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The influence of legal training and experience upon the behavior of policy decision makers has been a source of both academic and popular concern. This paper is a preliminary investigation of factors that might contribute to an undue influence of legal training on governmental policy making. The specific focus of this paper is higher-level federal executives in the career service. The distribution and number of high level executives with legal backgrounds are determined, and comparisons between legally-trained executives and executives from other backgrounds are made with respect to career patterns and attitudinal orientations. Executives with legal backgrounds are found to vary marginally on some specific characteristics, but there do not appear to be any systematic differences between groups which would lead to a variation in policy-making behavior. These findings do not support the assertion that lawyers dominate executive institutions of government. Lawyers do not appear to dominate the federal bureaucracy in numbers, nor do the data suggest that they are particularly different from other executives. Legal training, therefore, does not appear to have a direct, unmediated impact on the formation of public policy, at least to the extent that administrative agencies are involved in such policy making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights a symposium on program evaluation. For a number of reasons program evaluation has become an important subject for public administration. In the first place people have become more concerned with keeping government accountable. In varying degrees existing means for providing accountability have been found wanting. Techniques of program evaluation have been used increasingly in this area. Despite the wide interest in program evaluation there are not a great many sources one can turn to for information on the subject. Program evaluation is of concern to both executive and legislative branches, to auditing agencies and management. Both auditing agencies and managers need program evaluation, although not necessarily of the same kind or for the same purposes. The symposium has attempted to draw on practitioners rather than academicians so that the papers will largely indicate what is happening in the field. The symposium has included papers from both the U.S. Office of Management and the U.S. General accounting Office.

In March 1996, Vice-President Gore unveiled a plan to "dramatically change" parts of the federal bureaucracy by converting them into "performance-based organizations, " or PBO's. PBO's would be given more freedom in operations and held accountable for the achievement of specified results. While the PBO plan may improve effectiveness in some parts of the federal government, claims about its significance have been overstated, and it will encounter serious challenges in implementation. The PBO model is not likely to be applied widely. The paper also assesses the significance of the PBO proposal as a part of a larger battle to preserve the administrative capabilities of the federal government. Finally, it is argued that the proposal is evidence of the increasing internationalization of the "reinventing government" movement. The weakness of the PBO plan reflects some of the weaknesses of the larger international reform movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the structure of bureaucratic decisions in state Medicaid programs. More specifically, the analysis tries to discern an underlying pattern in Medicaid optional service adoptions across the American states during the period from 1985 through 1994. These adoptions result from state-level administrative initiatives rather than federal or state legislative actions. The analysis shows that states differ in the extent to which they extend services into more controversial aspects of health care. And their willingness to do so follows a clear cumulative pattern: States initiate more controversial, limited services only after they have already adopted a full range of services that are widely acceptable to the public and governmental officials. This cumulative pattern in administrative decisions reveals a great deal about the nature of bureaucratic actions in state-level social welfare programs. This study also produces an empirical measure of bureaucratic policy outputs that can be used as an analytic variable in other research efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the bureaucracy in the U.S. America is a home of frenzy. Whether it has more or less than other countries may be left to philosophers for debate, but it has its full share. Among the latest deliriums is that of waging war on the bureaucracy, now full of noise and promise. Some of the very best people of the U.S. are doing it, usually without discrimination, for discrimination takes the edge off of propaganda. The perfect case against "this new menace to civilization," the bureaucracy, was recently presented in graphic form in a Los Angeles paper. It is to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest, to give as little as possible for as much as one can get. Year in and year out another branch of the bureaucracy, composed of engineers, biologists, and bacteriologists, is supplying the very best citizens with water which they can safely drink and doing this without thought of cutting any melons for themselves.

