Search

This paper contends that Locke's educational writings are more robust in their commitment to autonomy than recent assessments of Locke as a theorist of “disciplinary liberalism” suggest. While Locke's account of parental power is conflicted, it is mostly compatible with a liberal, child-responsive approach to education. Insofar as Locke develops a pedagogy sensitive to the pupil's temperament and his rights as a child, he articulates a nuanced understanding of autonomy, shown to be a product of the individual's participation in a community of rational beings. Complicating both received understandings of Lockean liberalism as atomistic and newer claims about the dark forces of socialization it unleashes, this paper gleans from Lockean education the potential of a socially embedded subject, who looks both within and without himself to cultivate a posture of considerable critical independence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Looking to the relatively recent “religious turn” in Locke scholarship, this paper argues for an interpretation that reconciles two apparently contradictory aspects of his thought: on the one hand, property rights, thought absolute by many of Locke's readers; on the other hand, Locke's notion of duties of charity. On the basis of a rereading of the “Essay on the Poor Law,” I argue that Lockean charity may ground coercively enforceable distributive obligations. Nevertheless, I contend that the redistributive poor-relief system grounded on the principle of charity does not infringe property rights. The reason for this is that the right to charity and the right to property are both based on Locke's theological commitment to the right of each man to the means of preservation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper aims to illuminate the ongoing significance of Locke's political philosophy. It argues that the legitimacy of political authority lies, according to Locke, in the extent to which it collaborates with individuals so as to allow them to be themselves more effectively, and in its answerability to the consent such individuals should thereby give it. The first section discusses how the free will inevitably asserts its authority; the second shows the inevitability of the will's incorporation of authority as a kind of prosthesis, which in turn transforms the operation of the will; and the third treats the issue of consent, arguing that Locke is less interested in explicit acts of consent than in the norm of consent, in answerability to which structures of authority should be shaped so as to honor the beings whose capacity to consent is definitive for them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay argues that Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity provides a morally robust argument for religious pluralism—one which avoids the pitfalls of relativism and official neutrality by elucidating the need for a civil religion of toleration. The work thus contains Locke's friendly critique of his more radical Enlightenment contemporaries who had openly debunked the Bible. This critique is friendly, I argue, because Locke ultimately agrees with Spinoza and Hobbes about revelation, miracles, and religion's psychological causes. While Locke joined these thinkers in a common project to make Christianity less sacrificial and friendlier to enlightened selfishness, his analysis also reveals the need to retain some of its self-abnegating spirit in liberalism's service. But Locke has difficulty accounting for that spirit itself, and this problem in one of liberalism's original theorists may help explain the dissatisfactions and anxieties troubling tolerant societies today. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education is designed to provide the education necessary to produce citizens guided by the obligations of natural law. A careful examination of his recommendations, however, reveals that his education does not in fact teach children to obey the law of nature directly. Instead, it teaches them to obey the law of opinion or reputation. At the same time, he encourages children to see themselves as rational and therefore free. The law of reputation provides the necessary restraint to balance the desire for liberty, and the desire for liberty ensures that citizens must respect others in order to win their esteem. Respect for others' rights, an essential element of Lockean natural law, emerges from this specific combination of the law of reputation and the love of liberty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Some Thoughts Concerning Education offers the theory of governance the Two Treatises lack. Education is the key to Lockean politics: self-government and public order require virtuous citizens, and these citizens, as Locke suggested in the Essay and explains in the Education, are made rather than found, constructed from the ground up by discipline. Through early and careful practices of education, they are enmeshed in a net of habit and custom that naturalizes the moral commitments they are taught, rendering the process, and the artifice, invisible. Locke entangles his subjects in an architecture of power of which they become the bearers, thereby providing the foundation for public order and limited government. Locke's disciplinary liberalism allows us to better appreciate late modern subjectivity as an achievement, rather than a given of political life, albeit an achievement that involves some uncomfortable compromises and a willingness to accept, if not laud, our disciplinary commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Locke stresses the power of custom in shaping opinion and behavior, though this aspect of his thought has been underappreciated. Recognizing its importance raises critical issues, particularly the relation between custom and reason and the role of authoritative custom in supporting political and social power. Locke explains in detail the various psychological and sociological mechanisms by which the power of custom is manifested; but he nonetheless consistently and emphatically rejects its authority. Instead, Locke is a champion of the authority of reason. Because custom is powerful, but reason is authoritative, Locke attempts to enlist the power of custom in the service of reason and of reasonable politics, and because custom is powerful and its impact unavoidable, individual intellectual independence cannot mean being without cultural prejudices. At best, it means the ability to gain some critical distance from them. These observations place Locke's relation to the Enlightenment in a new perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the three centuries since the publication of the Two Treatises, a trail set down by Locke, although scarcely concealed, has gone unremarked—as has its final destination. If we miss this trail, we miss the work's coherence. If we follow this trail, we find a compelling, even shocking, case against Revelation as an independent source of authority. And we find a theory of property so powerful—certainly in Locke's own estimation—it compels the reconstitution of the relation between children and parents, wives and husbands, servants and masters, persons and polities, and ultimately between man and God. Indeed, Locke's story of the right of property is also the story of man's coming into his own, his coming into his own mind, freed from the irrational claims of Revelation. Thus, Locke's theory of property is nothing less than a story of man's Enlightenment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The essay clarifies the relationship between Locke's political and his religious thought. To the extent that Locke's political thought is an outgrowth of a particular strand of Christianity, its claims to universality would be significantly diminished. Several plausible interpretations of his political thought rely on his religiosity. Others maintain that this religiosity was a façade. Close attention to Locke's analysis of the Hebrew text of Gen. 1:28 unambiguously points to a critique of the Bible on semantic grounds. Locke subtly argues that the wording of the Bible makes the interpretation of scripture by scripture alone impossible. The fact that Locke goes out of his way to critique the Bible refutes interpretations of Locke's thought that rely on his religiosity and reestablishes the universalist claims of his political thought. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The moral theory of “mixed modes” John Locke presents in his Essay concerning Human Understanding is beset with paradoxes. On the one hand, he tells us that all mixed modes, including moral concepts, are “arbitrary” mental constructs. On the other hand, he speaks of an “eternal law” of right and wrong, and is well known as a champion of objective, universally valid natural law. This paradox stems from problems created by the new natural science. That science is predicated on the demolition of Aristotelian Scholasticism. Locke participates in that demolition on behalf of science, but it leaves him with limited options in building his own moral theory. Samuel Pufendorf responded to this situation by devising a theory of “moral modes,” and Locke follows Pufendorf's model. The essay concludes by noting some similarities and differences with the moral metaphysics of Immanuel Kant. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

