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The evidence presented in this paper shows that differential mortality by economic status is strongly present in the United States today, and that this relationship is monotonic, with men's death rates being lower among the wealthier. Also, the greater the number of spells of poverty, the higher the death rate. These data suggest that differential mortality rates by economic status are being confused with the well-known ethnic differences in mortality. An implication of this paper, therefore, is that ethnic differences in mortality are, in large part, a consequence of poverty or permanent low income, as opposed to genotype. Consequently, it may be just as valid, or even more so, to publish mortality tables by income as by race. A policy implication of this paper is that the redistributive effects of longevity-based transfer systems, such as social security (public pensions), may be less 'progressive' than has been assumed, since would-be poorer recipients are either less likely to live long enough to collect any benefits in the first place, or will not live to collect them for as long as more affluent recipients. In addition, I have failed to find a direct effect of schooling on probability of survival. Hence, the beneficial effect of schooling on longevity must work through its effect upon income, with only the latter directly influencing mortality risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to identify common features in the fertility patterns of the English-speaking world and provide a model basis for comparison of fertility between countries and over time. Attention is focused on the heterogeneity within the fertility patterns of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, similar to that reported earlier for the UK and the Irish Republic. The recent age-specific fertility patterns of these countries display a marked 'bulge' in fertility of women under age 25. A mixture model with two-component: Hadwiger functions provides a suitable fit. The heterogeneity thus suggested is shown to be related to differences in the timing of births by marital status, and its magnitude is related to the proportion of births outside marriage. Additionally, there is some evidence that, in the United States, and to a lesser extent in New Zealand, this heterogeneity in fertility patterns may be explained by ethnic differences in the timing and number of births. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper documents increasing cohabitation in the United States, and the implications of this trend for the family lives of children. The stability of marriage-like relationships (including marriage and cohabitation) has decreased - despite a constant divorce rate. Children increasingly live in cohabiting families either as a result of being born to cohabiting parents or of their mother's entry into a cohabiting union. The proportion of births to unmarried women born into cohabiting families increased from 29 to 39 per cent in the period 1980-84 to 1990-94, accounting for almost all of the increase in unmarried childbearing. As a consequence, about two-fifths of all children spend some time in a cohabiting family, and the greater instability of families begun by cohabitation means that children are also more likely to experience family disruption. Estimates from multi-state life tables indicate the extent to which the family lives of children are spent increasingly in cohabiting families and decreasingly in married families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common sense suggests that changes over time in aggregate period fertility rates should be closely, related to changes in desired completed fertility after controlling for contraceptive failure, and desired spacing and timing; the nature of the relationship is, however, far from clear. This paper shows that when desired completed fertility undergoes swings, like those in the United States in recent decades, the turning points in period fertility will precede those in desired completed fertility by as much as five years and the amplitude of the swings in period fertility will be more than twice as great. Cumulated fertility, on the other hand, will lag behind reproductive goals. Period fertility rates will exceed desired completed fertility when desires are increasing and fall below it when desires are decreasing. These theoretical results help to explain some salient features of the American baby boom and bust. It is also shown that during a demographic transition, period fertility will fall more rapidly than desired completed fertility, and that towards the end of the transition, period fertility will increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper was developed with two purposes in mind: first to extend the study of the family life cycle for this sub-population on the United States back to the 1800 birth cohort and secondly to examine the features of the family life cycle under conditions of high natural fertility. Evidence Consistent with a natural-fertility regime is presented using Mormon genealogies of married women who were born between 1800 and 1869. The family life cycle for this high-fertility population indicates how the reproductive potential of a population is tempered by life-cycle phenomena. Age at marriage greatly affects completed family size: Women who married by the age of 20 average about nine live births against an average of only six for women married at age 25. However. the age at birth of the last child is high and unrelated to age at marriage as would be expected under conditions of natural fertility. By using direct information on the age at death for these couples. we find that the average age at dissolution of the conjugal unit has not varied by more than a few years and has consistently been in the mid 60's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes self-selection of returning immigrants. We propose an empirical model for this purpose, and apply it to Israeli-born immigrants who arrived in the United States during 1970-79 and returned to Israel during 1980-89. The results, based on analyses of the 5 per cent Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the 1980 and 1990 United States censuses, suggest that those who return from the United States to Israel have reached a higher level at school than those who remain in the United States. However, the income analysis suggests that, at each schooling level, those who returned to Israel would have been less successful in the United States labour market than Israelis of similar schooling (and other measured characteristics) who remained in the United States. These results were corroborated using Israeli census data that include information