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Space systems are critical enablers of a wide range of applications utilized by a global range of consumers. The provision of critical space services is vulnerable to, among other things, deliberate interruptions through anti-satellite weaponry and means. The intrinsic characteristics of space systems make them both very efficient and very hard to replace, such as limited weight, the high cost of replacement and the low number of assets. Deliberate human threats to space critical infrastructures are many, varied and highly efficient, stemming also from legitimate technologies for protection that can be modified to become efficient anti-satellite weapons. In addition to the technical details, a few issues stand out. The first is that deliberately targeting satellites lends itself to a form of MAD logic (mutually assured destruction), which limits the willingness of states to do it for fear of reprisal or being themselves affected, due to interdependencies. The second is that certain forms of anti-satellite weaponry have become accessible to non-state actors, who do not respond to traditional deterrence and for whom jamming, cyber-attacks and other forms of weaponry are cost effective and efficient means of incurring huge damage with no immediate loss of life (which is an important political consideration). The third is that vulnerability also extends to military users, whose systems should, theoretically, be better shielded, more resilient and afforded more redundancy. In practice, those systems are not enough and, in the case of the US, more than 90% of military communications are routed through civilian systems. This has given rise to interesting new approaches and insights towards US vulnerability, highlighted by a number of high profile military exercises. Now, the US military speaks of "fog of electrons", space as an Achilles' heel, critical dependence of drones and smart weaponry on space infrastructures, the equalizing effect of space system targeting on American military superiority etc. These trends are also important for other countries to note. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A situation often met in the Romanian Armed Forces in recent years is the need for interconnecting two networks (domains) with different levels of classification. Considering that the Romanian armed troops are involved in numerous missions with NATO partners, solutions, already implemented across the organization, are considered to be applied in domestic systems, also. This paper presents the solutions adopted by NATO in order to solve the problem of cross-domains interconnections. We present the maturity level reached by these solutions and the possibility of implementing these solutions in the Romanian Armed Forces, with or without specific adaptation to our own rules and regulations. The goal is to use a NATO already proved solution to our national classified networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]