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This paper develops a method to identify manipulation of custodial suspects who attempt to invoke the Miranda right to legal counsel during a custodial interrogation. The method, developed from a combination of framing theory and hypergame theory, first documents the point where custodial suspects' preferences shift and second identifies the proximate cause of that shift using excerpts from legal cases. The method applies linguistic analysis within a hypergame framework to reveal rational behavior of custodial suspects who, despite owning an initial preference to invoke, waive their right to counsel without explicit pressure from police. The paper terms this shift in preferences "manipulation" adding the concept to hypergames and to the literature on noncooperative discursive exchanges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "Stratification-of-Goods" expresses social ranking where the lower status group consumes almost exclusively coarse goods such as Rambo films while the upper status group consumes almost exclusively refined goods such as Shakespearean plays. The Stratification-of-Goods is an enigma for the social welfare function (SWF)—which also applies at the level of the individual utility function. It is an enigma because it makes SWF and individual utility function ill-defined: there is no single metric that allows us to compare the utility functions across groups, as well as the tastes across a single decision maker (DM), insofar as they are segregated by the refinement of taste. This paper proposes a model that promises to solve the Stratification-of-Goods Enigma. The model, consistent with rational choice theory, starts with DMs who have identical tastes but differ with respect to income level. If income inequality is non-trivial, DMs invest differently in what this paper calls "sophistication capital"—the education needed to appreciate refined goods. The difference in investment in sophistication capital sets in motion dynamics that generates hard-to-reverse status stratification. In this fashion, this paper offers a solid endogenous account that solves the Stratification-of-Goods Enigma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a historical case study, this paper explores the mechanisms by which the rational interpretation of written text can produce divisiveness and splintering. The mechanisms of division are derived from theories of organizational rationality, cultural logics, organizational memory, and group conflict. The propositions are explored in an analysis of common sense rationality with a focus on the 19th century Stone-Campbell movement. When emotions are not adequately integrated into the culture of rational interpretation, group conflict can arise. The material characteristics of written text combined with a high-diffusion, low-hierarchy, highly recorded and publicized, and proactively contentious, emotionally triggering environment creates a breeding ground for division. The analysis paints a multi-dimensional picture of division and splintering from a sociomaterial standpoint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals choose camouflage as a dominant response when a state's political conditions worsen, particularly when a democracy turns authoritarian. Individuals hide their private preferences to survive under oppressive regimes. This paper argues that in many circumstances camouflage is the most rational, cost-minimizing reaction to oppression. The paper identifies five kinds of costs that induce individuals to resort to four different ideal types of camouflage: (1) avoidance of contact, (2) minimal participation, (3) restricted cooperation, and (4) full engagement with the oppressive regime. Camouflage is particularly advantageous as the costs of exit or voice are often high. Therefore, a large majority of citizens disagreeing with the ideology and policies of a regime are likely to camouflage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the information and beliefs about the possibility of repression, when will the civil society organize protests against the government? Under what conditions will the government repress popular protests? In this paper, I employ a novel signaling game to model the strategic interaction between the regime and civil society during the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Movement in Hong Kong. I illustrate how information and beliefs influence whether the civil society mobilizes mass protests. Specifically, I examine how government actions shape the civil society's beliefs about the government type, which in turn determine the protest turnouts and the government's decision to repress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judaic law famously bans pigs. For millennia, scholars have wondered why. This paper uses the economics of property rights to resolve the puzzle. We argue that the Judaic pig ban was an instrument for internalizing swine externalities. Free ranging pigs in search of sustenance trespass on agricultural landowners' property, wreaking destruction. Activities that foster such pigs thus create negative externalities that can cripple agricultural economies. When the expected cost of swine externalities becomes large, internalization becomes worthwhile: lawmakers with a vested interest in the agricultural economy ban activities that foster free ranging pigs. That is what transpired in ancient Judah, where lawmakers were priests whose livelihoods depended on agriculture, where all swine ranged freely, and where the expected cost of swine externalities surged during the late Iron Age. Lawmakers invoked God to enjoin involvement with pigs because a supernatural injunction was cheaper to enforce than a natural one: in a land of faithful Hebrews, Yahweh's swine prohibition enforced itself. The Judaic pig ban's features are consistent with pig bans recently adopted by US states such as Montana, which everyone agrees are instruments for internalizing swine externalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade-offs between quality and quantity arise in an abundance of contexts concerning group decision making. With the starting point being that group members provide more accurate evidence when they are involved with fewer tasks, team managers often encounter the following dilemma: Should they assign their group members with many tasks (attempting to gather more evidence with lower quality), or with fewer tasks (aiming at receiving less, but more high-quality evidence)? Secondly, what is the optimal