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‘Experiential knowledge’ is increasingly recognised as an important influence on reproductive decision-making. ‘Experiential knowledge of disability’ in particular is a significant resource within prenatal testing/screening contexts, enabling prospective parents to imagine and appraise future lives affected by disability. However, the concept of ‘experiential knowledge’ has been widely critiqued for its idiosyncrasy, its impermanence and consequently its perceived inferiority to (medical) knowledge. This paper explores some of these key critiques of experiential knowledge through an analysis of its constitution and uses in the context of reproductive decision-making. Seventeen UK-resident women with Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA), or with SMA in their family, took part in two in-depth interviews: one in 2007–9 and the other in 2013–4. By comparing and contrasting these women's accounts at two time points, this paper demonstrates the stark contrast between ‘lived experience’ of SMA (the visceral everyday realities of life with the condition) and the various way(s) this experience was transformed into, and presented as, ‘knowledge’ through the processes of making, and accounting, for reproductive decisions. The analysis highlights that multiple, distinct and sometimes competing experiential frameworks are used to conceptualise SMA across time and context. However, rather than evidence of its fallibility, this finding highlights that ‘knowledge’ is an inappropriate vessel with which to capture and transfer ‘experiential knowledge’. Rather, we need to consider how to value such insight in ways that harnesses its inherent strength without leaving it vulnerable to the epistemological critiques attracted by labelling it ‘knowledge’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: There has been a striking growth in the availability of health-related information based on personal experience in recent years and internet users are often drawn towards other people’s stories about their health. Accounts of other people’s experiences might convey social and emotional information that is not otherwise available but little is known about how it is used or the implications of its use in practice. This paper examines how people refer to information about other people’s experiences when accounting for decisions about antenatal diagnostic testing for foetal abnormality. We conducted a secondary analysis of 37 qualitative interviews undertaken across the UK with 36 women and nine of their male partners (eight couples were interviewed together) who talked about diagnostic testing for foetal abnormality in 55 pregnancies. When describing their decisions, respondents referred to examples of knowledge gleaned from their own and other individuals’ experiences as well as information based on biomedical or clinical-epidemiological research (usually about the probabilities of having a child affected by health problems or the probability of diagnostic tests causing miscarriage). Both forms of knowledge were employed in people’s accounts to illustrate the legitimacy and internal coherence of decisions taken. The analysis demonstrates the personally idiosyncratic ways that people reflect on and incorporate different types of information to add meaning to abstract ideas about risk, to imagine the consequences for their own lives and to help them to make sense of the decisions they faced. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]