This paper describes an important and pervasive use of policy analysis as a retrograde tactic in bureaucratic politics. Employed by those opposed to a policy initiative, the retrograde tactic permits bureaucrats to delay and sometimes reverse political initiatives at various stages of the policy process through the demand for analysis. After placing the retrograde tactic into the general context of the bureaucratic environment, we focus on the case of the controversy over the appropriate size of the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve-a controversy where the demand for analysis was used as an effective retrograde tactic by opponents of expansion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the post-1965 emergence of Black Power, civil disorder, and racism as the American problem as differentiated from previous notions of prejudice or discrimination. What was the effect of these phenomena on the policies, politics, and techniques of the racial bureaucracy? In what ways were organizational policies modified?
Research leading to this article was conducted under a Wayne State University Faculty Research Award. The article is edited from a longer paper presented at the American Society for Public Administration National Conference in Denver, April 1971.
* Public civil rights agencies moved through three distinct eras since the first agency was established in 1941: the era of prejudice until 1957; discrimination until 1967; and the era of racism since 1967. This article deals with the effects of civil disorder, black militance, and demands for black power and community control on the politics, programs, and personnel of the racial (civil rights) bureaucracy. How do the agencies now relate to the general community, to the black community? To what extent did racial conflict in the general community effect black-white relations among the employees of the racial bureaucracy? Is it possible for government to design programs and techniques to deal with "racism"? is there an agreed-upon operational definition of racism? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most important administrative aspect of the George W. Bush presidency was not its formal management reform agenda, but its attempt to extend the politicized presidency. Efforts to assert tighter political control of the federal bureaucracy, revived during the Ronald Reagan administration, were pursued to an extreme under Bush. Loyalty triumphed over competence in selection, and political goals displaced rationality in decision making. However, the strategy of politicization undermined the Bush administration’s own policy goals as well as its broader agenda to restore the strength of the institutional presidency. This apparent failure of strategy signals the urgent necessity for a fundamental reconsideration of the politicized presidency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public administration continues to face an identity crisis that turns on the question of whether the animating principles of the discipline are to be discovered in the political foundations of a given regime, or whether they are to be found in more universal and transcendent principles of scientific management. Herbert J. Storing reframed the identity crisis as a problem arising from America’s constitutional system of governance. In doing so, he created an important role for public administration in democratic governance. This role took the form of “closet statesmanship” and, in practice, requires the exercise of prudential judgment that looks more like judicial decision making than scientific management. In summarizing Storing’s writings, the authors convincingly argue that he has much to teach us about the ongoing debate regarding the role of the bureaucracy within America’s 87,576 systems of government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Personal interactions between clients and street-level bureaucrats are significant in explaining why street-level bureaucrats behave as they do. Not all bureaucracies that apply program rules to individuals, however, engage face-to-face with their clientele. As more intake procedures are automated, such “one-on-one” encounters decrease. The author generates and tests hypotheses about frontline bureaucratic decision making in the Social Security Disability program, by applying bounded rationality theory. The findings show that eligibility decisions by street-level bureaucrats are affected by their adherence to subsets of agency goals and perceptions of others in the governance system. How quickly they make decisions also has an impact. There is no evidence that the way in which bureaucrats evaluate clients explains their decisions when they lack face-to-face contact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article distinguishes the competing interpretations of the politics–administration dichotomy, noting that as, originally framed, it was intended to detach partisan politics and patronage from sound public management. Waldo, the author suggests, concerned himself with the later, more expansive conception of the dichotomy, which included the process of policy making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After 60 years of scholarship on the rule-bound bureaucratic personality, this article turns attention to the unbureaucratic personality. Identified by a willingness to bend rules, the unbureaucratic personality is thought to be influenced by individual and workplace attributes. The individual attributes investigated in this article include nonconformity, risk propensity, and public service commitment, all of which are expected to stimulate the unbureaucratic personality. Workplace attributes include formalization and centralization, which are expected to suppress the unbureaucratic personality, and red tape, which is expected to trigger it. These hypotheses are tested using mail survey data collected from employees of four cities in a midwestern state. The results of ordered probit modeling of the data suggest that nonconformity and risk taking increase the unbureaucratic personality, as do red tape and centralized workplaces. By contrast, the unbureaucratic personality appears to be diminished by public service commitment and workplace formalization. The implications of these results for the normative aspects of rule bending are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act generally has not considered how the strategic plan, annual performance plan, and annual performance report are produced and used. Are the documents good decision and management tools, as the act intends, or are agencies internalizing them to meet the unique needs of their organization? Interviews with representatives of 14 cabinet-level federal agencies suggest that implementation of the act is not standardized. Instead, it is influenced by the unique challenges that agencies face. Further, there is a relationship between the implementation challenges and the overall use of the documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasingly, public administration in the United States operates in a densely interconnected international system in which local decisions and actions may trigger global repercussions—and vice versa—and the fate of communities in one region is bound to the choices of decision makers elsewhere. Administrative actors have become enmeshed in a complicated, interwoven pattern of governance in ways that shape actions, issues, and opportunities for influencing administrative agencies at national, state, and local levels. These developments call for a critical reappraisal of our inherited notions of governance, management, and accountability. Terrorist tragedy and responses to it call attention to these themes, but they apply broadly across the spectrum of governance challenges. To demonstrate this point, we analyze some implications of transnational governance for the institutions and practices of U.S. public management, with particular attention to another subject: environmental policy and management. A conclusion is that the public administration community must adjust traditional practices to facilitate the effective management of the global processes that, in turn, reshape the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. government is considering how it should reorganize for homeland security. Consequently, attention has focused on the new Office of Homeland Security (OHS). Much debate focuses on two issues related to OHS: (1) whether the OHS should be a separate executive agency; and (2) whether the OHS director has sufficient authority to direct changes in policies and resource allocation of other departments and agencies. The authors believe the emphasis on these areas of interest is misplaced as measures of the eventual success of the OHS. Rather than focusing on these political issues, this article outlines several questions about how the OHS might approach its complex mission and highlights some organizational and bureaucratic realities that are likely to survive the debate over placement of the OHS within the executive branch and the authorities of the OHS director. This article concludes with a discussion of some organizational tools that the OHS or any coordinating office will require to fulfill its mandate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a representative democracy, we assume the populace exerts some control over the actions and outputs of government officials, ensuring they comport with public preferences. However, the growth of the fourth branch of government has created a paradox: Unelected bureaucrats now have the power to affect government decisions (Meier 1993; Rourke 1984; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981). In this article, the author relies on two competing theories of bureaucratic behavior-representative-bureaucracy theory and Niskanen's budget-maximization theory-to assess how well the top ranks of the federal government represent the demands of the citizenry. Focusing on federal-spending priorities, the author assesses whether Senior Executive Service (SES) members mirror the attitudes of the populace or are likely to inflate budgets for their own personal gain. Contrary to the popular portrayal of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1971), the author finds these federal administrators prefer less spending than the public on most broad spending categories, even on issues that fall within their own departments' jurisdictions. As such, it may be time to revise our theories about bureaucratic self-interest and spending priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the need to engage scholars in public administration and public management in a dialogue on the importance of accepting diversity in research methods. A number of public administrationists virulently attacked the New Public Management, particularly its reinventing government or National Performance Review (NPR) manifestations. For example, there were many attacks against the NPR on the grounds that it failed to account for the realpolitik of government. In particular, many challenged the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the NPR, which, they argued, confute the fundamental principles of democracy and constitutional rule. Central to their argument was that the review's call for a shift from administrative bureaucracy to entrepreneurial organizations ignores the very nature of democratic government and how it evolved in the U.S. From a traditionalist standpoint, the old public management, which emerged in the early 1970s as a result of dissatisfaction on the part of scholars in public policy and public administration, might be viewed more as an indictment of the New Public Management's methods rather than its scope. Like the charges against traditional public administration by the behaviorists, old public management, or at least a faction of it, questions the New Public Management's methodology from epistemological and axiological standpoints.