on returning Israelis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The majority of studies relating to mortality conditions in nineteenth-century Africa deal with the small number of white settlers or visitors. This paper examines the level and causes of mortality in Liberia of Africans who emigrated from the United States. We describe crude and age-standardized death rates by cause of death, and examine the age pattern of mortality and its conformity to existing models of age patterns for causes of death. The results of this analysis indicate that the age pattern of mortality of the Liberian immigrant population recapitulates rather precisely existing models of age patterns for all causes of death, and from specific causes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The performance of format demographic feedback models, like Ronald Lee's, provides a test of whether theories of endogenous fertility adjustment, like Richard Easterlin's, can explain the cyclic swings in U.S, and other births that they were designed to explain. This paper shows how the specification of a demographic feedback model determines its ability to sustain cycles of a given period and amplitude observed in data. Only a few of the many versions of Easterlinastyle theories imply formal models which do prove capable of matching U.S. targets, and then only by narrow margins. The general methods presented here are suitable for a broad investigation of the possible role of age- specific feedback in the diversity of more and less cyclic patterns in birth series in the developed world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1841 and 1842 emigration from the British Isles to the U.S.A. was larger than in any year before the great Irish Famine. Later in the century, depressed economic conditions in the U.S.A. reduced the flow of immigrants. In contrast, the increased immigration of 1841 took place under circumstances of depression in both the U.K. and the U.S.A. In this paper, samples of the passenger manifests of ships arriving in five ports in the United States during 1841 are analysed in the search for more information about the emigrants of that remarkable year. A new and more accurate estimate of immigrants according to nationality has been compiled. Profiles of the immigrants from each part of the British Isles are provided, according to their routes of emigration, the seasonal flow, their ages, sex, travelling companions and occupations. These are compared with the results of previous work on 1831, 1851 and the 1880s. The evidence points to some deepening of the emigration into more disadvantaged sectors of the population, as compared with 1831, even in this depressed year before improvements in transport had made a significant impact on the cost, time and travelling conditions of the journey. Yet, the very diversity of the emigration streams suggests that cyclical and technological problems can only partially explain the outflow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the relative time cost of children compared to other types of household tasks, and the relative time cost of producing quantity rather than quality of children is examined. These propositions lie at the heart of much of the literature on the economics of fertility, but they have rarely been examined directly. We employ household time-use data from a study of a large metropolitan area in the United States. Our results cast doubt on the notions that: (a) child-services are more time-costly than other household tasks; (b) that quantity of child-services is more time-costly than quality of child-services. Moreover, there appear to be strong complementarities between child-services and other household tasks, and time spent on child care does not seem to act as an obstacle to working outside the home. Finally, we suggest another economic interpretation of the fertility transition centred not on changes in objective factors exogeneous to the house- hold, but, instead, on the internal economic power structure of the household itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we estimate a fertility model based on Easterlin's synthesis framework. The model assumes that not all couples are able to achieve their desired number of living children because of supply constraints and that, for other couples, the number of living children may exceed desired fertility, depending upon child mortality, the level of fertility in the absence of control, and the degree of contraceptive regulation practised. Estimates of the model for samples of women with completed fertility taken from the Philippines (1973) and the United States (1965) indicated that a higher proportion of Filipino women than women in the U.S. were unable to achieve desired fertility because of supply constraints, that levels of fertility control of Filipino women not supply-constrained were lower, and that excess fertility of Filipino women was much higher. Demand-for-children equations based on the constraints model were quite different from those not taking into account the possibility that some women were supply-constrained, or that some women may have had more children than desired. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of children born during marital dissolution on the probabilities and timing of women's divorce and remarriage and explore whether the new children and those already present modify each other's effects on these outcomes. In studying the influence of post-marital childbearing on the probabilities of divorce and remarriage, an unexamined but significant problem in the area of marriage and childbearing. The present paper also provide an illustration of an application of this useful new technique. The impact of children on the processes of divorce and remarriage is an important topic for research. Both the effects of children living at the time of the dissolution of the marriage and the effects of those born to women while separated or divorced are important, as each has significant but different implications for the process of family formation. Previous researchers, however, have either examined only the impact of children already born at the time of breakdown or have not distinguished between these children and those born after the dissolution. Children are born to parents whose marriages have broken down relatively frequently in the United States. Data collected in 1970 showed that the probability of a birth within 48 months of separation or widowhood was 0.26. Although the post-marital birth rate has since decreased, it remains substantial. Because of the sharp increase in divorce rates after 1970 and a recent apparent delay in remarriage, more women will remain in a martially disrupted state for a longer period.

