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Western thinkers have often seen Confucianism as unique in that it does not fit well into standard categories of either religion or philosophy. In terms of how this difficulty is reflected in academia, it seems that Confucianism is simultaneously both a religion and a philosophy, and neither. This paper attempts to begin a discussion of a related issue, which has been relatively underappreciated; namely, how does Confucianism attempt to convince people to be Confucian? Restricting our discussion to the Analects, we can find appeals to a belief which seem almost religious, rational arguments which seem philosophical, and a host of other methodologies that may help to convince readers to follow the Confucian way. The discussion of the Analects is cursory here, and only a few passages will be discussed in a general manner. We will contrast this with a general outline of approaches to convincing people found in two-world theories, which can help to illuminate the uniqueness of the Analects, especially when it is read as a one-world perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An appreciation of the emphasis on flexibility in the Analects is one of the most consistent motifs in the various interpretations of this text. When applied specifically to normative readings, embracing adaptability, having malleable standards, and taking particulars into account are both promising and challenging ways to think about whether something might be moral or ethical. This paper attempts to deconstruct this familiar discussion along novel lines that can reveal new ways to reflect on the importance of flexibility in the Analects, while, at the same time, it reconstrues ways in which comparative projects might be oriented. The main argument is this: the Analects does not recognize a categorical distinction between a moral and non-moral realm. Whereas, in much modern academic thought, there is a distinction between what counts as contingencies and what is up to the individual, which, in turn, loosely corresponds to the non-moral and moral realms, the Analects does not make such clear distinctions. Everything, including core moral issues such as the individual's own choice, moral guidelines, and the contextualization of (moral) models, is all ultimately grounded in contingencies. Nevertheless, the Analects provides ways of reflecting on choices and actions that aim to steer people in specific directions. We may understand this as a type of morality, but one that is significantly distinct from those wherein the difference between the moral (non-contingent) and non-moral (contingent) is foundational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents Jeong Jedu (Hagok; 1649–1736) on the topic of emotions and its comparative and contemporary relevance. It discusses this leading neo-Confucian thinker's thought-provoking Four-Seven thesis and its vital implication for self-cultivation and ethics. This important topic has not been discussed in current scholarship on Korean Confucianism. The article begins with the Confucian notion of emotions (jeong/qing, 情), according to its textual and philosophical background in the Chinese tradition, and then covers key issues regarding the "Four Beginnings" of virtue, the "Seven Emotions", and leading neo-Confucian perspectives by Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529). The article also provides a brief comparative analysis of Toegye's and Yulgok's leading Korean opinions on the nature, role, and problem of emotions. The third section focuses on Hagok's interpretation in the same context. The fourth section discusses Hagok's ethics and spirituality of emotions in terms of the mind's original essence (bonche/benti) and innate knowledge (of good) (yangji/liangzhi) in connection to Wang Yangming's doctrines. The final section concludes by considering the originality and distinctiveness of Hagok's holistic interpretation. It also presents my contemporary reflections to articulate how Hagok's groundbreaking insights compare with certain Western theories of emotions and why they offer a worthwhile resource for comparative philosophy, religion, and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An appreciation of the emphasis on flexibility in the Analects is one of the most consistent motifs in the various interpretations of this text. When applied specifically to normative readings, embracing adaptability, having malleable standards, and taking particulars into account are both promising and challenging ways to think about whether something might be moral or ethical. This paper attempts to deconstruct this familiar discussion along novel lines that can reveal new ways to reflect on the importance of flexibility in the Analects, while, at the same time, it reconstrues ways in which comparative projects might be oriented. The main argument is this: the Analects does not recognize a categorical distinction between a moral and non-moral realm. Whereas, in much modern academic thought, there is a distinction between what counts as contingencies and what is up to the individual, which, in turn, loosely corresponds to the non-moral and moral realms, the Analects does not make such clear distinctions. Everything, including core moral issues such as the individual’s own choice, moral guidelines, and the contextualization of (moral) models, is all ultimately grounded in contingencies. Nevertheless, the Analects provides ways of reflecting on choices and actions that aim to steer people in specific directions. We may understand this as a type of morality, but one that is significantly distinct from those wherein the difference between the moral (non-contingent) and non-moral (contingent) is foundational.