John Locke's theory of property has been the subject of sustained contention between two major perspectives: a socioeconomic perspective, which conceives Locke's thought as an expression of the rising bourgeois sensibility and a defense of the nascent capitalist relations, and a theological perspective, which prioritizes his moral worldview grounded in the Christian natural law tradition. This essay argues that a closer analysis of Locke's theory of money in the Second Treatise can provide an alternative to this binary. It maintains that the notion of money comprises a conceptual area of indeterminacy in which the theological universals of the natural law and the historical fact of capital accumulation shade into each other. More specifically, the ambiguity of the status of money enables Locke to navigate an antinomy within the natural law such that he establishes a relation of necessity between the divine telos and accumulative practices. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Thomas Paine is customarily regarded as a pamphleteer, rhetorician, and polemicist rather than a significant political theorist. This article takes the philosophical content of Paine's thought seriously and argues that his account of property rights constitutes a distinct contribution to theoretical debates on the subject. Drawing on Paine's Agrarian Justice and other writings, this article shows that his theory of property defends a libertarian concern with private ownership that contains within its logic an egalitarian commitment to the redistribution of resources. Paine's justification of property is distinct from that of various other important figures in the history of ideas (including Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke) and represents his simultaneous commitment to foundational liberal values of individual freedom and moral equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Locke's political philosophy, like any that centers on individual rights such as property rights, raises the question whether human beings have any duty to charity, or economic assistance, to the needy. Locke's works contain some strong statements in favor of such a duty, but in his definitive treatment of property, chapter 5 of the Second Treatise of Government, he is conspicuously silent on charity. Based on a reading of that chapter and other texts, I conclude that the basis of Lockean morality is not individual right per se, but concern for the common good. I compare Locke's theory of property to those of Aquinas, Grotius, and Pufendorf in order to shed light on Locke's view of property and charity. Finally, I argue that Locke has a tiered moral theory that separates justice from charity. His economic and political theories focus on justice, masking Locke's actual devotion to charity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, John Locke intends that gentlemen educated according to his standards quietly dethrone the aristocrats as the model for society. Locke hopes to direct most gentlemen away from a desire to imitate aristocratic manners and toward practical economic goals consistent with the needs of all. The excellent example of the new gentlemen will combine with their good treatment of the lower classes to entice the latter to imitate them. Locke thus hopes to reconcile gentlemen and the common man. Crucial components of this education include a tough physical regimen, the humane treatment of servants, and the re-education of fathers. Locke's educational program supports his political goals in the Second Treatise and is somewhat adaptable to our own democratic age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relation between John Locke's doctrine of prerogative and constitutional government. Scholars have shown increased interest in Locke's doctrine in recent years, yet there is disagreement about its precise character. The Two Treatises of Government can be read such that this power is the result of the social compact and, thus, is a constitutional means of addressing emergencies. This paper instead argues that prerogative as it appears in the Two Treatises must be understood to be a natural power and, consequently, beyond constitutional control. It stands outside of the constitution because its logic denies that a good constitution is sufficient for liberal government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Locke claims that his moral and political teaching is capable of a fully rational demonstration. It would seem then that Lockean citizens are expected to grasp the rational bases of their regime. But Locke was notoriously vague or incomplete on what the rational demonstration entailed, in matters of theology especially, but in other matters as well. I examine this question in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the Two Treatises of Government, and Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and conclude that Locke did not expect most citizens to grasp the full philosophical demonstration of liberalism, but they would understand a simplified version of it. This, however, risks leaving liberal culture in an unsettled state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a reply by Jeremy Waldron on the criticisms that have been made on his interpretations on the views of John Locke on God and political philosophy in his book "God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought." The notion of basic equality by Locke is discussed.

