Search

This paper explores the relations between the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and China from a historical perspective. To do this it addresses the genesis and content of DAC’s “altruistic paradigm” and China’s “realist paradigm”, highlighting their differences. It also analyses DAC’s efforts and failure to co-opt China into the effective aid agenda: while China refuses to become a donor – citing its Southern identity – the DAC is resistant to recognising China as a co-operator with different responsibilities. The paper goes on to illustrate how, in order to survive “unfair competition”, the DAC incorporates elements from China and the South into its narrative and cooperation practices. Lastly, China’s move towards a more assertive foreign policy is explored along with the dynamic of relations between the DAC and China – between competition and convergence – in an uncertain international context.

In the second decade of the 21st century, Mercosur is faced with two potentially influential politico-normative proposals: the EU’s and China’s. This paper analyses the content and scope of these two politico-normative approaches, as well as their respective impacts on the regional bloc in the context of domestic changes in the governments of Argentina and Brazil. The paper states that Mercosur has produced two external strategies: interregional with the EU and bilateral with China. There are structural limitations to this strategy as well as some that relate to Mercosur’s domestic policies, but it contains the foundations for the bloc’s normative convergence with these extraregional actors and ultimately a positive-sum game.

This paper explores the relations between the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and China from a historical perspective. To do this it addresses the genesis and content of DAC's "altruistic paradigm" and China's "realist paradigm", highlighting their differences. It also analyses DAC's efforts and failure to co-opt China into the effective aid agenda: while China refuses to become a donor - citing its Southern identity - the DAC is resistant to recognising China as a co-operator with different responsibilities. The paper goes on to illustrate how, in order to survive "unfair competition", the DAC incorporates elements from China and the South into its narrative and cooperation practices. Lastly, China's move towards a more assertive foreign policy is explored along with the dynamic of relations between the DAC and China - between competition and convergence - in an uncertain international context. Este artículo explora, desde una perspectiva histórica, las relaciones entre el Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo (CAD) y China. Para ello, aborda la génesis y contenido del «paradigma altruista» del CAD y del «paradigma realista» chino, destacando sus diferencias. Asimismo, analiza los esfuerzos y el fracaso del CAD por cooptar a China en la agenda de la ayuda efectiva: mientras China no se asume como donante -evocando su identidad del Sur-, el CAD se resiste a reconocer a China como cooperante con responsabilidades diferenciadas. Posteriormente, el artículo ilustra cómo, para sobrevivir a una «competencia desleal», el CAD adopta elementos de China y del Sur en su narrativa y en sus prácticas de cooperación. Por último, examina el cambio en China hacia una política exterior más asertiva y la dinámica de las relaciones entre el CAD y China, entre competencia y convergencia, en un contexto internacional incierto. © 2018 CIDOB (Barcelona centre for international affairs). CA - Bracho

This paper examines China-Latin America relations through the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in the 2011-2018 period. In this context, the main perspectives on integration and regionalism are discussed, and CELAC is shown to possess the characteristics of a regional body. It is proposed that the relationship China seeks through this body can be explained by its interest in institutionalising a mechanism for rapprochement with Latin America and the Caribbean. It is noted that CELAC is seen by China as a strategic vehicle that allows it to engage bilaterally with various countries and develop an economic strategy under structurally asymmetric conditions. However, its institutional nature has prevented it from serving these interests. As per the methodology, documentary and qualitative data analysis is made using the systematisation of an unpublished database.

By examining how China became part of the modern world system historically and how it perceives migration in relation to its diplomacy strategy, this paper seeks to shed light on the relationship between transantional migration (supposedly not directly subject to national regulations) and international relations (still based on the national sovereignty). The paper suggests that the current international regime can no longer direct transnationalmigration flows, but remains critical in affecting migration in its patterns and its implications for social and economic development. China evidently does not want migration to complicate its international relations, and migrant receiving countries shouldbe cautious in using leverage of international relations when seeking China���s cooperation for migration. The interplay between international relations and transnational migration deserves more research.

A little more than a decade and a half into the “Asian century”, the epicentre of the global economy has moved from the North Atlantic towards East Asia at an unprecedented pace. As a correlate, China’s growing expansion at global level has been gradually undermining the position of leading regional powers such as Brazil and South Africa. The displacement of their investments and the consequent loss of their regional markets, added to the growth of other medium-sized regional powers through stronger links with Beijing, have damaged both countries prospects of regional leadership. From this perspective, in contrast to the abundant literature depicting China as a great opportunity for Brazil and South Africa, this paper warns that both countries’ regional importance has been diminished in favour of China, which calls the usefulness of the BRICS concept into question.

In this paper the Chinese presence in Spain is analyzed from a chronological perspective along with the ongoing changes in geographic location and economic activity. The growth in numbers of this community has obliged its members to look for new locations, distancing themselves from their ethnic strongholds, with the aim of bringingtheir migratory plans to fruition.

The present paper situates the relations between the European Union (EU) and China in a double framework: the general framework of UE-Asian relations, on the one hand, and the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) process initiated in 1996, on the other hand. Likewise, it examines EU-Chinese relations in a specific way –including the relations of the most relevant member states of the EU with China–, the latest events that have occurred in EU-Chinese relations in the new international scenario following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the future perspectives for EU-Chinese relations.

China’s rapid economic growth and increased openness has been one of the most significant developments in the global economy over the past 25 years. This paper analyses China’s impacts on the Latin American economies, and in particular the challenges that China poses for the region. It discusses both the direct impacts arising from bilateral trade and investment flows between China and Latin America, the indirect impacts associated with Chinese competition in export markets and for foreign direct investment, and the positive terms of trade effects resulting from China’s increased demand for raw materials. Challenges identified include the recent rapid increase of competition from Chinese imports in the Latin American market, the concentration of exports to China in a narrow range of primary products and the uneven distribution of profits from trade with China within Latin America.