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Adaptive behavior requires learning about the structure of one’s environment to derive optimal action policies, and previous studies have documented transfer of such structural knowledge to bias choices in new environments. Here, we asked whether people could also acquire and transfer more abstract knowledge across different task environments, specifically expectations about cognitive control demands. Over three experiments, participants performed a probabilistic card-sorting task in environments of either a low or high volatility of task rule changes (requiring low or high cognitive flexibility respectively) before transitioning to a medium-volatility environment. Using reinforcement learning modeling, we consistently found that previous exposure to high task rule volatilities led to faster adaptation to rule changes in the subsequent transfer phase. These transfers of expectations about cognitive flexibility demands were both task- (Experiment 2) and stimulus- (Experiment 3) independent, thus demonstrating the formation and generalization of environmental structure knowledge to guide cognitive control.Statement of RelevanceWe investigated whether structural knowledge of one task environment can be transferred to guide cognitive control strategies in new environments. Past research has found that while learning generally improves subsequent performance, it does so only for the learned task (“near transfer”) and has little or no generalizability to novel task rules and stimuli (“far transfer”). However, recent studies suggest that learning more abstract, structural task features (e.g., cognitive maps) allows for that knowledge to be applied to new environments. Here, we took a critical additional step and showed that people can acquire and transfer expectations about cognitive control demands (specifically cognitive flexibility) across different task environments. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of people’s ability to extract and re-use cognitive control learning parameters that transcend specific stimuli and tasks. This transfer of learned cognitive flexibility is particularly noteworthy because such flexibility is impaired in several common psychiatric conditions.

Negative affect is a fundamental dimension of human emotion. When extreme, it contributes to a variety of adverse outcomes—from physical and mental illness to divorce and premature death. Mechanistic work in animals and neuroimaging research in humans and monkeys has begun to reveal the broad contours of the neural circuits governing negative affect, but the relevance of these discoveries to everyday distress remains incompletely understood. Here we used a combination of approaches— including neuroimaging assays of threat anticipation and emotional face perception and >10,000 momentary assessments of emotional experience—to demonstrate that individuals showing greater activation in a cingulo-opercular circuit during an anxiety-eliciting laboratory paradigm experience lower levels of stressor-dependent distress in their daily lives (n=202-208). Extended amygdala activation was not significantly related to momentary negative affect. These observations provide a framework for understanding the neurobiology of negative affect in the laboratory and in the real world.STATEMENT OF RELEVANCEAnxiety, sadness, and other negative emotions are hallmarks of the human condition. When extreme, they contribute to a variety of adverse outcomes—from physical and mental illness to divorce and premature death—pointing to the need to develop a better understanding of the underlying brain circuitry. Recent work has begun to reveal the neural systems governing negative affect, but the relevance of these tantalizing laboratory discoveries to the real world has remained unclear. Here we used a combination of brain imaging and smartphone-based survey techniques to show that individuals marked by greater activation in a cingulo-opercular circuit during an anxiety-promoting laboratory paradigm tend to experience diminished distress in response to everyday stressors. These observations provide new insights into the brain systems most relevant to moment-by-moment fluctuations in negative mood, underscoring the importance of more recently evolved cortical association areas.

When searching for a target object (e.g., a friend at a party), we engage in a continuous “look- identify” cycle in which we use known features (e.g., hair color) to guide attention and eye gaze towards potential targets and then to decide if it is indeed the target. Theories of attention refer to the information about the target in memory as the “target” or “attentional” template and typically characterize it as a single, fixed, source of information. However, this notion is challenged by a recent debate over how the target template is adjusted in response to linearly separable distractors (e.g., all distractors are “yellower” than an orange target). While there is agreement that the target representation is shifted away from distractors, some have argued that the shift is “relational” (Becker, 2010) while others have argued it is “optimal” (Navalpakkam & Itti, 2007; Yu & Geng, 2019). Here, we propose a novel resolution to this debate based on evidence that the initial guidance of attention uses a coarse code based on “relational” information, but subsequent decisions use an “optimal” representation that maximizes target-to-distractor distinctiveness. We suggest that template information differs in precision when guiding sensory selection and when making identity decisions during visual search (Wolfe, 2020a, 2020b).

