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What are the consequences of the rise of foreign state-led investment for international politics? Existing research oscillates between a 'geopolitical' and a 'commercial' logic driving this type of investment and remains inconclusive about its wider international reverberations. In this paper, I suggest going beyond this dichotomy by analyzing its systemic consequences. To do so, I conceptually delineate a geoeconomic approach that emphasizes the globalized nature of foreign state investment. I argue that foreign state investment creates system-level patterns, which can be studied by observing similar sectoral and geographic investment behavior. I map this phenomenon globally for the first time, drawing on the largest dataset on foreign state investment. Empirically, I show how foreign state investment is highly concentrated in Europe, North America and East Asia, and is owned by a handful of dominant states. It is especially European geo-industrial clusters that represent the hotspots of such concentration. The findings also suggest that three global industries – energy production, high-tech manufacturing, and transportation and logistics – form the key areas for current and future state-led investment concentration. With these contributions, the paper illuminates the increasing presence of states as owners in the global political economy, and facilitates its study as a geoeconomic phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of international regime complexity that frames this study specifies expectations for international cooperation stemming from different combinations of hierarchy and differentiation among institutions in regime complexes. This paper compares relationships between regional financial arrangements and the International Monetary Fund in the regional complexes for crisis finance in East Asia, Latin America, and the euro area during 2000-2019 and tests these expectations. Creditor states that sit at the nexus between global and regional institutions are particularly influential in the choice of architecture (the combination of hierarchy and differentiation) for these complexes but are constrained by arrangements inherited from previous decades. Once chosen, the complex's architecture in turn shapes policy adjustment in borrowing countries and influences whether states pursue regime shifting or competitive regime creation when dissatisfied with institutions. These findings generally coincide with expectations, but exceed the degree of policy adjustment that the core theory expected for the euro area. Interinstitutional collaboration, the dynamics of which are elaborated, fills this explanatory gap. The paper concludes that relations among institutions are essential for understanding the outcomes and evolution of regime complexes and underpin a more complete explanation than provided by singular institutionalism, the power-gap hypothesis and other alternative approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the changing governance of economic development in a globalizing era in relation to the dynamics of global value chains and global production networks. Based on recent development in such East Asian economies as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, I examine how, since the 1990s, the embedded relation between one variant of state institutions, known as the developmental state, and national firms, well integrated into global chains and networks spanning different territories and regions, has evolved. Because of the deepening strategic coupling of these national firms with lead firms in global industries, the developmental state's attempt to govern the market and to steer industrial transformation through direct policy interventions has become increasingly difficult and problematic. Through this process of strategic coupling, national firms have been gradually disembedded from state apparatuses and re-embedded in different global production networks that are governed by competitive inter-firm dynamics. While the state in these East Asian economies has actively repositioned its role in this changing governance, it can no longer be conceived as the dominant actor in steering domestic firms and industrial transformation. The developmental trajectory of these national economies becomes equally, if not more, dependent on the successful articulation of their domestic firms in global production networks spearheaded by lead firms. In short, inter-firm dynamics in global production networks tend to trump state-led initiatives as one of the most critical conditions for economic development. This paper theorizes further this significant role of global value chains and global production networks in the changing international political economy of development. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The financial crises of the late 1990s marked an intellectual watershed for the global economy, and also for regionalism as the Janus face of globalization. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the theory and practice of regional cooperation and integration may evolve along different lines to how it was understood for most of the second half of the twentieth century. In East Asia, in particular, this will mean that the relationship between multilateralism and regionalism will change. The 'East Asian' region will become an increasingly important domain within which to explore enhanced protection against financial crises. What we might call 'monetary regionalism', sceptical western voices notwithstanding, is now firmly on the regional agenda in East Asia. Within conventional political economy, the theory and practice of monetary regionalism is not as easy to understand as traditional, trade-driven, regional integration. Thus one aim of this paper is to outline a theory of monetary regionalism and demonstrate the degree to which it represents a break with understandings of the regional project in East Asia prior to the late 1990s. From its start in 1989, APEC claimed to be a new type of regionalism. The promise was that APEC would promote open regionalism. APEC did not achieve this goal. Nor did it provide support to its Asian members during the financial crises of the late 1990s. At the same time, more traditional (what we might call Balassian) understandings of trade-driven regional integration are showing signs of decreasing importance. There is a growing appeal to trade co-operation, but this is notably an increasing interest in bilateral preferential trading arrangements. This leads to a complex picture of competing regional initiatives across the economic policy spectrum. The paper locates these initiatives in the wider context of the growing politico-economic dialogue between Southeast and Northeast Asia that has developed via the ASEAN+3 process since 1997. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the implications of the 1997 East Asian crisis for the globalization discourse in the context of three issues: the reversibility of globalization, the role of the state in economic activity, and institutional deficits, domestic and supranational, to manage the burgeoning volumes of cross-border economic exchanges. It focuses on Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea – the countries most severely affected by the 1997 crisis. It concludes that: (1) globalization is potentially reversible in some issue areas, provided there is the political will to do so; (2) states continue to matter in economic activity; (3) the new system of global commerce and finance must ensure accountability at various levels without undermining the democratic bases of the polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues for a pluralist, integrative, ‘post-Washington Consensus’ view of an East Asian financial architecture in the post-global crisis world. What are the key architectural problems and how might such problems be resolved? The article aims to address these general questions and to develop a policy-applicable theory about a post-crisis regional financial architecture by focusing on the case of East Asia. The generic problems identified in the study include sovereignty, power struggles, structural diversity, collective action problems and weak regional identity and norms. Herein, I present a conceptual model of logically possible solutions to such problems, which comprises principled minimalism and host regulation, decomposition and issue linkage, and informal intermediaries. The proposed solutions reflect and reinforce the normative fragmentation and decentralization of global financial governance in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Institutions across East Asia are in flux as a result of market pressures and political shifts. Some changes have been adaptive while others appear to erode institutional capacity. This framework article introduces the Special Issue, developing an analytic synthesis of scholarship on institutional capacity and change. We focus on the role of markets and firms in bringing about different types of institutional change, and the reconfiguration of state roles to meet new challenges. Accounts of institutional change increasingly focus on incremental institutional change and specify different endogenous processes through which it occurs. We show that changes in the way markets are structured, or market shifts, are important sources of institutional change in East Asia. Such market shifts operate in different ways and geographical scales. They can alter actor preferences with regard to institutional form, produce a shift in the relative political influence of different actors, and prompt institutional 'drift' – change in the functionality of institutions due to changed circumstances. Both states and firms play a role in these changes. As the case studies in the collection show, states and firms in the region have both reacted to contextual shifts in markets and proactively led institutional change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the use of film as pedagogical material to teach Everyday International Political Economy (EIPE). Film is an effective tool to bridge IPE research and teaching, and to fully integrate the everyday an as object of IPE scholarship and pedagogy. Film allows students to develop an understanding of IPE that considers often forgotten actors of the global economy, and to see how the global economy shapes and is shaped by what takes places in schools, workplaces, and households. The article discusses one practical experience of using film to teach EIPE: a 'Political Economy of East Asia' course developed by the author. It offers a concrete demonstration of how three movies can be integrated into the curriculum to discuss themes such as regional outsourcing, financial crises, East Asian developmentalism, the global division of labour, cultural globalization, and China's economic rise; how active learning through film is encouraged; and how students' work on these movies is assessed. The article concludes by addressing methodological difficulties, students' evaluations of the course, and future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the midst of intensifying global competition over green energy systems, Korean and Taiwanese companies are rapidly rising as serious exporters of smart microgrids. What explains the emergence of an East Asian presence in the global green energy sector? My core argument is that policymakers in Korea and Taiwan view smart microgrids strategically as a new developmental infrastructure, which will help position domestic firms onto a new competitive footing. I show that in Korea, this is taking place through the state's leveraging of the nation's innovation champions – globally leading chaebol or conglomerates and their networks of small and medium enterprise (SME) suppliers in the domestic market. In Taiwan, the state has leveraged government research institutes and their rich networks with internationally competitive SMEs and with large domestic firms. These efforts reflect the creation of a new form of public and private cooperation, which I refer to as 'hybridized industrial ecosystems'. These institutional mutations in the green energy sector suggest that the state's transformative capacity has been expanding, not shrinking as many recent writers on the developmental state conclude. Overall, the findings from this fresh new sector represents the unfolding of a new chapter of developmental thinking in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of regional economic agreements involving East Asian economies in the years since the financial crises is usually explained in the political economy literature by reference to economic factors. These agreements have been viewed either as a response to the costs of increasing interdependence and/or to the demand by domestic exporters to level the playing field when their rivals benefit from preferential trade agreements. A detailed examination of economic data finds no support, however, for the argument that intra-regional economic interdependence in East Asia has increased significantly since the financial crises. Case studies suggest that business has not played a major role in either promoting or opposing the agreements - not surprisingly in that the agreements are unlikely to have a major economic impact, and are not being widely