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The article explores the effect of currency reforms on German publishers. During first three post-World War II years, German publishers in the American Zone operated in an environment dominated by three factors. First, money was plentiful but goods were scarce, and publications were one of the few unrationed categories of available goods. Second, the war had left the public with a pent-up desire for reading material. Third, military government exercised considerable guidance and supervision over publications. A survey undertaken by Military Government in the spring of 1949 showed that the publishing industry reacted violently to various changed conditions, and provides a graphic illustration of the influence of economic factors on the content of mass communications. The institution of a free paper economy was effected within two weeks of the currency reform. While the post-currency reform rise in paper production provided periodicals with opportunities for greatly increased circulations, it did not lighten problems of the book publishing industry.

The aim of this study is to determine the criteria according to which world news presented in the Soviet Union-controlled press of Berlin, Germany is selected. Berlin of today, with its four sectors under U.S., British, Russian and French control respectively, offers a fertile field for the application of content analysis techniques developed in this country during the war. From the start of the quadripartite occupation Berliners have been aware that the press in the Soviet sector of Berlin differs radically from that in the sectors controlled by the Western Powers. Differences have not been confined to the editorial pages but have extended to the news columns. It is of particular importance to attempt to isolate criteria of selection at this time, since a critical news-print shortage limits nearly all German papers to one page or less of world news, and only a small percentage of available dispatches can be given space.