It is widely believed that predicted action outcomes are perceptually attenuated. Such mechanisms would prioritise processing of unexpected events, enabling us to perform corrective actions and update models of the world. However, evidence that action predictions attenuate perception is sparse. The present experiments determined whether predictive mechanisms in fact generate attenuation, or instead enhance perception – as assumed in sensory cognition domains outside of action. Under these accounts, it is thought that we combine prior expectations and sensory input to generate percepts, resulting in upweighted perception of the expected. Such mechanisms would enable rapid generation of veridical percepts in the face of sensory noise. We therefore manipulated probabilistic expectations in a paradigm typically used to demonstrate sensory attenuation during action. Participants produced actions and rated the intensity of concurrent passive tactile forces. Experiment 1 first confirmed previous findings that action outcomes are perceived less intensely than similar passive stimulation, but demonstrated more intense perception when reducing the contribution of non-predictive gating processes. Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated prediction explicitly and found that expected outcomes are perceived more, not less, intensely than unexpected outcomes. Computational modelling suggested that expectations alter the way sensory evidence is integrated – increasing the gain afforded to expected tactile signals. These findings challenge a central tenet of prominent motor control theories and demonstrate that sensorimotor predictions do not exhibit a qualitatively distinct influence on perception. Significance Statement Perception of expected action outcomes is thought to be attenuated. Such a mechanism is reasoned to be adaptive because surprising inputs are more useful, e.g., signalling the need to take new courses of action. This mechanism is thought to explain why we cannot tickle ourselves and explain unusual aspects of action and awareness in clinical populations. However, we do not know whether action predictions really attenuate perception. We demonstrate here that in fact action predictions enhance, rather than attenuate, touch. These findings are consistent with prediction theories outside of action, thought to explain how we generate accurate representations of our noisy sensory world. Our data importantly thereby demonstrate that action predictions do not have a qualitatively distinct influence on perception.

Age-related decline in theory of mind (ToM) may be due to waning executive control, which is necessary for resolving conflict when reasoning about other individuals’ mental states. We assessed how older ( n = 50) and younger ( n = 50) adults were affected by three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within ToM: competing self-other perspectives, competing cued locations, and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when people are representing a belief incongruent with their own. Individual differences in attention and response speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through incompatible self-other perspectives. However, older adults were disproportionately affected by managing conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest that previous studies may have underestimated older adults’ ToM proficiency by including unnecessary conflict in ToM tasks.

Listening-related fatigue is a potentially serious negative consequence of an aging auditory and cognitive system. However, the impact of age on listening-related fatigue and the factors underpinning any such effect remain unexplored. Using data from a large sample of adults ( N = 281), we conducted a conditional process analysis to examine potential mediators and moderators of age-related changes in listening-related fatigue. Mediation analyses revealed opposing effects of age on listening-related fatigue: Older adults with greater perceived hearing impairment tended to report increased listening-related fatigue. However, aging was otherwise associated with decreased listening-related fatigue via reductions in both mood disturbance and sensory-processing sensitivity. Results suggested that the effect of auditory attention ability on listening-related fatigue was moderated by sensory-processing sensitivity; for individuals with high sensory-processing sensitivity, better auditory attention ability was associated with increased fatigue. These findings shed light on the perceptual, cognitive, and psychological factors underlying age-related changes in listening-related fatigue.

Representations held in working memory are crucial in guiding human attention in a goal-directed fashion. Currently, it is debated whether only a single representation or several of these representations can be active and bias behavior at any given moment. In the present study, 25 university students performed a behavioral dense-sampling experiment to produce an estimate of the temporal-activation patterns of two simultaneously held visual templates. We report two key novel results. First, performance related to both representations was not continuous but fluctuated rhythmically at 6 Hz. This corresponds to neural oscillations in the theta band, the functional importance of which in working memory is well established. Second, our findings suggest that two concurrently held representations may be prioritized in alternation, not simultaneously. Our data extend recent research on rhythmic sampling of external information by demonstrating an analogous mechanism in the cyclic activation of internal working memory representations.

Individuals sometimes use social media instead of sleeping or while driving. This fact raises the crucial need for—and challenge of—successfully self-regulating potent social-media temptations. To date, however, empirical evidence showing whether social-media temptations can be self-regulated and how self-regulation can be achieved remains scarce. Accordingly, the present within-participants study ( N = 30 adults) provided causal evidence for self-regulation of social-media content and identified a potential underlying neural mechanism. We tested the premise that successful self-regulation requires limiting the mental representation of temptations in working memory. Specifically, we showed that loading working memory with neutral contents via attentional distraction, relative to passively watching tempting social-media stimuli, resulted in reduced self-reported desire to use social media, reduced initial attention allocation toward social-media stimuli (reduced late-positive-potential amplitudes), and reduced online representation of social-media stimuli in working memory (reduced contralateral-delay-activity amplitudes). These results have important implications for successfully navigating a social-media-saturated environment.

Memory often fills in what is not there. A striking example of this is boundary extension, whereby observers mistakenly recall a view that extends beyond what was seen. However, not all visual memories extend in this way, which suggests that this process depends on specific scene properties. What factors determine when visual memories will include details that go beyond perceptual experience? Here, seven experiments ( N = 1,100 adults) explored whether spatial scale—specifically, perceived viewing distance—drives boundary extension. We created fake miniatures by exploiting tilt shift, a photographic effect that selectively reduces perceived distance while preserving other scene properties (e.g., making a distant railway appear like a model train). Fake miniaturization increased boundary extension for otherwise identical scenes: Participants who performed a scene-memory task misremembered fake-miniaturized views as farther away than they actually were. This effect went beyond low-level image changes and generalized to a completely different distance manipulation. Thus, visual memory is modulated by the spatial scale at which the environment is viewed.

