541 results
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2. A comment on the Epple and Riordan paper.
- Author
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Green, Edward J.
- Subjects
GAME theory ,VOTING ,MAJORITIES ,ELECTIONS ,PRACTICAL politics - Abstract
Comments on a paper that applied some technical analysis from game theory to a dynamic version of the divide-the-dollar game in voting theory. Contribution of the work in principle to the understanding of the role of voting as a paradigmatic political institution; Analysis of whether the approach can yield a testable theory of the outcomes of majority rule; Investigation of how outcomes change over time as an existing government operates in a changing environment.
- Published
- 1987
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. The grass is not greener on the other side: the role of attention in voting behavior.
- Author
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Coufalová, Lucie and Mikula, Štěpán
- Subjects
VOTING ,ATTENTION ,PREFERENTIAL ballot ,ELECTIONS ,POLITICAL parties - Abstract
A lack of information about electoral candidates leads to a ballot order effect that increases the chances of candidates in the top electoral list positions winning voters' support. The ballot order effect is confounded by the effect of ranking and the effect of attention, which work in the same direction. We exploit a variation in ballot layout (the quasi-random location of the break between the first and second sides of the ballot) in the 2006, 2010, 2013, and 2017 Czech parliamentary open list proportional representation elections to disentangle these effects and identify the effect of attention. We show that being listed on the reverse side of the ballot paper decreases electoral support—measured by number of preferential votes received—by at least 40%. Focusing on preferential votes allows us to filter out the effect of political party preference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. Galton's two papers on voting as robust estimation.
- Author
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Levy, David M. and Peart, Sandra
- Subjects
VOTING ,ESTIMATION theory - Abstract
Discusses the research of Francis Galton on the relationship between voting and robust estimation. Use of the influence curve on determining voting and estimation relationship; Suggestion on the retirement process of juries; Accuracy of the vox populi principle on estimating voter preference.
- Published
- 2002
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
5. Democracy, corruption, and endogenous entrepreneurship policy.
- Author
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Parker, Simon C.
- Subjects
POLITICAL entrepreneurship ,CORRUPTION ,SOCIAL responsibility of business ,BUSINESSPEOPLE ,CAMPAIGN promises - Abstract
This paper endogenizes pro-entrepreneurship policies in a model where voters choose the strength of these policies and entrepreneurs generate social returns which benefit the median voter. In the model, incumbent firms who are harmed by the greater competition that this policy promotes can push back in two ways: via corruption and persuasion. Specifically, they can bribe elected politicians to break their campaign promises; and they can allocate some of their rents to corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives that also benefit voters. The model predicts that corruption which weakens pro-entrepreneurship policy can be completely neutralized by a forward-looking median voter—without removing the incentive among incumbent firms to bribe politicians. In this way, endogenizing entrepreneurship policy can destroy any relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship. Corporate social responsibility initiatives modify this prediction, which provides a novel rationale for CSR that appears to be new to the literature as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
6. The role of economic uncertainty in the rise of EU populism.
- Author
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Gozgor, Giray
- Subjects
ECONOMICS & politics ,RIGHT-wing populism ,ECONOMIC uncertainty ,VOTING ,LEFT-wing extremism ,ENDOGENEITY (Econometrics) - Abstract
Economic interests are assumed to be the leading driver of political preferences, and various empirical studies have examined how economic conditions affect political views and voting behavior. Meanwhile, populism is on the rise in European Union (EU) member countries. Against that backdrop, this paper aims to examine the effect of economic uncertainty on populist voting behavior based on a panel dataset of 24 EU countries from 1980 to 2020. We focus on whether total populist, right-wing populist, and left-wing populist votes are affected by a new indicator of economic uncertainty, namely, the World Uncertainty Index (WUI). Relying on a fixed-effects, bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator and instrumental variable estimations, we show that a higher WUI increases total populism and right-wing populist voting behavior. The baseline results remain consistent when dealing with potential issues of endogeneity and reverse causality, addressing omitted variable bias, and excluding outliers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
7. The Brexit referendum and three types of regret.
- Author
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Drinkwater, Stephen and Jennings, Colin
- Subjects
BREXIT Referendum, 2016 ,VOTING ,ELECTIONS ,VOTERS - Abstract
In this paper we examine three forms of regret in relation to the UK's hugely significant referendum on EU membership that was held in June 2016. They are: (i) whether 'leave' voters at the referendum subsequently regretted their choice (in the light of the result), (ii) whether non-voters regretted their decisions to abstain (essentially supporting 'remain') and (iii) whether individuals were more likely to indicate that it is everyone's duty to vote following the referendum. We find evidence in favor of all three types of regret. In particular, leave voters and non-voters were significantly more likely to indicate that they would vote to remain given a chance to do so again; moreover, the probability of an individual stating that it was everyone's duty to vote in a general election increased significantly in 2017 (compared to 2015). The implications of the findings are discussed in the context of the referendum's outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
8. The Shapley value analyzed under the Felsenthal and Machover bargaining model.
- Author
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Bernardi, Giulia and Freixas, Josep
- Subjects
VOTING ,GAME theory ,ELECTIONS ,DECISION making ,NEGOTIATION ,SOCIAL choice ,ELECTORAL coalitions - Abstract
In 1996, Felsenthal and Machover proposed a bargaining procedure for a valuable payoff in cooperative and simple games. They proved that the value underlying their bargaining scheme was the Shapley value by showing that it verifies the axioms that Shapley proposed for characterizing his value. They remarked that a direct proof of the result involves rather formidable combinatorial difficulties, but that it has some independent interest. In this paper, we prove such a combinatorial result and obtain a formula for the Shapley value that has a great potential to be extended to more general classes of games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
9. Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment.
