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In Yogācāra epistemology, the term prapañca refers to various dimensions of the cognitive process in aspects ranging from consciousness, language formation, the conceptualization of subject–object duality, mental defilements, and ignorance. Given that the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra conveys the richness of early tenets for both the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka traditions, an investigation of the meaning and discourse context of prapañca is a necessity. This paper conducts a contextual examination of the word prapañca, primarily addressing (1) a range of meanings, (2) possible characteristics, (3) conditions and consequences, especially the associations with the conceptualization (vikalpa) process, and (4) the significance of the elimination of prapañca that the corresponding dialogue implies. This paper finds that prapañca is associated with dualistic conceptualization and the evolution of consciousness within saṃsāra. It shows some qualities of the beginningless conceptual structure of saṃsāric conditioned negativity and is related to language formation. As the discourse in Laṅka adduces it as the root of suffering, liberation from it is a prerequisite for reaching enlightenment and achieving the state of Buddhahood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the significant effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York was the politics of the US-led war on terror encompassing secularism and calls for Islamic reformation. The political discourse of war on terror was not limited to the Americas but was witnessed in other Western nations, such as Australia. The discourse of "Islam needs reforming" by the Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, in response to the Lindt Café siege (labelled as "Islamic terrorism") tacitly associates Islam with terrorism and represents Muslims negatively to the wider Australian society. This paper with the research question of "How does 'Islam needs reforming' discourse perpetuate Islamophobia?" carried out critical discourse analysis on the selected speeches of Tony Abbott in response to the Lindt Café siege in 2014 to find out the context and implications of Abbott's discourse in relation to calls for Islamic revolution. The study found that Abbott through the example of al-Sisi's (Egypt's president) calls for Islamic reformation forwarded his stance of the need for change in Islam to counter terrorism. Therefore, the present paper argues that the calls for Islamic reformation in response to terrorism can associate Islam with terrorism, thus, perpetuating Islamophobia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues how the study of religion in Japan influenced the nation's conduct during the Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945). Specifically, the paper addresses the wartime national indoctrination texts of Katō Totsudō 加藤咄堂 (a.k.a. Katō Yūichirō 加藤熊一郎, 1870–1949). Although Katō was not strictly a religious scholar, analyzing Katō's texts is significant in understanding the influence of religious theory and religious studies discourse on Japanese society during the war. To illustrate this point, this paper introduces previous studies that have discussed the movements of religious scholars during the war. It then clarifies the significance of discussing Katō's texts, followed by an introduction to what has been revealed about Katō so far. The paper then examines Katō's wartime texts that discuss the relationship between war, faith and the readiness to die. The East–West comparison of views of life and death used by Katō was characterized as a wartime application of comparative religion. It was intended to emphasize Japan's superiority over other countries. Such features agitated Japanese readers to proactively enter the fight to the death through spiritual mobilization in a total war system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2015, religious freedom has become a heated and divisive political and public policy issue in Australia. While rarely defined or interrogated, 'religious freedom' does not exist as a value-neutral principle with a single meaning. Rather, its discursive constructions are varied and serve to promote certain interests at the expense of others. Offering a new perspective on the politics of religious freedom, this paper draws together four separate studies of the public discourse of religious freedom in Australia (spanning 35 years from 1984 to 2019) to chart how its framing has changed over time and to explore the implications of these changes. This analysis reveals three major discourses of religious freedom emerging over three phases: 'religious diversity'; 'balancing rights'; and 'freedom of belief'. This paper demonstrates how, once used to promote a progressive social agenda, religious freedom has become weaponised by the Christian Right and culture warriors in their battle to entrench in law the ongoing acceptability of discrimination against LGBTIQ+ people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the discourse concerning Islam and Muslims by assessing the extreme right-wing party, Vox, on Twitter. In addition, this paper examines the incidence (impact and reactions) of this party on the users of this social network. The objectives of this study are as follows: to identify themes and topics concerning this discourse; to analyze how the