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In this paper, we use city-level datasets of social assistance programmes over 280 cities between year 2003 and 2011 to verify the existence of the crowding out between social assistance programmes and unemployment insurance in China. In other words, the expansion of social assistance programmes is associated with a reduction in the enrolment of unemployment insurance. With verifying the existence of the crowding out, this article argues that the crowding out is a result of an ineffective coordination across government departments. In the process of 'dual decentralization,' in which the central government has delegated welfare provision responsibility to local governments, the misalignment of incentive and institutions between central and local governments explains the ineffective coordination. Different from many studies in the literature, this paper presents an adverse consequence of China's bureaucratic incentive system in social policy implementation. Also, while the conceptual framework 'fragmented authoritarianism' has highlighted the policy ineffectiveness in the economic policy area, this paper contributes to this literature by illustrating the policy ineffectiveness in the social policy areas. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decentralization is among the most globally ubiquitous public sector reforms. In the past few decades, many countries have taken formal steps to empower local governments, typically with a mix of stated developmental and governance goals. Although decentralization receives much attention, our systematic practical knowledge about it remains limited, and it is fair to say that it often does not meet expectations. Even supporters have begun to express frustration, and references to stalled decentralization or even recentralization have emerged in both policy debates and in practice. This paper briefly recaps what decentralization was expected to achieve, broadly summarizes what we know about performance, and highlights factors that support and impede reform. It also discusses weaknesses and challenges in how decentralization has been conceived, analyzed, designed, and implemented. The core argument is that this type of reform is more diverse and complex than has conventionally been acknowledged and that more careful analysis and strategic action tailored to a specific country are needed to help to realize more effective and sustainable decentralization. The paper closes with thoughts about future directions for how we conceptualize and pragmatically approach this diverse and consequential reform. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of fiscal decentralization and flat administrative structure on local budget size and program outlays. We test three related theoretical hypotheses in China's adoption of province-over-county scheme of financial administration. We provide evidence that both decentralization of expenditure and decentralization of revenue increase the size of local budgets; that the impact of the former far outweighs that of the latter with local budgets on a rising trajectory; and that discretion grants localities more means to increase their budget. These results show that as China's reform deepens the proportion of local outlay on administration declines because of more local discretion from eliminating the prefecture bypass between the province and counties. But neither decentralization nor increased local discretion has allocated more local resources for education, and both contribute to increasing outlay on economic development. The paper formulates tentative policy recommendations that carry potential application for other countries. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Effective planning makes a vital contribution to developmental success. It is generally perceived as being either centralized (top‐down) or decentralized (bottom‐up). Centralized planning dominated the early development decades, but disappointing results greatly lessened its appeal and paved the way for participatory and decentralized planning. Both types of planning are evident today, but the question has arisen as to whether top‐down and bottom‐up planning can be successfully combined into one effective, efficient, and popular system. This question is examined through the case of Bhutan where central planning was introduced at the outset of the country's push for modernization and today leads the way in the country's pursuit of Gross National Happiness (GNH). However, central planning has been complemented with decentralized participatory planning at the subnational levels. Success in aligning the two planning modes has been achieved by incremental development of the planning system, orientation to the unifying national vision of GNH, a powerful central planning agency, actors at all levels who are able and knowledgeable in their planning roles, and processes that are well organized and proven to work to the satisfaction of all participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decentralization is an extensively discussed topic within academic and institutional circles worldwide. While a common argument for decentralization is that it fosters democratic deepening, counterarguments cautiously point to unequal access to resources and distribution of power as factors that inhibit democratization. This study contributes to the literature on the relationship between decentralization and democratization through a comparative study of Water User Associations in two provinces of Turkey and shows in line with the literature that resource and power inequalities hamper the link between decentralization and democratization. However, as this article shows, civic engagement can generate 'countervailing power' that can overcome the negative impact of such inequalities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY Many countries are decentralizing in various ways. Decentralization is often intended at least partly to make government more efficient, flexible, and responsive. Many studies have evaluated the effects of decentralization on the provision of such services as health and education as well as on corruption, stability, and growth. Because what governments do and how well they do it is inseparably entangled with the question of how they are financed, this article outlines why and how a key element in a sound decentralization program should be to strengthen the linkage between local expenditures and local revenues-called here the Wicksellian Connection. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]