way to aggregate the collected evidence from a group, which may be contrasting and varying in accuracy? Should more weight be given to the more accurate group members, or to the larger number of those who provide the same answer? This topic is already studied within the mathematical framework of Terzopoulou and Endriss (2019). In this paper we complement it experimentally, by investigating to what extent people's decision-making patterns are in accordance with the optimal ones proposed by the normative model. Our findings suggest that people understand the task at hand and generally opt for optimal choices, especially in conflict-free cases. Still, a tendency towards overvaluing the importance of additional evidence, despite their accuracy, is observed; this translates into choosing options that align with the majority rule in aggregation problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a model to identify why, for some, the expression of liberal attitudes towards the LGBT population may be strategic rather than sincere. We show that the British population displays considerably more tolerant views towards homosexuality compared to the end of the 1980s. However, there is evidence that this has slowed in recent years, especially in areas that have experienced the highest levels of immigration, particularly from countries outside Europe. We explain these changes with reference to two effects that immigration/multiculturalism may have – direct cultural and indirect political effects – the latter manifested in selective liberalisation such that for some members of the in-group adopting a liberal attitude towards a group that was once the salient out-group (in this case the LGBT population) generates greater benefits for the in-group by creating disutility for the currently salient out-group (in this case culturally conservative religious minorities and immigrants). We explore both influences using survey data and find strong evidence for the first effect and suggestive support for the second effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we perform a text analysis of Adam Smith's two books, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, to better characterize their highly disputed differences in terms of moral cognition. In particular, given that Smith's ideas are still very cited and influential in the current scholarly debate on moral cognition, we are interested in understanding whether a text analysis would unveil a semantic structure that is in line with a dual process theory interpretation or, alternatively, with a neuro-emergent cognition one. We find that, despite that the intellectual koine in which Smith's thought was originally embedded would be more in line with a dual process theory approach, the analysis reveals a better consonance with the neuro-emergent cognition approach. This opens new and interesting perspectives in future research on the moral cognition of market interactions in a Smithian tradition of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rising Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita data indicates rises in living standards. Nonetheless, cultural pessimism is the received view. This paper makes a series of arguments that we should expect our cultural products (e.g. art or cuisine) to be on an upwards trajectory, just as RGDP per capita is. To do so, I expand on Bill James's "Peripheral Quality Indicia" in order to argue that analogous indicators for our cultural products strongly suggest that they have improved. I also claim that RGDP per capita is itself a peripheral quality indicium for essentially any good in the economy. I then sketch the conditions under which cultural products are actually lower in quality today than they were in previous periods in order to demonstrate the general unlikelihood of quality declining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relative risk aversion (RRA) models explain social class inequalities in education with risk avoidance, i.e., the risky choice assumption (RCA). This assumption concerns risks related to more ambitious educational choices and has been subject to little explicit scrutiny. In this paper, we test whether or not vocational education is a safety net that protects from labor market marginalization. We present an empirical assessment of upper-secondary track choices in Sweden, contrasting the vocational and the academic tracks for those not pursuing tertiary educational degrees. We use Swedish administrative data for all siblings born 1972–1980 and fit sibling fixed effects models netting out unobserved time-constant confounders. The only evidence in favor of the RCA is that when considering selection, graduates of the academic track without a tertiary degree initially face higher risks of not being stably employed and registered as unemployed in their early 20s than their counterparts from vocational education. However, the academic tracks significantly protect men from the threat of entering unskilled routine occupations. We conclude that the support for the RCA is scant at best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Particularly in the social sciences, scientific debates can be understood as a special expression of academic discourse and ideally support the progress of knowledge within a discipline. Very often, there are competing academic schools with greatly differing theoretical foundations, as we have seen, for example, in social sciences-especially by the "Methodenstreit" in economics, or the "Positivismusstreit" in Sociology. This paper aims to introduce a new approach to study academic schools and would like to contribute to the literature on the economics of science. To this end, the paper uses the economic theory of religion in general and the economics of sects in particular by transferring the approach to academic schools for the first time. Our results can help to extend the understanding of scientific decision-making and to explain the membership to an academic school. Although the model is presented in relationship to social sciences in general and economics in particular, the basic model of academic schools is generally transferable. JEL Classification : A12, B13, B21, B40, B53, Z12 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors study the role of kinship relationships in explaining mobilization for a revolt in Basel, Switzerland, in 1691; rebels consisted of a weaker fraction of the elite and individuals with citizen rights. The empirical section shows that revolts are mainly driven by the elite's distant kin rather