The article raises some objections on the interpretations of Jeremy Waldron on the views of John Locke on God and political philosophy in his book "God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought." The link of the defense of human moral equality by Locke to a theological doctrine is discussed.

The article discusses the political-theological problem in the "First Treatise of Government," of John Locke. The way by which the primacy of the biblical God is undermined in the treatise is discussed. The revision of the biblical fundamentals to permit a more reasonable and civil faith, is also tackled.

The article discusses the understanding of the Christian politics of John Locke by Jeremy Waldron. The issues raised by Waldron in his book "God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought," are given. The views of Locke on Christian egalitarianism are also tackled. The views of Waldron on western secular egalitarianism are elaborated.

The article raises some objections on the interpretations of Jeremy Waldron on the views of John Locke on God and political philosophy in his book "God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought." The reasons on why Waldron refuses to accept the notion that a proper understanding of Locke must be purely historical, is given.

The article tries to place the book "God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought," by Jeremy Waldron in the context of the political philosophy of John Locke. Some of the most influential interpretations of the political thought of Locke are discussed. The views of Locke on the right to private property is also tackled.

Locke's Second Treatise of Government argues for the rule of law as just and rightful politics, not only in the fundamental legislation that is the constitution but also in regular governance by the legislature. Locke also argues for executive prerogative, the power of doing good without or even against law during contingency and necessity. Rule by legislation and rule by prerogative each preserve the political community and reflect its foundation out of the state of nature. But they do not easily coexist in the constitution, which provides no means to judge the rightful use of prerogative. President Lincoln's strong, discretionary actions during the crisis of the Civil War illustrate Locke's argument about prerogative's fundamental importance and its problematic relation to ordinary lawfulness. However, as Lincoln recognized, both the Constitution and Congress formally provided for an executive power that was remarkably compatible with the rule of law--and that thereby responded to the Lockean problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offers a look at the analysis of the political thought and ideology of English philosopher John Locke, as influenced by the teachings and critique of political philosopher Leo Strauss. Main matters that James Stoners disagrees with Straussian revisionism; Claims of Locke on the issue of launching liberalism; Reason for the assumption that Locke is the true founder of liberalism rather than English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes.