used. Rather than there being an 'economic domino' effect at work, the new East Asian regionalism is best understood as being driven by a 'political domino' effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the influence of 'track two' policy networks in shaping regional political and security cooperation in East Asia. It focuses on two of the most established and lauded political-security networks: the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), critically exploring their effectiveness and influence today. Drawing on extensive interviews, participant observation and an analysis of documentary sources, it concludes that there is little evidence to suggest these networks have affected the significant institutional change described in much of the literature. Rather, there is persuasive evidence that their influence on track one has waned in recent years. After canvassing a range of alternative explanations for this state of affairs, it argues that recent scholarship on track two has paid insufficient attention to the scope conditions that are a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for unofficial networks to successfully achieve policy diffusion. Non-official diplomacy can affect institutional change, but it is less common than most accounts suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dollar dominance in East Asia has depended on its regional support. Japan's supportive policy toward the dollar, however, shifted in the late 1990s as the Japanese government began to address the region's heavy dependence on the dollar, which was regarded as one (but an important one) of the causes of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), by promoting the use of the yen in the region and regional monetary initiatives. Despite emerging signs of those challenges, Japan's domestic resistance and the region's power rivalry between Japan and China still makes the dollar the currency of choice in the medium term future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Asian financial crisis has significantly changed the way in which regionalism in East Asia is taking place. Prior to the crisis, regionalism in the area was noted for its relative lack of formal institutions; many analyses stressed the role of private businesses in fostering a 'regional economy'. Post-crisis regionalism is being led by the state and encompasses both monetary and trade dimensions. The reasons for this change are analysed and the regional policies of China and Japan examined. The spur to post-crisis regionalism is argued to have been provided by a desire to limit the influence in the region of the US and the international financial institutions. The Asian financial crisis has significantly changed the way in which regionalism in East Asia is taking place. Prior to the crisis, regionalism in the area was noted for its relative lack of formal institutions; many analyses stressed the role of private businesses in fostering a 'regional economy'. Post-crisis regionalism is being led by the state and encompasses both monetary and trade dimensions. The reasons for this change are analysed and the regional policies of China and Japan examined. The spur to post-crisis regionalism is argued to have been provided by a desire to limit the influence in the region of the US and the international financial institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan stands accused of purveying a defective developmental state model of growth to the East Asian states which was responsible for the onset of the currency crises from 1997 onwards, and then of failing to provide the necessary leadership for the stabilization and recovery of the region. Japan’s position of economic dominance and its nascent political leadership role in East Asia are now seen to be under attack. However, this article argues that over the longer term Japan is continuing to exercise considerable covert economic and political leadership in the region. Examination of Japanese policy makers’ perceptions of the East Asian crisis reveals that they see the region as hit above all by currency crises which have transmuted into economic ones, but that the model of export and DFI-powered growth in the region is still fundamentally sound. Japanese policy makers contend that Japan is not responsible for the occurrence of the crises, nor are the USA- and IMF-prescribed solutions likely to hold the key to the restoration of growth in East Asia. Instead, they quietly lay the blame for the crises upon China for undercutting the competitiveness of East Asian exports and moving ahead of the ASEAN-4 in the regional production cycle. Hence, Japanese policy, as manifested in the New Miyazawa Initiative, has concentrated upon regearing existing developmental models, and has gradually begun to restore a measure of confidence in Japanese economic leadership and to set the agendas of both the USA and multilateral institutions towards the crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the Asian miracle both as an ideological construct and as an empirical experience. As an ideological construct, the Asian miracle can best be understood in the context of the western construction of Otherness. Such a construction is an expression of a complex web of power relations forged mainly by a struggle between east and west over industrial achievement, the meaning of industrial progress and governance. As an empirical experience, industrialization in East Asia may be appre22 hended through gender as a key organizing principle manifested in a four-tier system of industrial work. Industrial strategies in East Asia have been deployed in conjunction with reproductive strategies which correspond to the specificities of capital formation and degree of capital25 technology intensity. The emerging social patterns since the crisis began in 1997 indicate that gradual changes which have taken place in the political economy of women's labour in East Asia have not necessarily altered a gender order governed by cultural conservatism which privileges males over females. A female gaze on the relation between economy and polity may contribute to the redesign of development policy along norms and values that can promote more gender-balanced and humane societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seven months after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) moved into the eye of the economic typhoon ravaging the region. The Fund's high profile coincides with the spread of the deflationary and inflationary effects of the financial collapse on the real economy of the region, making the period potentially explosive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]