Search

This paper draws on theories of socio-economic change stemming from political economy and economic sociology to examine the financialization of the US forest products industry. I argue that the widespread adoption of shareholder value norms of corporate governance constitutes one of the core ideological foundations for explaining how the financialization of non-financial firms was accomplished. At the same time, I suggest that economic sociologists' emphasis on the role of shareholder value ideology tends to obscure the concrete realities of contemporary capitalism and the socio-economic relations that underlie managerial conceptions of control. In this paper, I adopt a dialectical methodology that works at multiple levels of abstraction in order to highlight the internal relationship that exists between managerial conceptions of control and the material processes of capital accumulation. Using data mined from corporate proxy statements, I show that increases in concentrated stock ownership among institutional investors and the use of incentive-based compensation--among other important factors--underlie the adoption of shareholder value strategies in the US forest products sector. I then demonstrate how the pursuit of shareholder value reshaped the US forest products in the interests of the financial community while undermining long-term stability of the industry and the people who depend on it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a theoretical account of the reconstruction of workforce downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy since the 1980s. This account has two components. First, building on resource-dependence theory, I suggest that growing corporate dependence on institutional investors makes firms susceptible to their demand for greater returns, especially when these institutional investors are blockholders and resistant to counter-pressure from managers. Second, building on Fligstein's theory of conceptions of control, I suggest that the rise of shareholder value reorients managerial behavior, by changing the decision context in a way that induces managers to maximize shareholder value. Crucial to constructing this new decision context are a set of agency-theory prescriptions for reforming corporate governance. My analysis of downsizing announcements, drawing on a sample of 714 US firms between 1981 and 2006, shows that both the pressure from institutional investors and the new decision context encourage firms to downsize more frequently. By demonstrating how both pressure from investors and changed managerial decision contexts have contributed to the prevalence of workforce downsizing, this paper makes a strong case for the financialization of the American corporation, and contributes to the sociological research on growing job insecurity and income inequality over the past three decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]