Search

Malthusian theories are not an exclusive intellectual discovery of European writers. They have occurred elsewhere, in period of rapid population increase. In this paper, a Chinese example is analysed and the relevant essays translated. The essays were written at the same time that Malthus published his ideas and contain most of Ii is philosophical notions but are not supported by any statistical evidence. Unlike those of Malthus in Europe they did not evoke any controversy in China, although their author was well known as a man of letters and close to the central authority. Today, of course, Malthusianism is a subject much discussed in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the population policy in mainland China. Population policy in Communist China has little demographic significance. It is of interest mainly for what it reveals about the nature of the administrative and decision making process in Peking. Although evidence is often ambiguous, distinct phases of population policy can be distinguished, during which policy shifted from categoric denial of population problems to an endorsement of birth control and back to the denial of population problems.

From mortality levels in 1949 similar to those in the United States during the nineteenth century, China claims to have reduced mortality to levels comparable to those in the United States 30 years ago. The data used in this study come from Chinese medical research journals, which are published in Chinese and English for both the Chinese and international medical communities. It may be argued that the vital statistics in such publications are presented for propaganda purposes specifically by boosting morale or setting examples. If the health conditions of town dwellers had improved more rapidly than those of the rural populace, this would tend to bias reporting because hospitals and public health organizations located in urban areas contribute more information than rural areas, despite overall improvement in data collecting. With such a history of high mortality, the 1953 census statistics and concurrent large-scale vital registration surveys present an incredibly low death rate of 17 per thousand. Historically, infant mortality has been more affected by economic and political disruptions in the environment than has adult mortality. Infant mortality, always high in China, rose during the war years to 200 per thousand live births in some rural districts.

The article describes institutionalized motivation for family planning in China. Chinese developmental model has adopted historically unique models. The government has experimented with three approaches to modernization. The earliest Soviet model featured investment in urban-based heavy industry and rapid social mobility for the middle strata was stressed. In the second, a transitional approach, China's "New Economic Plan" allowed greater freedom to market forces, encouraging profit from agricultural investment and trade. During these years Chinese citizens were encouraged to reduce fertility to gain economic rewards, to win higher social positions, and to avoid political pressure. This was preceded and succeeded by a third, so-called Maoist economic plan in late 1957-59 and again from 1966 to the present. The Maoist approach aims at halting the urbanization process and the partial industrialization of rural areas. Income differentials by geographical location, occupation and social rank are narrowed. The political values for leaders stress service to the community without material incentives. The schools and mass media curb competition for individual achievement and upward mobility.

Since 1949 marital postponement has been extensively discussed in China. Furthermore, unlike some other means of fertility control, marital postponement has been received with the fewest misgivings. Not only was encouragement to delay marriage made part and parcel of social and family reform long before the decision to promote planned reproduction in China, but it has also become an integral component of the efforts to arrest the nation's demographic momentum since the 1950's. Moreover, following an interlude of quiet dissemination of contraceptive advice and devices from 1959 to 1962, exhortations to marry later constituted the prologue to a continuing phase of family planning activities in China. Yet, details of this Chinese discussion of marital postponement have been neither fully described nor analysed, outside China. The article presents a comprehensive account of the discussion of marital postponement in China during the birth-control campaign of the last two decades and also discusses its implications for the current fertility controversy outside of China.

This article focuses on sterilization, oral contraception, and population control in China. In the early spring of 1962 China resumed public discussions and propaganda in favour of late marriage. Events since then have made it abundantly clear that this open advocacy of marriage postponement constituted but a prologue to a new phase of fertility control activities. This bland re-opening of the birth control issue may well have been due to domestic considerations. In any case, the recent promotion of late marriage was initially not explicitly linked to the question of fertility control; its keynote was: "it is not good to get married and give birth to a child too early in life." Thus, the recent campaign to encourage late marriage with its accompanying emphasis upon personal well-being and the welfare of mothers and children may have been deliberately tactful. It reiterated the official position on the need for birth control, and simultaneously and simply laid the basis for the re-activation of the fertility control activities that were to come shortly.

Recent difficulties in the agricultural sector have accentuated the vital problem of China's huge population. With a population estimated to be over 700 millions, which is thought to be increasing by 15 millions annually, China has almost one-quarter of the world's total population. After a lapse of some four years China launched her second major birth control campaign during 1962. Such a decision reflected the conflict between the traditional Communist position, and the neo-Malthusian stand taken in 1957 by social activist Ma Yin-chu with his New Theory of Population. It is generally claimed that China's population is likely to reach 1,000 millions by 1980 or 1985, and about 1,200 millions by the year 2000 A.D. In most countries, which have experienced modernization, considerable increases in population have been absorbed, for a decline in mortality rates has been matched by a subsequent decline in fertility rates within a manageable period. China's need is for a far more immediate lowering of fertility rates. The alternative is that population growth will threaten the means of subsistence increasingly. Success in handling the population problem is seen by some as fundamental to the future of stable government, and yet China has not achieved any breakthrough in terms of population control, and, moreover, China's second major birth control campaign appears to have lapsed as did the earlier campaign.

The article presents a minature of Chinese population. Szechwan, the largest and most populous of the provinces in China proper, constitutes in its greater part a natural geographic region usually called the Red Basin. Except along the important rivers, its terrain varies from hilly to mountiinous, though the region is nonetheless intensively cultivated by means of elaborate terracing and irrigation devices. Sansheng hsiang, lies about six miles from Chengtu in the hills which rim the plain. A hsiang is an administrative sub-division of the hsien (county), and resembles the American township. In Szechwan it always contains at least one, and usually only one, market town. Most of Szechwan is peculiar for its lack of villages, if by the term is meant a large number of dwellings grouped together separate from the land tilled. Szechwanese farmers, as distinct from those in other parts of China proper, live in scattered households and household clusters. The population of the Chengtu area was radically altered in size and composition by the catastrophic events of the period between the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties.

Surveying the literature available in European languages, the author concludes that all past Chinese population data are inaccurate, and probably very markedly so, though there is no means at present of estimating the degree of error. This inaccuracy is attributed to a number of factors. At no time did the Government appear to realize the value of accurate population data as such, and the data actually collected have been very largely the by-products of inquiries with more immediately administrative aims. The geographical area covered by the `censuses' has varied considerably over time, and so also, either by intention or through defective organization, have the classes of the population included. Antagonism from the public has been common, arising partly from superstition but also from the association between the `censuses' and military and labour conscription and taxation. With the exception of the recent, local (hsien) censuses, uniform schedules, instructions and other census procedures have not been used. The author considers the possibilities of interpreting the population data now available for China and suggests means of collecting more accurate statistics in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]