A major debate in American education centers on the role bureaucracy plays in shaping educational performance. Proponents of school choice argue that large educational bureaucracies have contributed to dramatic performance shortfalls in America's public schools. Other scholars view educational bureaucracies as beneficial because they manage a wide range of problems and thus make it easier for teachers to focus on the core task of teaching. This study examines these competing claims about the impact of bureaucracy on student performance using district level data from Texas public schools. The findings from several regression models reveal negative relationships between bureaucracy (measured both at the central and campus administration levels) and student performance across several different grade levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses bureaucracies in the U.S. government in 2001. The administrative agencies of government at all three government levels, federal, state, and local, have been invested with substantial grants of authority by the actions of legislatures, chief executives, and courts. Their official powers include the issuance of regulations of general application and effect, the application of laws and regulations to specific individuals and organizations, and the employment, direction, and management of staff to perform such duties. Bureaucrats also influence the meaning of policies by the way they go about their duties. The character of a policy depends on the conduct of bureaucrats as well as on the contents of their decisions. Moreover, the administrative personnel who perform the public business are well-positioned to defend their decisions and ways of doing things against outsiders who would like to change them. Most of them enjoy a high degree of tenure in office - not total security but significant legal and procedural protections against unrestricted removal and other sanctions. Compared to many of their counterparts, they are very secure indeed and therefore more independent than they otherwise might be.

