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Accurately estimating and assessing real-world quantities (e.g., how long it will take to get to the train station; the calorie content of a meal) is a central skill for adaptive cognition. To date, theoretical and empirical work on the mental resources recruited by real-world estimation has focused primarily on the role of domain knowledge (e.g., knowledge of the metric and distributional properties of objects in a domain). Here we examined the role of basic numeric abilities - specifically, symbolic-number mapping - in real-world estimation. In Experiment 1 ( N = 286 ) and Experiment 2 ( N = 592 ), participants first completed a country-population estimation task (a task domain commonly used to study real-world estimation) and then completed a number-line task (an approach commonly used to measure symbolic-number mapping). In both experiments, participants with better performance in the number-line task made more accurate estimates in the estimation task. Moreover, Experiment 2 showed that performance in the number-line task predicts estimation accuracy independently of domain knowledge. Further, in Experiment 2 the association between estimation accuracy and symbolic-number mapping did not depend on whether the number-line task involved small numbers (up to 1000) or large numbers that matched the range of the numbers in the estimation task (up to 100,000,000). Our results show for the first time that basic numeric abilities contribute to the estimation of real-world quantities. We discuss implications for theories of real-world estimation and for interventions aiming to improve people's ability to estimate real-world quantities., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Given the large amount of information that people process daily, it is important to understand memory for the truth and falsity of information. The most prominent theoretical models in this regard are the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. The former assumes that both "true" and "false" tags may be added to the memory representation of encoded information; the latter assumes that only falsity is tagged. In the present work, we contrasted these two models with an expectation-violation model hypothesizing that truth or falsity tags are assigned when expectations about truth or falsity must be revised in light of new information. An interesting implication of the expectation-violation model is that a context with predominantly false information leads to the tagging of truth whereas a context with predominantly true information leads to the tagging of falsity. To test the three theoretical models against each other, veracity expectations were manipulated between participants by varying the base rates of allegedly true and false advertising claims. Memory for the veracity of these claims was assessed using a model-based analysis. To increase methodological rigor and transparency in the specification of the measurement model, we preregistered, a priori, the details of the model-based analysis test. Despite a large sample size (N = 208), memory for truth and falsity did not differ, regardless of the base rates of true and false claims. The results thus support the Cartesian model and provide evidence against the Spinozan model and the expectation-violation model., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Words judged for relevance in a survival situation are remembered better than words judged for relevance in a nonsurvival context. This survival processing effect has been explained by selective tuning of human memory during evolution to process and retain information specifically relevant for survival. According to the richness-of-encoding hypothesis the survival processing effect arises from a domain-general mechanism-namely, a particularly rich and distinct form of encoding. This form of information processing is effortful and requires limited cognitive capacities. In our experiment, we used the well-established psychological refractory period framework in conjunction with the effect propagation logic to assess the role of central cognitive resources for the survival processing effect. Our data demonstrate that the survival memory advantage indeed relies on the capacity-limited central stage of cognitive processing. Thus, rating words in the context of a survival scenario involves central processing resources to a greater amount than rating words in a nonsurvival control condition. We discuss implications for theories of the survival processing effect., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

The present study investigated whether we first remember an item (e.g., a word itself) and then its source (e.g., position on the screen) or whether the retrieval of item and source information can (partially) overlap. Participants were tested on the source either in immediate sequence to item recognition (as standard in source-monitoring research) or following as a separate block after full completion of the item recognition test to separate these processes in time, providing a baseline. Using the mouse-tracking procedure during the item and source tests, we analyzed how item and source decisions unfolded qualitatively over time. Despite no significant difference in the aggregated trajectory curvatures, more thorough analyses based on the individual trajectories revealed differences across the test formats. In the standard format, trajectories were less curved in the source than in the item test. In contrast, in the blocked format, this difference was in the other direction with source showing more curved trajectories than item. Alternative interpretations of mouse-trajectory curvatures on the source-monitoring paradigm and what their difference may imply for item and source processing are discussed., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