than the rebels' close kin. Allowing for coalition formation, as in the new theory of corruption, conflict, and inequality proposed in this comment, can give an alternative explanation. In the first formal model, we assume "elite" corresponds to the term "enforcer" in the new theory. This is a nonproductive individual who is the strongest in terms of fighting against peasants over a prize in a contest. In this simple model, there are no other players. Thus, this framework predicts that the only rebels would come from within the elite. Historical evidence shows that the marginal elite got stronger relatively and, thus, excluded the oligarchy from the winning coalition to take over the government. The direct application of this model would imply that non-elite members were not part of the rebellion. However, the historical facts presented by Armandola et al. show that non-elite citizens also participated in the revolt. To match these facts in Armandola et al., we allow informally individuals with citizen rights to participate in the rebellion. Peasants, a term also used in the new theory, and marginalized groups (a term only used in the commented paper) in the cities did not participate. Kinship effects are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military institutions can be seen as a solution to a type of principal-agent problem, in which a government principal contracts with a military agent to produce violence on their behalf. Absent extensive monitoring, low effort should be expected from the military agent. This should especially be the case for a mercenary force which cannot rely on patriotism or ideology. Yet the mercenary army of the British-ruled India consistently produced high and dedicated performance. In this paper, I argue that the otherwise curious institution of recruiting predominantly from the so-called 'martial races' helps to explain this puzzle. Drawing on Iannaccone's club goods model, I argue that the martial race recruitment system represented an effective solution to the principal-agent problem by allowing the British to benefit from a repeat business arrangement with a small number of ethno-religious groups whose costly in-group prohibitions and poor outside options helped both to screen out potential shirkers and deter poor performance on the battlefield. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Measuring inequalities in political participation across social groups is a challenging task as participation is typically coded in dummy variables. For instance, social scientists record whether their respondents have voted in the previous elections (1) or not (0). In this paper, we identify a list of desirable criteria that an inequality index used for empirical comparative studies should meet. Existing inequality indices fail to satisfy one or more of these criteria. Building on our list, we define a new Gini-type index, the Political Inequality in Participation Index (PIPI), suitable for cross-country comparisons. We show that inequalities measured by the PIPI are correlated to, but are qualitatively different from the best-known measurements. In particular, using data simulation techniques, we demonstrate that this correlation is decreasing in the complexity of societies' structure. Moreover, by replicating an existing study, we further demonstrate that when working with real-world data, the PIPI provides new empirical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states fail? Why do failed states persist without collapsing into complete anarchy? This paper argues that in response to insurgency or weakened state capacity, the best way for rulers to sustain their rule may be, paradoxically, to reduce the amount of political protection they provide to clients or citizens. This behavior recognizes and helps explain a puzzling feature of failed states, namely that central government often functions even when political disorder prevails. To evaluate this argument, the paper analyzes the case of King Stephen’s reign in medieval England. In response to a challenge to his succession, King Stephen dramatically decentralized government, a decision which has long puzzled historians. In addition, although far removed historically from contemporary cases, the reign of King Stephen exhibits just those characteristics of modern, failed states: insurgency, civil war, territorial fragmentation, increasing disorder and violence (even between adherents of the same side of the civil conflict), and yet the persistence of some amount of centralized rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates two forms of property as a social phenomenon and finds the Property Right Paradigm of economics to be wrongly conceived. Introducing new formulations for property reveals that private and communal property are frequently found together. When they are, as the scope of one increases the scope of the other shrinks. We examine how property rights are embedded in social exchange experiments. Calling on game theory, we find that communal property relations and private property relations contain exactly the same social dilemma. Furthermore, absent enforced rights, no property exists. Property comes to exist through socially producing its rights and we show that production must be coercive. We link our new theory of property to Robѐ's analysis of property and power in contemporary society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large body of often rather complex findings on intergenerational social mobility has by now come into existence but theoretical development has not kept pace. In this paper, focusing specifically on class mobility in European nations and the US, we aim, first of all, to identify the main empirical regularities that have emerged from research, making the now standard distinction between absolute and relative mobility. Next, we review previous theories of mobility, leading up to what we label as the liberal theory, and we note the difficulties now evident with the latter, associated with its functionalist basis. We then set out our own theory of intergenerational class mobility, grounded in the subjectively rational courses of action followed by the various actors involved. We seek to show how the empirical regularities described can in this way be accounted for, while pointing to additional evidence that supports the theory but also to ways in which it is open to further empirical test. Finally, we consider some more general implications of the theory and, on this basis, venture a number of – conditional – predictions on the future of