discourse is articulated and represented; and to understand the impact of this discourse by measuring the engagement of the most viral publications. To do so, we observed the publications posted by the party via its official account throughout 2022. The research methodology was based on qualitative and quantitative content analysis, and the publications themselves were monitored to ascertain the level of engagement. The results of this study clearly show that Vox created Islamophobic narratives; thus, Islam and Muslims are explicit targets of Vox's hate speech. Their rhetoric referred to security threats and threats to national identity, with the recurrent use of the idea that there is a "danger of Islamization" in Spain. The party uses disinformation and hoaxes, and users respond in a polarized way. The results of this study alert us to the worrying levels of radicalization and the normalization of Islamophobic racist discourse in the examined context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Xuanzang (602–664) is famous for his legendary life, his important translation works, and also his Discourse on the Realisation of Consciousness-Only (Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi, 成唯識論). This text, which is considered as a synthesis of Yogācāra thought, has been diversely interpreted by modern scholars and is still discussed, in particular about the status of external things. Nevertheless, this issue seems to be of little interest for Yogācāra thinkers compared to other topics such as the Noble Path, or else the three types of wisdom (trividhā prajñā, 三慧): learning (śruta, 聞), reasoning (cintā, 思), and cultivating (bhāvanā, 修). As emphasized in recent research, this topic represents a major issue for Buddhist practitioners. In an attempt to analyse it in Xuanzang's Discourse, and more generally in Yogācāra thought, this paper will first discuss Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's thought on the three types of wisdom. Secondly, since it is important to replace the three types of wisdom in the general argumentation of Xuanzang's Discourse, we will present the structure of his text which is modelled on a "path" leading progressively to Supreme Awakening. Then, we will present the main elements of the Noble Path and situate the three types of wisdom into it. Finally, we will explain that Xuanzang follows Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's conceptions and eventually confirm the importance of the three types of wisdom in Yogācāra thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wenshi Ziliao (Cultural and Historical Materials) are spaces where contemporary Chinese official discourse and local self-expression are coordinated. But these spaces are extremely limited on religious issues. The Pingli missionary case in the Shaanxi Wenshi Ziliao is seen as an anti-imperialist patriotic movement. However, by re-examining this conflict through the analysis of other materials, this article finds that the outbreak of the Pingli case is closely related to local power structures, the conditions of missionaries and Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions (P.I.M.E.), and the socio-cultural atmosphere. These hidden stories, although overlooked by the compilers of Wenshi Ziliao, are re-emphasized by priests of the local church, revealing attempts by Christians to continually adjust their self-expression in response to official discourse under the contemporary Chinese church–state relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the Japanese Nichiren Buddhist organization, Soka Gakkai (SG), whose members have supported the political party known as Kōmeitō, or Clean Government Party, in Japan for over half a century. SG members have often been criticized as 'impure' political actors, undergoing frequent public questioning of their motivations for engaging in electoral politics in light of their 'religious' status. The paper shows how the SG members' support for Kōmeitō at a qualitative level indeed transcends the typical demarcations of the 'secular-religious' binary system. However, they also simultaneously challenge the term 'religion' that has functioned as an ideology in the creation of statecraft and in their competition for legitimacy. The current paper is based on long-term fieldwork, extensive interviews, and doctrinal analyses that highlight how socially productive this discourse on religion has been. It also shows how a counter-episteme, rooted in Nichiren's theory of the Risshō Ankoku Ron and the idea of kōsen-rufu, sought to bring a 'Buddha' consciousness to bear on individual and collective action as a model for alternative 'politics'. Contrary to many claims, this did not entail contesting the modern institutional separation of 'church' and 'state', but is rather an attempt to find legitimacy for participating in 'Japan-making' in ways that cannot easily be understood or confined to explanations framed within the 'religious-secular' binary system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1945, official Catholic discourse around nuclear weapons has condemned their existence on the one hand and supported them as deterrents on the other. This paper argues the largely abstracted discourse on nuclear weapons within the World Church has been disrupted by voices of Urakami in Nagasaki since at least 1981, as the Vatican has re-considered both memory and Catholic treatments of the bombing of this city