When making risky choices, people often fall short of the norm of expected value (EV) maximization. Previous research has shown that presenting options in the Open Sampling (OSa) format, a 10-by-10 matrix of randomly arranged outcomes, can improve choices and reduce decision times. First, the current research aims to replicate and extend the findings on the OSa format. To this end, we compare OSa to the common description-based format as well as further graphical representations, and investigate the resulting accordance with EV maximization and decision time. Second, we study whether people lower (vs. higher) in numeracy, the ability to use probabilistic and mathematical concepts, particularly benefit from a graphical representation of options. We conducted five high-powered studies (total N = 1,575) in which participants chose repeatedly between two risky gambles, using different populations and gamble-problem sets. Overall, we could not find a benefit of the OSa format in terms of EV accordance in any of the five studies. However, three studies also tested a novel variant of the OSa format with grouped outcomes and found that it consistently improved EV accordance compared with all other formats. All graphical formats led to faster decisions without harming decision quality. The effects of presentation format were not moderated by numeracy in three of the four studies that assessed numeracy. In conclusion, our research introduces a new presentation format which consistently improves risky choices and can also be used to communicate risks in applied contexts such as medical decision making., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Exemplar models are often used in research on multiple-cue judgments to describe the underlying process of participants' responses. In these experiments, participants are repeatedly presented with the same exemplars (e.g., poisonous bugs) and instructed to memorize these exemplars and their corresponding criterion values (e.g., the toxicity of a bug). We propose that there are two possible outcomes when participants judge one of the already learned exemplars in some later block of the experiment. They either have memorized the exemplar and their respective criterion value and are thus able to recall the exact value, or they have not learned the exemplar and thus have to judge its criterion value, as if it was a new stimulus. We argue that psychologically, the judgments of participants in a multiple-cue judgment experiment are a mixture of these two qualitatively distinct cognitive processes: judgment and recall. However, the cognitive modeling procedure usually applied does not make any distinction between these processes and the data generated by them. We investigated potential effects of disregarding the distinction between these two processes on the parameter recovery and the model fit of one exemplar model. We present results of a simulation as well as the reanalysis of five experimental data sets showing that the current combination of experimental design and modeling procedure can bias parameter estimates, impair their validity, and negatively affect the fit and predictive performance of the model. We also present a latent-mixture extension of the original model as a possible solution to these issues., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

The repetition-induced truth effect refers to a phenomenon where people rate repeated statements as more likely true than novel statements. In this paper, we document qualitative individual differences in the effect. While the overwhelming majority of participants display the usual positive truth effect, a minority are the opposite-they reliably discount the validity of repeated statements, what we refer to as negative truth effect. We examine eight truth-effect data sets where individual-level data are curated. These sets are composed of 1105 individuals performing 38,904 judgments. Through Bayes factor model comparison, we show that reliable negative truth effects occur in five of the eight data sets. The negative truth effect is informative because it seems unreasonable that the mechanisms mediating the positive truth effect are the same that lead to a discounting of repeated statements' validity. Moreover, the presence of qualitative differences motivates a different type of analysis of individual differences based on ordinal (i.e., Which sign does the effect have?) rather than metric measures. To our knowledge, this paper reports the first such reliable qualitative differences in a cognitive task.

After imagining being stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land without any basic survival material and rating objects with respect to their relevance in this situation, participants show superior memory performance for these objects compared to a control scenario. A possible mechanism responsible for this memory advantage is the richness and distinctiveness with which information is encoded in the survival-scenario condition. When confronted with the unusual task of thinking about how an object can be used in a life-threatening context, participants will most likely consider both common and uncommon (i.e., novel) functions of this object. These ideas about potential functions may later serve as powerful retrieval cues that boost memory performance. We argue that objects differ in their potential to be used as novel, creative survival tools. Some objects may be low in functional fixedness, meaning that it is possible to use them in many different ways. Other objects, in contrast, may be high in functional fixedness, meaning that the possibilities to use them in non-standard ways is limited. We tested experimentally whether functional fixedness of objects moderates the strength of the survival-processing advantage compared to a moving control scenario. As predicted, we observed an interaction of the functional fixedness level with scenario type: The survival-processing memory advantage was more pronounced for objects low in functional fixedness compared to those high in functional fixedness. These results are in line with the richness-of-encoding explanation of the survival-processing advantage.