class mobility in more advanced societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When faced with oppression from the state, some groups and individuals choose costly opposition rather than a compromise. This may be caused by the cost of compromise being higher than the cost of opposition. However, it is also possible that the persistent opposition is due to some past decisions. The paper proposes a model explaining persistent opposition as a result of group-specific investment in human capital that traps individuals in an opposition group even when she would be better off outside the group. The model is illustrated with the case of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, the largest group opposing the Communist regime. Within that context, the model contributes to the explanation of the persistence and growth of the underground church under Communist rule as well as the post-Communist religious revival. The same model may also be applied to malign opposition groups, such as terrorist and criminal organizations, and it provides clues about how to deal with them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite similar educational aspirations, black students persist in higher education at much lower rates than white undergraduates. This paper advances a theoretical explanation for the racial gap in persistence by examining whether the differential attrition in college reflects contrasting incentives for educational persistence. To account for the highly unequal hurdles faced by black men and women in college and in the labor market, we propose a method that addresses race-gender-specific opportunity structures in both institutions simultaneously. This approach is based on forward-looking estimates of outcomes where students draw information from their race-gender reference group ahead of them. The model estimates the earnings payoffs of persistence separately for each race-gender group at three consecutive educational decision nodes: at high school graduation, college entry, and after one year in college. We subsequently apply one version of this model to data from the American Community Surveys (2001–2017), calculating the absolute and relative incentives for educational persistence across racial groups. In addition to large dollar earnings differentials, the analyses reveal striking racial gaps of the relative incentives to stay enrolled: "incentive inequality." This incentive race gap is largest at the earliest stages of the higher education career—high school graduation and college entry—where the black undergraduate dropout rate is highest. Our findings have substantive and methodological implications for situations where returns to investments are unequal across groups affected by discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the literature on Relative Risk Aversion theory in two ways: first, by considering that the effect of time preferences may differ according to both children's gender and social origin; second, by exploring this possibility for different educational outcomes: upper secondary school choices and university enrollment. We use data of the Survey of Household Income and Wealth, which contains questions specifically addressed to capture an individual's time discounting preference, to further explore the association between time discounting preference and the effect of social origin on educational outcomes in Italy. In line with prior research, we find that time preferences only have a meaningful effect among children of lowly educated parents. But such an effect, in turn, differs by gender: parental time preferences matter more for sons than for daughters of lowly educated parents. This gender effect is found both for upper secondary choices and for entry into higher education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35 % vs. 52 %). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have argued that the politically fractured landscape of medieval Western Europe was foundational to the evolution of constitutionalism and rule of law. In making this argument, Salter and Young (2019) have recently emphasized that the constellation of political property rights in the High Middle Ages was polycentric and hierarchical; holders of those rights were residual claimants to the returns on their governance and sovereign. The latter characteristics—residual claimancy and sovereignty—imply a clear delineation of jurisdictional boundaries and their integrity. However, historians' description of the "feudal anarchy" that followed the tenth-century disintegration of the Carolingian Empire does not suggest clearly delineated and stable boundaries. In this paper, I highlight the role of the Peace of God movement in the 11th and 12th centuries in delineating and stabilizing the structure of political property rights. In terms of historical political economy, the Peace of God movement provides an important link between the early medieval era and the constitutional arrangements of the High Middle Ages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article expands upon Fearon and Laitin’s seminal Explaining Interethnic Cooperation, a paper that formalized an explanation for how ethnic groups achieve cooperation through the use of in-group policing strategies that yield a more stable and substantively convincing equilibrium than tit-for-tat (spiral) reprisals by each side. This article expands the Fearon and Laitin framework in two ways. First, it generalizes their basic framework of two equally sized groups to an arbitrary number of arbitrarily sized groups. Second, the article expands the framework to allow for multiple interacting dimensions of identity. The paper uses this generalized framework to endogenize social identity into the formal model using a global games approach, in which there is uncertainty over which stage game will be played based on which dimension of identity is triggered by context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States incarcerates 1% of American adults. Incarceration rates have increased steadily since 1970 even while criminal activity has dropped. Additionally, while crime rates are relatively equal across races, the rate of incarceration for blacks has risen faster than for whites. This paper argues that plea bargaining, which accounts for 95% of criminal dispositions, is a major causal factor of high prison populations and high levels of racial stratification in prisons. This paper hypothesizes that by placing defendants in a multi-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, and