Anticipating the future is essential for efficient perception and action planning. Yet the role of anticipation in event segmentation is understudied because empirical research has focused on retrospective cues such as surprise. We address this concern in the context of perception of musical-phrase boundaries. A computational model of cognitive sequence processing was used to control the information-dynamic properties of tone sequences. In an implicit, self-paced listening task ( N = 38), undergraduates dwelled longer on tones generating high entropy (i.e., high uncertainty) than on those generating low entropy (i.e., low uncertainty). Similarly, sequences that ended on tones generating high entropy were rated as sounding more complete ( N = 31 undergraduates). These entropy effects were independent of both the surprise (i.e., information content) and phrase position of target tones in the original musical stimuli. Our results indicate that events generating high entropy prospectively contribute to segmentation processes in auditory sequence perception, independently of the properties of the subsequent event.

Despite the pervasiveness of facial inferences, scholars have debated whether our face reflects valid information regarding how we actually behave. Whereas previous research has largely focused on the accuracy of facial inferences, the present research examined the validity of face-based judgments. Specifically, we tested how accurate face-based judgments are, whether the accuracy of and confidence in face-based judgments are associated, and what mechanisms potentially link facial appearance to behaviors ( N = 1,386 American and Korean adults). We found that although face-based judgments could accurately predict someone’s behavior (Study 1), participants’ confidence about their face-based judgments was not associated with their accuracy (Studies 2a and 2b). Moreover, Study 3 demonstrated that the accuracy of facial inferences is possibly due to self-fulfilling effects of facial inferences. That is, accuracy is largely driven by perceivers’ beliefs rather than by the direct association between faces and behaviors.

Giving people more time to process information in working memory improves their performance on working memory tasks. It is often assumed that free time given after presentation of an item enables maintenance processes to counteract forgetting of this item, suggesting that time has a retroactive benefit. Two other hypotheses—short-term consolidation and temporal distinctiveness—entail a local effect of time on immediately preceding and following items. Here, we show instead a novel global and proactive benefit of time in working memory. In three serial-recall experiments ( Ns = 21, 25, and 26 young adults, respectively), we varied the position and duration of the free time within a seven-item list of consonants. Experiment 1 showed that the effect is global and not local. Experiments 2a and 2b showed that increased interitem time benefited performance only for the subsequent items, implying a proactive benefit. This finding rules out maintenance processes, short-term consolidation, and temporal distinctiveness as explanations of the free-time benefit but is consistent with the proposal of a gradually recovering encoding resource.

Our brains rapidly respond to human faces and can differentiate between many identities, retrieving rich semantic emotional-knowledge information. Studies provide a mixed picture of how such information affects event-related potentials (ERPs). We systematically examined the effect of feature-based attention on ERP modulations to briefly presented faces of individuals associated with a crime. The tasks required participants ( N = 40 adults) to discriminate the orientation of lines overlaid onto the face, the age of the face, or emotional information associated with the face. Negative faces amplified the N170 ERP component during all tasks, whereas the early posterior negativity (EPN) and late positive potential (LPP) components were increased only when the emotional information was attended to. These findings suggest that during early configural analyses (N170), evaluative information potentiates face processing regardless of feature-based attention. During intermediate, only partially resource-dependent, processing stages (EPN) and late stages of elaborate stimulus processing (LPP), attention to the acquired emotional information is necessary for amplified processing of negatively evaluated faces.

Although researchers have debated whether a core deficit of nonsymbolic representation of magnitude underlies developmental dyscalculia (DD), research has mostly focused on numerosity processing. We probed the possibility of a general magnitude deficit in individuals with DD and asked whether sensitivity to size varied in contexts of depth ordering and size constancy. We measured full psychometric functions in size-discrimination tasks in 12 participants with DD and 13 control participants. Results showed that although people with DD exhibited veridical perceived magnitude, their sensitivity to size was clearly impaired. In contrast, when objects were embedded in depth cues allowing size-constancy computations, participants with DD demonstrated typical sensitivity to size. These results demonstrate a deficit in the perceptual resolutions of magnitude in DD. At the same time, the finding of an intact size constancy suggests that when magnitude perception is facilitated by implicit mandatory computations of size constancy, this deficit is no longer evident.

Visual illusions have been studied extensively, but their time course has not. Here we show, in a sample of more than 550 people, that unrestricted presentation times—as opposed to presentations lasting only a single second—weaken the Ebbinghaus illusion, strengthen lightness contrast with double increments, and do not alter lightness contrast with double decrements. When presentation time is unrestricted, these illusions are affected in the same way (decrease, increase, no change) by how long observers look at them. Our results imply that differences in illusion magnitude between individuals or groups are confounded with differences in inspection time, no matter whether stimuli are evaluated in matching, adjustment, or untimed comparison tasks. We offer an explanation for why these three illusions progress differently, and we spell out how our findings challenge theories of lightness, theories of global-local processing, and the interpretation of all research that has investigated visual illusions, or used them as tools, without considering inspection time.

