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Masstige, or luxury for the masses, is a phenomenon that requires a heterodox economic approach based on Original Institutional Economics view of corporate power combined with Marxian concept of brand fetishism and post-Keynesian theories of pricing and consumer choice. The attitude toward luxury in classical works on political economy is briefly outlined. By applying the post-Keynesian theory of oligopolistic pricing, we show how the power of luxury brands enables high profits of luxury conglomerates. We use the post-Keynesian theory of consumer choice to differentiate between various types of masstige buyers. JEL Classification: B52, D11, D21, D43 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rent seeking has once again become an important topic in economics. However, rent seeking poses challenges that standard economic theory is not well equipped to handle. This paper develops a working definition of rent seeking that can be applied to post-Keynesian growth models. The main finding is that, in a post-Keynesian framework, rent seeking will have an effect on income distribution and average productivity. In addition, increases in rent seeking can have undesirable effects on the distribution of talent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a seminal paper on Marxian business cycle theory, Goodwin (1967) presented a model which assumed that a higher wage share leads to lower investment and thus a general economic slowdown. In contrast Kalecki (1971) was arguing that a higher wage share would have an expansionary effect because the consumption propensity out of wage income is higher than that out of profit income. Based on a general model that allows for wage-led as well as profit-led demand regimes, this paper estimates the effects of a change in the wage share on aggregate private domestic demand with quarterly data for 12 OECD countries.JEL classification: E11, E12, E20, E22, E25 [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Financialization is studied here from a microeconomic viewpoint. Following Stockhammer (2004a), the theory of the firm has been amended by introducing agency problems and class analysis between shareholders and managers. Further to that, I propose two alternative configurations for incorporation into the theory: the first views financialization as a constraint for the managerial firm, while the second discusses shareholders' interests and integrates them as an end in itself for the finance-dominated firm. My conclusions focus on finance-oppressed accumulation, financial fragility, and potential macroeconomic instability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]