This article presents the results of a study investigating the efficacy of political influence over bureaucracy in regard to banking in the United States. The relationship between elected officials and unelected bureaucrats is one of recurring interest to students of government. It is widely asserted that the first generation of public administration scholars believed that bureaucrats could and should be absolutely controlled by elected officials. Politicians made policy, and civil servants applied their neutral, nonpartisan expertise to carry out the wishes of their elected superiors in the most efficient manner possible. This politics/administration dichotomy, however, later gave way to decidedly less optimistic theories about the ability of elected officials to control the bureaucracy. According to this literature, bureaucrats enjoyed considerable, if not almost complete, independence from the "macropolitical" system. Three federal agencies oversee the safety and soundness of the nation's 12,500 commercial banks: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Federal Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. INSET: Methodology.

This article focuses on the nature of public administrative reform. Based on past patterns, failure might be anticipated of the most recent manifestation of reform, the National Performance Review (NPR). However, various features of the NPR proposals and the strategy that has been employed to implement them, as well as the context in which they have been introduced, warrant caution in using the past as a guide in this instance. Prominent among the reasons given for past failures of attempts at administrative reform is the hostility that members of the U.S. Congress have shown towards a disruption of the bureaucratic status quo. Various forces appear to be at work. Members of Congress often seek to preserve their institutional role in overseeing the bureaucracy and to preclude an enhancement of presidential control. Congressional resistance may also stem from the demands of groups whose privileges are threatened by proposed changes. One interpretation of why resistance so often emerges from Congress is that the very structure of government, the "classic bureaucratic formula of hierarchy, specialization, professionalism, and written rules and regulations," serves the interest of legislators.

The purpose of this article is to examine the periodical Public Administration Review's (PAR) treatment of administrative ethics. These contributions, of course, must be taken in the context of the much broader stream of scholarly publications on administrative ethics that has developed over the past 50 years. Similarly, the ongoing efforts of legislators, judges and wise practitioners should not be ignored. Nevertheless, as the journal of the American Society for Public Administration, PAR's treatment of administrative ethics has influenced several generations of students and practitioners. By the time PAR began publication in 1940, government in the U.S. had undergone a profound transformation. At the national level, foundations of an expansive administrative state had been laid. Big government was a reality and it was apparent to many observers that the public bureaucracy represented a rapidly growing center of power within the U.S. politics and its governing institutions. Given the problematic nature of that power in a democratic republic, attention now had to be paid both to its legitimacy and to controlling its exercise. A convincing rationale for administrative discretion extending well beyond technical issues and the resulting influence over many aspects of the U.S. life, was needed.

This article explores the bureaucracy of the U.S. Department of Labor during the development of a plan for the evaluation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. The Department of Labor units devoted much effort to the collaboration, but in the end, the effort fell short. Each of the units had a particular orientation to knowledge that would become crucial to the performance of the new task. For the most program managers were not interested in the evaluation approach because the actual or expected findings were either inconclusive or remote in time.

Increasingly, generalist administrators in the public sector are venturing beyond traditional management control functions. This article, in case study format addresses that development. It focuses on the author's experience in trying to apply a generalist perspective in a regional office of the highly fragmented HEW bureaucracy. It addresses that experience in terms of the strategies framework used the major roles played, and the successes and failures encountered. At the close, it stresses how the effective performative of generalist roles is dependent on a carefully cultivated external perspective and finely tuned awareness of the common concerns facing generalist administrators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author focuses on the success of zero-base budgeting (ZBB) in the U.S. The fiscal 1979 budget projects an expenditure growth of $40 billion, all but $8 billion of which is due to mandatory inflation and workload increases. The fiscal 1979 budget comes out just about where disembodied incrementalism would tend to. The budget is properly restrained in its claims for ZBB. By one vital measure, ZBB was a remarkable success. The new system was speedily installed throughout the federal bureaucracy. Even more astounding, ZBB was much more than an ancillary submission, merely supplementing the standard budget documents which continued to receive the lion's share of attention. The core budget estimates submitted by most federal agencies conformed to the ZBB guidelines. ZBB was introduced quickly and painlessly because it did not alter either "the rules of evidence" for budgeting or the structure for budget choices. Agency after agency accommodated ZBB to its existing budgetary framework. If an agency had a program budget, it selected programs as decision units, if its budget still was oriented to organizational lines, these became its ZBB categories.

