1. ON BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN POTENTIAL GAMES.
- Author
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SWENSON, BRIAN, MURRAY, RYAN, and KAR, SOUMMYA
- Subjects
MATHEMATICAL models ,NUMERICAL analysis ,MATHEMATICAL analysis ,ARTIFICIAL intelligence ,LINEAR systems - Abstract
The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous-time) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the discontinuous, set-valued nature of the best-response map. The paper focuses on elucidating several important properties of best-response dynamics in the class of multiagent games known as potential games--a class of games with fundamental importance in multiagent systems and distributed control. It is shown that in almost every potential game and for almost every initial condition, the best-response dynamics (i) have a unique solution, (ii) converge to pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and (iii) converge at an exponential rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
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