In his comment on Heck and Erdfelder (2016, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 1440-1465), Starns (2018, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25, 2406-2416) focuses on the response time-extended two-high-threshold (2HT-RT) model for yes-no recognition tasks, a specific example for the general class of response time-extended multinomial processing tree models (MPT-RTs) we proposed. He argues that the 2HT-RT model cannot accommodate the speed-accuracy trade-off, a key mechanism in speeded recognition tasks. As a remedy, he proposes a specific discrete-state model for recognition memory that assumes a race mechanism for detection and guessing. In this reply, we clarify our motivation for using the 2HT-RT model as an example and highlight the importance and benefits of MPT-RTs as a flexible class of general-purpose, simple-to-use models. By binning RTs into discrete categories, the MPT-RT approach facilitates the joint modeling of discrete responses and response times in a variety of psychological paradigms. In fact, many paradigms either lack a clear-cut accuracy criterion or show performance levels at ceiling, making corrections for incautious responding redundant. Moreover, we show that some forms of speed-accuracy trade-off can in fact not only be accommodated but also be measured by appropriately designed MPT-RTs.

Learners often allocate more study time to challenging items than to easier ones. Nevertheless, both predicted and actual memory performance are typically worse for difficult than for easier items. The resulting inverse relations between people's predictions of their memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) and self-paced study time (ST) are often explained by bottom-up, data-driven ST allocation that is based on fluency. However, we demonstrate robust inverted U-shaped relations between JOLs and ST that cannot be explained by data-driven ST allocation alone. Consequently, we explored how two models of top-down, strategic ST allocation account for curvilinear JOL-ST relations. First, according to the Region of Proximal Learning model, people stop quickly on items for which they experience too little progress in learning. Second, according to the Diminishing Criterion Model, people set a time limit and stop studying when this time limit is reached. In three experiments, we manipulated motivation with different methods and examined which model best described JOL-ST relations. Consistent with the Diminishing Criterion Model but not with the Region of Proximal Learning model, results revealed that curvilinearity was due to people setting a time limit.

The idea that two distinct modes of thought affect human cognition and behavior has received considerable attention in psychology. In the domain of metacognition, it is assumed that metacognitive judgments are based on both nonanalytic, experience-based processes and analytic, theory-based processes. This study examined whether the experience-based process of intuition underlies people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs). In four experiments, people made JOLs and took a test on compound remote associates, that is, groups of 3 words that were either remote associates of a single solution word (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). Previous research has shown that increased fluency of processing coherent triads produces brief positive affects that may underlie judgments. In all experiments, JOLs were higher for coherent than for incoherent triads. The same was true for recognition memory and free recall performance. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that coherent triads were processed more fluently (i.e., read more quickly) than incoherent triads. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the effect of semantic coherence on JOLs occurred for participants who were aware and unaware of relations between all three triad words, but was more pronounced for aware participants. In sum, this study demonstrates that intuition impacts JOLs over and above theory-based processes.

Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models account for observed categorical responses by assuming a finite number of underlying cognitive processes. We propose a general method that allows for the inclusion of response times (RTs) into any kind of MPT model to measure the relative speed of the hypothesized processes. The approach relies on the fundamental assumption that observed RT distributions emerge as mixtures of latent RT distributions that correspond to different underlying processing paths. To avoid auxiliary assumptions about the shape of these latent RT distributions, we account for RTs in a distribution-free way by splitting each observed category into several bins from fast to slow responses, separately for each individual. Given these data, latent RT distributions are parameterized by probability parameters for these RT bins, and an extended MPT model is obtained. Hence, all of the statistical results and software available for MPT models can easily be used to fit, test, and compare RT-extended MPT models. We demonstrate the proposed method by applying it to the two-high-threshold model of recognition memory.

Enhanced memory for cheaters could be suited to avoid social exchange situations in which we run the risk of getting exploited by others. Several experiments demonstrated that we have better source memory for faces combined with negative rather than positive behavior (Bell & Buchner, Memory & Cognition, 38, 29-41, 2010) or for cheaters and cooperators showing unexpected behavior (Bell, Buchner, Kroneisen, Giang, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38, 1512-1529, 2012). In the present study, we compared two groups: Group 1 just saw faces combined with aggressive, prosocial or neutral behavior descriptions, but got no further information, whereas group 2 was explicitly told that they would now see the behavior descriptions of very aggressive and unsocial persons. To measure old-new discrimination, source memory, and guessing biases separately, we used a multinomial model. When having no expectancies about the behavior of the presented people, enhanced source memory for aggressive persons was found. In comparison, source memory for faces combined with prosocial behavior descriptions was significantly higher in the group expecting only aggressive persons. These findings can be attributed to a mechanism that focuses on expectancy-incongruent information, representing a more flexible and therefore efficient memory strategy for remembering exchange-relevant information.