since the end of World War II. On 9 August 1945, a plutonium A-bomb, nicknamed 'Fat Man', was detonated by the United States over the northern suburb of Nagasaki known as Urakami. Approximately 8500 Catholics were killed by the deployment of the bomb in this place that was once known as the Rome of the East. Many years on, two popes visited Nagasaki, the first in 1981 and the second in 2019. Throughout the period from John Paul II's initial visit to Pope Francis's visit in 2019, the Catholic Church's official stance on nuclear weapons evolved significantly. Pope John Paul II's contribution to the involvement in peace discourses of Catholics who had suffered the bombing attack in Nagasaki has been noted by scholars previously, but we should not assume influence in 1981 was unidirectional. Drawing upon interviews conducted in the Catholic community in Nagasaki between 2014 and 2019, and by reference to the two papal visits, this article re-evaluates the ongoing potentialities and concomitant weaknesses of religious discourse. Such discourses continue to exert an influence on international relations in the enduring atomic age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) presents itself as a defender of traditional Christian values. Among these values, representatives of the ROC mention concern for marriage and family. To what extent is the position of the ROC an expression of commitment to the traditional Christian concept of marriage and family? In this article, we analyse the contemporary Orthodox discourse in Russia since Kirill Gundyayev became the Patriarch of Moscow in 2009. From a political science and security studies perspective, we highlight the main ideological elements of this discourse. We contrast these elements with similar content in Russian official documents and Vladimir Putin's statements. An analysis of what the ROC says about the problems and protection of marriage and family in Russia, against the background of Putin's statements and the actions of the state authorities, shows that the ROC's discourse on marriage and family echoes the main themes of the political discourse controlled by the state authorities. In its understanding of marriage and in its efforts on behalf of the family, the ROC represents a conservative doctrinal position. Although, in doctrinal terms, it essentially expresses the traditional Christian teaching on marriage, the strong ideologisation and securitisation of demographic issues in Russia are also reflected in church discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The early Tokugawa period witnessed the establishment of anti-Christian policy as a significant agenda. In 1647, Sessō Sōsai, a Zen monk, undertook the task of delivering sermons in Nagasaki, aiming to convert the local population to Buddhism. Following his preaching, Sessō authored two anti-Christian texts, with the second text reflecting a pronounced influence from Chinese Buddhist anti-Christian discourse. This article seeks to explore the correlation between Sessō's anti-Christian writings and his engagement with the Chinese Buddhist community in Nagasaki. By delving into the analysis of personal networks, this study illustrates Sessō's familiarity with the evolution of Buddhism in China and his incorporation of ideas from the Chinese Buddhist anti-Christian movement during his time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the affective potential of populist civilizational discourse. It reflects on two prevalent, opposing, civilizational identities to render visible their shared fantasmatic grounding. With reference to far right and Islamist configurations, the article aims to reveal the hidden and disguised elements of civilizational discourse that I contend give it affective power. Drawing on populist theory that centralizes antagonism in social identification, it examines the use of civilizational discourse in the performances of far right and Islamist parties, organizations, and individuals. I argue these civilizationist identities are defined by an obsession with a fantasmatic closure and homogeneity of social identities and civilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has always been a conviction in the ecumenical movement that social service is part of the essence of what it means to be the church. The strengthening of social and political witness of churches through church-related agencies and networks in the context of the beginning development discourse from the 1960s until the 1990s, however, led to a scenario in which the secular language of development and political action received much attention. In 2014 at the Malawi consultation, the World Council of Churches (WCC) and Action of Churches Together (ACT Alliance) reviewed their working relationships and explored better collaboration between agencies and churches, stating that the specific nature of churches as entities with an added value and particular profile in the area of social and political service would be strengthened. From this consultation, a mandate was given by the WCC Central Committee to develop a study document on the understanding and core components of the concept of "ecumenical diaconia", which then was made available to the 11th Assembly of the WCC in Karlsruhe, 2022. This article introduces the context, major content, and key convictions of this study document and related discussions in Karlsruhe. It answers the question: what is the significance of the