Stable population theory has recently been used to analyse the effects of changes in fertility and mortality on economic variables such as income per head. In this paper more general results are derived to describe the effects of changing vital rates on the variance and higher moments of the distribution of some age-dependent variable. Simple analytical expressions are derived which decompose the effects of changes in age structure into the effects on inter-cohort and intra-cohort variance. The results are easily applied to standard measures of the distribution of income. By combining the analytical results with actual age profiles of income and income variance from the United States and Brazil it is observed that both the magnitude and direction of the effects of population growth on measured inequality are sensitive to the specific age profiles used. The most surprising result is that the Brazilian age profiles suggest that higher growth rates may actually reduce measured inequality, although the effect is relatively small. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper information about cohorts of young women in the National Longitudinal Survey of Work Experience is used to examine the extent to which women maintain a continuity of work attachment during their early years of childbearing, the years when traditionally they were most likely to withdraw from the work force. The results indicate that women who maintain closer ties to the work force immediately before and after their first birth are also more likely to be employed in 1978 - between five and ten years after their first birth - independently of intervening fertility events and other labour supply factors considered to be important predictors of work. The notion that work and fertility are increasingly becoming complementary activities for American women is supported by these data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the introduction to this paper we set out four hypotheses we think are central to Easterlin's theory of contemporary population cycles: that the income prospects of small birth cohorts are better in early adult life than those of larger cohorts; that cohort taste and income aspirations are formed in adolescence and reflect parental income levels rather than those members of the cohort are likely to experience after entering the labour force; that the wider gaps between aspirations and incomes this implies for larger cohorts will constrain their fertility relative to that of smaller cohorts; and that through these effects persistent fertility cycles may be set up after an initial period of unusually small or large birth cohorts. In the first part of our analysis we considered whether cohort-specific fertility behaviour could be identified in American historical experience. Our finding, which may have been evident in the fertility patterns of Figure 2, was essentially negative: the fit of period-focused fertility regressions was consistently found to be better than that of cohort-focused regressions. In the latter, coefficients were usually of the wrong sign. Evidently, cohorts have tended not to be particularly consistent in their fertility behaviour through life, and if long cycles are established they are unlikely to be of the Easterlin type. Looking at possible Easterlin patterns in the timing of births, we confronted first the problem of finding a satisfactory empirical translation for the relative income concept. Owing to the substantial fluctuations that occur in yearly incomes, we found we could construct a variety of relative income indexes with little consistency between them. None fit fertility patterns very convincingly. It may be that highly aggregated measures cannot provide an adequate test, but so far that is all that has been offered. In any event the model has also seemed to us to be suspect on intuitive grounds. The young surely do l!now that in early adult life their incomes will not match those of their parents, and it may demand a great measure of acuity on their part to sense that the differential is wider or narrower for themselves than for their older siblings or associates,especially as their incomes will be rising rapidly at the time they are attempting the assessment. From I this perspective, the evaluation Easterlin assumes might be far too subtle to account for fertility declines of the magnitude that have occurred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper some findings of a family reconstitutions study of a group of high-upper-class American families are reported. The study extends over almost 2000 years, from the early colonial period to the Civil War. A substantive analysis of fertility patterns of a group of socially significant Philadelphia families provides interesting comparisons with the demographic experience of European social elites and raises additional questions regarding certain assumptions of classical demographic transition theory. The focus of the analysis is on fertility trends and evidence concerning the initiation of family limitation. If this group took a vanguard position by initiating the practice of family limitation in society as did other social elite groups, one might anticipate some evidence of this by the late eighteenth century.

