages is an increase of around 2% in reported taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elicited preference rankings for two lotteries are typically inconsistent across choice and pricing tasks. We test whether pre‐play learning makes preference rankings consistent. Pre‐play learning denotes ex‐ante lottery learning, where subjects observe playing lotteries before making decisions. We find that pre‐play learning makes the average selling prices for the p‐bet, of subjects who choose the p‐bet, higher than their average selling prices for the $‐bet. However, pre‐play learning is not strong enough to equalize the rates of standard and non‐standard reversals, although pre‐play learning reduces the rate of standard reversals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover's endowment. We find that first‐movers send less to second‐movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second‐movers return less when they are endowed less than first‐movers, regardless of whether the difference in endowments was initially given or occurred after a random shock. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ex‐post opportunistic behavior, commonly present in bilateral trade relationships, is a key element of the transaction cost economics. Investment in outside options is a prime example of such opportunism and often leads to inefficiency, for example by exerting effort to search for alternative business partners even if it does not add trade value. We experimentally investigate a bilateral trade relationship in which standard theory assuming self‐regarding preferences predicts that the seller will be better off by investing in the outside option to improve his bargaining position. The seller's investment, however, might negatively affect the buyer's other‐regarding preferences if the investment is viewed as opportunistic. We find overall support for our hypotheses that arise from the link between other‐regarding behavior and opportunism. Our findings suggest that when the transaction cost economics approach is applied to the design of a governance structure, other‐regarding preferences should be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reinvestigate the question first posed by Glaeser et al. (2000): Do survey measures about trust predict actual trusting behavior? This important study established that the behavior in an incentivized trust game is not correlated with the responses to the most widely used survey measures of trust. We conduct a replication and a reinvestigation of GLSS. In the replication, we use the GLSS protocol and we reproduce their results. In the reinvestigation, we introduce one major change: We replace their variation of the standard Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) investment game with the original unmodified game. The standard game endows both players, while the modified version endows only the first mover. After endowing both movers in the reinvestigation experiment, we find a significant correlation between the two measures, suggesting that trust is a single construct, whether measured by the survey questions or by an incentivized trust game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many assignment processes in which agents are given the opportunity to unilaterally select a match. Resulting allocations can be inefficient if agents do not internalize the consequences of their choice on others. To test this formally, we study how other‐regarding behaviors vary across two decision contexts: when subjects make a pure allocation decision; and when they select a partner. In both settings each subject's decision is final and it affects their payoff and that of other subjects in the same way. We find that subjects are more likely to sacrifice their own material well‐being to increase that of others when dividing a pie than when selecting a partner in a large anonymous setting—even though the consequences on the material payoffs of others are identical. These findings suggest that in assignment processes with unilateral selection, efficiency can be improved by presenting the selection process as a choice between outcomes involving multiple individuals, instead of simply selecting a match for themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all-pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous best-of-three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that subjects often make positive bids in only two battles. In sequential contests, theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles. Contrary to this prediction, subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles. Consequently, instead of always ending in the second battle, contests often proceed to the third battle. Finally, although the aggregate bid in simultaneous contests is similar to that in sequential contests, in both settings, subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted. The observed behavior of subjects can be rationalized by a combination of multidimensional iterative reasoning and a nonmonetary utility of winning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trophy. Goal. Dominated. Does priming individuals with competitive concepts such as these influence the temptation to cheat? We utilize a standard laboratory cheating task in a tournament setting and test whether nonconscious priming impacts the nature of cheating behavior. The results demonstrate an asymmetry in a winner-take-all setting: a competitive prime does not increase cheating to improve one's own outcome, but does significantly increase the willingness of an individual to sabotage a competitor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We run between-subject dictator games with exogenously specified 'give' or 'take' frames involving a balanced pool of male and female dictators and constant payoff possibilities. We find the following: Females allocate more under the taking frame than under the giving frame. Males allocate more under the giving frame than under the taking frame. In the taking frame females are more generous than males. But in the giving frame both are equally generous. Finally, when the combined population of males and females is considered, giving is found to be equivalent to 'not taking,' because the opposing gender effects offset each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social information 'nudges' concerning how others perform typically boost individual performances in experiments with one group reference point. However, in many natural settings, sometimes due to policy, there are several such group reference points. We address the complications that such multiple group social information might introduce through an experiment. The boost to average performance is significant and comparable to the one group case. Between-group inequality does not change. Individual inequality falls, however, because