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Leon Craig's five books are interrelated by a common approach: Craig writes of philosophic matters juxtaposing them with literary works, or one may reverse the order—whichever way, the exegesis proceeds in tandem. Moreover, he has intertwined the books in a sequential development. One can perceive Craig discovered his fountainhead in Plato. His first book, in 1993, The War Lover: A Study of Plato's “Republic,” has left its genetic pattern upon the next four, Of Philosophers and Kings: Political Philosophy in Shakespeare's “Macbeth” and “King Lear” (2001), The Platonian Leviathan (2010), Philosophy and the Puzzles of “Hamlet” (2014), and his latest, The Philosopher's English King: Shakespeare's “Henriad” as Political Philosophy (2015). In this latest effort, Shakespeare is the philosopher and Henry V the best of Shakespeare's English kings. But you will not appreciate the extent and intricacy of Craig's web unless you recognize that Plato's thought, especially as that thought has been conveyed in The Republic, runs through every filament. To be precise, taking such themes of that dialogue as Socrates's notion of a tripartite human soul, his taxonomy of defective regimes, his all but best regime of “Guardians,” and Socrates's ultimately best constitution, rule by a philosopher become king or king become philosopher, or only somewhat less improbably, a king become an understanding student of a counselor philosopher. Then, best self-government within the individual soul is likewise worked out in The Republic as Craig reads it. To my mind he has read Plato aright. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Plato's Lysis addresses the problem of Plato's Republic—the tension between individual and communal good—by exploring the question of what or who is the friend. Friends, I argue, experience another as their own, and themselves as not wholly their own. Unlike the guardians of Plato's Republic, friends say both mine and not mine of one another. Grounded in both self-awareness and belonging, friendship serves as a model for philosophy, and demonstrates the possibility of associations that support our complex identity as human beings and citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few philosophic devices have proved as influential or enduring as the tripartition of the soul in Plato's Republic. For all its virtues, however, we are mistaken to believe that the tripartite model is sufficient to convey, or that it was meant to convey, all the elements of the dialogue's psychological teaching. What is needed is an interpretation that takes fuller account of the soul's forces, and not just its "parts" (which are metaphorical anyway). This article outlines the basic elements of such an interpretation. After considering the virtues and limits of the tripartite model and of the structural perspective from it arises, the article examines eros and spiritedness, the soul's chief and most politically consequential forces, both in themselves and in their (surprising) relation to one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to establish that the decision of the philosopher in Plato's "Republic" to participate in politics should be interpreted as an internal necessity of philosophy rather than external compulsion. Leo Strauss, in his books "Natural Right and History" and "The City and Man," argued that philosophers cannot be persuaded, they can only be compelled to rule the cities. The question of the nature of the philosopher's compulsory descent to politics depends on the question whether teaching is intrinsic or extrinsic to philosophy. It intends to restore the ambiguity of Platonic idealism denied in the Straussian thesis of the limits to politics.

The article examines the political content of the early dialogues and their relationship to Plato's "Republic," with emphasis on questions of political reform. It discusses the development of Plato's thought and the Socratic problem. It explores the close relationship between the ethical views of the Socrates of the early dialogues and those attributed to Socrates by Aristotle, and Xenophon as well. It contends that Plato's rejection of the view of moral reform presented in the early dialogues is closely bound up with the new conception of moral psychology presented in the middle dialogues, which differs from the Socratic view.

In Plato's Republic, Glaucon tells a story about Gyges' ring that, on the surface, suggests a radical opposition between appearances and truth. We argue that, contrary to Glaucon's intentions, what his story actually reveals is that appearances are always and inevitably implicated in the attempt to tell the truth about justice or the soul. This mutual implication is confirmed by Glaucon's own commentary on his story as well as by Socrates' arguments about the city and the soul. We argue that knowing the soul ‘in itself’ requires that one examine it not by itself, but as it is immersed in human life. It is a question of how the soul ‘looks’ – meaning not simply how it seems or appears, but of where it is looking, or what it desires. Taking its looks into account, in this sense, is very different from being taken in by appearances. We explore the implications of this idea for the possibility of attaining philosophical knowledge about justice, and for the relationship between philosophy and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a comparison of Leo Strauss's and Raymond Aron's interpretations of Thucydides's history, this paper sheds light on the relationship between political history and political philosophy. In continuing the dialogue between the two thinkers, I demonstrate that in spite of their opposed views on modern historical consciousness, they converge in a defense of the object and method of classical political history. However, there is a deeper disagreement regarding the relationship between philosophy and politics. While Strauss makes the case for the compatibility of classical political history and classical political philosophy on the grounds that Thucydides is a “philosophic historian,” Aron argues that it is precisely because Thucydides is not a philosopher that he succeeds in understanding an essential feature of political things, namely, contingency in history. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is disagreement among scholars regarding the mendacity of esoteric writing. Some see it as a necessarily dishonest mode of communication; others argue it does not meet the conditions of lying; others are more nuanced in their assessment. In this article, we seek to resolve this disagreement by offering a systematic analysis of the literary practice in which we argue that there are both truthful and mendacious forms of esoteric writing. In sum, if an author conceals truths from a general audience while still being truthful on the surface of the text or makes it clear that he is being untruthful, he is not lying; yet if an author conceals truths while intentionally being untruthful on the surface, he is lying. Given the parallel ethical structure between esoteric writing and political discourse, we argue that the analysis provided in this article may illuminate the ethical choices made in both written and political statements. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay examines Aristotle's account of justice as a virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics by considering two related parts of it: Aristotle's elevated account of justice as lawfulness and his description of equity as a virtue. I focus on moral rather than legal questions by emphasizing Aristotle's identification of justice as lawfulness with complete virtue, and a broad sense of equity as superlatively good character. Some of the more difficult passages in book 5 prove to be tied together by the question of the goodness of justice and I argue that Aristotle points to a specific confusion in this regard characteristic of virtuous people. I conclude that Aristotle's critique of our ordinary opinions about justice offers crucial, albeit limited, support for the superiority of the contemplative life announced at the end of book 10. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is presented in which topics within the issue are discussed which includes playwright William Shakespeare and his plays "Troilus and Cressida" and "Timon of Athens".