by reducing transaction costs, plea bargaining allows prosecutors to act on a political will to incarcerate large numbers of people. Additionally, it hypothesizes that since black defendants are likely to have less faith in the criminal justice system than white defendants, this places them in a worse bargaining position, leading to systematically worse bargains. These differential bargains aggregate into a stratified prison population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses some issues of the debate on happiness in economics. In particular it deals with the relationship between happiness and sociality. In fact, in contemporary ‘economics and happiness’ literature there is a new interest in interpersonal relationships thanks to the huge empirical evidence that genuine sociality is one of the heaviest components of self-reported happiness. At the same time, mainstream economics is badly equipped for studying genuine sociality, because it treats interpersonal interactions as elements to be taken into account in terms of externalities. The intuition originating the paper is the conviction that if research on happiness aims at taking into account non-instrumental interpersonal relations, i.e. ‘relational goods’, scholars will profit by a reconsideration or retrieving of the Aristotelian tradition of happiness as eudaimonia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Escalation is a key characteristic of many consumption behaviors that has not received theoretical attention. This paper aims to propose both a definition and a theoretical treatment of escalation in consumption. We define escalation as a subject's attempt to obtain "more" or engage in consumption behaviors that are "more intense" on a measurable, quantitative or qualitative, objective or subjective, scale (more difficult ski slopes, stronger drugs, harder sex, better restaurants etc.), even if the subject preferred less intense consumption behaviors in the past. Further, this evolution in behavior also occurs if the budget constraint does not change. We will find endogenous and exogenous theoretical microfoundations for escalation in models of hedonic adaptation, desire for novelty, acquisition of consumption skills, rising aspirations, positional effects, and envy. However, we will also discuss the possibility that the tendency to escalate is a specific innate behavior inherent to human nature. Finally, we will propose a preliminary theoretical formalization of such behavior and indicate the possible implications of taking escalation into adequate consideration. JEL codes: B52, D11, D90, D91, I31 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the act of making a decision a process or pulse? Critiques of rational choice theory and models often treat cognitive processes of preference ordering as part of the act of decision that should be incorporated into the models. The failure to account for human psychology, they argue, responds for RCT's lack of predictability. However, this argument and the models of human mind, such as prospect theory, see decision as a process that begins at the cognitive considerations of preference ordering and extends up to the act of decision. In this paper, I argue that decision is analogous to a pulse rather than a process. I draw this analogy with the Dirac delta function, which in signal theory represents an unitary pulse. In the exact moment of making a decision, all preferences and contextual evaluations must have been already structured in the agent's mind, otherwise she would not be capable of making the decision. Acknowledging the pulse-like nature of rational choice models allows modellers to eschew the incorporation of complex cognitive processes into their analyses, which has both theoretical and empirical implications to RCT's representation of real-world phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates strategic thinking in the fictional world of Edgar Allan Poe's 'The Purloined Letter'. This short story has been rightly celebrated for its explicit analysis of strategic reasoning in which players attempt to outwit one another, which involves accounting for how they are all attempting to outwit one another. I differ from previous analyses by examining how the actors can often be wrong in their explicit analysis and consider the strategic actions they take rather than those they claim to take. Using elementary game theory, I describe the five games (and suggest a sixth) that make up the strategic heart of the story. These include games of signalling, screening, negotiation, revenge and a unique game called the 'pincer'. I consider how literary sources like 'The Purloined Letter' can provide insights into the applicability of strategic analysis in the 'real world'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Talcot Parsons suggested in 1963 that there are basically three kinds of authority: utilitarian authority, coercive authority, and persuasive authority. In this paper, I show that the models developed by Gibbons and Rutten (1997), Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992), Akerlof (1976) and Basu (1986) can be viewed as models where issues such as authority, power, influence and ideology, in the sense of Parsons, can be formally discussed, t also show the existence of an interesting difficulty in providing a contractarian interpretation of the State under the Parsonian view of governmental authority discussed in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the author's comments on the paper "Kinds of Third Party Effect on Trust," by Ronald S. Burt and Marc Knez. According to author, this paper is an excellent example of dogged and thorough analysis. He has two comments on the approach used by Burt and Knez. One comment deals with the dependent variable, trust, and the second concerns the independent variable, structure. One of the dominant themes in the paper is that distrust is more affected by various structural factors than trust. But, this conclusion is based on empirical results that do not operationalize trust and distrust as opposite ends of the same dimension. Trust is measured by asking the respondent to name people they would approach for counsel in looking for a new job. While this may be a conservative method, it has reasonable face validity. The measure of distrust is more problematic. The measure of direct ties and indirect ties as well as the measure indirect ties is standard in Burt's analysis. These constructs have been usefully applied at many levels of analysis, individuals, organizations and industries.