Yu, Tian, and Tang (2008) proposed two new techniques for asking questions on sensitive topics in population surveys: the triangular model (TM) and the crosswise model (CM). The two models can be used as alternatives to the well-known randomized response technique (RRT) and are meant to overcome some of the drawbacks of the RRT. Although Yu, Tian, and Tang provide a promising theoretical analysis of the proposed models, they did not test them. We therefore provide results from an experimental survey in which the crosswise model was implemented and compared to direct questioning. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evaluation of the crosswise model. We focused on the crosswise model because it seems better suited than the triangular model to overcome the self-protective “no” bias observed for the RRT. This paper-and-pencil survey on plagiarism was administered to Swiss and German students in university classrooms. Results suggest that the CM is a promising data-collection instrument eliciting more socially undesirable answers than direct questioning. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What theories explain variation in public opinion toward asylum seekers? We implement a survey experiment in which a representative sample of German residents evaluates vignettes of asylum seekers, which randomly vary attributes that speak to deservingness, economic and religious threat, and gender considerations of attitude formation. We find strong support for deservingness theories. Economic and religious threat theories also receive empirical support. Gender plays a negligible role. Importantly, we also document that economic and—to a lesser extent—religious threat considerations only matter when respondents evaluate economic refugees. By contrast, political refugees are welcomed nearly unconditionally. Our paper thus replicates key findings from Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2016) and Czymara and Schmidt-Catran (2016) using a representative sample and points to an important interaction effect in public opinion formation toward asylum seekers: economic threat only gets activated when refugees' deservingness is in doubt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In survey research, a consensus has grown regarding the effectiveness of incentives encouraging survey participation across different survey modes and target populations. Most of this research has been based on surveys from the United States, whereas few studies have provided evidence that these results can be generalized to other contexts. This paper is the first to present comprehensive information concerning the effects of incentives on response rates and nonresponse bias across large-scale surveys in Germany. The context could be viewed as a critical test for incentive effects because Germany's population is among the most survey-critical in the world, with very low response rates. Our results suggest positive incentive effects on response rates and patterns of effects that are similar to those in previous research: The effect increased with the monetary value of the incentive; cash incentives affected response propensity more strongly than lottery tickets do; and prepaid incentives could be more cost effective than conditional incentives. We found mixed results for the effects of incentives on nonresponse bias. Regarding large-scale panel surveys, we could not unequivocally confirm that incentives increased response rates in later panel waves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses speeding, that is, "too fast" responses, in web surveys. Relying on the response process model, we argue that very short response times indicate low data quality, stemming from a lack of attention on the part of respondents. To identify speeding, prior research employed case-wise procedures. Using data from nine online surveys, we demonstrate that response behavior of individual respondents varies considerably during a survey. Thus, we use case- and page-wise procedures to capture speeding behavior that taps different, although related, phenomena. Moreover, page-specific speeding measures capture aspects of data quality that traditional quality measures do not cover. Employing both page-specific and case-wise speeding measures, we examine whether removing speeders makes a difference in substantive findings. The evidence indicates that removing "too fast" responses does not alter marginal distributions, irrespective of which speeder-correction technique is employed. Moreover, explanatory models yield, by and large, negligible coefficient differences (on average about one standard error). Only in exceptional cases differences exceed two standard errors. Our findings suggest that speeding primarily adds some random noise to the data and attenuate correlations, if it makes a difference at all. The paper concludes by discussing implications and limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Real-time response (RTR) measurement is an important technique for analyzing human processing of electronic media stimuli. Although it has been demonstrated that RTR data are reliable and internally valid, some argue that they lack external validity. The reason for this is that RTR measurement is restricted to a laboratory environment due to its technical requirements. This paper introduces a smartphone app that 1) captures real-time responses using the dial technique and 2) provides a solution for one of the most important problems in RTR measurement, the (automatic) synchronization of RTR data. In addition, it explores the reliability and validity of mobile RTR measurement by comparing the real-time reactions of two samples of young and welleducated voters to the 2013 German televised debate. Whereas the first sample participated in a classical laboratory study, the second sample was equipped with our mobile RTR system and watched the debate at home. Results indicate that the mobile RTR system yields similar results to the lab-based RTR measurement, providing evidence that laboratory studies using RTR are externally valid. In particular, the argument that the artificial reception situation creates artificial results has to be questioned. In addition, we conclude that RTR measurement outside the lab is possible. Hence, mobile RTR opens the door for large-scale studies to better understand the processing and impact of electronic media content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fair evaluation of interviewers based on their cooperation rates is complicated in most surveys. Depending on the mode(s) of data collection and the methods used to assign sampled cases to interviewers, different interviewers often work cases that are more or less difficult to interview. Further, in centralized telephone facilities, interviewers are given cases affected by the results of earlier attempts by other interviewers. This paper proposes and evaluates an interviewer performance indicator that attempts to repair these weaknesses and can be used in all data collection modes involving interviewers. For each contact made by an interviewer, the deviation between the outcome of that contact (1 = successful interview, 0 = other) and the predicted probability of a successful interview for that contact (according to auxiliary information and survey paradata) is recorded. Each interviewer then receives a score that is the mean of these deviations across all contacts. This performance indicator gives larger credit to the interviewer who obtains success on difficult cases versus relatively easy cases. The indicator also gives smaller penalties to failures on very difficult cases. We analyze face-to-face and telephone contacts from three different surveys to illustrate the computation of this indicator and its properties. We find that calling-history paradata are the strongest predictors of obtaining interviews in both modes (especially for face-to-face contacts), and produce propensity-adjusted performance indicators that more effectively distinguish among interviewers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The study of mass communications can be divided into three parts: intent analysis, content analysis and effect analysis. This order not only reflects chronology. By placing content analysis in the middle position, it also highlights the contribution of that procedure to the other two, namely, to support inferences about intent on the one hand and effect or response on the other. This paper reports a number of special attempts to discern the intentions of enemy propaganda during World War II by means of rigorous analysis of the manifest content of the communications under control. Among the many other problems in the area of intent analysis is the problem of discovering whether two communications-controlling groups, formally related or not, actually collaborate in their propaganda output; and if so, under what conditions, in what ways, and to what extent. This is the general context of this study. Specifically, the subject of investigation was the nature of collaboration between the German and Italian propaganda ministries in their short-wave radio output beamed to North America just before and after the entry of the United States into the war.

The article focuses on German press after the freedom and refounding of democratic German newspapers, as of December 1, 1944. When German dictator Adolf Hitler took power in 1933, 2,243 of Germany's newspapers were directly connected with political parties. But Nazis could claim only about 100 party newspapers, and, of these, few had a circulation over 10,000. The two Catholic groups with less than half the number of votes, were represented by about six times as many newspapers. The Social Democratic Party, with a little more than half the number of votes, owned outright 148 newspapers and eighteen periodicals. The weakness of the labor press contributed to Hitler's rise in a passive but nevertheless in an important manner. Even under the Emperor and the Weimar Republic, four-fifths of these voters for labor parties subscribed to Nationalist newspapers, because these were cheaper, more sensational, had more news and, above all, appealed to women through more advertisements.