global ecumenical fellowship of churches in focusing on a common language of diaconia and a more explicit church-related terminology to describe and strengthen the social services of churches and their engagement in diaconia and social witness? It is recognized that this article is predominantly written from a German context and perspective in its construction of the international discourse on ecumenical diaconia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On a general level, the article analyzes how the clash of unconditional claims between secular rationales and religious narratives is prone to engender violence. To provide this discussion with material evidence, the case of the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and its media coverage is put under scrutiny. The author shows how the marker of "religious violence", otherness, and irrationality was (re)constructed in this context. In the last analysis, the article demonstrates that a parasitic relationship obtains between an occidentalist brand of reason and its presumed other (epitomized in the gestalt of "religious violence"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religion and science are often set up as polar opposites in Western philosophical and religious discourse and seen as representing different epistemological perspectives that juxtapose rationality with faith. Space exploration is largely viewed as a scientific and engineering problem and, thus, has tended to set aside the issue of religion as it relates to human movement off-planet. However, as we have moved increasingly toward the idea of colonization of the Moon and Mars, social scientists and philosophers have increasingly come to recognize that human movement into space also needs to be understood as a social phenomenon. As a social phenomenon, there is an inherent necessity to consider how religion may play a role in or influence the process of human exploration and settlement of space. However, what do we mean when we say "religion?" One of the fundamental problems of thinking about the relationship between religion, science, and space exploration is that the meaning of the word religion is rarely well-defined. Do we mean faith-based religions such as Christianity or Islam? Or do we mean practice-based religions such as Shinto and some forms of Buddhism? This paper will explore the question of religion and science from the perspective of Japanese religions as a way of problematizing the manner in which we think about and define religion as it relates to the practice of space exploration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I use Critical Technocultural Discourse Analysis (CTDA) to examine the productive associations between Twitter as a technological artifact and the quotidian discourse on Hindu nationalism online. The analysis explores the interplay between (1) Twitter as a technical artifact—examining the interface for its affordances and protocols; (2) Twitter as practice—unpacking the quotidian discourse conventions and strategies used to articulate Hindu nationalism; and (3) Twitter as ideology—examining how Hindutva ideology co-opts the platform's affordances to promote anti-minority discrimination. My analysis highlights how the online discourse of Hindu nationalism is a constitutive force informing discussions and decisions concerning several vital issues related to governance, policies, citizenship, COVID-19, and other topics. The discourse of Hindu nationalism online has the potential to percolate into the lived realities of people and has material implications for the workings of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its global rise, theoretical frameworks to capture populism have been derived primarily from case studies in the Western hemisphere. To assess if and how the premises of populism travel across different contexts, we offer a comparative analysis of populist discourses in Turkey, India, and Russia, countries with different political contexts and religions. The content analysis of 1682 speeches of Erdoğan, Modi, and Putin shows that they depart from their European and American counterparts because they are neither nativist nor inclusive. Instead, they introduce a new notion of "people" anchored in a religiously defined community, interpret the nation's past to achieve their own political goals, and identify different driving forces to restore their lost global role. A comparison of Erdoğan, Modi, and Putin highlights the blind spots of existing studies, which fail to carefully contextualize the term, thus obscuring the country-specific constituents of populist discourses and the role of religions. Understanding the regional variants of populism not only helps us capture the reasons behind the leaders' appeal and resiliency but also their so-called unexpected actions and decisions, such as Putin's territorial and religious claims over Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the analysis of an empirical study that explored the political discourse of the Church of Greece (CoG) during a specific period of the Greek financial crisis, that is, from January 2015 to January 2019. The analysis is based on official texts of the CoG, reports in two daily newspapers, and the results of a quantitative content analysis. Through our analysis, we explore three main questions. The first focuses on the types of issues ('agenda') raised by the main representatives of the CoG; the second focuses