- Author
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Dougherty, Keith L. and Pittman, Grace
- Subjects
CONGRESSIONAL apportionment ,APPORTIONMENT (Election law) ,LEGISLATORS ,VOTERS ,VOTING - Abstract
This paper examines state interest in the nine bases of congressional seat apportionment considered for the House of Representatives as part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. We ask, what if voters preferred apportionments that delivered larger vote shares to their state? We then show that among all states, one basis of apportionment was a weak Condorcet winner, while the others were in a vote cycle. In both chambers of Congress, however, pure majority voting created orderings of the nine bases and a different Condorcet winner. Ironically, Congress did not select either Condorcet winner. Instead, a population-based apportionment was reported out of committee and passed both chambers as a consequence of agenda control and lack of pairwise voting. Our analysis provides an example of how agenda setting with incomplete information unintentionally can produce undesirable outcomes for a legislature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
10. Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox.
- Author
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Kamwa, Eric
- Subjects
BALLOTS ,VOTING ,VOTERS ,POLITICAL candidates ,OPTIMISM ,PESSIMISM - Abstract
A voting rule that permits some voters to favor a candidate by revealing only the initial segment of their sincere rankings is said to be vulnerable to the truncation paradox. In this paper, we consider four models for counting truncated ballots, optimistic, pessimistic (the most common), averaged, and round-down. Under the impartial anonymous culture assumption, the choice of model generally has a real impact on truncation-paradox vulnerability, but exceptions exist. When the election is decided by a one-shot scoring rule, the optimistic model is invulnerable to the truncation paradox, but all other models are vulnerable. We identify new voting rules immune to the truncation paradox, such as the Modified Borda Count. To obtain a more complete picture of the impact of processing model, we assess the likelihood of the truncation paradox in three-candidate elections with large electorates, focusing not only on one-shot scoring rules but also scoring rules with one-by-one or below-average elimination. Our assessment confirms that the processing model for truncated ballots may really matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
11. Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums.
- Author
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Holcombe, Randall G. and Kenny, Lawrence W.
- Subjects
REFERENDUM ,PROPERTY tax ,PUBLIC schools ,BALLOTS ,VOTING ,VOTING machines - Abstract
From 1939 to 1968 Florida used a unique referendum system to set property tax rates for public school operating expenditures at the median millage rate selected by voters. These referendums revealed the entire distribution of voter preferences, which is not possible in the standard up or down referendum. We are the first to use the Florida referendum data. The form of the ballot played an important role in how people voted. Voting machine elections were much more likely than paper ballots to result in rejections of the recommendations of school boards, and produced much greater dispersion of expressed preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2007
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
12. Are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences?
- Author
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Szembrot, Nichole
- Subjects
AMBIGUITY ,POLITICAL campaigns ,POLITICIAN attitudes ,VOTERS ,ACCESS to information - Abstract
In campaigns, candidates often avoid taking positions on issues, concealing the policy preferences that would guide them if elected. This paper describes a novel explanation for ambiguity in political campaigns. It develops a model of candidate competition in which policy-motivated candidates can choose whether or not to announce their policy preferences to voters. It applies Eyster and Rabin's (Econometrica 73(5):1623-1672, 2005) concept of cursed equilibrium, which allows for varying degrees of understanding of the connection between type (policy preference) and strategy (whether to announce). If voters updated according to Bayes' rule, they would understand that candidates who do not announce positions are strategically concealing an unpopular policy preference. In equilibrium, only the most extreme candidates, those located furthest from the median voter's position, would choose to take no position. However, if voters do not sufficiently appreciate the informational content of a non-announcement, unraveling will not occur and both extremists and more moderate candidates will not announce positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
13. Vetoing and inaugurating policy like others do: evidence on spatial interactions in voter initiatives.
- Author
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Asatryan, Zareh, Havlik, Annika, and Streif, Frank
- Subjects
VOTER attitudes ,REFERENDUM ,SPATIAL behavior ,DIRECT democracy ,VOTING ,CITIES & towns ,SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC factors ,GOVERNMENT policy ,PSYCHOLOGY - Abstract
A sizeable literature studies strategic interactions between governments. In this paper, we ask whether, in the presence of direct democratic institutions, voters' actions in vetoing a decision or inaugurating a policy by a binding initiative in their jurisdiction have spillover effects on the actions of voters in neighboring jurisdictions. We collect (and make available) data on 3300 initiatives in German towns from 2002 to 2014 and match these to panel data on the towns' sociodemographic and fiscal characteristics. We apply an instrumental variables approach and find that a jurisdiction's probability of hosting an initiative is positively driven by the neighbors' direct democratic activity. The size of the estimated average effect peaks around a 20 km neighborhood-where a standard deviation change of neighbors' activity increases the probability of hosting an initiative by 5 percentage points-then gradually declines and fades away after around 60 km. This effect is driven by spillovers in similar policy areas and by successful initiatives, and is stronger in towns with relatively more information flows (measured by newspaper consumption and commuter flows). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