This paper estimates models of choice of child-care arrangement that include measures of price, quality and availability, obtained directly from parents in the National Child Care Survey (NCCS) of 1990. Choice models are a key tool of empirically oriented rational choice researchers. However, most researchers do not have the information they need to adequately test their hypotheses and rely solely on the individual characteristics of choosers. This paper compares how one might go about actually using a rational choice approach with appropriate data and how results compare with the standard approaches in literature today. NCCS is a representative survey of households with children under age 13, funded by the National Association for the Education of Young Children and the Administration for Children, Youth and Families. Few child care choice models include characteristics of alternatives such as price, child/staff ratio and travel time, as well as those of decision makers, such as age, education and income.

This paper applies the theory of rational choice to one of the most discussed social problems, AIDS. The theory of rational choice, while not quite a synonym for economic theory, is sufficiently interchangeable with it to justify characterizing the application of rational choice theory to topics in sociology, for example, the design of institutions for the control of social pathologies such as drug addiction and associated diseases such as AIDS. Authors argue that peer pressure will be mobilized more effectively for the prevention of AIDS among intravenous drug users, if the ex-users, instead of being paid a salary, are paid by the number of current users that they bring to the place where information and either equipment for preventing the spread of HIV through sharing of needles are dispensed. In view of criticism of rational choice theory, the empirical methodology employed by theorists insufficiently rigorous to satisfy an economist's empirical standards. Authors tested a hypothesis on a sample of only two observations and obviously a sample of two is much too small to allow reliable inferences to be drawn.

This article investigates the nature of organizational culture using a contest framework. management theorists describe corporate culture as the nature of relationships, set of rules and customs within an organization. In this paper, theorists have attempted to formalize the notion of organizational culture or rather one facet of organizational culture, namely, the extent of cooperation, through the analysis of contest behavior. Theorists have restricted themselves to the analysis of organization subordinates while ignoring the role of the authority. For example, suppose the authority wants to induce cooperation at minimal cost, the question of whether it is advisable to use few large rewards or many small ones should receive attention. Although, theorists, have shown the importance of the number of prizes in the determination of organizational culture, theorists have not explicitly studied the effect of the size of rewards. The model of organizational culture developed in this paper should provide a fertile ground for experimental work.

This article surveys various economic literature which tries to model loss of control in hierarchies. Hierarchies have been studied by sociologists, management theorists and economics over this century. In most of these studies it has been assumed that supervisory effort is observable, although, imperfectly. The idea is that if a supervisor has worked at a reasonably high level, then layers below should have worked reasonably well and consequently production ought to be reasonably good. In pure supervision models, it might be easy for the firm not to show loss of hierarchical control when it grows. This is more so when it grows and when the supervisory effort is not directly visible. in all models discussed in this paper, theorists have talked about pure hierarchies,where every employee has a unique boss. This has been done for modeling convenience, in realty one has a matrix and other forms of organization. One key problem of modeling supervision and planning together is the difficulty in objectively defining the relationship between the two.

