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In the chemical product production process, activities relating to the transportation and storage of residual hazardous materials increase the risk of workplace contamination and associated negative impacts on worker health and safety. In this context, the dynamic nature of the process complicates the study of the parameters underlying the related operational risks. The current operational risks assessment standard, ISO 31000, cannot provide a practical pathway to assess risks in dynamic operational environments. We, therefore, model a dynamic environment to investigate the effect of functional time variation on risk assessment. Verification of the claimed effect will show that even with rigorous instruction when using the available equipment, the process cannot fully conform to current safety standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Processing facilities handling large amounts of hazardous substances are attractive targets for terrorists. Thus, these work sites are exposed not only to accidents but also to intentional threats. Some research has separately studied risk caused by either potential accidental events or terrorist acts. However, studies focusing on integrated risk assessment and management (dealing with both safety and security issues) are lacking. This paper proposes an approach to assess and manage integrated risks. This method is based on an influence diagram which incorporates safety and security‐related factors into one framework. It considers the effects of management actions on both accidental and intentional risks. This method can help to detect hidden risk (i.e., the risk not recognized during design and operation stages) and ensure to reduce the real risk to an acceptable level by guiding the selection of management actions. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated using the overfilling risk management of an oil tank. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 38: 42–51, 2019 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explosion and fire accidents happen frequently in petrochemical enterprises. For improving risk management, Bow‐tie method is applied to analyze causes, consequences, and control methods of such disasters. Based on fault tree analysis, 42 combination scenarios of primary events leading to explosion and fire accident are achieved. Important order of primary events is determined. Event tree is developed where four consequences, with different occurrence probability and loss degree, are obtained considering of success or failure of emergency evacuation and automatic fire extinguishing system. Structure of Bow‐tie model is established where three accident sources, including limit concentration of liquefied petroleum gas, equipment fault or operation error and fire source, are taken into account. After identification of accident causes and consequences, precautionary and loss‐reducing measures are proposed. The model was applied to analyze explosion and fire accident occurring in Jinyu group of China, demonstrating poor connection between the pipe and oil tank truck and non‐explosion‐proof equipment resulted in the accident. The delayed emergency excavation and failure of automatic fire extinguishing system led to fully developed fire and heavy casualties. To reduce such disasters, controlling suggestions in terms of educational training, intelligent monitoring, equipment management, and safety management were provided for Jinyu group. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 38: 78–86, 2019 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Risk analysis and evaluation of oilfield gathering station (OGS) is a challenging task, given that much of the available data are highly uncertain and vague, and many of the mechanisms are complex and difficult to understand. A combinational method of analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation (FCE) is proposed in this study to assess hazards in OGS associated with multiple subsystems' failures. The evaluation index system of safety performance in OGS was established, which included tank unit index, pipe unit index, digital monitoring unit index, and other systems. The weight of each index was confirmed through AHP method. Then the AHP and FCE methods were combined to validate the risk levels of representative enterprise S (S‐OGS). The evaluation results show that the evaluation grade of S‐OGS was low risk. This study provides a basis to improve the risk levels of OGS. It is expected that this work may serve as an assistance tool for managers of enterprise in improving the risk levels of oilfield operations. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 38: 71–77, 2019 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals working in process facilities containing toxic gases may face gas releases and poisoning risks. Many studies regarding individual risk (IR) have been carried out on a worst scenario basis. However, the worst scenario‐based approach cannot represent realistic release risks and may overestimate the IR. In this study, an approach based on complete accident scenario set (CASS) and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) is proposed to quantitatively assess IR of toxic gas release in process facilities. By combining the gas leakage probability and joint distribution probability of the wind direction and speed, a CASS can be built. The CFD method is used to predict the concentration field of gas release and dispersion. Then, the toxic gas concentration can be converted to poisoning fatality probabilities according to the dose–response model. A virtual IR contour can finally be defined by the accumulative assessment of all release scenarios. A case study of an IR area classification in a natural gas process and carbon dioxide recycle terminal processing facility that contains an ammonia refrigeration system is also investigated. With the proposed methodology, the quantitatively classified IR level in process facilities can provide scientific references for safety decision makers. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 38: 52–60, 2019 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For years, professionals involved in the investigation of industrial accidents have identified “human error” as a common cause of many major process safety incidents. However, incorrect actions by workers that lead or contribute to disaster are associated with factors related to cultural, engineering, situational, psychological, procedural, and organizational aspects, and tend to remain in the background. The aeronautical industry has developed exhaustive research into causal factors and methodologies to address risks associated with “human error.” Pilots work in complex environments and are routinely exposed to high stress that can induce pilot error which may result in a threat to flight safety. As in the Oil and Gas industry, catastrophic accidents are infrequent, but are highly visible and often involve massive loss of life. The environment to which operators and managers of process plants can be exposed and that of aircraft crew can be similar. This article describes these similarities and explores causal factors to find commonalities and possible root causes. The ǁ Center for Chemical Process Safety Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) approach has provided a more comprehensive framework to examine aspects that influence behaviors of individuals that work in hazardous environments. The paper evaluates typical factors associated to “human error” with possible causes related to the RBPS elements. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 37: 145–149, 2018 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hazard and risk analysis depends heavily on human decision making in the form of engineering judgment and expert opinion. Human decision making may be flawed by the effects of heuristics and cognitive biases. The influence of these psychological factors may invalidate the results of hazard and risk analysis studies. They must be managed carefully to minimize their possible adverse impacts. This article provides a pragmatic view of cognitive biases and guidance on how to address them in hazard and risk analysis. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 37: 205–210, 2018 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major process accidents continue to occur with the advancement of modern process systems. Major process accidents should not be viewed as Black Swan and can be predicted and prevented. This article investigates the characteristics of process accidents. Based on which, a method for the diagnosis and classification of accidents is proposed. The proposed tool is applied to the Bhopal accident and the swine flu event. The case studies verify the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed tool. To tackle major process accidents, conventional risk assessment, and management approaches are inapplicable without adaption. Enormous research work is needed to develop new generation of methods and tools that enable safer process systems and operations. Knowledge and technological gaps are identified in this perspective. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 37: 268–275, 2018 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Process safety management systems are generally credited with reducing major accident risk in the process industries. While those systems have been around for many years—the EU introduced the Seveso Directive in 1982, and US OSHA promulgated the PSM regulation 10 years later— many companies today are challenged by inadequate and/or stagnant process safety management system performance. Several companies have experienced major incidents, particularly when they are subject to prescriptive regulations such as OSHA PSM. Reliance on compliance with prescriptive regulations is no guarantee of preventing major incidents. No regulator anywhere has ever thought of everything that can cause a process safety incident and then written a regulation to safeguard against that occurrence. Good process safety requires that hazards are identified, the risks of these hazards are understood, and those risks are managed by “doing the right thing.” This frequently requires additional activities that go beyond regulatory compliance. In 2007, CCPS introduced Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS), which builds on lessons learned since the early 1980s, and applies management system principles of Plan, Do, Check, Act. Being risk‐based, RBPS is not prescriptive. It recognizes that all hazards and risks are NOT equal, and focuses more resources on the higher hazards and risks that have been identified. This enables finite company resources to be optimally deployed to efficiently improve process safety performance. The 20 elements of RBPS go beyond OSHA PSM to include other elements, such as risk analysis and performance metrics. Some companies have embraced RBPS and moved away from compliance‐driven process safety management systems. However, RBPS is primarily focused on process plant operations. While some elements of RBPS can be applied to large and small projects, RBPS and its guidance does not comprehensively address projects or certain other aspects of process safety. The paper highlights “some completely different” process safety elements for which no RBPS guidance is currently available, and discusses the application of a more comprehensive RBPS approach to fill these gaps. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 37:25–30, 2018 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human factors and process safety management (PSM) have become key factors in preventing exposure to both hazardous materials and major accidents. Therefore, comprehensive process safety management is required to address all aspects of human factors. Currently, there are several‐process safety management models all of which have some weaknesses with respect to the control of human factors inherent in the process industry. Moreover, there is as yet no universally accepted process safety management model that treats process safety management as an integral part of the management system. Therefore, a need has arisen to integrate human factors and the existing frameworks and models into a single integrated management system to ensure a holistic approach of control and a continuous learning system. This article identifies the missing human factors in the current system and describes an integrated process safety management system (IPSMS) model drawn from screening all existing PSM frameworks, while integrating