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The purpose of the paper is to assess the theory that the downside risk insurance provided by more generous welfare states generates long run efficiency gains, which counterbalance the short run efficiency losses caused by work disincentives in these states (Feldstein 1974, 1976; Sinn 1995, 1996). Testing downside risk theory requires long term data, so the paper makes use of the three longest running national socio-economic panel surveys. These are the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1968-), the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-) and the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP, 1984-). The paper focusses on prime age households (heads 25–59) and assesses their participation in and returns to adult education and job training. Our results indicate some support for the theory in so far as Dutch and German prime age adults, living in more generous welfare states, were much more likely than Americans to take the risk of foregoing current earnings and investing in additional education. In all three countries returns on investment were substantial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper uses household economic panel data from five countries—Australia, Britain, Germany, Hungary and The Netherlands—to provide a reassessment of the impact of economic well-being on happiness. The main conclusion is that happiness is considerably more affected by economic circumstances than previously believed. In all five countries wealth affects life satisfaction more than income. In the countries for which consumption data are available (Britain and Hungary), non-durable consumption expenditures also prove at least as important to happiness as income. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the paper is to assess the theory that the downside risk insurance provided by more generous welfare states generates long run efficiency gains, which counterbalance the short run efficiency losses caused by work disincentives in these states (Feldstein 1974, 1976; Sinn 1995, 1996). Testing downside risk theory requires long term data, so the paper makes use of the three longest running national socio-economic panel surveys. These are the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1968-), the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-) and the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP, 1984-). The paper focusses on prime age households (heads 25-59) and assesses their participation in and returns to adult education and job training. Our results indicate some support for the theory in so far as Dutch and German prime age adults, living in more generous welfare states, were much more likely than Americans to take the risk of foregoing current earnings and investing in additional education. In all three countries returns on investment were substantial.

In a previous paper in this journal (Headey et al., 2000) a comparison was made between three so-called 'best cases' of welfare regime types, the 'Liberal' US, 'the 'Corporatist' Germany and the 'Social-Democratic' Netherlands. The main conclusion was that the Social-Democratic welfare state performed best on nearly all social and economic indicators that were applied. That paper was based on the ten-year datasets drawn from the national socio-economic panel studies. For this paper we use the unique comparative panel dataset of the European Community Household Panel. At the time of research, only three waves of data covering the 1994-96 period were available. Instead of three countries representing three different welfare state types as in the earlier paper we cover twelve countries allowing us to distinguish a fourth Southern or Mediterranean welfare regime type and to compare the performance of the four regimes. Compared to the Headey's et al. paper we focus on the comparative analysis of the level of deprivation and pay less attention to income poverty and inequality. Because we consider deprivation to be part of the concept of social exclusion (see also Atkinson et al., 2002) our results also provide evidence on how welfare regimes across the EU cope with social exclusion. We conclude that the Social-Democratic welfare state does a good job of preventing income poverty but performs less well in equalising levels of deprivation. Our results also show that the immature Southern welfare states perform worse with respect to preventing deprivation. Trying to explain levels of deprivation by estimating Tobit panel regressions it turned out that the impact of regime type remains significant though limited. Common, 'structural' disparities between the countries and regimes in terms of economic welfare, the demographic structure, and the employment situation explain most of the variance across countries.

The 1980s and 1990s have been decades of quite good economic growth in North America and much of Western Europe. But how have the fruits of growth been shared? This paper reviews changing income distributions in the U.S., Germany and the Netherlands. These three countries may be taken as exemplars and leading economic performers in "the three worlds of welfare capitalism" (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The U.S. is a liberal welfare-capitalist state, Germany a corporatist state, and the Netherlands (less clearly) a social democratic welfare-capitalist state. The paper focuses particularly on income changes in the bottom, middle and top quintiles and takes a ten year period into account. Previous analyses have shown that labor and market income dispersion are increasing, with increased returns to human capital. The potential impact of government through the tax-transfer system has been largely ignored. All three governments redistribute income from the rich to the poor. However, the paper shows that only the Dutch government has redistributed sufficiently to ensure that the bottom quintile has gained along with others. In Germany and the U.S. the poorest quintile was considerably worse off in absolute terms at the end of the decade.than the beginning. The German government somewhat counteracted the trend towards greater income dispersion by redistributing to the poorest quintile, so the loss of market income was partly compensated. In the U.S. the impact of government on the poorest quintile stayed about the same, so this group ended up with about the same decrease in disposable income as market income. The U.S., Germany and the Netherlands are the only three countries for which ten or more consecutive years of panel data are available. The data come from the PSID-GSOEP Equivalent File 1980-97 and from a comparable file constructed from the Dutch SEP data.

The question whether ethnic diversity is associated with declining social cohesion has produced much controversy. We maintain that more attention must be paid to cognitive mechanisms to move the debate ahead. Using survey data from 938 localities in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, we explore a crucial individual-level mechanism: perceptions of diversity. We not only consider perceptions of the amount, but also of the qualitative nature of diversity. By asking about various qualitative aspects of diversity, we test the cognitive salience of three explanations that have been proposed in the literature for negative diversity effects: out-group biases, asymmetric preferences and coordination problems. We show that all three mechanisms matter. Perceptions both mediate statistical diversity effects, and have important explanatory power of their own. Moreover, we are able to address the question to what extend the relationship of perceived diversity and neighborhood social cohesion varies across policy contexts. Based on assumptions in the literature about positive impacts of inclusive and culturally pluralist immigrant integration policy approaches, we hypothesize that ethno-cultural diversity is less negatively related to neighborhood social cohesion in more inclusive policy contexts. Our results provide partial support for this hypothesis as perceived diversity has a significantly stronger negative impact on neighborhood cohesion in Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-national comparisons generally show large differences in life satisfaction of individuals within and between European countries. This paper addresses the question of whether and how job quality and working conditions contribute to the quality of life of employed populations in nine strategically selected EU countries: Finland, Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Using data from the European Quality of Life Survey 2003, we examine relationships between working conditions and satisfaction with life, as well as whether spillover or segmentation mechanisms better explain the link between work domain and overall life satisfaction. Results show that the level of life satisfaction varies significantly across countries, with higher quality of life in more affluent societies. However, the impact of working conditions on life satisfaction is stronger in Southern and Eastern European countries. Our study suggests that the issue of security, such as security of employment and pay which provides economic security, is the key element that in a straightforward manner affects people's quality of life. Other working conditions, such as autonomy at work, good career prospects and an interesting job seem to translate into high job satisfaction, which in turn increases life satisfaction indirectly. In general, bad-quality jobs tend to be more "effective" in worsening workers' perception of their life conditions than good jobs are in improving their quality of life. We discuss the differences in job-related determinants of life satisfaction between the countries and consider theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

The paper uses household economic panel data from five countries--Australia, Britain, Germany, Hungary and The Netherlands--to provide a reassessment of the impact of economic well-being on happiness. The main conclusion is that happiness is considerably more affected by economic circumstances than previously believed. In all five countries wealth affects life satisfaction more than income. In the countries for which consumption data are available (Britain and Hungary), non-durable consumption expenditures also prove at least as important to happiness as income.