14. On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting.
- Author
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Kamwa, Eric
- Subjects
VOTING ,SCHOOL elections ,ELECTIONS ,PROBABILITY theory - Abstract
Preference approval voting (PAV) and fallback voting (FV) are two voting rules that combine approval and preferences, first introduced by Brams and Sanver (in: Brams, Gehrlein and Roberts (eds) The mathematics of preference, choice and order, Springer, Berlin, 2009). Under PAV, voters rank the candidates and indicate which ones they approve of; with FV, they rank only those candidates they approve of. In this paper, we further develop the work of Brams and Sanver (2009) by exploring some other normative properties of FV and PAV. We show among other things that FV and PAV satisfy and fail the same criteria; they possess two properties that AV does not: Pareto optimality and the fact of always electing the absolute Condorcet winner when he exists. To provide a practical comparison, we evaluate the probabilities of satisfying the Condorcet majority criteria for three-candidate elections and a considerably large electorate, examining FV and PAV alongside other voting rules. Our findings indicate that PAV outperforms the Borda rule in this regard. Furthermore, we observe that in terms of agreement, FV and PAV align more closely with scoring rules than with approval voting. Our analysis is performed under the impartial anonymous culture assumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
15. Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation.
- Author
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Ainsley, Caitlin
- Subjects
FEDERAL Reserve bank personnel ,APPOINTMENT to public office ,CONGRESSIONAL hearings (U.S.) ,NOMINATIONS for public office ,VOTING ,CONSTITUENTS (Persons) - Abstract
This paper examines the politicization of Federal Reserve (Fed) appointments. In contrast to the extant appointment literature's almost exclusive focus on ideological proximity as a predictor of Fed nominations and confirmations, I theorize that senators will be more likely to vote against confirmation when their constituents have little confidence in the Fed because it allows them to more credibly defer blame on the Fed for economic downturns. Drawing on novel estimates of state-level confidence in the Fed as well as new common space estimates of senators' and central bankers' monetary policy preferences, I demonstrate that when constituents do not have confidence in the Fed, senators are less likely to vote in favor of confirmation regardless of their ideological proximity to the nominee. The results have important implications for the ability to fill Fed vacancies and, in turn, the balance of power between the Fed and regional bank Presidents in the monetary policymaking process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
16. Partisan views on the economy.
- Author
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SWANK, OTTO H.
- Subjects
POLITICAL parties ,ECONOMIC models ,GUERRILLAS ,ECONOMICS ,VOTING ,POLITICAL participation - Abstract
In this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues X and y. The policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the relationship between X and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on. We show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element. Policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1994
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
17. Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition: A comment.
- Author
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Coughlin, Peter
- Subjects
INCOME redistribution ,ELECTIONS ,POLITICAL science ,MATHEMATICAL models ,VOTING - Abstract
This comment is concerned with the relation between the basic model of elections and income redistribution in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and the model in Coughlin (1986a). Its purpose is to (i) isolate the (small set of) assumptions that separate these closely related models, (ii) identify a special case of the Lindbeck-Weibull model where their results immediately provide direct extensions of four of the results in my paper, and (iii) point out that one of the lemmata in my paper identifies the precise location of the equilibrium income distribution for this important special case of the Lindbeck-Weibull model. The comment also relates these observations to Lindbeck and Weibull's example of familiar assumptions that satisfy their sufficient conditions for the existence of a political equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1991
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
18. Decomposing political advertising effects on vote choices.
- Author
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Law, Wilson
- Subjects
POLITICAL advertising ,TELEVISION advertising ,VOTING ,DECISION making in political science ,POLITICAL candidates ,MASS mobilization - Abstract
This paper studies the channels through which political television advertising influences individuals' voting decisions. Scholars are interested to learn whether advertising primarily persuades people to change their choices of candidates or mobilizes people to vote. I find that advertising does both: about 60% to 70% of advertising's effect is persuasion, and 30% to 40% of it is mobilization. Advertising's effects are stronger on those who did not plan to vote for a major-party candidate. To decompose the impact into its components, the present paper estimates a multinomial probit model that permits analysis of decisions of turnout and candidate choice jointly in a Markov chain framework. In contrast to most studies that estimate the effects of aggregated exposure to advertising on voters' choices on Election Day, I study how advertising influences peoples' monthly voting intentions leading up to Election Day. In the context of the 2008 presidential election, the magnitude of the advertising effect is not large enough to overcome John McCain's significant deficit, but it potentially could have changed the outcomes of other close elections such as those in 2000 and 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
19. Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective.