Model comparisons are a vital tool for disentangling which of several strategies a decision maker may have used--that is, which cognitive processes may have governed observable choice behavior. However, previous methodological approaches have been limited to models (i.e., decision strategies) with deterministic choice rules. As such, psychologically plausible choice models--such as evidence-accumulation and connectionist models--that entail probabilistic choice predictions could not be considered appropriately. To overcome this limitation, we propose a generalization of Bröder and Schiffer's (Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 361-380, 2003) choice-based classification method, relying on (1) parametric order constraints in the multinomial processing tree framework to implement probabilistic models and (2) minimum description length for model comparison. The advantages of the generalized approach are demonstrated through recovery simulations and an experiment. In explaining previous methods and our generalization, we maintain a nontechnical focus--so as to provide a practical guide for comparing both deterministic and probabilistic choice models.

Research and theorizing suggest a processing advantage of category-level correlations over exemplar-level correlations. That research has also shown that category-level correlations serve as a proxy for inferring exemplar-level correlations. For example, an individual may learn that the demand for a product category, like cheese, in one store predicts the demand for this category in another. The individual could then draw the unwarranted conclusion that the demand for an exemplar, like cheddar, would also predict the demand for this exemplar in the other store. This notion is supported by previous experiments demonstrating that the subjective exemplar-level correlation follows the implication of the category-level correlation. However, in virtually all previous experiments suggesting a processing advantage for category-level over exemplar-level correlations, the stimulus correlation at the category level was substantial, whereas the correlation at the exemplar level was weak. Here, we tested the hypothesis that individuals process the level that is most informative, either the exemplar or the category level. We presented participants with a zero correlation at the category level, but varied the correlation at the exemplar level. Participants presented with a zero correlation across exemplar products correctly reproduced a zero correlation across product categories. When presented with a substantial correlation at the exemplar level, however, they erroneously reproduced a similar correlation at the category level. These findings therefore imply that there is no general processing advantage for correlations at higher aggregation levels. Instead, individuals seemingly attend to the level that holds the most regular information. Findings are discussed regarding the role of covariation strength in correlation detection and use.

In probabilistic inferences concerning which of two objects has the larger criterion value (e.g., which of two cities has more inhabitants), participants may recognize both objects, only one, or neither. According to the mental-toolbox approach, different decision strategies exist for each of these cases, utilizing different probabilistic cues. Possibly, however, participants use these cues to build a subjective rank order that involves all objects, irrespective of their recognition status. The decision process then simply utilizes the distance between two objects in one's subjective order. We tested the role of such linear orders in reanalyses of existing data and in a new experiment. Participants' choices and decision times were determined both by subjective rank-order distances and by the recognition status of the compared objects. To integrate these theoretically inconsistent findings, we discuss the role of the evidential difference (or the degree of conflict) between two objects.

Former experimental studies have shown that decisions from memory tend to rely only on a few cues, following simple noncompensatory heuristics like "take the best." However, it has also repeatedly been demonstrated that a pictorial, as opposed to a verbal, representation of cue information fosters the inclusion of more cues in compensatory strategies, suggesting a facilitated retrieval of cue patterns. These studies did not properly control for visual salience of cues, however. In the experiment reported here, the cue salience hierarchy established in a pilot study was either congruent or incongruent with the validity order of the cues. Only the latter condition increased compensatory decision making, suggesting that the apparent representational format effect is, rather, a salience effect: Participants automatically retrieve and incorporate salient cues irrespective of their validity. Results are discussed with respect to reaction time data.

In several recent reviews, authors have argued for the pervasive use of fast-and-frugal heuristics in human judgment. They have provided an overview of heuristics and have reiterated findings corroborating that such heuristics can be very valid strategies leading to high accuracy. They also have reviewed previous work that implies that simple heuristics are actually used by decision makers. Unfortunately, concerning the latter point, these reviews appear to be somewhat incomplete. More important, previous conclusions have been derived from investigations that bear some noteworthy methodological limitations. I demonstrate these by proposing a new heuristic and provide some novel critical findings. Also, I review some of the relevant literature often not-or only partially-considered. Overall, although some fast-and-frugal heuristics indeed seem to predict behavior at times, there is little to no evidence for others. More generally, the empirical evidence available does not warrant the conclusion that heuristics are pervasively used.