Because the types and quantities of goods and services consumed vary by age anti because a transition to a stationary population signifies for most countries a marked shift in age structure, it is commonly believed that a trend toward a stationary population would affect the pattern of consumer demand. Analysing time series data from the United States from 1929 to 1970 anti then Projecting consumption patterns to the year 2020 on the basis of two alternative fertility assumptions (an average of two children versus three children per family), this paper finds little difference in the allocation of consumer purchases between the two projections. While the more Slowly growing population is an older population. it is at the same time wealthier: and those goods and services that an older population would tend to acquire relatively more of are essentially the same as those on which a wealthier population would spend proportionately less, and vica versa. These two effects are largely offsetting. Only eleven categories of consumption expenditure are examined, and it is possible that a more detailed analysis would disclose changes that are hidden by the current level of aggregation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the theoretical level, the paper has two aims: to develop a three-country migration model and to incorporate British emigration schemes of the 1920s into it. The model is tested on data of U.K. emigration to Canada, the U.S.A. and Australia from 1920 to 1936. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent studies there appears a tendency to generalize white-black differences in fertility to a majority-minority context. Results are regarded as providing general information on the fertility behavior of all minority groups in American society. However, unlike findings relating to some sub-groups of the population, e.g. Roman Catholics, the basic premise that the fertility of blacks is the product of social constraints different from those which affect white America is as yet unresolved. The purpose of this paper is to examine the assertion that the minority group status is indeed, relevant to the study of black fertility. Part of the tenuous current position of this assertion stems from inadequate conceptualization of the problem's many aspects. A major goal is to review the limited literature on the topic, bringing together the set of ideas currently available. This process generates a number of hypotheses, which are examined with data from the 1970 Census Public Use Sample. To examine this problem properly, a methodological innovation is necessary. As this innovation has value beyond, the current study, a subsidiary objective of this paper is to demonstrate the utility of this technique in the study of fertility.

Using the iterative intra-cohort interpolation procedure, this article tries to remedy the lack of data on home-leaving by providing an international comparison of estimated census-based single-year age-specific net rates of leaving home for males and females in China, Japan, South Korea, United States, France, and Sweden. It demonstrates that large differences in the age pattern of leaving the parental home between the East Asian and the Western countries. For example, the median ages at home-leaving of males and females in the three East Asian countries studied were higher than those in the three Western countries studied by a margin of 2-3 years. The role played by social and cultural traditions as well as by ethnic ideologies in the large differences in the home- leaving pattern between the East Asian and Western countries is also considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the effect of Catholicism on fertility in the United States. It is shown that many studies on Catholicism and fertility are seriously flawed because of sample selection bias, which occurs because ex-Catholics prefer smaller families than non-Catholics. It has been found that religious activity has no effect on fertility if it is treated as an endogenous variable. Further, it is shown that the fertility transition in the United States is partly related to the changing effect of Catholic norms. Thus, the direct effect of economic variables, such as women's earnings, on fertility might have been overstated by economists. In this study, wife's schooling is used as a proxy for her earning ability, because the quality of data available on wife's earnings is low, and also because it is not possible to identify the relationship between wife's earnings and fertility with the data at hand. Thirdly, wife's schooling is an important determinant of her earning ability. It might also reduce fertility by increasing her ability to plan family size. It has been shown that current religion is not necessarily independent of fertility decisions. Results indicate that a positive effect of Catholicism on fertility is inflated, when current religious status is used as a measure. The study also explains the divergence between Catholic and non-Catholic fertility that has been claimed to have occurred during the `baby boom' period. This study also shows that the results are affected by whether the husband's or the wife's religion is used in the estimate. The results also indicate that Catholic norms have a highly significant positive effect on fertility for respondents born before 1920. Variations in fertility after this period are at best weakly related to a Catholic upbringing. This implies that changes in fertility over time are at least partly associated with changes in the influence of norms.