- Author
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de Mouzon, Olivier, Laurent, Thibault, Le Breton, Michel, and Lepelley, Dominique
- Subjects
POPULAR vote ,ELECTORAL college ,INTERSTATE agreements ,VOTING ,MATHEMATICAL models of forecasting ,PROBABILITY theory ,SELF-interest - Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning of a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College. The two versions of interstate compacts that are considered here differ in only one respect: in one case, the interstate compact allocates its electoral votes to the regional popular winner, while in the other case it allocates the votes to the national popular winner. They both differ from the ongoing National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as it is assumed that the agreement is effective as soon as the members sign it. Decisiveness and welfare analyses are conducted with a simplified symmetric theoretical version of the Electoral College wherein malapportionment problems are absent. The three most popular probabilistic models are considered and the study is conducted either from the self-interest perspective of the initiators of the interstate compact or from a general interest perspective. The analysis combines analytical arguments and simulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
20. A capture theory of committees.
- Author
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Name-Correa, Alvaro J. and Yildirim, Huseyin
- Subjects
COMMITTEES ,GROUP decision making ,DISCLOSURE ,GROUP facilitation (Psychology) ,ATTITUDE change (Psychology) ,CORRUPTION ,VOTING - Abstract
Why do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue that they may also serve to discourage outside influence or capture by raising its cost. As such, committees may contain members who are uninformed or who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger when outsiders have larger stakes in its decision or contribute lower-quality proposals, or when its members are more corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes helps deter capture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
21. The problem of polarization.
- Author
-
Grafstein, Robert
- Subjects
POLARIZATION (Social sciences) ,EXTREMISTS ,INCOME redistribution ,VOTERS ,FEAR & politics ,IDEOLOGY ,NEGOTIATION ,VOTING - Abstract
This paper offers a unified political economy explanation of political extremism and moderation regarding income redistribution. Unlike the standard spatial voting model, the explanation herein recognizes that extremists are distinguished not only by their political positions, but also by the intensity with which they hold them. The paper uses an extension of Aumann and Kurz’s (Econometrica 45(5):1137-1161,
1977 ) bargaining model to endogenize moderation and extremism in the context of democratic voting. The extension shows that low-income voters tend to be bolder in their redistributive demands and high-income voters tend to be more tenacious in defending them. These hypotheses are evaluated empirically using the Political Action Panel Study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
22. More evidence of the effects of voting technology on election outcomes.
- Author
-
Allers, Maarten and Kooreman, Peter
- Subjects
VOTING ,ELECTIONS ,VOTING machines ,BALLOTS ,VOTER turnout ,VOTING research - Abstract
Using two different data sources—municipal level data and individual data—we consider several hitherto unexplored aspects of the relationship between voting technology and election outcomes. We distinguish between introductory and permanent effects of electronic voting, and between national and municipal elections. We test for a possible asymmetry between the effect of moving from paper ballots to electronic voting, and vice versa, and we control for polling station density. We find a positive but temporary effect of electronic voting on voter turnout, a negative effect on the fraction of residual votes, and no effect on the share of left wing parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2009
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
23. Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited.
- Author
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Felsenthal, Dan and Tideman, Nicolaus
- Subjects
VOTING ,SOCIAL choice ,POLITICAL candidates ,BORDA count ,CHEBYSHEV approximation ,VOTERS - Abstract
A strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is an alternative, x, that a majority of voters rank higher than z, for every other alternative, z. A weak Condorcet winner (WCW) is an alternative, y, that no majority of voters rank below any other alternative, z, but is not a SCW. There has been some confusion in the voting/social choice literature as to whether particular voting rules that are SCW-consistent are also WCW-consistent. The purpose of this paper is to revisit this issue, clear up the confusion that has developed, and determine whether three additional SCW-consistent voting rules-that as far as we know have not been investigated to date regarding their possible WCW consistency-are indeed WCW-consistent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
24. Is newspaper coverage of economic events politically biased?
- Author
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Lott, John and Hassett, Kevin
- Subjects
OBJECTIVITY in journalism ,NEWSPAPERS -- Objectivity ,UNITED States political parties ,ECONOMICS & politics ,ECONOMIC trends ,PARTISANSHIP - Abstract
This paper develops an econometric technique to test for political bias in news reports that controls for the underlying character of the news reported. Because of the changing availability of the number of newspapers in Nexis/Lexis, two sets of time are examined: from January 1991 to May 2004 and from January 1985 to May 2004. Our results suggest that American newspapers tend to give more positive coverage to the same economic news when Democrats are in the White House than when Republicans are; a similar though smaller effect is found for Democratic control of Congress. Our results reject the claim that 'reader diversity is a powerful force toward accuracy.' When all types of news are pooled into a single analysis, our results are significant. However, the results vary greatly depending upon which types of economic data are being reported. When newspapers are examined individually the only support that Republicans appear to obtain is from the president's home state newspapers during his term. This is true for the Houston Chronicle under both Bushes and the Los Angeles Times during the Reagan administration. Contrary to rational expectations, media coverage affects people's perceptions of the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