Perhaps the most significant characteristic of "totalitarian" regimes is the elevation to the status of the Germany's political faith. State-monopolized propaganda is substituted for the competition of ideologies to be found in the established pattern of representative government. This transformation requires the "coordination" of all instruments of opinion management, particularly the press, under the guidance of a central agency of the one-party state. The primary aim of government propaganda, however, is not so much to eliminate opportunities for direct and broadly effective criticism as to conquer the minds of the people. "Popular en-lightenment" seeks to produce demonstrations of civic approval, for "one cannot sit on bayonets." The task of staging manifestations of mass identification with the elite in power calls for expert handling of public opinion. The necessity of "dosing" propaganda "prudently" accounts largely for the fact that in Germany the former liberal press has not simply been stamped out by government decree.

It has long been observed by social scientists and, more intuitively, by those who are concerned with the practical politics of public opinion, that one function of the mass media is to confer recognition on individuals or groups. Public recognition, in turn, when it comes from a "significant other" or an important reference group, may exercise an influence on the opinions and behavior of those who receive it. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role that recognition, as expressed through the mass media, played by influencing politically-significant behavior in one crisis situation—the Berlin blockade of 1948-49. Following the end of the Second World War, the city of Berlin in Germany was divided into four sectors, each of which was occupied by one of the four major powers. A full blockade of the land and water routes leading to the sectors occupied by the Western Allies was imposed by the Soviet Union in June 1948. Moscow's objective in doing this was apparently either to force the United States, Great Britain, and France to relinquish their position in Berlin, or else to obtain major concessions from them in West Germany.

Deviant interviewer behavior is a potential hazard of interviewer-administered surveys, with interviewers fabricating entire interviews as the most severe form. Various statistical methods (e.g. cluster analysis) have been proposed to detect falsifiers. These methods often rely on falsification indicators aiming to measure differences between real and falsified data. However, due to a lack of real-world data, empirical evaluations and comparisons of different statistical methods and falsification indicators are scarce. Using a large-scale nationally representative refugee survey in Germany with known fraudulent interviews, this study tests, evaluates, and compares statistical methods for identifying falsified data. We investigate the use of new and existing falsification indicators as well as multivariate detection methods for combining them. Additionally, we introduce a new and easy-to-use multivariate detection method that overcomes practical limitations of previous methods. We find that the vast majority of used falsification indicators successfully measure differences between falsifiers and nonfalsifiers, with the newly proposed falsification indicators outperforming some existing indicators. Furthermore, different multivariate detection methods perform similarly well in detecting the falsifiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the current challenges of conducting a General Social Survey (GSS) in face-to-face mode and evaluates the alternative of fielding these surveys in self-administered mixed-mode (web, mail) instead. Based on data from Germany, it first illustrates the stark decline of participation in face-to-face surveys since 2002 and reports a strong increase in the cost of conducting these surveys over the same period. It then discusses the possibility of implementing GSS-type surveys in a self-administered design and reports results from a mode experiment implemented in the German part of the European Values Study (EVS) 2017/18. The results of the experiment indicate that self-administered mixed-mode surveys are a viable alternative for cross-sectional general population surveys in Germany; they shorten the fieldwork period and lead to higher response rates, while being more cost-efficient than face-to-face surveys. Despite the finding that the sample composition deviates from the general population in both modes, the face-to-face mode represents the population slightly better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a case study of the attitude of Russian workers in Germany during World War II, towards the problem of interpreting attitude survey data. As mentioned in the article, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey found that the Russian workers were most anti-Germans during the war, based on responses given by French, Italian and Russian workers in Germany. However, as maintained by the authors, the same data may be interpreted, to mean that the Russian workers were actually more favorable to the Germans than were the other groups. This reinterpretation also appears to fit certain facts now available regarding foreign workers in Germany, better than does the interpretation put forward by the Bombing Survey. A possible explanation for the original interpretation is afforded by the theory that new data, including survey data, tend to be incorporated in an existing cognitive structure. Moreover, the complexity of international attitudes also contributes to the difficulty of interpreting statements of individuals as to what they think about other national groups.