Since Gary S. Becker's seminal contributions, the new home economics approach to fertility has concentrated on completed family size. Yet the existence of a two-child norm in the United States implies that the timing of births can be just as significant as completed parity for American fertility rates; and micro-economic factors are clearly of consequence in household timing decisions given the high degree of fertility control and the number of working women. Couples are assumed to exercise perfect fertility control and to be free of physical impairments such as sub-fecundity and involuntary sterility, and not to experience miscarriages or stillbirths. If loans and financial securities are available at equal rates of interest, the decision problem of the household is to maximize its life-cycle utility subject to the constraint that the present value of its child and non-child expenditures equal the present value of its income stream. When capital markets are perfect, the size of the costs of child care influences the number of desired births, but not necessarily their timing. By borrowing on its future income, a couple can begin childbearing quite early and still enjoy a standard of living which approximates its life-cycle norm.

The article reports an investigation of the relation between the number of live births during a woman's reproductive life cycle and her ages at those births. Four samples of women from the United States and from the Philippines are used. The timing patterns of childbearing in these samples display several striking regularities. In all samples childbearing tends to occur in the center of the fecund period irrespective of the number of children, so that the mean age at childbearing is essentially independent of final parity. In addition, the timing patterns are symmetric around the mean age at childbearing. Most important of all, the patterns are very alike in the different samples examined, despite large differences between average family size, methods used to regulate fertility, and economic, social, and cultural characteristics in the different populations. The distribution of these ages for every final parity, which will be referred to as the timing distribution of childbearing conditional upon final parity, and the distribution of final parity together contain all the information about fertility for any population. Indeed, the complete timing distribution requires reproductive histories of individual women who have completed childbearing and such statistics are difficult to obtain. As a result, it appears that this distribution has not previously been studied in its entirety.

In the article, the author presents a reply to C.F. Westoff's article "Another Look at Fertility and Social mobility," published in this issue of the journal "Population Studies." In his thoughtful paper, Westoff has clearly shown that even if the correct procedure is followed, it does not alter the findings of the Princeton studies. It has been earlier shown that the fertility of mobile couples was "intermediate" between that prevailing in their place of origin, and in their place of destination, which is, of course, consistent with what the author has noted for the Aberdeen sample. Thus, it would seem that one cannot easily dismiss the Aberdeen case as being different on the grounds that the social class system is more structured in Great Britain than in the U.S. Also, some researchers noted that findings of various studies may be "time bound" and thus, only under some conditions or at certain stages of development, will the fertility of rural-urban migrants be higher than that of urban residents. Perhaps the same conditions apply concerning the social mobility-fertility hypothesis.