25. Mystifying but not misleading: when does political ambiguity not confuse voters?
- Author
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Janssen, Maarten and Teteryatnikova, Mariya
- Subjects
VOTER psychology ,POLITICAL psychology ,AMBIGUITY ,POLITICAL campaigns ,CHOICE (Psychology) ,TRUTHFULNESS & falsehood ,POLITICAL culture ,DISCLOSURE ,PSYCHOLOGY - Abstract
The purpose of political campaigns in democracies is to provide voters with information that allows them to make 'correct' choices, that is, vote for the party/candidate whose proposed policy or 'position' is closest to their ideal position. In a world where political talk is often ambiguous and imprecise, it then becomes important to understand whether correct choices can still be made. In this paper we identify two elements of political culture that are key to answering this question: (i) whether or not political statements satisfy a so-called 'grain of truth' assumption, and (ii) whether or not politicians make statements that are comparative, that is contain information about politicians' own positions relative to that of their adversaries. The 'grain of truth' assumption means that statements, even if vague, do not completely misrepresent the true positions of the parties. We find that only when political campaigning is comparative and has a grain of truth, will voters always make choices as if they were fully informed. Therefore, the imprecision of political statements should not be a problem as long as comparative campaigning is in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
26. Uncertainty, polarization, and proposal incentives under quadratic voting.
- Author
-
Patty, John and Penn, Elizabeth
- Subjects
VOTING ,QUADRATIC equations ,SOCIAL choice ,PUBLIC goods ,INCENTIVE (Psychology) ,MATHEMATICAL models - Abstract
We consider the quadratic voting mechanism (Lalley and Weyl in Quadratic voting. Working paper, University of Chicago, 2015; Weyl in The robustness of quadratic voting. Working paper, University of Chicago, 2015) and focus on the incentives it provides individuals deciding what proposals or candidates to put up for a vote. The incentive compatibility of quadratic voting rests upon the assumption that individuals value the money used to buy votes, while the budget balance/efficiency of the mechanism requires that the money spent by one voter by redistributed among the other voters. From these assumptions, we show that it follows that strategic proposers will have an incentive to offer proposals with greater uncertainty about individual values. Similarly, we show that, in an electoral setting, quadratic voting provides an incentive to propose candidates with polarized, non-convergent platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
27. Quadratic voting and the public good: introduction.
- Author
-
Posner, Eric and Weyl, E.
- Subjects
PUBLIC goods ,VOTING ,QUADRATIC equations - Abstract
This introduction to the Public Choice special issue on 'quadratic voting (QV) and the public good' provides an opinionated narrative summary of the contents and surveys the broader literature related to QV. QV is a voting rule, proposed by one of us Weyl (Quadratic vote buying. , 2012), Lalley and Weyl (Quadratic voting. , 2016) building off earlier work by Groves and Ledyard (Econometrica 45(4):783-810 1977a), Hylland and Zeckhauser (A mechanism for selecting public goods when preferences must be elicited, Kennedy School of Government Discussion Paper D, 70, 1980), where individuals buy as many votes as they wish by paying the square of the votes they buy using some currency. An appreciation of the history of research in the field suggests that QV is uniquely practically relevant compared to the other approximately Pareto-efficient mechanisms economists have proposed for collective decisions on public goods. However, it faces a number of sociological and ethical concerns regarding how a political system organized around QV would achieve the efficiency aims stated in abstract theory and whether the pure aggregate income-maximizing definition of efficiency QV optimizes in its simplest form is desirable. The papers in this volume flesh out and formalize these concerns, but also provide important responses in two ways: by suggesting domains where they are unlikely to be applicable (primarily related to survey research of various kinds) and versions of QV (using an artificial currency) that maintain many of QV's benefits while diffusing the most important critiques. Together this work suggests both a practical path for applying QV in the near-term and a series of research questions that would have to be addressed to broaden its application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. A precise method for evaluating election schemes.
- Author
-
Bordley, Robert F.
- Subjects
ELECTIONS ,POLITICAL participation ,VOTING ,DICTATORSHIP ,POLITICAL science - Abstract
A previously published paper evaluated election schemes under a wide variety of election circumstances. This paper improves upon the previous work by refining the measures used to rate the election schemes and increasing the statistical significance of those ratings. With these modifications, we can now draw some new conclusions: (a) In general circumstances, the Borda System outperforms the Copeland System which out-performs Approval which outperforms Majority Rule. (b) The Maximin Rule -- strongly supported by Rawls's -- turns out to be a reasonable election rule if the number of election alternatives is large relative to the number of voters. (c) With two exceptions, all our election systems performed quite well given a society with highly correlated utilities. (d) Given a polarized society, a serial dictatorship was better than every other election system except Borda. Perhaps even more importantly, we now have the possibility of conducting some cost/benefit analyses of different proposals for electoral changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1985
29. Expenditures and votes: In search of downward-sloping curves in the United States and Great Britain.
- Author
-
Cuzán, Alfred G. and Heggen, Richard J.
- Subjects
PUBLIC spending ,POLITICAL parties ,VOTING ,DEPRESSIONS (Economics) - Abstract
An earlier paper showed a negative relation between increases and accelerations in F, the ratio of federal expenditures to GNP and E, the reelection or defeat of the incumbent party in the White House over the last 100 years. This paper argues that there also exists a negative relation between V, the percentage of the popular vote cast for the incumbents, and F. This function is displaced by wars and depressions and can drift over time, making it difficult to discover negative curves in the data. Dividing British and US data for the last 50 years into party periods yields clearly discernable negative functions for F and V for the incumbents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1985
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
30. Reply to Ledyard's comment.
- Author
-
Coughlin, Peter J.