on the framing used concerning these issues; and the third focuses on how the agenda and frames interact with regard to the CoG's active (discursive) role as an 'established church' and/or a 'public religion'. Our findings indicated that the CoG intervened in a considerable number of issues not strictly related to religion or the Greek financial crisis. Moreover, the main framing devices of the CoG's discourse varied from identity to conflict frames, while its discourse reflected its self-understanding as both an established church and a public religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-World War II era, Sōka Gakkai has deployed the terminology and concept of "religion" (shūkyō 宗教) in a variety of contexts and to a variety of ends. Do these positions simply reflect a post-war strategic stance? Do they have deeper historical and philosophical roots? A careful reading of key texts by founding president Makiguchi Tsunesaburō 牧口常三郎 (1871–1944) suggests that, from its inception as the Value-Creating Education Society (Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai 創価教育学会) in the 1930s, the movement has occupied an ambiguous space, relative to the conceptualization and practice of "religion", as these were imported at the start of the Meiji Era (1868–1912), adopted and indigenized to respond to the cultural, social and political exigencies of modernizing Japan. Examples of Makiguchi's heterodoxy, relative to the established understanding of "religion" and its role, include: the rejection of specific ideas of "religion", in relation to education and science, as represented in the writings of such intellectuals as Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 and Ishiwara Atsushi 石原純; refusal to accept the official definition of Shintō as non-religion; positing an essential continuity between faith/trust among human subjects and faith directed at ideas and objects typically considered "religious"; promoting the idea of worldly benefit, as a result of faith in and practice of "religion". A careful reading of Makiguchi's complex, and often heterodox, discourse, relative to the conceptual category of "religion", can frame a more nuanced interpretation of his ultimate heterodoxy—his rejection of the Ise Shrine amulet, an act for which he was arrested and confined to prison in July 1943. It can also clarify the basis for the Sōka Gakkai's post-war deployments of the concept of religion, and create a more flexible and expansive interpretative space for considering the organization's discourse and praxis in the post-war era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how two seemingly contradictory global trends—scientific rationality and religious expressiveness—intersect and are negotiated in people's lives in Nordic countries. We focus on Finland and Sweden, both countries with reputations of being highly secular and modernized welfare states. The article draws on our multi-sited ethnography in Finland and Sweden, including interviews with health practitioners, academics, and students identifying as Lutheran, Orthodox, Muslim, or anthroposophic. Building on new institutionalist World Society Theory, the article asks whether individuals perceive any conflict at the intersection of "science" and "religion", and how they negotiate such a relationship while working or studying in universities and health clinics, prime sites of global secularism and scientific rationality. Our findings attest to people's creative artistry while managing their religious identifications in a secular, Nordic, organizational culture in which religion is often constructed as old-fashioned or irrelevant. We identify and discuss three widespread modes of negotiation by which people discursively manage and account for the relationship between science and religion in their working space: segregation, estrangement, and incorporation. Such surprising similarities point to the effects of global institutionalized secularism and scientific rationality that shape the negotiation of people's religious and spiritual identities, while also illustrating how local context must be factored into future, empirical research on discourses of science and religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In regard to rhetoric, Emmanuel Levinas stands against its violence. In spite of the rhetoric, he justifies the notion of discourse in Totality and Infinity in order to prove the possibility of the ethical relationship between the Same and the Other. In later works, he also criticizes the ontological language, which is used in the tradition of occidental philosophy. He explores a third way and proposes the notion of Saying, opposed to Said, as ethical language, witness in Otherwise than Being. However, there is a paradoxical structure of language. Although the Saying precedes the Said, the system of language and even the ontological language, it has to be reduced to this latter when it is expressed as philosophical form. The present study situates what is at stake in the criticism of rhetoric and ontological language by Levinas and examines the notion of witness as opposed to these forms of language. Witness is a concrete form of ethical language that consists in "for the other" of the ultimate passivity of the subjectivity. Therefore, the Saying is possible only as witness where the subject is exposed to "a calling into question" by the Other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]