1. Managerial Short-Termism and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting
- Author
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Tomislav Ladika, Zacharias Sautner, University of Zurich, Finance (ABS, FEB), and Corporate Governance
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,1402 Accounting ,Profit (accounting) ,Earnings ,Equity (finance) ,2002 Economics and Econometrics ,Monetary economics ,Short termism ,Investment (macroeconomics) ,10003 Department of Banking and Finance ,Term (time) ,330 Economics ,Incentive ,2003 Finance ,Accounting ,Vesting ,Business ,Finance - Abstract
We show that executives cut investment when their incentives become more short term. We examine a unique event in which hundreds of firms eliminated option vesting periods to avoid a drop in income under accounting rule FAS 123-R. This event allowed executives to exercise options earlier and thus profit from boosting short-term performance. Our identification exploits that FAS 123-R’s adoption was staggered almost randomly by firms’ fiscal year-ends. CEOs cut investment and reported higher short-term earnings after option acceleration, and they subsequently increased equity sales.
- Published
- 2020