- Subjects
INCOME redistribution ,ELECTIONS ,EQUILIBRIUM ,VOTING ,PROBABILITY theory - Abstract
Presents a response to a comment on an article about income redistribution and elections. Explanation on the existence of equilibrium among voters; Assumptions on the probability of votes; Opinion on the claims of John O. Ledyard regarding election theorems.
- Published
- 1986
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
31. The effect of a reduction in the opening hours of polling stations on turnout.
- Author
-
Garmann, Sebastian
- Subjects
VOTER turnout ,POLLING places ,VOTING ,TWENTY-first century ,HISTORY - Abstract
In recent years, scholars and policymakers alike have discussed potential causes and consequences of low voter turnout. Election administration laws may provide means to encourage turnout that are of low cost and easily implementable. In this paper, I provide a policy evaluation of a change in an election administration law. Specifically, I estimate the causal effect of a reduction in the opening hours of polling stations on turnout. To this end, I make use of a policy change in a German state that cut the number of opening hours of polling stations. Using political units from an adjacent state with the same election dates and effectively the same election system as a control group in a difference-in-differences design, I find that reducing the opening hours of polling stations significantly reduces voter turnout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
32. On choosing the alternative with the best median evaluation.
- Author
-
Laslier, Jean-François
- Subjects
VOTING research ,UTILITARIANISM ,MEDIAN (Mathematics) ,EVALUATION methodology ,CHOICE (Psychology) - Abstract
The voting rule proposed by Basset and Persky (Public Choice 99:299-310, ) picks the alternative with the best median evaluation. This paper shows that this MaxMed principle is equivalent to the MaxMin (so-called Rawls') principle, with the proviso that one can discard half of the population. In one-dimensional, single-peaked domains, the paper compares the MaxMed rule with majority rule and the utilitarian criterion. The MaxMed outcome is rejected by a majority of voters in favor of outcomes that are also utilitarian improvements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
33. Axiomatizations of a positional power score and measure for hierarchies.
- Author
-
Brink, René and Steffen, Frank
- Subjects
POWER (Social sciences) ,AXIOM of choice ,HIERARCHIES ,AUTHORITY ,DECISION making ,VOTING - Abstract
The extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the authority structure. This is based upon the bare positions of actors and ignores the existence of decision-making mechanisms. The few studies, which also take into account decision-making mechanisms, are 'membership-based'. In an earlier paper we demonstrated that such an approach is, in general, inappropriate. As a solution we suggested an 'action-based' approach and developed a power score and measure ascribing positional power to actors in hierarchies. In this paper we axiomatize this power score and measure and illustrate their applicability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
34. Corporate governance under proportional electoral systems.
- Author
-
Suh, Jaekwon
- Subjects
CORPORATE governance ,PROPORTIONAL representation ,MINORITY stockholders ,ELECTIONS ,REPRESENTATIVE government ,VOTING - Abstract
This paper provides a political explanation for the form of corporate governance captured by the degree of minority shareholder protection (MSP). Using a multi-stage game model of three-party competition under proportional electoral systems, I demonstrate that the electoral threshold-the minimum percentage of votes a party must receive to get at least one seat in parliamentary PR systems-is inversely related to the degree of MSP. This finding represents an important modification to formal models in the political economic literature that tends to omit the political process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
35. Fiscal effects of budget referendums: evidence from New York school districts.
- Author
-
Nguyen-Hoang, Phuong
- Subjects
REFERENDUM ,VOTING ,SCHOOL budgets ,SCHOOL accounting ,FUNDING formulas (Education) ,MANAGEMENT - Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence on how budget referendums affect school inputs by taking advantage of an exogenous enactment of budget referendums for small city school districts (SCSDs) in New York State in 1998. The paper shows that SCSDs reduce instructional spending and increase student-teacher ratios while preserving administrative spending in response to budget referendums. These empirical findings are obtained by difference-in-differences estimations on data processed with propensity score matching, and the results are robust to sensitivity analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
36. The proximity paradox: the legislative agenda and the electoral success of ideological extremists.
- Author
-
Buchler, Justin
- Subjects
PARADOX ,UNITED States Congressional elections ,LEGISLATIVE voting ,POLITICAL agenda ,EXTREMISTS ,MODEL-based reasoning - Abstract
This paper presents a new approach to spatial models of legislative elections in which voters have preferences over the bundles of roll call votes implied by candidate locations rather than over the locations themselves. With such preferences, voters with single-peaked, symmetric preferences and perfect information can sincerely prefer a distant candidate to a more proximate candidate. Moreover, negative agenda control in Congress makes such preference orderings inevitable, so party agenda control can allow majority party extremists to defeat more centrist minority party candidates. The model has implications for theories of parties in Congress, and spatial modeling more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