There is considerable debate about whether bilingual children have an advantage in executive functioning relative to monolingual children. In the current meta-analysis, we addressed this debate by comprehensively reviewing the available evidence. We synthesized data from published studies and unpublished data sets, which equated to 1,194 effect sizes from 10,937 bilingual and 12,477 monolingual participants between the ages of 3 and 17 years. Bilingual language status had a small overall effect on children’s executive functioning ( g = .08, 95% confidence interval = [.01, .14]). However, the effect of language status on children’s executive functioning was indistinguishable from zero ( g = −.04) after we adjusted for publication bias. Further, no significant effects were apparent within the executive-attention domain, in which the effects of language status have been hypothesized to be most pronounced ( g = .06, 95% confidence interval = [−.02, .14]). Taken together, available evidence suggests that the bilingual advantage in children’s executive functioning is small, variable, and potentially not attributable to the effect of language status.

Previous research indicates that writing practice may be more beneficial than nonmotor practice for letter learning. Here, we report a training study comparing typing, visual, and writing learning conditions in adults ( N = 42). We investigated the behavioral consequences of learning modality on literacy learning and evaluated the nature of the learned letter representations. Specifically, the study addressed three questions. First, are the benefits of handwriting practice due to motor learning per se or to other incidental factors? Second, do the benefits generalize to untrained tasks? And third, does handwriting practice lead to learning and strengthening only of motor representations or of other types of representations as well? Our results clearly show that handwriting compared with nonmotor practice produces faster learning and greater generalization to untrained tasks than previously reported. Furthermore, only handwriting practice leads to learning of both motor and amodal symbolic letter representations.

Dyadic interactions are associated with the exchange of personality-related messages, which can be congruent or incongruent with one’s self-view. In the current preregistered study ( N = 52), we investigated event-related potentials (ERPs) toward real social evaluations in order to uncover the neural mechanisms underlying the processing of congruent and incongruent evaluative feedback. Participants interacted first, and then during an electroencephalogram (EEG) session, they received evaluations from their interaction partner that were either congruent or incongruent with their own ratings. Findings show potentiated processing of self-related incongruent negative evaluations at early time points (N1) followed by increased processing of both incongruent negative and positive evaluations at midlatency time windows (early posterior negativity) and a prioritized processing of self-related incongruent positive evaluations at late time points (feedback-related P3, late positive potential). These findings reveal that, after real social interactions, evaluative feedback about oneself that violates one’s self-view modulates all processing stages with an early negativity and a late positivity bias.

The subjective experience of causing an action is known as the sense of agency. Dysfunctional sense of agency over speech has been suggested as a cause of auditory hallucinations. However, agency over speech has not been extensively characterized in previous empirical studies. Here, we manipulated self-voice identity, an indicator of self, embedded in the acoustic quality of voice and examined implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency. Experiment 1 ( N = 29 adults) demonstrated more compression of a perceived interval between action and outcome when participants heard their undistorted voices than their pitch-distorted voices. Experiment 2 ( N = 28 adults) revealed a strong top-down effect of self-voice identity: Specifically, the judgment of agency over speech was more resistant than the judgment of agency over hand/limb movement to low-level sensorimotor inconsistency. Our findings provide new insight into the sense of agency over speech and an informative perspective for understanding aberrant experience in auditory hallucinations.

Cognitive ability consists not only of one’s internal competence but also of the augmentation offered by the outside world. How much of our cognitive success is due to our own abilities, and how much is due to external support? Can we accurately draw that distinction? Here, we explored when and why people are unaware of their reliance on outside assistance. Across eight experiments ( N = 2,440 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk), people showed improved metacognitive calibration when assistance occurred after a delay or required active choice. Furthermore, these findings apply across a wide range of cognitive tasks, including semantic memory (Experiments 1a and 1b), episodic memory (Experiments 2a and 2b), and problem solving (Experiments 3a–3d). These experiments offer important insights into how we understand our own abilities when we rely on outside help.

Prominent theories of visual working memory postulate that the capacity to maintain a particular visual feature is fixed. In contrast to these theories, recent studies have demonstrated that meaningful objects are better remembered than simple, nonmeaningful stimuli. Here, we tested whether this is solely because meaningful stimuli can recruit additional features—and thus more storage capacity—or whether simple visual features that are not themselves meaningful can also benefit from being part of a meaningful object. Across five experiments (30 young adults each), we demonstrated that visual working memory capacity for color is greater when colors are part of recognizable real-world objects compared with unrecognizable objects. Our results indicate that meaningful stimuli provide a potent scaffold to help maintain simple visual feature information, possibly because they effectively increase the objects’ distinctiveness from each other and reduce interference.

