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In section 48 of Being and Time , Heidegger quotes from chapter XX of Der Ackermann aus Böhmen , a late medieval prose poem written in Early New High German, circa 1400: "As soon as a man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die." In this paper, I provide the context for the quotation. I also suggest that Heidegger's interest in Der Ackermann cannot be explained solely in terms of his believing the poem was the source of the quotation on page 245 of Being and Time. I offer a justification for this claim by showing that Heidegger's discussion of death in Being and Time employs three important images: "debt," "inheritance," and "ripeness" – all of which can be found in chapter XX Der Ackermann. I show these "borrowings" to be at once a reference to the context of the Christian/humanist heritage to which they belong and a part of the newly evolving Daseinsanalytik. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cassirer is important in 20th Century philosophy for the attention he gives to the fundamental relationship between myth and language. For Cassirer, myth is a non-subjective form of discourse wherein the origin of language coincides with both the human-divine encounter and the event of being itself. In this article, I trace the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger on the nature of the magical (or “primitive”) sign, which is at the heart of mythical discourse. While Heidegger initially argues that this form of sign is structurally impossible on the basis of his accounts of signs and language in Being and Time, he later comes to recognize that he had not properly accounted for its possibility within his phenomenological deduction. I conclude by describing how Heidegger’s notion of poetry eventually comes into alignment with the way Cassirer describes the function of myth and the magical sign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I establish first the critical role of conscience in Heidegger's Being and Time. As the call of care, conscience attests to the authenticity of Da-sein as it discloses and "accomplishes" Da-sein as the being it is delivered over to be. Heidegger's interpretation of conscience also epitomizes the central aporias of Being and Time, which, with a view to revoking the Western metaphysical tradition, ultimately recalls it. At the heart of such aporias is the hermeneutic circle in the attestation of conscience, whose voice only "reaches him who wants to be brought back." While the language of conscience and attestation was put away in Heidegger's later writings, I argue that the question concerning conscience is a leading question that will continue to guide us to build our way back and forth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]