37. Coalition politics and accountability.
- Author
-
Kiss, Áron
- Subjects
POLITICAL accountability ,COALITION governments ,AUCTIONS ,PRODUCTION functions (Economic theory) ,ELECTIONS ,VOTING - Abstract
The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) can not be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2009
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
38. The political-economy of conflicts over wealth: why don’t the rabble expropriate the rich?
- Author
-
Coram, Alex
- Subjects
DEMOCRACY ,EQUALITY ,VOTING ,DISTRIBUTION (Economic theory) ,ECONOMICS ,WEALTH - Abstract
The most striking feature of liberal democracies is the coexistence of large inequalities of wealth with a roughly egalitarian distribution of voting power. So far most attempts to explain this have asked ‘why don’t the poor form a coalition to expropriate the rich?’ This paper argues that this is not necessarily the best way to interpret the problem and attempts to provide an alternative unified political-economic model that is more consistent with standard assumptions about voting. This is done by studying what would happen if every possible coalition could form in a wealth distribution game. Among the main findings is that, if the marginal contribution of every individual to production is increasing sufficiently, there is a stable distribution of the product. This may include the egalitarian distribution. If individuals are not so valuable there is no stable distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2008
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
39. Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns.
- Author
-
Borgne, Eric and Lockwood, Ben
- Subjects
ELECTIONS ,PUBLIC officers ,VOTING ,POLITICAL participation ,POLITICAL science - Abstract
This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive “re-election concerns” effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2006
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
40. Does forced voting result in political polarization?
- Author
-
Leon, Fernanda and Rizzi, Renata
- Subjects
COMPULSORY voting ,POLARIZATION (Social sciences) ,POLITICAL attitudes ,VOTING ,BRAZILIAN politics & government ,PSYCHOLOGY - Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of the compulsory voting legislation on individuals' political orientations though a regression discontinuity framework. The identification comes from Brazil's dual voting system-voluntary and compulsory-whose exposure is determined based on citizen's date of birth. Using self-collected data, we find that compulsory voting legislation has sizable effects on individuals' political preferences, making them more likely to identify with a political party and to become extreme oriented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
41. The political economics of redistribution, inequality and tax avoidance.
- Author
-
Bethencourt, Carlos and Kunze, Lars
- Subjects
POLITICAL economic analysis ,TAX enforcement ,ELECTIONS ,TAX base ,INCOME redistribution ,GOVERNMENT revenue ,INCOME tax laws ,TAX shelters - Abstract
A central result in the political economy of taxation is that the degree of redistribution is positively linked to income inequality. However, empirical evidence supporting such a relationship turns out to be mixed. This paper shows how the different empirical reactions can be rationalized within a simple model of tax avoidance and costly tax enforcement. By focusing on structure-induced equilibrium in which taxpayers vote over the size of the income tax and the level of tax enforcement, we show that more inequality may well reduce the extent of redistribution, depending on two opposing effects: the standard political effect and a negative tax base effect working through increases in the average level of tax avoidance and the share of enforcement expenditures in total tax revenue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
42. A spatial model of legislative voting with perceptual error.
- Author
-
Ladha, Krishna K.
- Subjects
VOTING ,SOCIAL choice ,SOCIOECONOMICS ,LEGISLATORS ,IDEOLOGY - Abstract
This paper presents a unidimensional spatial model of voting in which members of Congress vote based on an imprecise perception of roll-call alternatives. The model is applied to the Senate roll-call votes of 1977 to estimate the ideal points of the senators, and to examine the role of a liberal-conservative dimension in describing votes on economic issues relative to social issues. In light of the spatial model, the paper argues that "standard" models of roll-call voting are not based on a theory of choice, and hence, that it is difficult to interpret their results. Alternatives to standard models, based on the spatial model, are developed and are used to analyze the role of ideology in deciding a specific economic issue: coal strip-mining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1991
43. Incomplete information, income redistribution and risk averse median voter behavior.
- Author
-
Bishop, John A., Formby, John P., and Smith, W. James
- Subjects
VOTING ,RISK aversion ,RISK ,EXPECTED utility ,UTILITY theory ,REFERENDUM ,INCOME redistribution ,NET losses - Abstract
This paper extends the median voter model to include risk aversion. An expected utility maximizing median voter with an aversion to risk may behave differently than a median voter who is certain. A referendum on income redistribution from the top of the distribution to the bottom which fails when the median voter is certain may pass in the extended median voter model. Economic inefficiencies and the net losses accompanying redistribution are shown to play a pivotal role in determining the behavior of the risk averse median voter. The model is illustrated using a one percent Demogrant redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1991
44. Cycle avoiding trajectories, strategic agendas, and the duality of memory and foresight: An informal exposition.
- Author
-
Miller, Nicholas R., Grofman, Bernard, and Feld, Scott L.
- Subjects
VOTING ,GROUP decision making ,DECISION making ,ELECTIONS ,SOCIAL choice - Abstract
This paper considers the notion of cycle avoiding trajectories in majority voting tournaments and shows that they underlie and guide several apparently disparate voting processes. The set of alternatives that are maximal with respect to such trajectories constitutes a new solution set of considerable significance. It may be dubbed the Banks set, in recognition of the important paper by Banks (1985) that first made use of this set. The purpose of this paper is to informally demonstrate that the Banks set is a solution set of broad relevance for understanding group decision making in both cooperative and non-cooperative settings and under both sincere and sophisticated voting. In addition, we show how sincere and sophisticated voting processes can be viewed as mirror images of one another - embodying respectively, "memory" and "foresight." We also show how to develop the idea of a "sophisticated agenda," one in which the choice of what alternatives to propose is itself a matter of strategic calculation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1990
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
45. Multi-party competition with exit: A comment on Duverger's Law.
- Author
-
Humes, Brian D.