Analyzes the criticism made by political philosopher Leo Strauss on the political thought and ideology of John Locke, an English philosopher who developed liberal constitutionalist ideas on government. Basis of the interpretation of the work of Locke by the Cambridge School; Reason for the admiration gained by Locke among dissenting clergy, though attacked by spokesmen for the Church of England; Discussion of the issue associated with the interpretation of Locke on his understanding of the U.S.

This essay examines the liberal distinction between public and private spheres by analyzing civil and conjugal society in the work of John Locke and John Milton. Although the two authors explain the institution of civil government similarly, suggesting similar conceptions of liberal life, my explication of their views on marriage shows that they conceive of public and private quite differently. Marriage for Locke is a contract, the primary term of which is procreative sex. Because contracts are enforced by civil authorities, the apparently private conjugal society is subject to civil rule. In contrast, the purpose of marriage for Milton is comfort and companionship, which can only be known by those directly involved, which means that civil government cannot interfere. In marriage, one retains a natural domestic liberty and remains judge in one's own case. Exposing these variants of the public-private division, the article explains the differences in Locke's and Milton's liberalisms and suggests that neither acceptably encompasses intimate relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke's treatise on education, has yet to be fully integrated with his more familiar political and philosophical works. On the surface, there seems to be some tension between Locke's advice on how best to educate the young, and his prescriptions for political legitimacy. The emphasis on consent in the Second Treatise of Government seems to require a parallel emphasis on freedom of thought, but it is the possibility of precisely this sort of freedom that Locke calls into question with a theory of education grounded in the external inculcation of mental habits that control behavior throughout life. This surface tension, however, is dispelled by Locke's theory of knowledge, as it is expressed in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The Essay's skepticism with regard to an objective and public knowledge makes clear, first, that education is reducible to indoctrination, and second, that liberty therefore requires the rejection or fundamental reconstitution of what has been learned [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the democratic side of Locke's political thought, which is generally not appreciated. How is it that Lockean constitutionalism is also "popular government." institutions, that is, but institutions considerably informed by a democratic spirit? The answer involves Locke's three characteristic innovations in institution-planning: "civil" government, a supreme "legislative" power coupled with a responsible executive, and, inter alia, a vigilant "majority"--a party or movement of the people with authority to elect to government and to rebel against any non-popular government. While Locke does raise up a powerful executive, he also makes it dependent as a rule on a rather democratic legislative. What Locke wishes to induce over time is something like parliamentary government, with the executive vested in a cabinet and the whole more or less responsible to the people in his sense, especially to a majority: [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents arguments put froward by John Locke, regarding the suggestion by contemporary liberals in their defense of strict separation between church and state with the principle of liberal neutrality. Why Locke is against strict separation; Connection between strict separation and liberal neutrality not being secure; What are the aims of Locke's arguments.

Focuses on how John Locke dealt with the suggestions that relativism and toleration is similar and his defense for toleration against Jonas Proast's belief that toleration would develop into moral relativism. How Locke refutes Proast's arguments; Description of Locke's arguments.

Discusses John Locke's views concerning private and public realms of activities in response to feminist criticisms on his works. Criticisms of Locke's views on patriarchy; Features of the feminist critique of Locke; Locke's liberal distinction between public and private.

Demonstrates the radical character of John Locke's attack on patriarchalism in the `Two Treatises of Government.' Rejection of the natural and divine order; Preparation for Locke's individualistic liberal politics; Solution to the political problem of religion; Locke's disagreement with the Bible concerning the family and its place in political life.