The article focuses on efforts of a German legislator Gustav Stresemann to establish a peaceful alliance between Germany and France after the First Word War, as of June 1, 1944. Stresemann also won the Nobel Peace Prize for this initiative. The general estimate of Stresemann was that he was a sincere friend of peace, desirous of collaborating with his neighbors, the initiator of a new order. Nobel Prizeman seems to be denying French claim that the passive resistance was a government program inspired from Berlin, Germany. Modern apologists for Stresemann may say what they will, but not even they would maintain that the three verbs quoted constitute a program whose moral quality would be of the finest. The article analyzes Stresemann's diary, notes, letters and unconscious revelations, in an attempt to understand his psychology and ideas related to the initiative he took. According to the author, Stresemann was a safe, repentant sinner of the right, a good European and a safe bet for Allies.

The purpose of this present article is neither to attack nor to vindicate press control, but to furnish a systematic presentation of the ideology and mechanism of such regulation as developed by the German National Socialist Workers Party in Germany. In a totalitarian state the press bears a relation to the life of the people different from that in countries where other types of government obtain. To dismiss this differentiation by saying that press regulation is indefensible is to approach the problem with a closed mind. There is no connection between the old press laws and the new. The old law was based upon the legalistic concept of the state merely acting as policeman in the enforcement of the laws. The new role of the press is educational and its aims and activities must dovetail into those of the state, and the other cultural organizations. The person who has been born and reared amid a full freedom of the press may look upon press regulation. In spite of the strictures there are, however, compensating advantages.

