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The financial crisis clearly illustrated the importance of characterizing the level of 'systemic' risk associated with an entire credit network, rather than with single institutions. However, the interplay between financial distress and topological changes is still poorly understood. Here we analyze the quarterly interbank exposures among Dutch banks over the period 1998-2008, ending with the crisis. After controlling for the link density, many topological properties display an abrupt change in 2008, providing a clear - but unpredictable - signature of the crisis. By contrast, if the heterogeneity of banks' connectivity is controlled for, the same properties show a gradual transition to the crisis, starting in 2005 and preceded by an even earlier period during which anomalous debt loops could have led to the underestimation of counter-party risk. These early-warning signals are undetectable if the network is reconstructed from partial bank-specific data, as routinely done. We discuss important implications for bank regulatory policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We address a fundamental problem that is systematically encountered when modeling real-world complex systems of societal relevance: the limitedness of the information available. In the case of economic and financial networks, privacy issues severely limit the information that can be accessed and, as a consequence, the possibility of correctly estimating the resilience of these systems to events such as financial shocks, crises and cascade failures. Here we present an innovative method to reconstruct the structure of such partially-accessible systems, based on the knowledge of intrinsic node-specific properties and of the number of connections of only a limited subset of nodes. This information is used to calibrate an inference procedure based on fundamental concepts derived from statistical physics, which allows to generate ensembles of directed weighted networks intended to represent the real system-so that the real network properties can be estimated as their average values within the ensemble. We test the method both on synthetic and empirical networks, focusing on the properties that are commonly used to measure systemic risk. Indeed, the method shows a remarkable robustness with respect to the limitedness of the information available, thus representing a valuable tool for gaining insights on privacy-protected economic and financial systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The financial crisis clearly illustrated the importance of characterizing the level of 'systemic' risk associated with an entire credit network, rather than with single institutions. However, the interplay between financial distress and topological changes is still poorly understood. Here we analyze the quarterly interbank exposures among Dutch banks over the period 1998-2008, ending with the crisis. After controlling for the link density, many topological properties display an abrupt change in 2008, providing a clear - but unpredictable - signature of the crisis. By contrast, if the heterogeneity of banks' connectivity is controlled for, the same properties show a gradual transition to the crisis, starting in 2005 and preceded by an even earlier period during which anomalous debt loops could have led to the underestimation of counter-party risk. These early-warning signals are undetectable if the network is reconstructed from partial bank-specific data, as routinely done. We discuss important implications for bank regulatory policies.

In directed networks, reciprocal links have dramatic effects on dynamical processes, network growth, and higher-order structures such as motifs and communities. While the reciprocity of binary networks has been extensively studied, that of weighted networks is still poorly understood, implying an ever-increasing gap between the availability of weighted network data and our understanding of their dyadic properties. Here we introduce a general approach to the reciprocity of weighted networks, and define quantities and null models that consistently capture empirical reciprocity patterns at different structural levels. We show that, counter-intuitively, previous reciprocity measures based on the similarity of mutual weights are uninformative. By contrast, our measures allow to consistently classify different weighted networks according to their reciprocity, track the evolution of a network's reciprocity over time, identify patterns at the level of dyads and vertices, and distinguish the effects of flux (im)balances or other (a)symmetries from a true tendency towards (anti-)reciprocation.