Ferrigno et al. (2021) claim to provide evidence that monkeys can reason through the disjunctive syllogism (given A or B, not A, therefore B) and conclude that monkeys therefore understand logical “or” relations. Yet their data fail to provide evidence that the baboons they tested understood the exclusive “or” relations in the experimental task. For two mutually exclusive possibilities—A or B—the monkeys appeared to infer that B was true when A was shown to be false, but they failed to infer that B was false when A was shown to be true. In our own research, we recently found an identical response pattern in 2.5- to 4-year-old children, whereas 5-year-olds demonstrated that they could make both inferences. The monkeys’ and younger children’s responses are instead consistent with an incorrect understanding of A and B as having an inclusive “or” relation. Only the older children provided compelling evidence of representing the exclusive “or” relation between A and B.

Evaluative conditioning is one of the most widely studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance task is a highly cited evaluative-conditioning paradigm and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for evaluative-conditioning effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered ( N = 1,478 adult participants), preregistered close replication of the original surveillance-task study (Olson & Fazio, 2001). We obtained evidence for a small evaluative-conditioning effect when “aware” participants were excluded using the original criterion—therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a need for caution when using evidence from the surveillance-task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about “unaware” evaluative-conditioning effects.

Rapid and seemingly effortless word recognition is a virtually unquestioned characteristic of skilled reading, yet the definition and operationalization of the concept of cognitive effort have proven elusive. We investigated the cognitive effort involved in oral and silent word reading using pupillometry among adults (Experiment 1, N = 30; Experiment 2, N = 20) and fourth through sixth graders (Experiment 3, N = 30; Experiment 4, N = 18). We compared multiple pupillary measures (mean, peak, and peak latency) for reading familiar words (real words) and unfamiliar letter strings (pseudowords) varying in length. Converging with the behavioral data for accuracy and response times, pupillary responses demonstrated a greater degree of cognitive effort for pseudowords compared with real words and stronger length effects for pseudowords than for real words. These findings open up new possibilities for studying the issue of effort and effortlessness in the field of word recognition and other fields of skill learning.

One remarkable aspect of human cognition is our ability to reason about physical events. This article provides novel evidence that intuitive physics is subject to a peculiar error, the classic conjunction fallacy, in which people rate the probability of a conjunction of two events as more likely than one constituent (a logical impossibility). Participants viewed videos of physical scenarios and judged the probability that either a single event or a conjunction of two events would occur. In Experiment 1 ( n = 60), participants consistently rated conjunction events as more likely than single events for the same scenes. Experiment 2 ( n = 180) extended these results to rule out several alternative explanations. Experiment 3 ( n = 100) generalized the finding to different scenes. This demonstration of conjunction errors contradicts claims that such errors should not appear in intuitive physics and presents a serious challenge to current theories of mental simulation in physical reasoning.

Visual search is facilitated when the target is repeatedly encountered at a fixed position within an invariant (vs. randomly variable) distractor layout—that is, when the layout is learned and guides attention to the target, a phenomenon known as contextual cuing. Subsequently changing the target location within a learned layout abolishes contextual cuing, which is difficult to relearn. Here, we used lateralized event-related electroencephalogram (EEG) potentials to explore memory-based attentional guidance ( N = 16). The results revealed reliable contextual cuing during initial learning and an associated EEG-amplitude increase for repeated layouts in attention-related components, starting with an early posterior negativity (N1pc, 80–180 ms). When the target was relocated to the opposite hemifield following learning, contextual cuing was effectively abolished, and the N1pc was reversed in polarity (indicative of persistent misguidance of attention to the original target location). Thus, once learned, repeated layouts trigger attentional-priority signals from memory that proactively interfere with contextual relearning after target relocation.

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a widely used measure of adults’ propensity to engage in reflective analytic thought. The CRT is strongly predictive of many diverse psychological factors but unsuitable for use with developmental samples. Here, we examined a children’s CRT, the CRT–Developmental (CRT–D), and investigated its predictive utility in the domains of science and mathematics. School-age children ( N = 152) completed the CRT–D, measures of executive functioning, measures of rational thinking, and measures of vitalist-biology and mathematical-equivalence concepts. CRT–D performance predicted conceptual understanding in both domains after we adjusted for children’s age, executive functioning, and rational thinking. These findings suggest that cognitive reflection supports conceptual knowledge in early science and mathematics and, moreover, demonstrate the theoretical and practical importance of children’s cognitive reflection. The CRT–D will allow researchers to investigate the development, malleability, and consequences of children’s cognitive reflection.

Drawing on dual-process theory, we suggest that the benefits that arise from combining several quantitative individual judgments will be heightened when these judgments are based on different cognitive processes. We tested this hypothesis in three experimental studies in which participants provided estimates for the dates of different historical events (Study 1, N = 152), made probabilistic forecasts for the outcomes of soccer games (Study 2, N = 98), and estimated the weight of individuals on the basis of a photograph (Study 3, N = 3,695). For each of these tasks, participants were prompted to make judgments relying on an analytical process, on their intuition, or (in a control condition) on no specific instructions. Across all three studies, our results show that an aggregation of intuitive and analytical judgments provides more accurate estimates than any other aggregation procedure and that this advantage increases with the number of aggregated judgments.

