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Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin-an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulating an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considerable research has focused on understanding variation in reproductive skew in cooperative animal societies, but the pace of theoretical development has far outstripped empirical testing of the models. One major class of model suggests that dominant individuals can use the threat of eviction to deter subordinate reproduction (the ‘restraint’ model), but this idea remains untested. Here, we use long-term behavioural and genetic data to test the assumptions of the restraint model in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), a species in which subordinates breed regularly and evictions are common. We found that dominant females suffer reproductive costs when subordinates breed, and respond to these costs by evicting breeding subordinates from the group en masse, in agreement with the assumptions of the model. We found no evidence, however, that subordinate females exercise reproductive restraint to avoid being evicted in the first place. This means that the pattern of reproduction is not the result of a reproductive ‘transaction’ to avert the threat of eviction. We present a simple game theoretical analysis that suggests that eviction threats may often be ineffective to induce pre-emptive restraint among multiple subordinates and predicts that threats of eviction (or departure) will be much more effective in dyadic relationships and linear hierarchies. Transactional models may be more applicable to these systems. Greater focus on testing the assumptions rather than predictions of skew models can lead to a better understanding of how animals control each other's reproduction, and the extent to which behaviour is shaped by overt acts versus hidden threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Remarkable variation exists in the distribution of reproduction (skew) among members of cooperatively breeding groups, both within and between species. Reproductive skew theory has provided an important framework for understanding this variation. In the primitively eusocial Hymenoptera, two models have been routinely tested: concessions models, which assume complete control of reproduction by a dominant individual, and tug-of-war models, which assume on-going competition among group members over reproduction. Current data provide little support for either model, but uncertainty about the ability of individuals to detect genetic relatedness and difficulties in identifying traits conferring competitive ability mean that the relative importance of concessions versus tug-of-war remains unresolved. Here, we suggest that the use of social parasitism to generate meaningful variation in key social variables represents a valuable opportunity to explore the mechanisms underpinning reproductive skew within the social Hymenoptera. We present a direct test of concessions and tug-of-war models in the paper wasp Polistes dominulus by exploiting pronounced changes in relatedness and power structures that occur following replacement of the dominant by a congeneric social parasite. Comparisons of skew in parasitized and unparasitized colonies are consistent with a tug-of-war over reproduction within P. dominulus groups, but provide no evidence for reproductive concessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]