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People often hold extreme political attitudes about complex policies. We hypothesized that people typically know less about such policies than they think they do (the illusion of explanatory depth) and that polarized attitudes are enabled by simplistic causal models. Asking people to explain policies in detail both undermined the illusion of explanatory depth and led to attitudes that were more moderate (Experiments 1 and 2). Although these effects occurred when people were asked to generate a mechanistic explanation, they did not occur when people were instead asked to enumerate reasons for their policy preferences (Experiment 2). Finally, generating mechanistic explanations reduced donations to relevant political advocacy groups (Experiment 3). The evidence suggests that people's mistaken sense that they understand the causal processes underlying policies contributes to political polarization.

Four studies investigated whether activating a social identity can lead group members to choose options that are labeled in words associated with that identity. When political identities were made salient, Republicans (but not Democrats) became more likely to choose the gamble or investment option labeled "conservative." This shift did not occur in a condition in which the same options were unlabeled. Thus, the mechanism underlying the effect appears to be not activated identity-related values prioritizing low risk, but rather activated identity-related language (the group label "conservative"). Indeed, when political identities were salient, Republicans favored options labeled "conservative" regardless of whether the options were low or high risk. Finally, requiring participants to explain the label "conservative" before making their choice did not diminish the effect, which suggests that it does not merely reflect inattention to content or construct accessibility. We discuss the implications of these results for the literatures on identity, priming, choice, politics, and marketing.

We show that likelihood judgments are biased toward an ignorance-prior probability that assigns equal credence to each mutually exclusive event considered by the judge. The value of the ignorance prior depends crucially on how the set of possibilities (i.e., the state space) is subjectively partitioned by the judge. For instance, asking "what is the probability that Sunday will be hotter than any other day next week?" facilitates a two-fold case partition, [Sunday hotter, Sunday not hotter], thus priming an ignorance prior of 1/2. In contrast, asking "what is the probability that the hottest day of the week will be Sunday?" facilitates a seven-fold class partition, [Sunday hottest, Monday hottest, etc.], priming an ignorance prior of 1/7. In four studies, we observed systematic partition dependence: Judgments made by participants presented with either case or class formulations of the same query were biased toward the corresponding ignorance prior.