When discussing the preconditions of liberal Islamic politics, liberal theorists often advocate the reinterpretation of traditional religious texts in light of liberal political theory. Such an interpretive project is worth comparing to a similar project conceived by the medieval Islamic philosopher Alfarabi, whose effort to introduce Greek political philosophy into his political-religious community parallels these efforts to introduce liberal theory into Islamic communities. Alfarabi argued that traditional texts should be reinterpreted in light of a new political science, one based on Greek sources but adapted to the unique needs of a community like his. This article shows how Alfarabi conceived of these adaptations, emphasizing the flexibility that he thought students of Greek political philosophy should adopt in accommodating even Islamic doctrines that they could not fully accept. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The extension of human life is one of the central goals that Francis Bacon posits for science, and this goal shapes his political thought significantly. Bacon's interest in life extension appears throughout his corpus, but the Wisdom of the Ancients contains his most extensive treatment of its political and philosophical consequences. Here, I interpret a series of myths in the Wisdom of the Ancients and argue, first, that through them Bacon presents key political strategies for promoting life extension and tending to its hazards; and, second, as he does so, he sketches a new portrait of philosophy, which directs some of its energies to understanding what makes longer life worth living. My reading addresses a profound and neglected subject at the heart of Bacon's politico-scientific project, and advances the growing literature on Bacon that turns to the Wisdom of the Ancients to explain unexamined goals of his science. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The account of “democracy” presented in the writings of Alfarabi differs considerably from all other treatments of the subject, both ancient and modern. The goal of this article is to elucidate the falāsifa's view of democracy and account for its unusual character, by showing how appropriate it is to both the meaning of the term in medieval Arabic and the political situation of their own time. Questions such as internal order, war, immigration, philosophy, and their relationship to democracy as understood by the falāsifa are all duly considered. The article concludes with the suggestion that this peculiar sort of democracy nonetheless resembles modern democracy in one small but crucial respect. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Tocqueville's juxtaposition of aristocracy and democracy as the regimes characteristic of different historical periods gives rise to the question whether he accepts or rejects the category of human nature. In the juxtaposition of the distinct “worlds” of aristocracy and democracy and their respective conceptions of “man,” some perceive an implicit rejection of the idea of a universal human nature. Others, however, see an attempt to portray human nature comprehensively by highlighting the truth of both aristocratic inequality and democratic equality. While generally endorsing this latter interpretation, the essay maintains that most of its variants are too “democratic” in two respects. First, they underestimate the difficulties Tocqueville must confront in establishing the naturalness of the equality principle, and second, they wrongly insist that he understands nature to privilege the democratic principle. Tocqueville ultimately defends the naturalness of equality, but his claims about the greater justice of the equality principle should be understood as rhetorical rather than as reflective of his conclusions about nature. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Here is a study of what Leo Strauss in his marvelous book, Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958), tells us about Machiavelli's The Prince, and how he tells it. The “how” is quite remarkable: his book is unlike any other book that has ever been written on Machiavelli. For the first time Machiavelli's esotericism is not only alluded to or introduced but explained at length. In explaining, Strauss shows how he arrived at his discoveries in Machiavelli's texts, teaching his readers the proper mixture of innocence and savvy. With his book Strauss gives a wholly new picture of an author who set store by being “wholly new.” All scholarly studies on Machiavelli can now be divided into those written before Strauss and those written after him, and the latter between those that take account of him in some fashion and those that willfully, or blithely, ignore him. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his response to the fictitious “sensible knave” in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume argues that the practice of justice is always in our own interest. This article provides the first comprehensive interpretation of Hume's response, incorporating his discussion of virtue and happiness in his essay “The Sceptic.” It will be seen that this argument is a hedonistic one, resting on the superior pleasure and security of a life of modest wealth and intellectual cultivation. Hume's argument ultimately fails, and he knows it. He offers it nonetheless because it is generally true and socially beneficial. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his Plan for a Constitution for Corsica, Rousseau recommends a series of institutional arrangements and psychological incentives designed to generate certain salutary opinions and behaviors on the part of the citizens. However, he also indicates in several ways that it is not only impossible to control such outcomes absolutely or permanently, but also undesirable insofar as a static people tends to be a languorous people. This essay argues that the model of citizenship that emerges in Corsica is more dynamic and less thoroughly choreographed than is often recognized. Rousseau suggests that what it takes to attach citizens to the collective good over the long term requires not only a specific form of socialization, but also that the people are capable, to some degree, of transcending their socialization. The goal of Rousseau's legislative art is not to form a people that can remain on “autopilot,” but rather to cultivate a form of reflection and judgment that is rooted in and animated by healthy attachments and proper conditioning of the passions. The puzzle becomes the relationship between these two sides of the legislative art. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The argument of Rousseau's Essay on the Origin of Languages is intimately connected with that of his Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men. The origin of political society is inseparable from the origin of language, which, in turn, is inseparable from the origin of reason. That so much of the Essay is concerned with music leads us to wonder what music has to do with reason, politics, and language. These two books share what is a regular feature of Rousseau's manner of writing—presenting what seem to be logical foundations as temporal origins. In emphasizing the priority of melody to harmony in music, the Essay on the Origin of Languages articulates the necessarily melodic, and hence temporal, character of thinking, which proves to be the key to understanding both why Rousseau must write as he does and what it means for language to be musical. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his recent book on Strauss, Steven B. Smith has called attention to “a curiously neglected passage from the very center of Natural Right and History,” a passage in which Strauss “acknowledges the way political decisions grow out of concrete situations and cannot be deduced from a priori rules.” The passage reads: Let us call an extreme situation a situation in which the very existence or independence of a society is at stake. In extreme situations there may be conflicts between what the self-preservation of society requires and the requirements of commutative and distributive justice. In such situations, and only in such situations, it can justly be said that the public safety is the highest law. A decent society will not go to war except for a just cause. But what it will do during a war will depend to a certain extent on what the enemy—possibly an absolutely unscrupulous and savage enemy—forces it to do. There are no limits which can be defined in advance, there are no assignable limits to what might become just reprisals. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Alexander the Great is often understood to be the first statesman to attempt a “universal state,” owing in large part to his philosophical education under Aristotle. This picture of Alexander informs many of his depictions in popular culture, and influences his appropriation in contemporary discourse on globalization. I argue here that Plutarch's Life of Alexander offers an alternative view of Alexander's political action, one that explains his imperial ambitions by focusing on his love of honor (philotimia) and the cultural indeterminacy of his native Macedon, rather than his exposure to philosophy. Plutarch's portrayal of Alexander provides a useful model for the study of globalization by showing how political expansion can arise from and give rise to indeterminate political identities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Most contemporary political theorists who have interpreted Sophocles' Antigone have focused on the fearsome clash between Antigone and Creon. The relationship between Antigone and her weaker, more cautious sister Ismene has not garnered similar attention. This essay addresses this gap by revisiting the tantalizing possibility that Ismene played a more significant role in resisting Creon than has often been assumed. The essay shifts the analysis of Antigone, first, by illuminating the complex and fraught relationship between two women and emphasizing the political and legal challenges that they face together as women. Second, the essay shifts focus from vertical power relations—that is, between the individual and government—to horizontal power relations between disempowered outsiders. On this reading, Antigone reveals less about the downfall of a character than it does about the political power of the weak and disadvantaged. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In book VII of the Politics, Aristotle requires that the best regime be eusunoptos, "easily taken in at a glance." Throughout the history of political thought, the attendant ideal of the polis as a compact and surveyable society was particularly influential. However, closer scrutiny of the way in which Aristotle uses eusunoptos suggests that it designates a problem rather than a solution, to wit, the problems of defining political unity and of attuning the individual and the common good. Exploring the different contexts in which eusunoptos occurs in Aristotle's works, this paper argues that it has political, rhetorical, and poetical meanings that cannot be entirely distinguished from each other. As such, the notion is shown to be germane to the general design of book VII, which constructs the best regime in order to bring to light the limits of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Francis Bacon's New Atlantis is considered with a view to the problematic unity of its author's oeuvre. Beginning from the question of the genre or literary character of the work and proceeding through a consideration of the Platonic precedent announced in the title, an attempt is made to reconcile Bacon's rejection of the classical, utopian tradition of political thought with the apparently utopian character of the island of Bensalem. Such an interpretation suggests that the title announces a project shown to be possible, even necessary, in the course of the travel story that is the drama of the work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]