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Tax evasion by small businesses can be tackled using different approaches. A traditional one recommends to increase the probability of an audit that is perceived by small businesses. Clearly, this entails high administrative and compliance costs. Another possibility is to reduce the room for accounting manipulation by applying more stringent accounting standards. This article uses a panel of administrative data concerning 71,000 Italian small businesses observed in tax years 2005 to 2008. The aim of this article is to evaluate the impact of a reform implemented in 2006. Until 2005, small businesses adopting more stringent accounting standards were granted a special audit regime such that the probability to be audited was particularly low. This regime was repealed in 2006. It is shown that the reform increased profits and turnover, as reported by the subset of businesses that were more likely to perceive the reform as an increase in the probability of an audit.

Italy adopted in 1998 a peculiar audit scheme (Studi di Settore), for small and medium enterprises and the self-employed. This scheme is based on a particular interaction between the tax agency and taxpayers, where the agency unveils only part of the information used to develop its audit rule. The authors study this scheme by means of a simple theoretical model and they test it using a sample of 23,000 firms in manufacturing sectors in the 2005 tax year. A number of theoretically relevant relations are confirmed. In particular, reports made by taxpayers seem to be positively associated to the firm's size. When taxpayers know that the probability to be audited decreases, they tend to report less. Other factors that are expected to influence the behavior of taxpayers have no or an ambiguous impact on reporting behavior. © The Author(s) 2011.