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This paper considers the extent to which South Africa utilises positive economic statecraft to promote human rights in the region – that is, the degree to which it mobilises its economic engagement to affect a desirable political outcome in its foreign engagements in Southern Africa. The country's reaction to crises in Zimbabwe and Swaziland over the past 20 years is a strong indicator of the limits of South Africa's statecraft in this regard. These engagements highlight the inevitable clash between the country's principled preference for ‘non-interference’ in the affairs of sovereign states and its constitutional mandate to respect and promote human rights. Despite eschewing the role of ‘regional hegemon’, there is an expectation that South Africa will play an integral role in securing regional stability. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that the country chooses to approach resolving regional challenges with a co-ordinated political and economic approach. This paper argues that, to be more effective in spreading a progressive regional agenda that encourages democracy, governance and human rights, South Africa needs to incorporate a stronger element of positive economic statecraft in its foreign policy implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper adopts a Nigerian perspective to South Africa's position in global economic governance, particularly in relation to its role in the BRICS and G20. It is informed by the challenge of transforming Africa's current marginal role in global economic governance, and the kind(s) of regional partnerships that Africa's largest economies can strategically develop and use to place the continent on a higher economic pedestal globally. The paper places challenges confronting Africa in context, exploring how South Africa, by negotiating a strategic partnership with other continental economic powers outside of the BRICS, such as Nigeria, stands to leverage Africa's role and global position on a ‘win–win’ basis. It concludes by noting the costs and potential benefits of such a partnership, and offers some suggestions on the way forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa's foreign policy has evolved through various presidents, from Nelson Mandela to Jacob Zuma. One characteristic lacuna through the various administrations has been the weak linkage between foreign economic strategies and domestic economic objectives. There is a gap between what is expressed in rhetoric and the actual execution of foreign policy. Further, since the dawn of democracy there has also been a gradual shift from a foreign policy that exhibited strong normative expressions, inclined to the West, to a more pragmatic foreign policy that is aligned with the new rising powers. Yet, beyond the tilt, there seems to be a lack of clarity of ideas that inform the various decisions and activities associated with foreign policy activities. This paper takes a closer look at these changes in South Africa's foreign policy, with particular focus on foreign economic strategies as played out in the country's role in multilateral economic processes such as the World Trade Organisation, the G20 and the BRICS, which comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the current constructs which theoretically underpin foreign policy for this country are either overblown or incoherent; they do not appropriately define or advance or prioritise South Africa's national interests abroad, nor do they acknowledge the tensions embedded in the clash between normative policies andrealpolitik. Drawing from ‘real time’ experiences in international diplomacy, this lecture explores some of the dilemmas that South Africa, as a middle-range power in the world, confronts in its international engagements. The cost-effectiveness of South Africa's global projection is also examined, and some practical reforms to achieve better results in the current age of austerity suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The service sector increasingly has become the cornerstone of a great number of economies in both the developed and developing world. The main barrier to trade in services is the imposition of domestic regulations which are aimed at ensuring the affordability, availability and efficiency of services. Such domestic regulations are important for services and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) consequently recognises the right of countries to regulate in order to achieve these goals. The GATS, however, also seeks to discipline such regulations to ensure that they do not hinder trade in services. This article seeks to assess these seemingly competing interests in the context of South Africa's history and its burgeoning telecommunications sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]