In the post-World War II period, a transformation of urban processes has occurred which raises questions about the appropriateness of "territorial" government. This change has manifested in activities and problems that transcend and defy identity by spatial propinquity or physical boundedness. As such, a significant mismatch occurs between territorial and political boundaries, raising questions of representation and administrative legitimacy. Those patterns of governance based on the territorial model - both local government and centralized areawide bureaucracy - are ill-equipped to handle the variety of unique decisions and diverse constituencies surrounding most major land use control situations. Instead, the trans-territorial complexity of metropolitan settlement raises the possibility of a new perspective which views land use control through an open system of concurrent government. This non-hierarchical system operates through an intergovernmental coordination of interest and knowledge specific agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the more pressing problems of our times is the state of the bureaucracy. Not only have governmental institutions-federal, state, and local-fallen to new lows in public esteem, but there is evidence that the organizational performance that has gotten them this reputation is worsening rather than improving as new tasks are undertaken and level added to level in the hierarchy. Now we have a new President who has vowed to do something about the "horrible bureaucracy" over which he is presiding. This article warns him and his associates that reform isn't as easy as it sounds, and that reorganization, while necessary and useful, is only a part of the answer. It suggests a seven-point approach, the two most important of which are the exploring of new patterns of administration to replace ultimately the bureaucratic form; and the involving of members of the system-the bureaucrats themselves-in its modification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines administrative reform in the comparative context of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. A reform continuum is presented, which moves from the nonstrategic incremental reforms of the United States to the comprehensive and fundamental reforms adopted in New Zealand. The role of politics and political leadership is linked to the various models of reform. More comprehensive and strategic efforts require great initial political leadership and will, but incremental efforts require more continuous political involvement. In the countries examined, using fundamental reform to create a simplified base from which to launch other initiatives appears to be a key component of success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attacks on government can undermine commitment to and confidence in professional public administration. These attacks should be examined from the perspective of the history, functions, and values of public administration. Dwight Waldo's thought provides such a perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More news emanates from officials than from any other source. Most of it passes routinely through formal channels of "public information" in the government to reporters on newsbeats around Washington. Not all news gathering is routine, however. Some nonroutine news comes from officials who disclose a pertinent piece of information to the press on their own initiative and without specific authorization to do so. The rest reporters piece together by making their rounds, exchanging and cross-checking bits of information with their contacts in the government, and taking educated guesses. In these instances, too, it is officials who provide the information that makes the news. The contrast between the American and British press suggests an explanation. The volume of detailed information on the inner workings of the U.S. government in the press astonishes, and occasionally dismays, foreign observers. The reason for the difference is not so much legal sanction or reportorial aggressiveness as it is bureaucratic need. Getting things done in Washington requires greater use of the press than it does in London.

The development of public administration in the U.S. was the extent to which sociological factors apparently affected the prescriptions and principles of which its literature was composed. Through the early teachings, the successes of the reform movement and the widespread adoption of the city-manager form of government, has been widely distributed both through academia and the general public. Political scientists and sociologists have begun to raise questions about the operation of administrative structures in and on government and society. It seems odd that the field of public administration itself has not evidenced a general awareness of the rumblings of change that are being heard in the public and from some intellectuals. The traditional bureaucratic administrative structure possesses two central characteristics. The more basic of those is the principle of hierarchy, which entails strictly defined roles articulated in terms of layers of authority. Policy is set at the top of the hierarchy and transmitted down through rules and close authoritative supervision, which insures that the rules are followed.

The article focuses on the administrative decentralization and political power. By mid-50s it was possible to discern emerging conflicts of doctrine and practice among those who previously applauded and defended bureaucrats. A major shift of outlook and values in governmental design seemed to be taking place. By the middle of the 19th century, however, legislative supremacy, the long ballot and the spoils system resulted in widespread disillusionment, which in turn gave impetus to efforts to take administration out of politics by lodging it in independent boards and commissions and by introducing the merit system to break the hold of parties on the bureaucracies. Different segments of the population feel differentially disadvantaged by the governmental machinery in operation at any given moment and agitate for structural changes to improve their position. It has long been recognized that much public policy is shaped largely by clusters of bureaus, their organized clienteles and legislative committees and legislators specializing in each public function.