According to numerous research studies, when adults hear a statement twice, they are more likely to think it is true compared with when they have heard it only once. Multiple theoretical explanations exist for this illusory-truth effect. However, none of the current theories fully explains how or why people begin to use repetition as a cue for truth. In this preregistered study, we investigated those developmental origins in twenty-four 5-year-olds, twenty-four 10-year-olds, and 32 adults. If the link between repetition and truth is learned implicitly, then even 5-year-olds should show the effect. Alternatively, realizing this connection may require metacognition and intentional reflection, skills acquired later in development. Repetition increased truth judgments for all three age groups, and prior knowledge did not protect participants from the effects of repetition. These results suggest that the illusory-truth effect is a universal effect learned at a young age.

Prior investigations have demonstrated that people tend to link pseudowords such as bouba to rounded shapes and kiki to spiky shapes, but the cognitive processes underlying this matching bias have remained controversial. Here, we present three experiments underscoring the fundamental role of emotional mediation in this sound–shape mapping. Using stimuli from key previous studies, we found that kiki-like pseudowords and spiky shapes, compared with bouba-like pseudowords and rounded shapes, consistently elicit higher levels of affective arousal, which we assessed through both subjective ratings (Experiment 1, N = 52) and acoustic models implemented on the basis of pseudoword material (Experiment 2, N = 70). Crucially, the mediating effect of arousal generalizes to novel pseudowords (Experiment 3, N = 64, which was preregistered). These findings highlight the role that human emotion may play in language development and evolution by grounding associations between abstract concepts (e.g., shapes) and linguistic signs (e.g., words) in the affective system.

Although declarative concepts (e.g., apple) have been shown to be identifiable from their functional MRI (fMRI) signatures, the correspondence has yet to be established for executing a complex procedure such as tying a knot. In this study, 7 participants were trained to tie seven knots. Their neural representations of these seven procedures were assessed with fMRI as they imagined tying each knot. A subset of the trained participants physically tied each knot in a later fMRI session. Findings demonstrated that procedural knowledge of tying a particular knot can be reliably identified from its fMRI signature, and such procedural signatures were found here in frontal, parietal, motor, and cerebellar regions. In addition, a classifier trained on mental tying signatures was able to reliably identify when participants were planning to tie knots before they physically tied them, which suggests that the mental-tying and physical-tying procedural signatures are similar. These findings indicate that fMRI activation patterns can illuminate the representation and organization of procedural knowledge.

Contextual effects require integration of top-down predictions and bottom-up visual information. Given the widely assumed link between integration and consciousness, we asked whether contextual effects require consciousness. In two experiments (total N = 60), an ambiguous stimulus (which could be read as either B or 13) was presented alongside masked numbers (12 and 14) or letters (A and C). Context biased stimulus classification when it was consciously and unconsciously perceived. However, unconsciously perceived contexts evoked smaller effects. This finding was replicated and generalized into another language in a further experiment ( N = 46) using a different set of stimuli, strengthening the claim that symbolic contextual effects can occur without awareness. Moreover, four experiments (total N = 160) suggested that these unconscious effects might be limited to the categorical level (numbers context vs. letters context) and do not extend to the lexical level (words context vs. nonwords context). Taken together, our results suggest that although consciousness may not be necessary for effects that require simple integration or none at all, it is nevertheless required for integration over larger semantic windows.

The visual system adapts to the environment, changing neural responses to aid efficiency and improve perception. However, these changes sometimes lead to negative consequences: If neurons at later processing stages fail to account for adaptation at earlier stages, perceptual errors result, including common visual illusions. These negative effects of adaptation have been termed the coding catastrophe. How does the visual system resolve them? We hypothesized that higher-level adaptation can correct errors arising from the coding catastrophe by changing what appears normal, a common form of adaptation across domains. Observers ( N = 15) viewed flickering checkerboards that caused a normal face to appear distorted. We tested whether the visual system can adapt to this adaptation-distorted face through repeated viewing. Results from two experiments show that such meta-adaptation does occur and that it makes the distorted face gradually appear more normal. Meta-adaptation may be a general strategy to correct negative consequences of low-level adaptation.

Very little is known about how individuals learn under uncertainty when other people are involved. We propose that humans are particularly tuned to social uncertainty, which is especially noisy and ambiguous. Individuals exhibiting less tolerance for uncertainty, such as those with anxiety, may have greater difficulty learning in uncertain social contexts and therefore provide an ideal test population to probe learning dynamics under uncertainty. Using a dynamic trust game and a matched nonsocial task, we found that healthy subjects ( n = 257) were particularly good at learning under negative social uncertainty, swiftly figuring out when to stop investing in an exploitative social partner. In contrast, subjects with anxiety ( n = 97) overinvested in exploitative partners. Computational modeling attributed this pattern to a selective reduction in learning from negative social events and a failure to enhance learning as uncertainty rises—two mechanisms that likely facilitate adaptive social choice.

