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To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01819.x Byline: GIJS JAN BRANDSMA (1), JENS BLOM-HANSEN (2) Abstract: The literature on comitology has largely ignored the European Commission's actual behaviour in the daily workings of the numerous comitology committees that were designed to control it. On the basis of survey data of Danish and Dutch representatives on nearly all comitology committees, this paper investigates the Commission's role in the system. We find that the Commission acts both as a mediator and as a policy advocate, but to varying degrees. We take a first step towards understanding this behaviour by an inspection of four arguments found in the literature on comitology and the Commission: the constraining or enabling impact of the comitology procedures; the institutional position of the responsible Directorate-General; the nature of the cases dealt with by the committees and, finally, the intensity of the member states' preferences in relation to the committees' cases. In comitology, each of these arguments shapes the mediating or the advocating behaviour of the Commission. Author Affiliation: (1)Gijs Jan Brandsma is in the Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University. (2)Jens Blom-Hansen is in the Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. Article History: Date received 12 March 2008. Date accepted 1 December 2008.

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00655.x Byline: KUTSAL YESILKAGIT (1), JENS BLOM-HANSEN (2) Abstract: The partnership principle in EU cohesion policy was introduced in order to involve subnational authorities and interest organizations in policy formulation and implementation. In this article we examine how the member states have reacted to this call for a new way of making public policy. We argue that the multi-level governance literature and the critics of the multi-level governance framework have not examined implementation structures properly, but have focused on regional influence. We conduct a comparative analysis of the Dutch and Danish implementations of the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. Our findings show that when examining implementation structures it becomes clear that member states are in full control of the re-allocation of EU funds. They show that Denmark and The Netherlands have been able to absorb EU cohesion policy within already existing national implementation structures of labour market policies and regional development. One central theoretical implication of our study is that the focus of studies of any fundamental re-allocation of power resources in cohesion studies should comprise the entire network of implementation rather than the strategies of its individual component actors. Author Affiliation: (1)Kutsal Yesilkagit is in the Utrecht School of Governance, University of Utrecht. (2)Jens Blom-Hansen is in the Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. Article History: Date received 23 November 2005. Date accepted 28 April 2006.

Studies of bureaucracy have been very concerned about whether the bureaucracy exploits its informational advantage vis‐à‐vis politicians to influence policy decisions. Yet, little theorizing has been undertaken about how such influence takes place. We identify and test three mechanisms that must be at work in order for policy information to function as a vehicle for political influence of bureaucrats. Using data from politicians and bureaucrats in five different political systems and survey experimental methods to deal with endogeneity and social desirability bias, we find evidence supporting all three mechanisms: bureaucrats are generally willing to use policy information to influence political decisions, politicians rely on policy information from bureaucrats when making such decisions, and the way policy information is presented matters for the policy preferences of politicians. We discuss the implications of the results and factors that are important for the mechanisms to apply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy networks is a powerful analytical concept. However, it must be combined with a model of the actor if the analyst is to move beyond description and into the more interesting field of policy explanation. This article argues that this may be done by the use of 'new institutionalism'. It first demonstrates that policy networks may be understood as institutions, i.e. as rules constraining the actions of the participating actors. It then outlines the contribution which institutional theory may make to policy network analysis. This is done by giving an institutional answer to three questions which the policy network literature has not successfully addressed. Why do networks come into existence? Why do networks change? Why are networks so persistent? The institutional logic is illustrated in a case study of a Danish intergovernmental policy network: the annual budget negotiations between the state and local authorities. The main lesson to draw from this exercise is that when the insights from policy network analysis are combined with the theoretical insights from 'new institutionalism', it is indeed possible to start providing explanations of policy networks and their impact on policy outcomes.

Studies show that the EU institutions have strong preferences with regard to the design of the EU comitology system which, consequently, is the result of intense inter-institutional negotiations. However, the exact choice of comitology procedure to install in a given legislative proposal has received much less scholarly attention. Based on a behavioural logic of control maximization, this article investigates the comitology preferences of the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament in the legislative process. The findings from an analysis of all new directives and regulations in the years 1999-2006, a total of 686 acts, show that the Council seeks strict comitology control while the Commission and the Parliament both seek permissive control. This holds even though the legislative process is characterized by a high degree of agreement on comitology. The analysis indicates that this is because the actors strategically anticipate each other's preferences, not because there is a true alignment of preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]