Locke's doctrine of toleration is best understood in the context of his larger argument about the political significance of Christ. Christ, Locke argues, separated the spiritual and political realm. His argument for separating the two realms, his basis for insisting that magistrates he tolerant of religious heterodoxy, is essentially theological. This claim is further developed by exploring Locke's thoughts of the unconcealment of foundation of moral duty which Christ was purported to have brought about. The bearing this unconcealment has on Locke's thoughts of the necessity of toleration is also explored, Finally, some comparisons between Locke and Hobbes's understanding of the significance of Christ are made, with a view to providing a new theoretical approach to their thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current historiographical debate over the relation of John Locke's philosophy to the republican political tradition has ignored the medical orientation which Locke brought to his political writings. Recognizing that Locke wrote within a medical paradigm, which he derived from Calvinist religious thought, permits us to see that Locke was working within a variation of republicanism and not in opposition to it. Locke attempted to "cure" political corruption, much as Puritans had tried to cure their society of sin's corruption. The failure of Locke's therapeutic approach to political virtue has provided the basis for recent criticisms of liberalism and a challenge to the convention that Locke was an original and central figure in creating Anglo-American political culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the two stories on the evolution of political society presented by John Locke in "The Second Treatise." The two stories on the development of political society include the dramatic story of the state of nature and social contract and a more fix account of the development of social society "by an insensible change" out of the family group. It states that the contrast between the two stories could barely be greater.

This article explores a hitherto unexamined aspect of John Locke's political thought, his advocacy of general naturalization. It is based upon an unpublished manuscript of Locke's which appears in the Appendix. Although naturalization was supported by a number of Locke's contemporaries, the arguments for naturalization which rely on the tradition of classical republicanism must be distinguished from those such as Locke's which rely on the new political economy. The classical republicans ground naturalization in the need for increasing the number of citizens available for a civic militia; this need, in turn, is intertwined with a vision of imperialistic conquest on the Roman model. Locke's arguments are based on a theory of an expanding commercial society and the productive power of labor. They reflect a new concept of individualistic voluntaristic citizenship which provides an alternative to the common law notions of natural allegiance of Locke's day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question addressed by this essay is whether Thomas Hobbes is the true intellectual forebear of John Locke. A brief comparison of the teachings of these two authors with respect to natural justice and civil justice would seem to suggest that Locke is a determined adversary of Hobbes whose views on justice are reducible to the maxim that "might makes right." But a reexamination of Locke's Second Treatise shows that Locke adopts this principle with hardly less thoroughness than Hobbes. Even so, an important difference remains, for Locke takes steps to disguise the grim reality of power, whereas Hobbes makes the enlightenment of people the sine qua non of his political science. Locke's departure from Hobbes is seen as an attempt to instill in the body politic a degree of justice that would not otherwise exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the argument of author John Locke with regards to political obligation. Definition of political obligation; Correlation between obligation and power; Information on three rights which a person must exercise on his own judgment without deferring to the judgment of the community's representative.

The article discusses John Locke's "A Letter Concerning Toleration" which reveals the flaccidity of the blanket defenses of free expression that are second nature to the Left. Locke explicitly identifies certain qualities as Christian which appear to be indispensable for maintaining free institutions. The core of the intolerance which defines and safeguards Locke's general commitment to liberty is nothing less than a pledge to equality.

The author reflects on the political teaching of the English philosopher John Locke on the defense of the right of resistance called as Second Treatise. He asserts that the right of resistance is a matter of choice or necessity of people who may resist whenever they had good ideas to constitute the government or certain crimes they have been committed. He further explains that the belief has been criticized by other philosophers including Peter Laslett and John Dunn.

An essay is presented on the historical sense of John Locke, an English philosopher. It offers a history of early modern political thinking in which Locke has been part. The author suggests a more careful and critical reading of Locke which reveals something quite different from what both the traditional and revisionist interpretations agreed upon that Locke had no historical sense about him.

The article discusses the theory of philosophical discourse by John Locke. It notes that Locke engaged in esoteric writing by saying things he did not believe and sometimes withheld things he dido larga naka. His idea that rhetorical devices are perfect cheats misleading judgment should be avoided in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct. He also advocates a clear, no-nonsense prose, aiming to facilitate the transfer of ideas.

The article focuses on the views of several writers on the advantages of election. Jean-Jacques Rousseau asserts that election accounts for improvement in the workings of politics and assurance of the quality of the resulting product. Further, John Locke expresses that the legitimacy of elective government is under the ground of the moral premise as basis for the enactment of legislature.

Looks at several critiques to the political thought of English philosopher John Locke on equality and hierarchy. Views of Locke on private property as seen in chapter five of his book "Second Treatise of Government"; Reason for the need of Locke of an account of property as a natural right according to political philosopher Leo Strauss; Meaning of natural right as viewed by Locke.