Search

In recent years, critics of online platforms have raised concerns about the ability of recommendation algorithms to amplify problematic content, with potentially radicalizing consequences. However, attempts to evaluate the effect of recommenders have suffered from a lack of appropriate counterfactuals--what a user would have viewed in the absence of algorithmic recommendations--and hence cannot disentangle the effects of the algorithm from a user's intentions. Here we propose a method that we call "counterfactual bots" to causally estimate the role of algorithmic recommendations on the consumption of highly partisan content on YouTube. By comparing bots that replicate real users' consumption patterns with "counterfactual" bots that follow rule-based trajectories, we show that, on average, relying exclusively on the YouTube recommender results in less partisan consumption, where the effect is most pronounced for heavy partisan consumers. Following a similar method, we also show that if partisan consumers switch to moderate content, YouTube's sidebar recommender "forgets" their partisan preference within roughly 30 videos regardless of their prior history, while homepage recommendations shift more gradually toward moderate content. Overall, our findings indicate that, at least since the algorithm changes that YouTube implemented in 2019, individual consumption patterns mostly reflect individual preferences, where algorithmic recommendations play, if anything, a moderating role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of common sense is invoked so frequently in contexts as diverse as everyday conversation, political debates, and evaluations of artificial intelligence that its meaning might be surmised to be unproblematic. Surprisingly, however, neither the intrinsic properties of common sense knowledge (what makes a claim commonsensical) nor the degree to which it is shared by people (its "commonness") have been characterized empirically. In this paper, we introduce an analytical framework for quantifying both these elements of common sense. First, we define the commonsensicality of individual claims and people in terms of the latter's propensity to agree on the former and their awareness of one another's agreement. Second, we formalize the commonness of common sense as a clique detection problem on a bipartite belief graph of people and claims, defining pq common sense as the fraction q of claims shared by a fraction p of people. Evaluating our framework on a dataset of 2,046 raters evaluating 4,407 diverse claims, we find that commonsensicality aligns most closely with plainly worded, fact-like statements about everyday physical reality. Psychometric attributes such as social perceptiveness influence individual common sense, but surprisingly demographic factors such as age or gender do not. Finally, we find that collective common sense is rare: At most, a small fraction p of people agree on more than a small fraction q of claims. Together, these results undercut universalistic beliefs about common sense and raise questions about its variability that are relevant both to human and artificial intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the concept of experiment aversion (EA) and its applicability in different situations. The authors argue that EA can be influenced by various factors and can be reduced through interventions that address biases. They criticize a previous study that denied the existence of EA, pointing out flaws in its methodology and failure to consider certain factors. The authors emphasize the significance of consent and the impact of perceived knowledge on EA. They conclude that while EA can vary across contexts and societies, it is a phenomenon that can be alleviated. The text suggests that researchers should focus on understanding the circumstances and causes of EA, as well as finding ways to mitigate it, rather than attempting to disprove its existence. [Extracted from the article]

Randomized experiments have enormous potential to improve human welfare in many domains, including healthcare, education, finance, and public policy. However, such "A/B tests" are often criticized on ethical grounds even as similar, untested interventions are implemented without objection. We find robust evidence across 16 studies of 5,873 participants from three diverse populations spanning nine domains--from healthcare to autonomous vehicle design to poverty reduction--that people frequently rate A/B tests designed to establish the comparative effectiveness of two policies or treatments as inappropriate even when universally implementing either A or B, untested, is seen as appropriate. This "A/B effect" is as strong among those with higher educational attainment and science literacy and among relevant professionals. It persists even when there is no reason to prefer A to B and even when recipients are treated unequally and randomly in all conditions (A, B, and A/B). Several remaining explanations for the effect-- a belief that consent is required to impose a policy on half of a population but not on the entire population; an aversion to controlled but not to uncontrolled experiments; and a proxy form of the illusion of knowledge (according to which randomized evaluations are unnecessary because experts already do or should know "what works")--appear to contribute to the effect, but none dominates or fully accounts for it. We conclude that rigorously evaluating policies or treatments via pragmatic randomized trials may provoke greater objection than simply implementing those same policies or treatments untested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The natural tendency for humans to make and break relationships is thought to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. In particular, allowing conditional cooperators to choose with whom they interact is believed to reinforce the rewards accruing to mutual cooperation while simultaneously excluding defectors. Here we report on a series of human subjects experiments in which groups of 24 participants played an iterated prisoner's dilemma game where, critically, they were also allowed to propose and delete links to players of their own choosing at some variable rate. Over a wide variety of parameter settings and initial conditions, we found that dynamic partner updating significantly increased the level of cooperation, the average payoffs to players, and the assortativity between cooperators. Even relatively slow update rates were sufficient to produce large effects, while subsequent increases to the update rate had progressively smaller, but still positive, effects. For standard prisoner's dilemma payoffs, we also found that assortativity resulted predominantly from cooperators avoiding defectors, not by severing ties with defecting partners, and that cooperation correspondingly suffered. Finally, by modifying the payoffs to satisfy two novel conditions, we found that cooperators did punish defectors by severing ties, leading to higher levels of cooperation that persisted for longer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]