- Subjects
POLITICAL parties ,BALLOTS ,VOTING - Abstract
Contrary to Duverger's Law, there exist multi-party systems in conjunction with simple majority single-ballot systems. At least three exceptions exist to this "law". Rae (1971) and Riker (1976; 1982) offer explanations for two of the most prominent exceptions, i.e. Canada and India. I also discuss another exception. Great Britain. In this paper, I use a simple one-dimensional spatial model to show that a multi-party system can be supported under a simple majority single-ballot system. This explanation depends on the way political parties exit the system. If parties decide sequentially whether or not to exit, a multi-party system can not be maintained. If political parties make this decision simultaneously, a multi-party system may be able to sustain itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1990
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
46. Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior.
- Author
-
Schram, Arthur and Van Winden, Frans
- Subjects
PUBLIC goods ,VOTING ,POLITICAL parties ,GOVERNMENT policy ,CONSUMPTION (Economics) - Abstract
Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies. An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1989
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
47. INTRODUCTION.
- Subjects
GROUP decision making ,SOCIAL choice ,DECISION making ,VOTING - Abstract
Focuses on demand-revealing process, which is a way of making collective decisions. Basic principle of the demand-revealing process; Information on the framework that motivates voters to provide honest statements of the relative values to them of the options under consideration; Explanation of the caveat to the incentive for honest statements.
- Published
- 1977
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
48. BORDA'S RULE, POSITIONAL VOTING, AND CONDORCET'S SIMPLE MAJORITY PRINCIPLE.
- Author
-
Fishburn, Peter C. and Gehrlein, William V.
- Subjects
MATHEMATICAL models ,SCORING rubrics ,SOCIAL sciences ,SOCIAL choice ,VOTING - Abstract
This paper identifies aspects of Borda's rule that distinguish it from all other strictly monotonic positional scoring rules. Moreover, it demonstrates through most of the characterizations that Borda's rule is closely related in certain respects to Condorcet's simple majority principle. The paper does not attempt to resolve the conflicts between Borda's rule and Condorcet's principle, but it does show that Borda's rule is unique among positional scoring rues in its adherence to certain conditions that might suggest a preference for this rule over other positional scoring rules. We conclude with an informal summary of the results presented in the paper. These results presume at least three candidates in the set A of candidates. Strictly monotonic positional scoring rules are referred to as w rules. 1. The Borda rule is the only w rule that invariably yields all candidates as tied winners whenever the number of voters who prefer candidate x to candidate y equals the number who prefer y to x for all x and y in A. 2. The Borda rule is the only w rule that invariably yields x as a winner under one profile when x is a winner under a second profile and the number of voters who prefer candidate a to candidate b is the same in both profiles, for all a and b in A. (Theorem 1.) 3. When A contains exactly three candidates and w is any non-Borda rule, the number of profiles with Condorcet winners that are also Borda winners exceeds the numbers of profiles with Condorcet winners that are also w rule winners for any sufficiently large set of voters. (Theorem 2.) 4. The Borda rule is the only w rule that guarantees that a Condorcet winner will not be beaten by every other candidate under rule w. (Theorem 4.) 5. The Borda rule is the only w rule that guarantees that a candidate that is beaten by every other candidate under simple majority will not be the unique winner under rule w. (Corollary 1.) 6. A sequential weighted elimination rule invariably yields the Condorcet winner... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1976
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
49. Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry.
- Author
-
Xefteris, Dimitrios
- Subjects
POLITICAL candidates ,HETEROGENEITY ,ELECTIONS & psychology ,SPATIAL behavior ,VOTING ,POLITICAL competition - Abstract
This paper studies electoral competition between two purely office-motivated and heterogeneous (in terms of valence) established candidates when the entry of a lesser-valence third candidate is anticipated. In this model, when the valence asymmetries among candidates are not very large, an essentially unique equilibrium always exists and it is such that: (a) the two established candidates employ pure strategies, (b) the high-valence established candidate offers a more moderate platform than the low-valence established candidate, (c) the entrant locates between the two established candidates and nearer to the established high-valence candidate and, surprisingly, (d) both established candidates receive equal vote-shares. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
50. Imperfect information and the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis.
- Author
-
Bredemeier, Christian
- Subjects
INCOME redistribution ,VOTING research ,IMPERFECT information games ,MAJORITIES ,INCOME inequality ,INCOME statistics ,TAX cuts ,DECISION making in economic policy - Abstract
Standard majority-voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean-to-median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed. This paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean-to-median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard framework with imperfect information. In such a model, it is important to consider the source of rising mean-to-median ratios. Income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich, which tends to reduce the support for redistribution. An empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first Reagan tax cut. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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