This paper argues that the incomplete-contracting or property-rights approach, can throw light on the meaning of authority. This approach emphasizes the idea that ownership of a physical or a non-human asset is a source of power when contracts are incomplete. The reason is that an owner has residual control rights over the asset in uncontracted-for contigencies. The second part of the paper argues that incomplete contracts and residual control rights are helpful for understanding the meaning of authority. The property rights approach, like a number of other theories of the firm, views the firm in contractual terms. Moreover, like transaction-cost theory, the property rights approach stresses the role of asset ownership and residual control rights as a way of overcoming contractual incompleteness. This article discusses in detail as to what the approach can tell one about the meaning of authority. An incomplete contracting setting is a natural one for studying authority, just as it is for studying boundaries of firms

The literature on nudging has rekindled normative and conceptual debates surrounding the extent to which and the direction in which people can legitimately influence each other's actions. An oft-heard objection to nudging is that it exploits psychological mechanisms, manipulates people and thereby insufficiently respects their rational decision-making capacities. Bypassing and/or perverting people's rational capacities, nudges are said to undermine agency. In this paper, I analyze and deflate these criticisms. After disentangling the different conceptions of rationality that pervade the arguments of both nudging enthusiasts and critics, I critically assess how and under which circumstances nudging can be said to undermine, pervert, bypass but also strengthen people's rationality. Only in a limited set of cases, I argue, does it make sense to object to nudges for making people less rational than they are, can be or should be. Crucial in this respect will be the distinction between outcome-oriented and process-oriented conceptions of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether individuals are loss averse with respect to their status quo wealth level in sharing situations. In a real-effort dictator game, dictators are asked to share their earnings either before or after earning them. The instructions also variably emphasize the amount that the dictator will give or receive at the end of the experiment. This study finds that whether the money is already earned or not has no statistically significant effects on the average sharing behavior, regardless of which instructions are used. The results indicate that dictator game participants are not loss averse with respect to their status quo wealth level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we study how norms of symmetry and centricity affect the functioning of two ways to allocate resources described in the economic anthropology literature, namely reciprocity and redistribution. The baseline reciprocity study, with no explicit priming of the norm of symmetry, features near-zero levels of allocative efficiency. Consistent with the anthropological framework we use throughout, we find that priming the norm of symmetry among the players through pre-play communication dramatically increases efficiency. Next we study a game of redistribution and find that in the final stages of the game allocative efficiency levels consistently approach 100%, regardless of how the chief comes to acquire centricity in the group. We conclude that reciprocity and redistribution can seldom allocate resources efficiently in the absence of norms of symmetry and centricity in the institutional design. By way of comparison, we confirm a robust finding in the experimental economics literature that a simple market exchange game achieves high efficiency, even when the traders can formulate expectations about each other’s compliance with norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If welfare stigma depends upon social attitudes, only the neediest apply for welfare when they can more easily be seen to do so. Using GoogleMaps' 'StreetView' feature, this article finds that the approval rate of applications for social assistance is higher in welfare offices with building characteristics that enhance the visibility of entry. A fitting explanation for this finding is that persons looking for social assistance dislike being thought of as 'welfare cases', and apply more conservatively when others can see it. The effects decline in the rate of poverty, suggesting that the self-reliance norm weakens as poverty increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies belief formation for two kinds of religion. The main conclusion is that they follow different mechanisms. Specifically, for religions relying on supernatural powers, people formulate beliefs based on their prior beliefs and experiences, and they may claim their beliefs for some realistic considerations. For religions based on self-sufficiency, mainly Buddhism, beliefs are formed by an awareness of suffering and dependent arising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of EU development aid to the economies of the former Soviet Union under conditions of imperfect monitoring. Transnational sovereignty partnerships (TSPs) suggest a novel type of aid recipient and an institutional component of the TACIS program. TSPs are composed of distributive planners and developmental entrepreneurs. Distributive planners set the development strategy and developmental entrepreneurs implement it based on EU development aid. I model the delivery of EU development aid to the former Soviet Union as an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with private signals. Aid effectiveness occurs when the European Commission signals that it will finance another TSP, without reducing its expected profit from aid implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