Many different definitions of the construct of motivational ambivalence have appeared in the literature on reproductive health. Using a theoretical framework in which motivational ambivalence is defined as an interaction between positive and negative pregnancy desires, we propose two hypotheses. The first is that positive and negative pregnancy desires independently predict the risk of an unplanned pregnancy. The second is that ambivalence and three related constructs that are also based on the interaction between positive and negative desires are each important predictors of pregnancy risk. We use weekly journal data collected from a US sample of 1,003 women aged 18–19 years and conduct hazard model analysis to test our hypotheses. Using both dummy and continuous predictors, we report results that confirm both hypotheses. The proposed interaction framework has demonstrated validity, compares favourably with previously reported alternative approaches, and incorporates a set of constructs that have potential importance for further research directed at the prevention of unplanned pregnancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent rise in identification with American political parties has focused interest on the long-term dynamics of party support. Liberal commentators cite immigration and youth as forces that will produce a natural advantage for the Democrats in the future, while conservative writers highlight the importance of high fertility amongst Republicans in securing growth. These opinions are not based on demographic analysis. We addressed this omission by undertaking the first ever cohort component projection (up to 2043) of populations by American party allegiance, based on survey and census data. On current trends, we predict that American partisanship will change much less than the nation's ethnic composition because the parties are similar in age structure. Nevertheless, our projections suggest that the Democrats will gain 2–3 per cent more support than the Republicans by 2043, mainly through immigration, although the higher fertility of Republicans may eventually offset that advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a further contribution to recent investigations of the relevance of genetic processes for demographic outcomes, we investigate genetic associations with whether adolescents use contraception. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we find that variants in the dopamine transporter gene DAT1, the dopamine receptor gene DRD2, and the monoamine oxidase gene MAOA are associated with unprotected sexual intercourse. Consistent with previous analyses of these data, the genotypes DRD2*A1/A2, DRD2*A2/A2, DAT1*9R/10R, and MAOA*2R/ are associated with higher odds of unprotected sexual intercourse than other genotypes at these loci. The DRD2 associations apply to both men and women, whereas the other associations apply to women only. These results are robust to controls for population stratification by continental ancestry, do not vary by contraceptive type, and are consistent with previous research showing that these genetic variants are associated with higher rates of impulsivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the 'reproductive polarization' hypothesis, family-policy regimes unfavourable to the combination of employment with motherhood generate greater socio-economic differentials in fertility than other regimes. This hypothesis has been tested mainly for 'liberal' Anglo-American regimes. To investigate the effects elsewhere, we compared education differentials in age at first birth among native-born women of 1950s and 1960s birth cohorts in seven countries representing three regime types. Women with low educational attainment have continued to have first births early, not only in Britain and the USA but also in Greece, Italy, and Spain. Women at all other levels of education have experienced a shift towards later first births, a shift that has been largest in Southern Europe. Unlike the educationally heterogeneous changes in age pattern at first birth seen under the Southern European and Anglo-American family-policy regimes, the changes across birth cohorts in the study's two 'universalistic' countries, Norway and France, have been educationally homogeneous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we investigated the impact of health on domestic migration within the USA. We find that, for men below 60 years of age, a move from the middle to the bottom of the health distribution reduces mobility by 32-40 per cent. Non-random attrition from the panel implies that these are lower bounds. By contrast, we find evidence that, among older men, there is higher mobility at the top and bottom of the health distribution than there is in the middle. For women, we find no evidence of a relationship between their own health and mobility, although spouse's health does affect the mobility of married women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent substantial declines in first marriage in Western countries have been accompanied by increases in the average age at first marriage. Since the period proportion ever marrying, PEM, is sensitive to cohort tempo changes, the recent fall in the PEM may simply reflect cohort delays in marriage. The importance of timing factors is examined in the light of twentieth-century experience of first marriage in England and Wales and the USA. Using a variant of the Timing Index developed in research on fertility, we measure cohort timing effects for marriage and calculate an adjusted PEM. After examining twentieth-century trends in nuptiality for men and women, we find substantial tempo effects on the period PEM. Adjusted PEM values show a real decline in marriage for cohorts, but that decline is considerably smaller than the one shown by the unadjusted figures. This is especially true for England and Wales, where the decline in marriage was much greater. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from the Food and Agricultural Organization and some other sources, it was estimated that rapid population growth in countries with an initial average calorie availability of below 2800 per head inhibited improvements in food production and availability per head during the 1980s and early 1990s. There were statistically significant negative effects of population growth on the growth in the production of noncereal food crops, milk, and meat, and in total food production. Because net food imports and aid shipments of cereals responded similarly, rather than acting as compensatory factors, the development in total calorie availability per head was least satisfactory in countries with the most rapid growth. A rapid increase in the number of adults of working age appeared to be no less disadvantageous than an increase in the number of children or elderly. Weaker effects were found when the entire 1970-95 period was considered. There were few indications that poverty, illiteracy, or land or water scarcity made it particularly difficult to cope with a growing population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A quiet demographic revolution has occurred during the twentieth century in the United States: the decline in intergenerational household sharing. Why were these living arrangements so common for older women early in the century? We examine the characteristics of adult kin who shared intergenerational households in 1910. Two nationally representative samples, of elderly mothers and their co-resident biological adult children were taken from the 1910 Census P.U.S. and linked to test general hypotheses relating to the determination of living arrangements. We find that kin availability influenced co-residence in two ways: by increasing the pool of children available and by facilitating strategic processes of kin selection based on quality of children. As kin availability increased, mothers chose security (especially the retention of headship) and a child's lack of competing obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the interrelationship between the education of women and fertility rate. Women's educational attainment has been closely correlated with several aspects of demographic behaviour, including the reproductive process. Every additional year of mother's schooling leads to a reduction in the number of children she bears. Educated women find it easier to obtain jobs in the labour market, their earning potential is higher, and possibly their jobs are emotionally more satisfying. They, therefore, have more to lose by withdrawing temporarily from the labour force after childbirth. Better knowledge and more efficient use of birth control have probably contributed to the relatively low fertility of the higher social strata. Finally, highly educated parents may have higher aspirations for their children, which increase the cost of rearing them; or they may prefer alternative satisfactions to those yielded by children. All this may lead to delaying the first birth,or to an increased propensity to remain childless, but both the tempo and quantum of later parity transitions are also likely to be influenced by mothers' educational level. In addition, more time spent in the education system may itself lead to a postponement of the first birth. This study found a positive relationship between mothers' education and the third-birth rate . In the second parity cohorts, probabilities of a third birth for women with more than 12 years' education, an increasingly large group, were higher than for those who only had compulsory education, even though the former had begun their childbearing later. This is true for both five year and ten year probabilities and should not be seen as simply a spacing effect. Hence suggesting that education did not act as an impediment to the birth of third child in the present study.

The article analyses the demographic change and the migration from the Netherlands to the United States and other countries. It suggests that it was only after the Second World War that emigration from the country was significant. This article concentrates on the push-factors. It is clear that most Dutch immigrants came from rural areas, the bulk of them from the sea-clay grain-farming areas, like Zealand and Groningen, where agricultural modernization was eroding the position of the small farmer and farm labourer. About one-third of emigrants came from the sandy soils, and only 14 per cent from the dairy areas. Most emigrants were of farmer or farm-labourer status. Religion was also important as a push factor: many studies have pointed to the role played especially by the Afscheiding, the orthodox Calvinist Secession of 1834, in stimulating the nineteenth century Calvinist waves of emigration, although we should always bear in mind that actually Catholic emigrants far outnumbered the much more publicized Seceder emigration.

The chapter discusses emerging issues in demographic research in the U.S. Demographers studying the U.S. population should consider pro-natalists and anti-natalists factors in demographic transition and fertility trends. Emerging issues that affect demography include low fertility rates, low marriage rates, and decreasing marital stability. Recent trends in family transition research include the growing collection of event histories in survey data and increasing attention to the linkages amongst transitions.

