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Milton Friedman's publications and commentaries became the subject of enormous publicity and scrutiny in the United Kingdom. This paper analyzes the interaction of Milton Friedman and U.K. economic policy from 1938 to 1979. The period under study is separated into four subperiods: 1938-46, 1946-59, 1959-70, and 1970-79. For each of these subperiods, the author considers Friedman's observations on, and role in, key developments in U.K. monetary policy and in general U.K. economic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a commentary on the paper by Riccardo DiCecio and Edward Nelson which considers the estimation of the parameters of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the British economy. The methodology used for estimation was analyzed. The generic problem in approximating the DSGE model with a structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) was highlighted. Some problems with multiple parameter values in both the Phillips curve and the wage equation were also discussed.

We revisit the Kaldor growth facts for the United States and the United Kingdom during the postwar period. We find that while overall the original Kaldor facts continue to hold, deviations occurred along several dimensions: Instead of staying constant, the growth rates of real GDP per worker and of real capital per worker have slowed down in the United States and the United Kingdom since the 1970s, the capital-to-output ratio has increased in the United Kingdom, and the share of income paid to labor has decreased in the United States since 1990. We discuss how to calculate the Kaldor facts in multi-sector growth models and establish that a slowdown in GDP-per-worker growth naturally results from secular changes in relative prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors estimate the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) on U.K. data. Their estimates suggest that price stickiness is a more important source of nominal rigidity in the United Kingdom than wage stickiness. Their estimates of parameters governing investment behavior are only well behaved when post-1979 observations are included, which reflects government policies until the late 1970s that obstructed the influence of market forces on investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the issues regarding the implementation of the policy by the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in Great Britain. Determination of whether the two-year policy horizon set by the MPC is optimal for their inflation targeting approach; Appropriateness of the MPC practice to condition its inflation forecast; Extent to which policymakers should respond to asymmetric risks in inflation forecasts.

Focuses on the role of the Bank of England in fueling the financial and economic boom that preceded the information crisis of 1825. Background on the information crisis of England on 1815; Contributing factors to the crisis; Discussion on the three forces that occurred in most of historic crises.

Examines the relationship between the exchange rate regime and variables of macroeconomy such as output, prices and interest rates. Exchange rate regime of the United Kingdom; Relation with trade; Impact of exchange rate regime in volatility of economy's macroeconomic performance.

This article contrasts the experiences of the United States and United Kingdom during and after the Great Recession to understand the role of financial shocks in the magnitude of the crises and length of the recoveries. It starts from the common consensus that the Great Recession first and foremost was a financial crisis. It shows that relative to the United States, the Great Recession in the United Kingdom was more closely associated with a decline in productivity. Motivated by the similar behavior of financial variables at a business cycle frequency, it contrasts the behavior of the U.S. and U.K. economies through the lens of a simple real business cycle model augmented with financial shocks. A credit channel that operates on firm hiring decisions captures the magnitude of the output decline in both the United States and United Kingdom but exaggerates the response of the hours margin for the United Kingdom. The conclusion is that the financial channel supported in the U.S. data seems less appropriate for understanding the U.K. experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the study conducted by Charles Goodhardt which assessed the process and strategy by which the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) implements monetary policy in Great Britain. Appropriateness of the MPC two-year policy horizons in terms of its inflation targeting approach; Use of interest rate path in inflation forecasts of MPC; Extent to which MPC policymakers respond to asymmetric risks in inflation forecasts.

Focuses on the British financial crisis of 1825. Causes of the crisis; Description on the information problems faced by investors of the United Kingdom in distinguishing high from low quality securities; Evaluation of the response of the Bank of England to the crisis.

Looks at the banking systems of Germany and Great Britain during pre-World War I. Effect of the institutional form of banks to a country's rate of economic growth; Structure of German banks; Comparison on the banking system of Germany and the United Kingdom; Reasons why bank equity holdings may increase efficiency of investments.

Discusses the indexes used in Great Britain in reference to an inflation target to make the index more appropriate for monetary policy. Details on the index devised by the bank of England; Information on Retail Price Index (RPIX); Treatment of asset prices; Several sources of bias; Implications of inflation for monetary policy.