A program of maximum participation proved to be politically unfeasible, while the very concept of participation displayed a brilliant ambiguity. Maximum feasible participation emerged unclear, unexamined and ununderstood. Because it served many agendas, it enjoyed a vitality, which permitted it to grow in this uncertain terrain. The theme of participation confronts administrators in two basic ways, one is that it focuses attention upon the poor, a group largely neglected by many public bureaucracies and second, it emphasizes degrees of citizen involvement which have not been typical in public bureaucracies. The increasing use of professionals and the redefinition of administration as a professional field has fed the notion that planning is politics-free. Policy involvement in community action planning is propelled by the contention that citizens read poor citizens and thus should have a focal role in developing plans, which affect them. The demand for policy involvement today is different because leaders of the black and the poor recognize the importance of policy involvement and are organizing to see that it becomes reality.

The article discusses some developments related to public administration. It highlights that the size and complexity of the government of New York City are such that its experience in internal administration deserves special attention. Recent comments on developments in the Office of Administration are especially welcome. These have been prepared by Philip Finkeistein, executive assistant to the deputy mayor and Sigmund G. Ginsburg, special assistant to the deputy mayor and senior management consultant, both of the Office of the Mayor-Office of Administration, New York City. The focus of their comments is upon developments in the Office of Administration, the mayor's primary resource for the coordination and management of the far-ranging activities of the metropolis. Another line of action is a management practice and manpower utilization review of the city government, adapted from the federal approach. The management review program undertook to identify the changes necessary to make the structural reorganization effective.

The importance of the relationships between the President and the bureaus has long been recognized. It is the bureaus which, in large part, carry out Presidential policy directives. How, in a President's crowded schedule, can he fit in meetings with Bureau Chiefs, and what would a President discuss in these meetings? Although Presidents will answer these questions for themselves, the author suggests that the time has arrived for a renewal of close relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses ubiquitous anomie, that is, bureaucrat bashing that throughout the federal service. Civil servants by themselves cannot do much to improve the situation because their situation is the effect not the cause. The cause lies in ideological dissensus within the political stratum, profound disagreements over equality, democracy and hence the role of government, disagreements that create conflicting expectations that no conceivable cadre of civil servants can meet. What is possible is to approach better understanding of why there is and will continue to be this ubiquitous anomie and to encourage members of the public service to ameliorate what they alone cannot change. When Max Weber provided the classical definition of bureaucracy, scholar Irving Spitzberg emphasized two features: security of tenure and monopoly of expertise. In the U.S., this monopoly, though it never existed entirely in a system of checks and balances, has been shattered by the rise of policy analysis. All around the country, in think-tanks, consulting firms, universities, state and local governments, congressional staffs and elsewhere, there are rival teams of analysts who have recently been or expect soon to be in government. They know as much as those in the bureaucracy.

The article focuses on the practice of members of the U.S. Congress in criticizing the bureaucracy of the U.S. government. While times are difficult, this is not the first, nor will it be the last, for bureaucracy bashing by members of the U.S. Congress. This division has a long history in the United States. As early as 1866 California Senator James A. McDougall proclaimed: "Our city of Washington is filled with officials who have new duties to perform, offices to be made for them. You may go to any of the departments of the government and walk through during business hours, and you will not find: one clerk in five who has any business to do except smoke a cigar and enjoy conversation with his friends." In his study of red tape, Herbert Kaufman noted the origin of rules and regulations: "The moment a government program for a specified group gets started, legislation and administrative directives and court battles proliferate. Procedures for requesting benefits, for processing such applications, for distributing the benefits; and for settling disputes with applicants over their entitlements must be established."

This article focuses on the developments made in the field of public administration. One of the important developments in public administration is the spread of planning programming budgeting (PPB) system from federal to state and local government in the United States is no longer news, but now it appears the movement has crossed the Atlantic to Great Britain. An even more serious problem, according to "The Economist," relates to implementation of the system. Most of the money is actually spent by local authorities, with the help of a very nonspecific rate support grant. The journal concedes are putting PPB to work on their budgets, but adds there is no assurance that these units will define their objectives the same way as the national government. There is a development of new principle in the field of public administration. According to thinkers, bureaucracy is obsolete. Its rigidities encumber modern organizations. Their need is to be adaptive, with capacity for rapid response to rapidly changing environments, problems, and objectives. This capacity is optimized by organization on a fluid work-team basis, with project-oriented teams formed, changed, disbanded, and formed a new as work requires. Work-team organizations have in fact existed, under various names, for some time. Project management, product management, program management, task forces, matrix management all are premised on the assumption of work-team design.