Reading is a highly complex learned skill in which humans move their eyes three to four times every second in response to visual and cognitive processing. The consensus view is that the details of these rapid eye-movement decisions—which part of a word to target with a saccade—are determined solely by low-level oculomotor heuristics. But maximally efficient saccade targeting would be sensitive to ongoing word identification, sending the eyes farther into a word the farther its identification has already progressed. Here, using a covert text-shifting paradigm, we showed just such a statistical relationship between saccade targeting in reading and trial-to-trial variability in cognitive processing. This result suggests that, rather than relying purely on heuristics, the human brain has learned to optimize eye movements in reading even at the fine-grained level of character-position targeting, reflecting efficiency-based sensitivity to ongoing cognitive processing.

The ability to remember associations among components of an event, which is central to episodic memory, declines with normal aging. In accord with the specificity principle of memory (Surprenant & Neath, 2009), these declines may occur because associative memory requires retrieval of specific information. Guided by this principle, we endeavored to determine whether ubiquitous age-related deficits in associative memory (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin, 2000) are restricted to specific representations or extend to the gist of associations. Young and old adults (30 each in Experiment 1, 40 each in Experiment 2) studied face-scene pairs and were administered associative recognition tests following variable delays. Whereas both young and older adults could retrieve the gist of associations, older adults were impaired in their ability to retrieve more specific representations. Our results also show that associations can be retrieved from multiple levels of specificity, suggesting that episodic memory might be accessed on a continuum of specificity.

Decades of research have established the ubiquity and importance of choice biases, such as the framing effect, yet why these seemingly irrational behaviors occur remains unknown. A prominent dual-system account maintains that alternate framings bias choices because of the unchecked influence of quick, affective processes, and findings that time pressure increases the framing effect have provided compelling support. Here, we present a novel alternative account of magnified framing biases under time pressure that emphasizes shifts in early visual attention and strategic adaptations in the decision-making process. In a preregistered direct replication ( N = 40 adult undergraduates), we found that time constraints produced strong shifts in visual attention toward reward-predictive cues that, when combined with truncated information search, amplified the framing effect. Our results suggest that an attention-guided, strategic information-sampling process may be sufficient to explain prior results and raise challenges for using time pressure to support some dual-system accounts.

Impressions of other people’s faces (e.g., trustworthiness) have long been thought to be evoked by morphological variation (e.g., upturned mouth) in a universal, fixed manner. However, recent research suggests that these impressions vary considerably across perceivers and targets’ social-group memberships. Across 4,247 U.S. adults recruited online, we investigated whether racial and gender stereotypes may be a critical factor underlying this variability in facial impressions. In Study 1, we found that not only did facial impressions vary by targets’ gender and race, but also the structure of these impressions was associated with the structure of stereotype knowledge. Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that individual differences in perceivers’ own unique stereotype associations predicted the structure of their own facial impressions. Together, the findings suggest that the structure of people’s impressions of others’ faces is driven not only by the morphological variation of the face but also by learned stereotypes about social groups.

Mind-body practices such as yoga and meditation are often believed to instill a “quiet ego,” entailing less self-enhancement. In two experiments, however, Gebauer et al. (2018) demonstrated that mind-body practices may actually increase self-enhancement, particularly because such practices become self-central bases for self-esteem. We conducted preregistered replications of both of Gebauer et al.’s experiments. Experiment 1 was a field study of Canadian yoga students ( N = 97), and Experiment 2 was a multiwave meditation intervention among Canadian university students ( N = 300). Our results supported Gebauer et al.’s original conclusions that mind-body practices increase self-enhancement. Although the self-centrality effects were not clearly replicated in either experiment, we found evidence that measurement and sampling differences may explain this discrepancy. Moreover, an integrative data analysis of the original and the replication data strongly supported all of Gebauer et al.’s conclusions. In short, we provide new evidence against the ego-quieting perspective and in support of the self-centrality interpretation of mind-body practices.

Reading causes widespread changes in the brain, but its effect on visual word representations is unknown. Learning to read may facilitate visual processing by forming specialized detectors for longer strings or by making word responses more predictable from single letters—that is, by increasing compositionality. We provided evidence for the latter hypothesis using experiments that compared nonoverlapping groups of readers of two Indian languages (Telugu and Malayalam). Readers showed increased single-letter discrimination and decreased letter interactions for bigrams during visual search. Importantly, these interactions predicted subjects’ overall reading fluency. In a separate brain-imaging experiment, we observed increased compositionality in readers, whereby responses to bigrams were more predictable from single letters. This effect was specific to the anterior lateral occipital region, where activations best matched behavior. Thus, learning to read facilitates visual processing by increasing the compositionality of visual word representations.