All social exchanges involve some degree of uncertainty, although the amount depends on the conditions of the exchange. Uncertainty may arise due to the unverifiable quality of the good exchanged or the indeterminable quality of the exchange partner (i.e., whether she is trustworthy). Social exchange theory offers several mechanisms by which uncertainty may be reduced or mitigated such as through trust, repeated exchanges, reputation, information regarding the exchanges of others, and institutions. This paper applies principles from social exchange theory to religious behavior and argues that the same mechanisms that reduce uncertainty in social exchanges also reduce uncertainty in ‘religious’ exchanges, resulting in higher levels of religious commitment. In particular, this paper proposes that having experiences believed to be supernatural, having close ties to others within one’s religious congregation, and being affiliated with a higher tension church should increase religious commitment through decreasing uncertainty. Analysis of the 1988 General Social Survey and the 2007 Baylor Religion Survey supports these hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that kinship ties and sharing information on violent acts can be interpreted as forms of ‘hostage-taking’ likely to increase cooperation among co-offenders. The paper tests this hypothesis among members of two criminal groups, a Camorra clan based just outside Naples, and a Russian Mafia group that moved to Rome in the mid-1990s. The data consist of the transcripts of phone intercepts conducted on both groups by the Italian police over several months. After turning the data into a series of network matrices, we use Multivariate Quadratic Assignment Procedure to test the hypothesis. We conclude that the likelihood of cooperation is higher among members who have shared information about violent acts. Violence has a stronger effect than kinship in predicting tie formation and thus cooperation. When non-kinship-based mechanisms fostering cooperation exist, criminal groups are likely to resort to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the determinants of perceptions of the honesty of most people across 48 US states and three periods. The results show support for the detrimental effects of income inequality but no or little support for a set of popular alternative theories from the related literature on social trust. The decline in honesty perceptions in recent decades is found to have been a consequence of increasing social polarization and the natural decline of the most trusting age cohorts. Residual honesty has increased since the 1970s, giving rise to markedly different policy implications than those forwarded in most studies in the trust literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper combines ideas from several branches of the social sciences into an economic model of college enrollment, following recent theoretical work by Akerlof and Kranton (2002). Basic to the model are notions of ‘fitting in,’ social status, and investments in human capital during high school. After using the NELS data and maximum likelihood estimation to uncover the behavioral parameters of the model, I predict the effects of ‘economic’ and ‘social’ policy interventions. I find that policies implemented during high school are often too late to reduce disparities in college enrollments; the exceptions are policies that shape adolescents’ social environments. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper presents a new argument that links generalized social trust and collective action in situations with a large number of actors who do not have specific information on each other. Generalized social trust enhances large-N cooperation through the social exchange heuristic, which stimulates conditional cooperation in social dilemmas. Using data from a survey in four countries and recycling behavior as an indicator of collective action, this explanation is tested with individual-level data. While the relationship between generalized social trust and large-N collective action is often hypothesized, there is scant micro-level evidence as it has mainly been tested at the macro level. The results show that people holding generalized social trust cooperate more readily in large-N dilemmas, and that they most likely do so because of the social exchange heuristic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores a highly controversial issue: while most European countries are secular, the governments of these countries widely support religious institutions. The arguments put forward by the median voter seem insufficient to explain the data. We show that if political parties are allowed to take an ideological position with respect to religion, the observed deviations from the most preferred policy by the median voter could be explained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Freedom of choice is often defended with reference to its positive influence on the satisfaction of preferences. The more choice options there are, the greater the level of utility one derives from choosing one of the options. Moreover, it is assumed that the satisfaction of preferences will not decrease if the size of the choice set increases, in particular in parametric situations. This paper opposes this conclusion by showing that choosing option a from a one-element choice set {a} may not be identical with choosing option a from a two-element choice set {a,b}. The character and the consequences of choosing option a may change considerably with the addition of another option b. Therefore, the level of utility derived from option a changes as well, possibly even in a negative way. Hence, an increase in freedom of choice may diminish one's preference satisfaction, also in parametric situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behavior is rational to the extent that it optimizes actions, beliefs, and information collection subject to various constraints. It is intelligible to the extent that it makes sense to an interpreter. The two concepts are connected because interpretation ordinarily proceeds on the assumption that others would do what we do under the same circumstances, mutatis mutandis. And because we of necessity understand our own behavior as being as rational as possible given the constraints we face, we must interpret the behavior of others in the same way. This paper develops the concepts of rationality and intelligibility, and applies them to the problem of interpretation. It does so by relying upon Jon Elster's recent work upon the same concepts. Like Elster, moreover, this paper concerns both the interpretation of real behavior and that of fictional characters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]