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Digital labor platforms (DLPs) enable new work arrangements by connecting workers who sell their labor, with clients, who purchase their services through the platform. As platform governance in the multi-actor setting is complex, we provide platform actors, policy makers, and researchers with an overview of the possible configurations of platform governance on DLPs. By focusing on "who" makes decisions, the influence platform owners, worker, and clients have on the platform is surfaced. Our taxonomy differentiates decision rights throughout the service transaction process, which includes matchmaking, price setting, scope setting, process control direct exchange and quality control. We classify 106 DLPs and find that platform owners can exert considerable influence or, alternatively, empower workers and clients by granting them decisions rights. A cluster analysis results in three archetypes which show that the influence of the platform owner increases from open marketplace DLPs, to cooperative DLPs, to platform-controlled DLPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Platform governance mechanisms such as market access control help to align all market players towards a specific value proposition. Our study focuses on understanding an important market access control mechanism: platform owners granting priority access to a subset of supply-side complementors to grow the marketplace and remove potential demand-side bottlenecks. We study the interplay between priority access and the variation in expertise of the complementors. Leveraging a randomized priority access given to expert institutional investors in online peer-topeer lending industry, we show that it creates negative spillover effect on the performance of crowd retail investors. We provide evidence in support of two mechanisms in driving the impact of priority access, the intensity of priority access and cream-skimming by institutional complementors, on the retail crowd market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although prior research on platform ecosystems has extensively studied complementors developing external platform extensions, it has overlooked internal complementors within the company that provides the platform. Given that platform owners and internal complementors often constitute separate organizational entities, they potentially pursue conflicting interests. Thus, it is critical to understand how they interact efficiently to jointly create beneficial development outcomes for their overall company. Our study addresses this gap by conducting a revelatory case study of internal complementors of one of the world's leading enterprise software providers. We develop a process model that explains how internal complementors and platform owners interact and why such interactions lead to benefits or drawbacks for their company. The study contributes to literature on platform ecosystems by showing that internal complementors have only limited access to platform owner resources. It reveals how internal complementors are dynamically governed and influence platform owners to adapt their governancepractices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the generativity of digital platform ecosystems has been studied extensively in many business-to-consumer domains, research on the novel phenomenon of IIoT platforms is sparse. The peculiarities of IIoT platform ecosystems are a double-edged sword: On the one hand, the heterogeneity of actors and devices leads to high generative potential. On the other hand, the resulting complexity can impede its realization. Even though generativity is often seen as a platform’s inherent characteristic, our study suggests that it must be driven deliberately in complex domains like the IIoT. As initial results of a theory elaboration case study, we propose two modes that drive generativity in the form of a virtuous cycle by moving from abstraction of individual solutions to concretization of generic modules and vice versa. Our final results will contribute to extant literature on generativity in complex digital platform ecosystems and provide valuable insights for practitioners in the IIoT domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The success of platform-based software ecosystems depends on the crucial coordination between platform and third-party applications during co-evolution. Leveraging the change of platform release governance of Firefox, this paper examines the impact of rapid release process on app update behavior (app responsiveness and app size change). Drawing on boundary resource perspective, we theorize how rapid release process as a social boundary resource affects app update behavior, and how app developers' usage of technical boundary resource (i.e. platform API) affects this impact. Using a unique longitudinal dataset in Firefox, we conduct empirical analyses and conclude that the rapid release process decreases size change of app updates while platform API usage enhances app responsiveness. Moreover, platform API usage strengthens the effects of the rapid release process on app update behavior. This research enhances our understanding of the impact of platform governance practices on platform-third party coordination and provides practical guidance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the importance of online reviews, digital platforms regularly redesign review systems to enhance platform performance. A unique platform governance aspect of the Apple App Store review system is their resetting of apps' overall ratings each time app developers release an update. This means that with each update apps have to rebuild their reputation from scratch. Using panel data from the Apple App Store, we analyze the effects of developers' updating behavior and of the rating resetting on subsequent app performance. Using an instrumental variable approach, we distinguish between feature and maintenance updates, and whether the app update is the developer's choice or driven by the platform. We find strong indications for divergent effects on app performance subject to the type of update and its source. This suggest that developers can use updating as a strategic instrument and that platform governance has an impact on the strategic importance of this instrument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Open Government Data (OGD) is increasingly an object of research. Whilst referred to as a platform problem, few studies examine the phenomenon using platform concepts. One challenge governments face is to establish thriving OGD ecosystems through appropriate platform governance. The governance of innovating complements on the demand side of platforms, such as services using OGD datasets by entrepreneurs for citizen users, is well studied in platform literature. However, understanding of the supply side and how third parties can be governed to help innovate platform core architecture, such a ministries sourcing quality datasets for OGD platforms, is lacking. In our preliminary study of emergent OGD platforms in Latin America, we construct a model extending concepts of boundary resources from the demand side to the supply side to expand our understanding of platform governance. In addition to contributing to platform governance theories, we improve our understanding of OGD platform ecosystem cultivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital platforms have emerged as a major organizational form in various industries including hospitality (e.g., Airbnb), innovation (e.g., Designhill), and software development (e.g., Apple iOS). Some platforms evolve successfully to build stable and growing ecosystems, while many fail to do so. The high rate of failure amongst platforms can be linked to platforms emulating mechanisms from successful platforms that are less applicable to their context. Therefore, understanding the evolution of platforms requires attention to variations in their evolution mechanisms across platform types. In this paper, we analyze the mechanisms of platform evolution across multiple platform types by reviewing the growing literature on digital platforms within major Information Systems (IS) journals, IS conferences and management journals. We identify three categories of evolution mechanisms, namely platform design, platform operations and capabilities, and platform ecosystem and governance. Our analysis points to variation in the applicability of each category across different types of platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]