Search

Comments on Albert Breton and Thomas Courchene's papers on the constitutional change in Canada. Important questions to ask about constitutional arrangements and about their design and redesign; View of Breton on the codification of a Charter of Rights in the 1982 Constitution; Inconsistencies in Courchene's theory.

Comments on Tom Courchene's informative analysis of the central role played by the Canadian Economic Union issue in the constitutional debates of 1982. Discussion of balkanization; First order of business for any producer seeking rents via the political process; Dominant feature in the Canadian political system.

Contrary to Duverger's Law, there exist multi-party systems in conjunction with simple majority single-ballot systems. At least three exceptions exist to this "law". Rae (1971) and Riker (1976; 1982) offer explanations for two of the most prominent exceptions, i.e. Canada and India. I also discuss another exception. Great Britain. In this paper, I use a simple one-dimensional spatial model to show that a multi-party system can be supported under a simple majority single-ballot system. This explanation depends on the way political parties exit the system. If parties decide sequentially whether or not to exit, a multi-party system can not be maintained. If political parties make this decision simultaneously, a multi-party system may be able to sustain itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I apply the work of Abrams and Iossifov (Public Choice 129:249–262, ) to monetary policy in Canada to see if same political party affiliation is needed to produce evidence of political opportunism. After modifying their analysis to maintain the time-series consistency of their variables for Canada, I find that both an error correction model and a Taylor rule reformulation of their test generate evidence consistent with same party political opportunism, but only weakly so. On the other hand, I also find the presence of more traditional indicators of political influence. In particular, the data suggest that the election of a Liberal party government, a decrease in the degree of political competition, and to a lesser extent, the election of a minority government all positively influence the expansiveness of Canadian monetary policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Language serves two key functions. It enables communication between agents, which allows the set-up and functioning of formal and informal institutions. It also serves a less obvious function, as it provides a reassuring quality more closely related with issues linked with trust, social capital, and cultural identification. While research on the role of language as a learning process is widespread, there is no evidence on the role of language as a signal of cultural affinity. We pursue this latter avenue of research and show that subtle language affinity is positively linked with change in earnings when using English-speaking data for cities in the Golden Horseshoe area in Southern Ontario during the period 1991 to 2001. The results are robust to changes in specification, and a broad number of empirical tests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods. The approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the Government of Canada over 130 years. Political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the Canadian government's attempt to secure the Canadian economic union in the constitution. Examination on the increasing tendency for both levels of government to engage in policies that fragment the domestic common market; Exploration on ways in which an internal common-market provision could be enshrined in the constitution; Comment from University of British Columbia political scientist Alan Cairns on an early version of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Details a study which explored the local political participation in a Canadian municipality. Activities and characteristics of a municipal electorate; Theory and concepts of local political participation; Results and conclusions.

Federal government spending in the Canadian provinces for 1962–2002 is examined with emphasis on the role of seat-vote elasticities in majoritarian electoral systems. Fixed effects regressions establish that per capita federal spending in a province increases with political competition, as measured by provincial seat-vote elasticities, and with loyalty to the federal government as measured by the degree of provincial support for the federal government. However, too much loyalty can be counter-productive because very loyal provinces are uncompetitive with low seat-vote elasticities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fact that incumbents generate and spend more campaign funds than challengers raises the question of why incumbents set campaign spending limits. The Canadian federal elections between 1979 and 2000 are used to evaluate three theoretically plausible explanations: to limit costly effort; to reduce the probability that well-funded candidates buy-off elections; to maximize the incumbent’s vote-share. It is estimated that the marginal benefit of low levels of campaign spending are greater for majority candidates than challengers, but that diminishing returns set in more quickly, indicating that a well-chosen limit could maximize the majority candidate’s vote-share. The actual and estimated optimal majority vote maximizing campaign spending limits compare favorably. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely believed that government ideology and electoral constraints are two major factors that influence the level of public expenditures. However, Frey and Schneider argue that the effects of the two phenomena are not simultaneous. Only when a government is popular can it pursue ideological goals, and when popularity is low, energies must be redirected toward gaining support from voters to win the next election. Data draw from the Canadian provincial case are used to test empirically this hypothesis. The findings support the Frey and Schneider explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assesses the outcome of the federal election campaign by rational choice model in Canada. Reasons for electoral abstinence; Correlation between differential benefit and probability; Influence of the levels of Duty on voting behavior.

Evaluates the ability of common explanatory variables to predict the voters in Canada. Estimation of logit voting regressions; Effects of demographic variables on the probability of voting; Difficulty in explaining turnout; Support for the rational voter theory.

Examines the application of the model of 'ideology' to analyze the method of construction of nationality in the minds of the people in Canada. Differences between the perceived status quo and preferred alternative of the voters; Importance of various policy dimension in explaining voting decisions among educated Canadians; Influence of Quebec sovereignty on vote choice.

Examines the effectivity of public choice on the federal system of government in the Province of Quebec. Argument on the dimension of political process in federalist framework; Operation of two forces in federalist system; Explanation on the mixture of empirical record in the contribution of federalism.

The article reexamines the issue of decentralization in Canada. It focuses on the possibility of collusion among governments to circumvent the discipline of competitive federalism. It is argued that component governments in a federal constitution collude for the same purpose. The evidence indicates a positive correlation between collusion and total government size.

This article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that politicians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection. It concludes that while this "electoral cycle" thesis was initially overstated by its proponents, it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed. This conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in Canada between 1951 and 1984. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses a study which tested the central assumption of a model on ceilings on campaign spending which is that challengers have a superior marginal product of expenditure in terms of votes obtained while incumbents enjoy an initial advantage, using cross-sectional data from constituencies in the 1979 Canadian federal elections. Graphic model of incumbent and challenger; Role of volunteer labor and third party candidates; Nature of simultaneity based on the results of inspection of the votes and expenditure equations.

The amending formula of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982 is analysed and assessed, as are a variety of alternative formulae, some of which were actually proposed and then rejected. The models and techniques of game theory provide measurements of the power and satisfaction of the individual provinces under the various amending procedures. Thus, past and future provincial bargaining positions can be compared with provincial interests, and several potential outcomes for future bargaining can be projected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses how the diverse interests of the Canadian government and the ten provincial governments were at least temporarily reconciled to produce the final document of the Constitution Act of 1982. Meaning and significance of constitutions in the political life of countries; Interpretation of some of the more salient events of the 1980-81 constitutional history of Canada; Type of constitutional restriction on the exercise of political power.

Analyzes the behavior of the Canadian central bank within the context of a theory of bureaucracy. Active use by the Bank of Canada of switching government deposits in pursuing its monetary objectives; Assumption regarding the theory of bureaucracy; Ways a central bank can influence the overall covertness of its monetary policy.