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Le courant Law and Finance souligne l’impact determinant du droit sur le financement et la gouvernance des entreprises. Il vehicule en outre l’idee de la superiorite du systeme de common law britannique sur le systeme de droit civil francais. Malgre son influence, ce courant de recherche repose sur des fondements theoriques et methodologiques fragiles. Cet article expose en detail les differentes critiques pouvant etre adressees a la these du Law and Finance. Sur la base de travaux recents, il prone une approche moins ambitieuse de l’interaction droit-finance reposant sur l’analyse microeconomique des relations entre les regles juridiques, les pratiques de gouvernance des entreprises et la forme des contrats de financement.

Le European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (esfrs) a reitere, dans son rapport du 20 novembre 2006 intitule « Basel II and the Scope for Prompt Corrective Action in Europe », sa proposition d’instaurer dans l’Union europeenne une politique d’actions correctives precoces sur un modele apparente au cas americain. Nous presentons dans cet article une analyse de cette proposition en montrant que son adoption aurait des implications sur les autres constituants du filet de securite financiere europeen allant bien au-dela de ce que reconnait le esfrc.

Existing French bankruptcy/insolvency law is composed of extra-judicial treatment of firms’ difficulties and judicial treatment of their failures. In the first part, there is mediation. French mediation procedure falls mainly within the province of bargaining theory. However, during the negotiation between the manager of the failing firm and its chief creditors, the president of the commercial court may suspend all lawsuits by creditors. Through a case-study, we highlight the drawbacks of this situation. To this end, we use a signaling game because the information context is asymmetric, and the manager of the failing firm has the exclusive right to declare financial distress and demand that creditors agree to a workout. Classification JEL : C7, K2

Is Internet an ideal model for a self-regulated economy? It seems possible to decentrely organize and render enforceable a property right system on which interindividual negotiations could be based. Moreover, traditional State intervention is no longer operable since Internet users can by pass the usual regulatory frameworks. A the same time, the long-term sustainability of the competitive process is not guaranteed in the digital economy, and cyber-activities generate externalities that affect the non-users of the Internet. These call for the organization of an institutional framework that would avoid the capture of self-regulations by interest groups seeking to exercises monopoly power. Delegating the management of some essential resources – especially, the addressing system – to an entity responsible for the regulation in the last resort would enable the construction of such a framework. Classification JEL : H4, K2, L4, L5, L9