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), which provide citizens with information on the party that best represents their political preferences, are often cited as evidence of the empowering capabilities of digital tools. Aside from the informational benefits of these voter guides, observational studies have suggested a strong effect on political participation and vote choice. However, existing impact evaluations have been limited by a reliance on convenience samples, lack of random assignment, or both. This raises questions about self-selection and the precise mechanisms underlying how voters learn about politics. Here, we provide evidence from a field experiment with survey outcomes conducted with a sample of over 1,000 German citizens in the 2017 federal election campaign. Using linked panel survey and digital trace data combined with a randomized encouragement to complete a VAA, we assess respondents' compliance with treatment and observe how the use of this tool affects political behavior, attitudes, media consumption, political knowledge, and even social media activity. Our findings reveal that the overwhelming consensus in favor of positive effects on turnout and vote choice should be treated with caution, as we find no such effects. Rather, the actual virtue of VAAs in a complex online information environment lies in increasing knowledge about parties' positions on issues—exactly the kind of information these tools were designed to provide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rising penetration of smartphones now gives researchers the chance to collect data from smartphone users through passive mobile data collection via apps. Examples of passively collected data include geolocation, physical movements, online behavior and browser history, and app usage. However, to passively collect data from smartphones, participants need to agree to download a research app to their smartphone. This leads to concerns about nonconsent and nonparticipation. In the current study, we assess the circumstances under which smartphone users are willing to participate in passive mobile data collection. We surveyed 1,947 members of a German nonprobability online panel who own a smartphone using vignettes that described hypothetical studies where data are automatically collected by a research app on a participant's smartphone. The vignettes varied the levels of several dimensions of the hypothetical study, and respondents were asked to rate their willingness to participate in such a study. Willingness to participate in passive mobile data collection is strongly influenced by the incentive promised for study participation but also by other study characteristics (sponsor, duration of data collection period, option to switch off the app) as well as respondent characteristics (privacy and security concerns, smartphone experience). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To mitigate the effects of low survey participation rates and possible nonresponse bias in survey estimates, survey organizations often try to collect auxiliary information with which to evaluate and possibly adjust for differences between respondents and nonrespondents. Call record data and other forms of paradata are commonly used for this purpose, but these data tend to be only weakly correlated with the survey items. Follow-up surveys conducted with nonrespondents try to get around this issue by asking a subset of key items selected from the original questionnaire. However, intensive follow-up procedures are expensive and have other known limitations. In this article, we explore an alternative follow-up procedure that simply asks nonrespondents for consent to use their administrative records in lieu of taking part in a telephone survey interview. Utilizing a unique study design with administrative records available for the overall study sample, we examine characteristics of telephone nonrespondents who consent to record use in a mail follow-up survey. Interestingly, we find that many telephone nonrespondents are willing to grant access to their administrative records. These consenting nonrespondents are similar to the remaining survey nonrespondents, yet different from the telephone survey respondents, which results in reduced nonresponse bias for some key economic items. We discuss the practical implications of these findings and offer some suggestions for incorporating the collected administrative data in nonresponse bias evaluation and adjustment procedures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Panel conditioning has posed one of the main challenges to panel studies since their inception in the social sciences. Aside from the risk of reactivity to previous interviews, there is reason to expect that cumulative survey experience increases the reliability of data emanating from panel studies relative to cross-sectional surveys. This positive aspect of recurrent interviewing for data quality has been given relatively little attention in the empirical research to date. Drawing on observational data from 30 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we study the effect of individual survey experience on reliability, focusing on person-fit statistics from item-response models. The analysis documents that four years of survey experience produce a higher increase in person reliability than tertiary education compared to primary education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Response propensities are increasingly being used during data collection for responsive survey design applications. Better propensity models, with more predictive power, are needed to guide responsive interventions during data collection. However, available data on both respondents and nonrespondents to improve these models are limited. This analysis investigates the usefulness of a new type of paradata, in the form of an interviewer observation taken at the call level, to increase the predictive power of propensity models. The interviewer observation investigated is the interviewer's assessment of the likelihood that a given respondent will participate in the survey, collected at each contact of a telephone study. We evaluate whether these ratings improve the fit and discrimination of "classic" response propensity models that include call record data and interviewer characteristics. Then, the performance of the interviewer observation is tested in a simulated responsive survey design, where propensity models are generated at several dates during data collection, to determine whether the observations improve the accuracy of the predictions made at these time points over using classic propensity models. The interviewer ratings not only contribute to the predictive power of the classic models overall but, on their own, appear to perform better than the classic model at predicting high probability cases in the responsive survey design context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the impact of a candidate being perceived as the "winner" of political debates on individual voting behavior in West Germany. Three models were tested for the study. The first probes for a general debate impact on the individual politician's evaluation. The second tests the effect of the perception of the winner on the spectator's evaluation and the final test establishes the effect of the perception of the winner on the vote decision. Party identification and the politicians' evaluations are included as control variables because they have been shown to determine the vote to a large extent. The parameters of the evaluation and winner models are estimated through the use of ordinary least squares. In each election year a majority of the electorate watched at least parts of the debates. The three debates of 1972 were viewed by an overwhelming 84 percent of the electorate. The 1976 debate drew the interest of 75 percent. The audience numbers suggest that more people watched the debates than are politically very interested or claim to be strong partisans. A positive sign of the debate variable (DEB) means that debate watchers rated that candidate higher than nonwatchers.

This article explores the nature and effects of the campaign debates held in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1972. The findings indicate that the debates were bruising personal battles that emphasized issues and ethics. While they did not have any direct effects on either candidate perceptions or issue salience, there is evidence that the debates may have had some important indirect effects on the electorate's ultimate voting choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The story of the Free Germans of World War II is a case in point, and may offer some insights into Russian methods of psychological warfare. Moscow's wartime use of the National Committee of Free Germans and the League of German Officers is of particular interest for two reasons. First, these two bodies served as vehicles for harnessing German sentiments of nationalism to Russian policy. Second, this episode provides another instance in which Soviet policy-makers chose to abandon orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine when it fitted their needs. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the propaganda efforts of the Free Germans. It seems that they hoped at best to get the people to rise against Hitler and put an end to the war. The Russians were not blind to German psychology, and tended to promote rather than hinder the internal opposition against Hitler. However, as events showed, a mass rising against the Nazi government did not occur.

Discusses stereotyping of Germans in occupied Germany by American journalists following the end of World War II. Identification of the so-called Nazi type of German; Description of pre- and post-war reportage on Germans which represents this stereotype; Representations of German youth; Psychological aspects of the German defeat; Notion of the collective guilt of Germans for the atrocities committed by Germany during the war; Attitudes toward antisemitism; Policy implications of recognizing stereotyping trends.

