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Quality of life may be understood as a multidimensional evaluation of life circumstances in relation to values, expectations, and perceived well‐being. Quality of life is thus dependent on the subjective perception of the current life situation, not only objective circumstances. According to metacognitive theory, metacognition guides the appraisal of inner experiences (i.e., thoughts and feelings) and influences how one relates to external stressors. Hence, dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and the cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS), which includes perseverative thinking, threat monitoring and ineffective coping strategies, may negatively influence subjective quality of life. Therefore, we aimed to investigate if metacognitive beliefs and CAS strategies were associated with quality of life. A sample of 503 participants (77.1% women, mean age 41.0, SD = 11.5) completed the metacognitions questionnaire 30 (MCQ‐30), the CAS‐1 and the quality of life scale (QOLS). We used structural equation modelling (SEM) to estimate associations between the variables founded in metacognitive theory. The results of the SEM showed a significant direct relationship between metacognitive beliefs and quality of life. CAS strategies mediated the effect of metacognitive beliefs on quality of life. Higher level of metacognitive beliefs was associated with greater use of CAS strategies, which in turn was associated with lower quality of life. Further, more CAS strategies were associated with lower quality of life. The results support the generic metacognitive model and suggest that stronger endorsement of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and corresponding CAS strategies are associated with lower quality of life. This observation held even when controlling for relevant covariates and suggests that modifying metacognitive beliefs may impact on subjective quality of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The metacognitive model of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) places worrying, meta‐worry ("worry about worry") and corresponding underlying metacognitive beliefs (i.e., beliefs about worry) as central in the maintenance of symptoms. Previous research has demonstrated significant relationships between these factors and symptoms, but no study has tested the statistical fit of this influential model including its hypothesized components and the suggested paths between them. The aim of the current study was therefore to evaluate the fit of the metacognitive model of GAD. A total of 312 participants constituting an analogue GAD sample were included in a cross‐sectional study and completed self‐report measures of anxiety and depression symptoms and scales relevant to the metacognitive model. Metacognitions, worry, and meta‐worry in their hypothesized order provided a good model fit and explained significant and substantial variance in symptoms. These results provide further support for the metacognitive model of GAD and demonstrates separate and unique contributions from worry and meta‐worry to generalized anxiety symptoms of which meta‐worry was the most influential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]