the boost is largest among the pre-'nudge' very poor performers. Finally, the boost to average performance is highest when individuals freely choose their group affiliations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision making. A treatment group was given a dose of alcohol designed to target a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 while the BAC of those in the control group remained 0.00. We investigate the behavior of control and treatment groups in the following types of tasks: math, uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism. Our results indicate that alcohol consumption has little systematic effect on economic behavior, at least for the BAC level considered. Further, there is little evidence that alcohol differentially impacts the choices of male and female subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we use the 'Click' version of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task to explore preferences for conformism. In the task subjects can infer the behavior of others from the mass of clicks heard. This signal is uninformative about the precise choices of the other participants, and never mentioned in the instructions. We control the exposure of subjects to clicks by implementing treatments with and without earmuffs. We further test the effect of the introduction of a common rather than individual resolution of uncertainty, still keeping individual payoffs independent of other subjects' choices. We find strong evidence of conformist behavior even in such an inhospitable environment. Simply hearing the others clicking marginally affects subjects behavior. Introducing a common random draw results in a dramatic shift of the average choices toward risk loving, in particular by women, which is consistent with social preference considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laboratory experiments are usually done on individuals, but many business decisions involve groups. Therefore, we ran ultimatum games using individuals and two-person teams. We primed business roles with the labels 'labor' and 'management,' or we used the generic labels of 'proposer' and 'responder.' With business labels, individuals offered lower shares at higher stakes with no significant differences in acceptance rates. For teams, business labels had no significant effect on shares offered, with significantly lower acceptance rates at higher stakes. Teams offered less than individuals, along with higher acceptance rates with generic labels, compared to no significant differences with business labels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play. We examine two methodological questions which affect many studies of communication in games, particularly those studying the relationship between communication and cooperation in supergames. We show that making it easier for subjects to reach an agreement (by allowing more rounds of communication) does not increase cooperation with a limited message space treatment. Thus, limited message space treatments are not a good substitute for the use of chat. Making the game longer, thereby making the connection between the first period and the continuation game more obvious, also has little impact on cooperation. For both the two- and three-period versions of our game we find substantial amounts of contingent play. This implies that use of a finitely repeated game, which has a number of methodological advantages, maintains the main properties of the underlying supergame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We revisit the effect of traders' experience on price bubbles by introducing either one-third or two-thirds steady inflow of new traders in each of four consecutive experimental asset markets. We find that bubbles are still reduced in the treatments with a steady inflow of new traders, but at a slower pace compared to the baseline treatment in which new traders are only introduced in the last market. Our analysis of individual trading behavior shows that the slower abatement of bubbles in the inflow treatments can be attributed mainly to the inexperienced traders who make more mistakes than experienced traders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies show that identifying contributors increases contributions to public goods. In practice, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing it. We design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay to view information about identities and contributions of group members. We compare this to a treatment in which there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are identified. Our main findings are that: (i) contributions in the treatment with costly information are as high as those in the treatment with free information, (ii) participants rarely choose to view the information, and (iii) being a high contributor is correlated with choosing to view information about others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We revisit the claims about the biological underpinnings of economic behavior by specifically exploring if observed gender differences in risk/time preferences can be explained by natural fluctuations in progesterone/estradiol levels during the menstrual cycle and by prenatal exposure to testosterone and estrogen levels. We find no effect of the menstrual cycle (and thereby, of associated fluctuations in progesterone and estradiol levels) or of the digit ratio on either risk or time preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A 'collusion puzzle' exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability to tacitly collude, and leads to a collapse in collusion in experimental markets with three or more firms, in natural markets there are such numbers of firms colluding successfully. We present an experiment showing that, if managers are deferential toward an authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to middle managers and providing suitable informal nudges. This holds not only with two but also with four firms. We are also able to distinguish compliance effects from coordination effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition among individuals comes in a variety of forms: for mates, for resources, and for prestige and recognition. Such competitive pressure can lead individuals to engage in unethical behavior in an effort to get ahead. There are several forms of cheating in which individuals may engage to improve their own outcome: they may lie about their own performance in a task and they may lie about others' performance in a task. Our research is the first to examine how competition affects each of these two types of cheating behavior. We find that individuals are much more willing to cheat by lying about themselves than they are willing to sabotage another when under competitive pressure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]