Education has been systematically and deliberately used in both Germany and Japan to force minds of young people and adults alike into the rigid mold of Axis ideology. Since the Imperial Japanese Department of Education, through its Bureau of Thought Supervision, has dispatched "thought supervisors" to the various provinces "for inspection, for guidance and for supervision in connection with thought matters." Japan has thereby woven a net in which the intellectual powers of her people are entangled. Germany has been equally zealous. No room is left for private opinion. The life and sports of students as well as the thought and conduct of teachers are brought within the system of regimentation. The declared purpose and program it again. When this war is won, the United Nations should be able to choose whether the educational systems of the Axis countries shall be allowed to lead into another war by the continued teaching of lies and false attitudes and values, or whether they shall be compelled to mend their ways.

Propaganda presupposes definition of sound policy, based upon comprehensible knowledge of the facts and of the political, military and economic situation and also of the enemy psychology. When a line of policy has been laid down, actual propaganda operations may be begun, but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda is that only truthful statements be made. Secondly, there must be no conflicting arguments, and this can only be ensured by close cooperation of all propagandists and by strict adherence to the policy defined. The political attitude of the United Nations with respect to Germany is extremely confusing. On the one hand, threats of indiscriminate reprisals and punishment are made. On the other hand, promise after promise is given equally indiscriminately to the "German people," according to which, after the war, no reprisals will be taken by the Allies and Germany will be received as a welcomed member of the commonwealth of nations.

This article focuses on the psychological dilemma suffered by many people during World War II. Pitted against each other in the war between Germany and Great Britain are the British Ministry of Information, established in September 1939 and the German Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, established in March 1933. The Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda has been functioning at home and abroad. On the other hand, The British Ministry of Information's hectic career offers many lessons for the conduct of public relations for democracy in wartime. The Ministry of Information has been partially the result of British experiences of 1914-18. With the end of the war in 1918, the British propaganda effort subsided, and for almost twenty-one years no formal information organization disseminated British culture and political views systematically. The prevalent opinion in the British press was that younger and more liberal men coming to the front in the Ministry of Information, would bring the Ministry much closer to the press.

This article presents a bibliography related to propaganda and public opinion polls in the U.S. The book, "Democracy Through Public Opinion" by Harold Dwight Lasswell analyzes factors that may lead U.S. public opinion to exert democratic control over basic decisions. In "What Every Citizen Should Know About the Navy" by Hanson Weightman Baldwin, an Annapolis graduate and former naval officer, now military and naval specialist for the "New York Times" outlines the training and tasks of enlisted men and officers. He sketches their daily life, describes their quarters, notes their disciplines. Different types of naval vessels are described and sketched. A final chapter on naval strategy is illustrated with charts. A glossary of naval terms precedes an appendix of naval statistics. In the new edition of "Germany Prepares for War," Ewald Banse outlines the basic Nazi war plan in 1932. The author is a German geographer, appointed by the Nazis as Professor of Military Science at Brunswick Technical College.

The article discusses German propaganda through radio service in the U.S. during World War II. The German radio service for North America was instituted, on April 1933, American opinion had begun to be disturbed by the precipitous and strangely brutal descent of National Socialism on established institutions within the Reich, the first German empire. One month after the outbreak of war in 1939, a Gallup poll showed that nearly three-fourths of the American people wanted the Allies to win; less than two per cent favored a German victory. Always, Berlin broadcasters directed their efforts primarily toward "the masses." Reading its lesson from history and the newspapers of the day, the German radio sought to keep alive the fading tradition of American enmity for Great Britain. Most of the speakers tried to create an atmosphere in which the listener will believe that to accept the German point of view is merely to show sound judgment and homely common sense. In the months preceding the German aggression against Norway and Denmark, confidence in an Allied victory was high, and Americans who thought that the U.S. should extend more aid to the Allies were in a minority. The German radio devoted only a moderate amount of attention to specifically American attitudes. Its appeals were addressed to Americans as a, proud and moralistic people. German radio broadcasts had sought to mold opinion in the U.S. during nearly a year of war. In the fourteenth month of war, the chief difference between German broadcasts to Great Britain, an avowed enemy, and those to the U.S. was one of quantity rather than quality.

