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Most human societies are characterized by the presence of different identity groups which cooperate but also compete for resources and power. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we model a society subdivided into groups with constant sizes and dynamically changing powers. Both individuals within groups and groups themselves participate in collective actions. The groups are also engaged in political contests over power which determines how jointly produced resources are divided. Using analytical approximations and agent-based simulations, we show that the model exhibits rich behavior characterized by multiple stable equilibria and, under some conditions, non-equilibrium dynamics. We demonstrate that societies in which individuals act independently are more stable than those in which actions of individuals are completely synchronized. We show that mechanisms preventing politically powerful groups from bending the rules of competition in their favor play a key role in promoting between-group cooperation and reducing inequality between groups. We also show that small groups can be more successful in competition than large groups if the jointly-produced goods are rivalrous and the potential benefit of cooperation is relatively small. Otherwise large groups dominate. Overall our model contributes towards a better understanding of the causes of variation between societies in terms of the economic and political inequality within them., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Many animal and human societies exhibit hierarchical structures with different degrees of steepness. Some of these societies also show cooperative behavior, where cooperation means working together for a common benefit. However, there is an increasing evidence that rigidly enforced hierarchies lead to a decrease of cooperation in both human and non-human primates. In this work, we address this issue by means of an evolutionary agent-based model that incorporates fights as social interactions governing a dynamic ranking, communal work to produce a public good, and norm internalization, i.e. a process where acting according to a norm becomes a goal in itself. Our model also includes the perception of how much the individual is going to retain from her cooperative behavior in future interactions. The predictions of the model resemble the principal characteristics of human societies. When ranking is unconstrained, we observe a high concentration of agents in low scores, while a few ones climb up the social hierarchy and exploit the rest, with no norm internalization. If ranking is constrained, thus leading to bounded score differences between agents, individual positions in the ranking change more, and the typical structure shows a division of the society in upper and lower classes. In this case, we observe that there is a significant degree of norm internalization, supporting large fractions of the population cooperating in spite of the rank differences. Our main results are robust with respect to the model parameters and to the type of rank constraint. We thus provide a mechanism that can explain how hierarchy arises in initially egalitarian societies while keeping a large degree of cooperation.

There has been much interest in the evolutionary forces responsible for, and underlying the diversity in, female primate reproductive cycles. While there has been limited research on sexual receptivity in primates, this has been one recurring topic of interest. Some primate species are like humans, sexually receptive to mating throughout their entire estrus cycle, while other species are the opposite, receptive for mere hours out of their several-week cycles. Why is there such prominent variation in sexual receptivity length among primate species? Here we examine the evolutionary trade-offs associated with sexual receptivity length using mathematical modeling. We investigate how various factors, including having ovulation signs present versus concealed ovulation, female physiological costs, and group size, each influence the length of females' receptive periods. We find that both continuous receptivity and very short lengths of receptivity are able to evolve. Our model predicts that increasing the impacts of infanticide will increase the length of the female receptive period, emphasizing the possible importance of paternity confusion. Similar effects can also be achieved by increasing the non-genetic benefits provided by males. Overall, our work offers a theoretical framework for understanding the evolution and diversity of mating traits in female primates.

Modern speciation theory has greatly benefited from a variety of simple mathematical models focusing on the conditions and patterns of speciation and diversification in the presence of gene flow. Unfortunately the application of general theoretical concepts and tools to specific ecological systems remains a challenge. Here we apply modeling tools to better understand adaptive divergence of whitefish during the postglacial period in lakes of northern Fennoscandia. These lakes harbor up to three different morphs associated with the three major lake habitats: littoral, pelagic, and profundal. Using large-scale individual-based simulations, we aim to identify factors required for in situ emergence of the pelagic and profundal morphs in lakes initially colonized by the littoral morph. The importance of some of the factors we identify and study - sufficiently large levels of initial genetic variation, size- and habitat-specific mating, sufficiently large carrying capacity of the new niche - is already well recognized. In addition, our model also points to two other factors that have been largely disregarded in theoretical studies: fitness-dependent dispersal and strong predation in the ancestral niche coupled with the lack of it in the new niche(s). We use our theoretical results to speculate about the process of diversification of whitefish in Fennoscandia and to identify potentially profitable directions for future empirical research.

Leadership can be effective in promoting cooperation within a group, but as the saying goes "heavy is the head that wears the crown". A lot of debate still surrounds exactly what motivates individuals to expend the effort necessary to lead their groupmates. Evolutionary game theoretic models represent individual's thought processes by strategy update protocols. The most common of these are random mutation, individual learning, selective imitation, and myopic optimization. Recently we introduced a new strategy update protocol - foresight - which takes into account future payoffs, and how groupmates respond to one's own strategies. Here we apply our approach to a new 2 × 2 game, where one player, a leader, ensures via inspection and punishment that the other player, a subordinate, produces collective good. We compare the levels of inspection and production predicted by Nash Equilibrium, Quantal Response Equilibrium, level-k cognition, fictitious play, reinforcement learning, selective payoff-biased imitation, and foresight. We show that only foresight and selective imitation are effective at promoting contribution by the subordinate and inspection and punishment by the leader. The role of selective imitation in cultural and social evolution is well appreciated. In line with our prior findings, foresight is a viable alternative route to cooperation.

When group cohesion is essential, groups must have efficient strategies in place for consensus decision-making. Recent theoretical work suggests that shared decision-making is often the most efficient way for dealing with both information uncertainty and individual variation in preferences. However, some animal and most human groups make collective decisions through particular individuals, leaders, that have a disproportionate influence on group decision-making. To address this discrepancy between theory and data, we study a simple, but general, model that explicitly focuses on the dynamics of consensus building in groups composed by individuals who are heterogeneous in preferences, certain personality traits (agreeability and persuasiveness), reputation, and social networks. We show that within-group heterogeneity can significantly delay democratic consensus building as well as give rise to the emergence of informal leaders, i.e. individuals with a disproportionately large impact on group decisions. Our results thus imply strong benefits of leadership particularly when groups experience time pressure and significant conflict of interest between members (due to various between-individual differences). Overall, our models shed light on why leadership and decision-making hierarchies are widespread, especially in human groups.