Episodic memory binds the diverse elements of an event into a coherent representation. This coherence allows for the reconstruction of different aspects of an experience when triggered by a cue related to a past event—a process of pattern completion. Previous work has shown that such holistic recollection is evident in young adults, as revealed by dependency in retrieval success for various associations from the same event. In addition, episodic memory shows clear quantitative increases during early childhood. However, the ontogeny of holistic recollection is uncharted. Using dependency analyses, we found here that 4-year-olds ( n = 32), 6-year-olds ( n = 30), and young adults ( n = 31) all retrieved complex events in a holistic manner; specifically, retrieval accuracy for one aspect of an event predicted accuracy for other aspects of the same event. However, the degree of holistic retrieval increased from the age 4 to adulthood. Thus, extended refinement of multiway binding may be one aspect of episodic memory development.

Many people have claimed that sleep has helped them solve a difficult problem, but empirical support for this assertion remains tentative. The current experiment tested whether manipulating information processing during sleep impacts problem incubation and solving. In memory studies, delivering learning-associated sound cues during sleep can reactivate memories. We therefore predicted that reactivating previously unsolved problems could help people solve them. In the evening, we presented 57 participants with puzzles, each arbitrarily associated with a different sound. While participants slept overnight, half of the sounds associated with the puzzles they had not solved were surreptitiously presented. The next morning, participants solved 31.7% of cued puzzles, compared with 20.5% of uncued puzzles (a 55% improvement). Moreover, cued-puzzle solving correlated with cued-puzzle memory. Overall, these results demonstrate that cuing puzzle information during sleep can facilitate solving, thus supporting sleep’s role in problem incubation and establishing a new technique to advance understanding of problem solving and sleep cognition.

Models are central to the practice and teaching of science. Yet people often fail to grasp how scientific models explain their observations of the world. Realizing the explanatory power of a model may require aligning its relational structure to that of the observable phenomena. In the present study, we tested whether relational scaffolding—guided comparisons between observable and modeled events—enhances children’s understanding of scientific models. We tested relational scaffolding during instruction of third graders about the day/night cycle, a topic that involves relating Earth-based observations to a space-based model of Earth’s rotation. Experiment 1 found that participants ( N = 108) learned more from instruction that incorporated relational scaffolding. Experiment 2 ( N = 99) found that guided comparison—not merely viewing observable and modeled events—is a critical component of relational scaffolding, especially for children with low initial knowledge. Relational scaffolding could be applied broadly to assist the many students who struggle with science.

Physically salient but task-irrelevant distractors can capture attention in visual search, but resource-dependent, executive-control processes can help reduce this distraction. However, it is not only physically salient stimuli that grab our attention: Recent research has shown that reward history also influences the likelihood that stimuli will capture attention. Here, we investigated whether resource-dependent control processes modulate the effect of reward on attentional capture, much as for the effect of physical salience. To this end, we used eye tracking with a rewarded visual search task and compared performance under conditions of high and low working memory load. In two experiments, we demonstrated that oculomotor capture by high-reward distractor stimuli is enhanced under high memory load. These results highlight the role of executive-control processes in modulating distraction by reward-related stimuli. Our findings have implications for understanding the neurocognitive processes involved in real-life conditions in which reward-related stimuli may influence behavior, such as addiction.

This study contributes to the growing literature linking physical characteristics and behavioral tendencies by advancing the current debate on whether a person’s facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) predicts a variety of antisocial tendencies. Specifically, our large-scale study avoided the social-desirability bias found in self-reports of behavioral tendencies by capturing survey data not only from more than 1,000 business executives but also from evaluators who reported knowing the focal individuals well. With this improved research design, and after conducting a variety of analyses, we found very little evidence of fWHR predicting antisocial tendencies. In light of prior research linking fWHR to social perceptions of evaluators, our results are suggestive of an evolutionary mismatch, whereby a physical characteristic once tied to antisocial tendencies in ancestral environments is—in modern environments—not predictive of such behaviors but instead predictive of biased perceptions.

Recent work suggests that the positive manifold of individual differences may arise, or be amplified, by a mechanism called mutualism. Kievit et al. (2017) showed that a latent change score implementation of the mutualism model outperformed alternative models, demonstrating positive reciprocal interactions between vocabulary and reasoning during development. Here, we replicated these findings in a cohort of children ( N = 227, 6–8 years old) and expanded the findings in three directions. First, a third wave of data was included, and the findings were robust to alternative model specifications. Second, a simulation demonstrated that data sets of similar magnitude and distributional properties could have, in principle, favored alternative models with close to 100% power. Third, we found support for the hypothesis that mutualistic-coupling effects are stronger and self-feedback parameters weaker in younger children. Together, these findings replicated the work of Kievit et al. (2017) and further support the hypothesis that mutualism supports cognitive development.