The article presents information on a controversy regarding the collapse of France during the Battle of France. Most of the spokesmen for this point of view had a clear realization that the Battle of France was lost and occupation of the metropolitan territory by the enemy inevitable. Though the truth was concealed from the public it was realized that France would not be able to stand the superiority of the German Army in armaments, numbers and tactics. The division of opinion was spread over two concepts. The first concept identifies France with a political abstraction: The Indivisible Republic. The ideal of the other party was "Eternal France," a mystical entity existing independently of regimes and frontiers but linked in some supra-logical way with the soil of France and French blood. It is the underlying psychological factor which explains the lack of initiative, paralyzing redtape and sheer neglect, so frequently and legitimately cited as the causes of France's failure to prepare adequately during the inactive phase of the war. According to the author in a democratic country there is an intimate relation between opinion and morale and the morale is good only when the fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy majority rule within constitutional and reasonable limits is observed.

The article presents that every nation has queer ideas about every other nation, but perhaps the queerest is the composite picture of the U.S. which the Nazis have drawn for German consumption. Since the German state has a monopoly on the printed word, this view of America, a caricature not devoid of humor, gives a slightly disturbing impression of authoritativeness. Americans may smile at some of the cruder distortions, but they should not underestimate the significance of official propaganda on the part of a powerful government. The Nazis see America as a rich, vulgar, corrupt, and basically uncultured land, owned by Jews, full of criminals, and clinging to a degenerate form of democracy. What is most deplorable in Nazi eyes, the Americans are neither a race nor a nation but a sort of racial conglomeration in which the best blood, which made the country powerful, is German. Racially, one Nazi authority on America writes that the Americans are a highly primitive people. Their culture is still in the kindergarten, and in every respect Americans behave like children.

This article focuses on the Nuremberg party rally which is now held in September of each year. According to the Nazi theory of the Volksfuhrerstaat theory, the leaders, as a natural elite, make decisions for which they bear complete responsibility, while followers follow faithfully. Although in theory only a party affair, it broadens into a "review of the German nation," to give expression to the Nazi theory of the Volksfuhrerstaat people's leader state, which, we are told, is a new and ennobled type of democracy. Over all it is dictator Adolf Hitler whose single will ultimately guide the followers. Between leader and follower there is said to be a strong bond of faith, love, and loyalty. Designed as the most striking demonstration of this theory, the Party Rally is not only the most important link between leader and follower and a place of accounting for leaders, but it is also intended to be a center of propaganda and political regeneration, a sounding board for announcements to Germany and to the world.

In no other war in history has propaganda played so important a part as in the world conflict of 1914-18. Although most of us know the extent to which the neutral countries were bombarded with propaganda from the civil authorities of the Allied and Central powers, few of us perhaps realize the importance placed upon propaganda as an instrument of warfare by the military authorities. The destruction of the enemy morale by the dissemination of defeatist, disheartening, and revolutionary leaflets, pamphlets, books and propaganda news sheets, was recognized as an important part of the offensive against the enemy. While the Allied artillery, for instance, was pounding the German troops with shells, the propaganda sections were bombarding these same troops and the German people behind the lines with arguments. The seriousness with which this attack of word bullets was regarded by the military machines on both sides, and the effect that Allied propaganda had upon the morale of the German troops and civilians behind the lines, is the story of the paragraphs that follow.

Although the role played by public opinion in a totalitarian state is carefully controlled, this does not mean that a dictatorship ignores the opinion of its citizens or does not try, to measure their thinking. In this article, Arthur L. Smith, Jr., who is Professor of History at California State College at Los Angeles, describes the considerable effort Nazi Germany devoted to this end between 1939 and 1945. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a letter to the editor related to the control of Germany after her surrender in the 2nd World War.

The article presents information on the book "Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949," by Richard L. Merritt. In October 1945, shortly after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Occupation Military Government of the United States undertook a novel endeavor. For the first time in history the military employed modern survey methodology to measure sentiment in occupied territory rather than relying mainly on unscientific secret service reports. Together with more conventional sources, such as minutes and reports from cabinet meetings, these data make it possible to assert with confidence key claims about German society-for example, that the general public accepted the U.S. occupation policy, while political elites were less accommodating. from the perspective of a political scientist, Merritt's presentation lacks a coherent theoretical framework. Finally, Merritt cautions against overgeneralizing from the recent episodes of right-wing violence against foreigners.