the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). The model, which adopts the PLAN, DO, CHECK, and ACT framework, also outlines an implementation strategy. We conclude that IPSMS provides both a theoretical and a practical framework with which to manage, measure and analyse process safety management systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 37:67–85, 2018 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Risk matrices are used widely in process safety to rate and rank risks posed by processes to help with decision making. For example, commonly they are used in process hazard analysis to rate the risks of hazard scenarios and determine the need for risk reduction. However, there are no standards for risk matrices in process safety. Companies develop their own without the benefit of established industry guidelines. Risk matrices are deceptively simple but their design and use are rife with pitfalls, even for experienced users. Some of these pitfalls are not obvious and invalid risk ratings can result which are unrecognized. Guidelines for constructing risk matrices that address these pitfalls are provided. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 37:49–55, 2018 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many coal gasification related accidents happened in China recently. Investigations of the accidents show that the performance of safety barriers and the risk influence factors contributing to it plays an important role. Lack of attention on the performance of safety barriers and associated risk influence factors hinder the thorough understanding of these accidents and, therefore, needs to be addressed by providing a new analysis methodology. Herein, we developed an approach from critical events and safety barriers to control the major hazards during the coal gasification process. The method consists of process hazard identification based on critical events, barrier performance evaluation based on barrier diagrams, and quantification of risk influence factors based on Bayesian network. The application of the method indicates that it is suitable for controlling major hazards of the coal gasification process as well as other chemical processes. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 382-391, 2017 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has gained popularity as a semi-quantitative risk assessment tool, but often unexpected difficulties are encountered when rolling out LOPA. This article discusses the practical aspects of LOPA implementation in Marathon Petroleum Company LP's Refining Organization (MPC Refining). Specifically, it shows how scenarios are selected from a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and how they are organized for conducting LOPA efficiently, and it discusses whether to conduct LOPA concurrently or after the HAZOP. The article also compares the [cause → consequence] or [consequence → cause] methodology and addresses the implications of combining multiple causes in a single scenario. Another key aspect of LOPA implementation is the set of numerical values used for frequencies, modifiers and risk-reduction factors. The article shows how numerical values should be tied to the risk matrix and how internal consistency is achieved through the use of standardized values and restrictions on the use of frequency modifiers. It discusses potential solutions for cases where the LOPA outcome does not meet the risk target. Finally, the article shows how the use of application standards can supplement LOPA by defining minimum protections and providing standard LOPA scenarios. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 284-291, 2017 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, 46 chemical plants were investigated and assessed by Safety Department of Shanghai Institute of Technology in China. The safety management and technology ability and level were evaluated by the method of Safety Checklist Analysis (SCA) under the perspective of Safety Specialty Engineer. The risk levels of the overall of 46 plants were got. The SCA assessment presents the visible and invisible risks of the plants quantitatively and plainly. The results show that a majority of the plants have not fully implemented either on the good safety management or the reliable safety practice technology. The level of the overall risk indicate that about 35% of the plants reach the level of A (Scores ≥90), and others both lower than A, even 2 plants in the level of E, with total disregard for their health, safety, and well-being. Otherwise, 23 items were surveyed and judged one by one in safety assessment by SCA, and put forward suggestions for rectify and reform, which helps the plants recognize the reality of the situation and make better in the future. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 95-101, 2017 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Simultaneous operations (SIMOPs) occur within process facilities when two or more activities occur at the same time and place. They may involve risks that are not identified when each activity is considered by itself. A SIMOP review identifies possible interactions between activities that may adversely impact people, property, or the environment. SIMOP reviews are an important adjunct to the performance of process hazard analyses such as hazard and operability studies. A number of major process industry accidents have involved SIMOPs. Several examples are described. A procedure for conducting a SIMOP review and an example are provided. The development of a plan to address the performance of SIMOPs using the results of SIMOP reviews is discussed and plan contents are identified. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 62-66, 2017 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Companies that operate in multiple locations around the world face the challenge of developing consistent risk tolerance criteria across their operations in various locations. However, the views of local stakeholders on the tolerability of the risks can vary significantly from one location to another. Indeed, the actual risks that people are exposed to and currently tolerate can vary significantly depending on local factors. The challenges in developing consistent criteria for such multiple locations are described and addressed in this article. Regulators in several countries have developed numerical risk tolerance criteria and require that facilities meet them. The procedures used in the development of such criteria are described and form the basis for a method that is suggested for setting consistent criteria across national boundaries. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 153-158, 2016 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The explanation of process safety protection layers and related probability of failure does not need to be complicated. This article shows visuals that can be used to explain the complexity of safety layers and their relationship to reduce the risk of an overall incident. It is proposed that the 'Swiss Cheese Model' be replaced with a more realistic probability wheel referred to as the probability circular ruler, leading to usable information to be included in the P&ID as tagging labels with safety data of the process protecting device. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 124-136, 2016 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing from a career from 1963 through 2016 in the chemical and process industries, this article will describe some informal practices of process safety elements observed during the Master-Apprentice era of the 1960s. The article will trace the development of incident investigation, Process Hazard Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis tools used by the author. It will touch on safety instrumented systems and the development of Layer of Protection Analysis to determine how strong the safety instrumented functions should be. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 8-12, 2016 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability of an Independent Protection Layer (IPL) to achieve a given level of risk reduction is dependent upon its fulfillment of several core attributes. A key provision for any IPL to be considered effective and functionally adequate is its capability to respond to a process demand quickly enough to stop the propagation of the hazard scenario it was designed to prevent. While this seems obvious and reasonable, the estimation of Process Safety Time and the specification of IPL Response Times are more complex, and often deferred or overlooked altogether. What is Process Safety Time? How is it determined? When? And by whom? This article examines the relationship between Process Safety Time and IPL Response Times, essential variables for the justification of IPL effectiveness, and their impacts on the success of Layer of Protection Analysis. VC 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 383--388, 2015 Keywords: layer of protection analysis; independent protection layer; process safety time; IPL response time [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The terrorist attacks to two French chemical facilities in June and July 2015 raised the flag about the attractiveness of chemical plants to terrorist groups and the imminent risk of similar attacks in western countries. Although the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US put the security of chemical infrastructures in a spotlight, the majority of previous attempts have since been made toward threat assessment and vulnerability assessment of chemical plants yet overlooking their attractiveness as an influential parameter in security risks. The recent poaching of a rhino in a French zoo on March 6, 2017, despite all the security measures in place, can be taken as a metaphor to show the inefficacy of security countermeasures if not coupled with measures to reduce the attractiveness. The present work aims to emphasize the applicability of safety concepts such as inherently safer design and land use planning to this purpose. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 37: 150–152, 2018 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes a security risk assessment and protection methodology that was developed for use in the chemical and process industries in Belgium. The method employs a risk-based approach according to design principles for object-oriented protection, using so-called Typicals. The approach is beneficial for workers in the chemical industry because of the familiarity with safety models and concepts in this particular industry. The model combines the rings-of-protection approach with generic security practices including management and procedures, security technology (e.g., CCTV, fences, and access control), and human interactions (proactive as well as reactive). The method is illustrated in a case-study where a practical protection plan was developed for an existing chemical company. This article demonstrates that the method is useful for similar chemical and process industrial activities far beyond the Belgian borders, as well as for cross-industrial security protection. In summary, this article offers an insight into how the chemical sector might protect itself on the one hand and an insight into how security risk management may be practiced on the other hand. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 72-83, 2015 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crude tankers emit volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that are highly flammable and hazardous to human health and the environment. In light of these hazards, an international law has been enforced to regulate obligatory implementation of VOC management plans on board crude oil tankers. For the sake of safety, a risk assessment is performed to obtain information needed to make decisions about the safe design of a VOC recovery process. A hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) is conducted to identify plausible hazardous scenarios. A layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is subsequently conducted to overcome the qualitative nature of HAZOP. A risk ranking method is used to select HAZOP results for use as inputs to LOPA for a more quantitative assessment. The initiating causes and existing protection layers are identified. The frequencies of the initiating causes and the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of each independent protection layers (IPL) are estimated quantitatively. The current mitigation is estimated by multiplying the initiating cause likelihoods by the PFDs for the applicable IPLs and adjustment values. The estimated current mitigation is then compared to a risk acceptance criterion to make recommendations for design improvements to further reduce risks to an acceptable level. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 339-344, 2014 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The manuscript defines and discusses the products of a successful cyber-physical system in the chemical industry using two examples. The first is the ability to make the correct decision quickly regarding an unforecasted large sale of a product. The second is the automatic availability of critically needed information, accessible anywhere in the world which provides endless possibilities for the chemical industry. Concerns and some resolutions are also discussed. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 329-332, 2014 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) is used to evaluate the risk of individual hazard scenarios by combining initiating event frequencies with failure probabilities of protection layers. Some practitioners include events and conditions that enable the occurrence of hazard scenarios in the analysis, such as conditional modifiers, but sometimes they are excluded to ensure conservative results. However, these events and conditions, and other factors that enable scenarios, are often key parts of hazard scenarios and their exclusion from the analysis can result in overly conservative results. This article broadens the definition of enabling events and conditions to include other factors that can have a significant impact on the risk of hazard scenarios. Such other factors include management systems to account for inadequacies in, and failure to follow, policies, procedures, and work instructions; at-risk factors to account for the time period in which a process is at risk; incident outcomes to represent different possible consequences for the same initiating event; and release conditions to account for different release conditions or circumstances. Their inclusion in LOPA studies is described with examples. The determination of adjustment factors to account for their effect on scenario risk is also demonstrated. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 221-226, 2014 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an update on the Chemical Industries use, direction, and effectiveness of leading indicators and provides recommended leading indicators to help drive performance in a common direction. As the use of leading indicators is in its nascent stages, it is anticipated that additional surveys and updates will be published on a biannual basis. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 247-258, 2014 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Layers of Protection Analysis evaluates the sequence of events that first initiate and then propagate to a hazardous event. This semiquantitative risk assessment technique can expose the role that automation plays in causing initiating events and in responding to the resulting abnormal operation. Automation that is specifically designed to achieve or maintain a safe state of a process in response to a hazardous event is now referred to as safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI). Guidelines for Initiating Events and Independent Protection Layers addresses four basic types of SCAI: safety controls, safety alarms, safety interlocks, and safety instrumented systems. This article discusses the design, operation, maintenance, and testing practices necessary for SCAI to be considered as independent protection layers (IPL). It also provides guidance on claiming multiple layers of protection in the basic process control system. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 186-194, 2014 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Last year at the 8th Global Congress for Process Safety, we presented a paper entitled, 'Beware of the Black Swan: The Limitations of Risk Analysis for Predicting the Extreme Impact of Rare Process Safety Incidents.' The paper discussed the difficulties of predicting black swan events-rare but catastrophic occurrences which continue to happen in the chemical processing industries despite the focus that has been brought to process safety over the past 30-40 years. Once black swan events occur, after investigations and development of lessons learned, they become white swans. By white swans, we mean these type of events become more predictable and as we do hazard identification and risk analysis we become cognizant of the similar potential scenarios in new plants and plant modifications-at least for a while. This article discusses how white swans slowly become greyer as time goes on if the lessons learned from black swan events are not kept fresh. Examples of black swans that become white swans and then become grey as time goes on will be discussed. Ideas of how to keep the white swans from becoming grey with time, including the key role of Management, will also be discussed. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 110-114, 2014 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bow-tie diagrams are emerging as a very useful tool to depict and maintain an up-to-date, real-time, working risk management system embedded in daily operations. They are a proven concept in the worldwide offshore industry. These diagrams provide a pictorial representation of the risk assessment process. This article introduces the bow-tie concept to the downstream and chemical process industries in the United States. The authors believe that bow-tie diagrams can be a resourceful method in the safety and risk practitioner's toolkit to improve performance of the hazard identification and risk assessment process and to demonstrate that major hazards are identified and managed to as low as reasonably practicable. Because of their graphical nature, the biggest advantage of bow-tie diagrams is the ease to understanding of risk management by upper management and operations groups. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 33: 26-35, 2014 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the process safety literature it is often claimed that the analysis of near-miss incidents can improve process safety performance. However, empirical research has demonstrated that near miss events are interpreted as marginally successful, leading to riskier behavior due to lower perceived risk analyses. In other words, experiencing a near-miss incident can result in the false conclusion that the original risk was over-estimated. To be effective, the analysis of near-misses must be grounded in an objective evaluation of the event, the outcome, and the severity of the alternative outcome's consequences. In this article, several examples are presented where a near-miss incident preceded a serious incident with significant human injury or property damage. If the near-miss had been investigated, properly evaluated, and appropriate corrective actions been implemented, the more severe incident would not have occurred. A recurring theme in these examples is the underestimation of consequence severity, that is, the misinterpretation of the near-miss as a high probability, low-consequence severity scenario rather than a narrowly averted low-probability, high-consequence severity scenario. A deliberate consideration of the lower probability, more severe consequence scenario would have facilitated a more thoughtful evaluation of corrective actions. A methodology based on game theory is presented for evaluating the impact of near-misses on risk perception. A game-theoretical model is used to demonstrate the need for shifting payoffs away from lagging process safety indicators and toward leading indicators. An equally important outcome of this analysis is the effective communication of the risk at operational and managerial levels of the organization. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 322-327, 2013 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores new process safety metrics for measuring process safety performance in the chemical processing industry. While Process Safety Management enables an operation to optimize their process safety programs and organizational risks, there is an emerging need to evaluate process safety implementation across an organization through measurement of key indicators. Lagging metrics utilize process safety incidents as the numerator and divide it by an appropriate process-related denominator or 'normalization factor.' Currently, work hours is used extensively as a normalization factor to evaluate safety performance in the process industries. However, this lagging metric does not directly reflect process safety information and may not accurately reflect the safety performance of the process. Modified denominators are explored in this study and compared with the existing time-based denominator to validate the effectiveness and applicability of the new metrics. Each proposed normalization factor was validated using available industry data. A statistical unitization method has been used to convert incident rates of different ranges for the convenience of comparison. Results show that some proposed process-related metrics have potential as alternatives, used along with the time-based metric, to evaluate process safety performance within organizations. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 337-345, 2013 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work aims to present, in a practical approach, the application of Process Safety basic principles and management elements to the major turnaround of an Olefins Plant in the year 2011. This application can be understood and emphasized in the various stages of a turnaround: planning, pre-turnaround, shutdown and decontamination, maintenance itself, commissioning, and startup of the plant. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 264-267, 2013 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2007, the American Petroleum Institute (API 521/ISO 23251) published guidance on the use of High Integrity Protective Systems (HIPS) to mitigate overpressure scenarios. A natural extension of HIPS is to use system design and operating discipline to mitigate overpressure scenarios where use of fully instrumented protection layers or conventional relief devices is neither practical nor effective. In Dow, this approach is referred to as Alternate Overpressure Protection (AOP). System design (HIPS or AOP) is commonly used to mitigate overpressure scenarios when: (1) a conventional pressure relief device (PRD) is not practical or effective, (2) a conventional PRD will not be reliable or (3) a conventional PRD will work but is not cost effective. HIPS or AOP can also be used to reduce the required relief size by limiting the operating window of the process. The purpose of this article is to provide several practical examples on the use of HIPS and AOP and to describe some of the challenges and associated strategies to ensure successful implementation and sustained process safety performance. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 248-254, 2013 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The determination of safety integrity levels (SILs) for safety instrumented functions requires the comparison of calculated risk with risk tolerance criteria. The IEC 61511/ISA 84 standard on safety instrumented systems specifies the use of risk tolerance criteria for hazardous events but does not provide any guidance on the type or form of criteria that should be used. Industry guidance on appropriate risk tolerance criteria for SIL determination is also lacking. This article discusses the type and form of criteria that should be employed and their use in SIL determination is described. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 307-310, 2013 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In responding to the request to give a paper at the 50th Loss Prevention Symposium, this article gives a brief synopsis of my career, and how attending the annual LPS meetings over the last 37 years has tremendously supported my professional work. It relates how a theoretical physical chemist was transformed into a consultant having an expertise in electrostatic ignitions of fires and explosions. Of all the reasons, one could have for attending an LPS, networking is singled out, emphasized, and supported by examples. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 5-7, 2016 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major chemical incidents continue at industrial facilities in the United States. More effective arguments for a "business case" for safety are necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve prevention. Findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board from its investigations at two oil refineries suggest that greater authority for engineers and safety professionals is a critical requirement to prevent future incidents. Engineers and safety professionals should have greater influence on process design, commissioning, maintenance, and capital and operating budgets. They should be part of the firm's highest level of management and Board of Directors. Engineers should also have the ability to make process hazard analysis an ongoing process and to directly communicate hazards and needed safeguards to senior corporate leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent report by the UK's Health and Safety Executive postulated that severe explosions can propagate at subsonic speeds but generate overpressures of several bar in open areas and this "new" type of explosion is episodic in nature. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) paper based their findings on a specific interpretation of historical data and "empirical evidence" from previous incidents and selected experimental data. They indicate that their results should guide plant design and risk assessment. The report fails to take account of key evidence from recent large‐scale experimental studies and incident investigations in proposing a hypothetical explosion mechanism over those that are known to occur and are well understood. This has the potential to misdirect efforts to manage such events. The first part of the article will review a number of incidents and demonstrate that each of these incidents can indeed be explained by fast deflagrations or transition to detonations, in complete contradiction to the HSE findings. The results found at the incident sites will be directly compared against results from recent DDT work and damage. The second part of the paper will present a novel technique for determining the DDT transition velocity from high‐speed video footage of experiments performed at large scales. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 38: e11998, 2019 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A production operation often consists of multiple unit operations, supported by plant‐wide services such as instrument air, power, electronic communications, and cooling water. The production operation can be covered by multiple risk studies, which divide up the production operation based on nontechnical reasons, such as unit management, study length, and convenience. The use of multiple studies is particularly common with large production units or with integrated packaged equipment. The "divide and conquer" approach to the studies is good for planning and execution, but the resulting "pieces and parts" analysis can allow significant common cause scenarios to get lost in the clutter. Traditional HAZOP approaches generally focus on pairing individual causes with deviations and consequences. This traditional approach can result in inadequate consideration of more complex scenarios, such as those involving:Multiple automated system actionsGlobal loss of serviceTransference of risk These complex scenarios are often interrelated and thus are not well suited for analysis by HAZOP procedures that mandate a single cause‐consequence relationship. This article will propose extensions to the typical HAZOP process to address these challenges in a more holistic manner. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 38: e11997, 2019 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A little over 10 years ago, Chevron developed and implemented an Asset Reliability Process with the goal of improving the reliability of our facilities, with a strong focus on improving the availability of our facilities. This was known as URIP or our Unit Reliability Improvement Process. The building blocks of this process include subprocedures for:Design for reliabilityReliability opportunity identification and resolutionRisk assessment and asset strategySurveillance and condition monitoringProactive maintenanceMaintenance and failure prevention While we were successful in improving the availability of our facilities with the implementation of URIP, we continued to experience incidents and unplanned downtime associated with the integrity of our assets. As a result, we identified the need to revise our process to place a greater focus on asset integrity. This presentation describes the development and implementation of our revised reliability process, which we have renamed as our Unit Reliability and Integrity Process. The resulting asset care program still includes the subprocedures listed above, with the incorporation of asset integrity requirements. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 38: e12018, 2019 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Establishing an effective asset integrity management (AIM) program begins with the creation of a leadership team at the appropriate level of management. The team membership should encompass all areas of responsibility for asset integrity. Management at the corporate level cannot effectively drive execution of the details. Oversight at a low level in the organization can result in inconsistencies in implementation across the enterprise or insufficient resources to fully implement the AIM program. The AIM program should drive overall risk management for all assets. Regulatory covered processes may have higher safety risks, but non‐covered assets may still pose significant business risk that requires elevated coverage. The AIM program should be established as a full life cycle program, from design to decommissioning. Clearly defining and documenting standards, roles, and responsibilities for each phase of the life cycle are essential to an effective AIM program. Each role needs to be filled with subject‐matter experts who are actively engaged with the leadership team. A successful AIM program can improve existing risk management and reliability efforts through appropriate management direction, thoughtful application of the program to all assets, and clear documentation of the expectations for the full life cycle of the equipment. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 38: e12008, 2019 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A table of contents for the issue is presented.