Based on documents obtained from the archives of the Agency for International Development and on the author's interviews with participants in the field, this article describes the evolution of America's international population policy. The analysis highlights the perceived negative view of the consequences of rapid population growth that were popular among American policy makers during the 1960s. Also discussed are organizational and policy changes that took place within the Agency for International Development's population programme during its early years. The article concludes that the origins of Americas international population programme were fundamentally conservative, and based on the assumption that a certain demographic balance was an essential feature of a properly ordered social life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Samples from the U.S. passenger lists are used to focus upon the emigrants from England to the U.S.A. during 1841. Probably as many as three-quarters of the English emigrants of that year made the U.S.A. their destination, though only a minority of Irish and Scottish emigrants sailed directly to U.S. ports. The English appear very largely to have spurned the unusual opportunities for assisted emigration to colonies that were available that year. The occupations of male emigrants are compared with occupations reported in the population census of 1841. Farmers, general labourers, and industrial workers, particularly those employed in textile industries, were over represented among the emigrants. Yet the movement was not predominantly an exodus of labourers from agriculture, nor from some of the most depressed occupations such as framework knitters and nailers. Various occupational groups are analyzed according to travelling companions, dependants and age, in an effort to distinguish between the more cycles sensitive groups and those seemingly intent on permanent emigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on American Catholism and the International family planning movement. First, the involvement of the government in fertility control both in the United States and throughout the developing world was an involvement in family life. Children, after all, are born into and reared by families. Family life is a central concern of the Church. Even among non-practising Catholics, the key life-cycle events-birth, marriage, and death-demand an appearance in Church. Objections were raised not only because of the details of what the government proposed, but also because Church leaders saw the government usurping an area in which the Church claimed special competence.

Life-table estimates indicate that one-quarter of U.S. women intend no more births by age 25, one-half by age 27, and three-quarters by age 30. The resulting long period at risk of unwanted fertility is argued to be an important underlying dimension of the revolution in attitudes to and practice of sterilization. Life-table estimates are then considered of the timing of sterilization after the last wanted birth. Almost one-quarter of all couples select sterilization within the first year after they have had the number of children they desire. Recent experience would imply that four-fifths of all couples will eventually use contraceptive sterilization. In order to examine the determinants of men's and women's sterilization, logistic regression is used with a polytomous dependent variable: sterilization of the woman, sterilization of the man, or no sterilization within four years of the last wanted birth. Covariates considered are age and parity at last wanted birth, year and duration of marriage at last wanted birth, wife's and husband's education, wife's and husband's religion, whether residence is in a central city, region, pill-use history and timing-failure histories before the last wanted birth, and unwanted birth. Large and significant effects are found for most of these variables, and these effects change in interpretable ways between early innovative behaviour and sterilization during the most recent period when it was widely accepted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on how the economic impact of children on household budgets in industrialized countries is usually considered to have two components: direct maintenance expenditure, which consists of out-of-pocket spending for food, clothing, education, and the like; and opportunity expenditures, or the opportunities parents forego when bearing and rearing children. An important aspect of opportunity expenditures is the income that women forego by staying home to bear and rear children and by not participating in market work. When opportunity expenditures on children are viewed in this way, two measurement issues are involved. Thus, this article presents estimates of opportunity expenditures on children in the United States as measured by the foregone hours of market work and earnings of women between the ages of 15 and 55. A unique aspect of the study is the use of multi-state tables of working life to assess the impact of childbearing on age-specific and lifetime hours of market work by mothers.

The influence of fertility on the proportions working among white married women in the U.S. from 1970 to 1975 is analyzed by using longitudinal data from the National Fertility Studies. The intention to have author child is found to have a negative effect Independently of the impact of age of youngest child and parity. There is also evidence that childbearing fosters work, particularly at the extremes of the parity distribution. Further investigation of the interaction between the two activities reveals that whereas most childless women work and then have a birth, once childbearing is completed fewer women take advantage of the renewed opportunity to work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the fertility patterns and differentials among various immigrant groups in Australia. Like two other major countries of immigration, the United States and Canada, Australia has eliminated ethnicity as a criterion for the screening of potential immigrants. Fertility ratios standardized by age and marital status suggest that the overall fertility of foreign-born women was higher in both 1971 and 1976; however, some evidence of convergence towards an Australian norm was found. Four distinct patterns of fertility were noted. In two of them, Arab and South European, marital fertility was substantially higher but non-marital fertility quite low. The Northwest European pattern was closest to that of the native-born; however, in the East European pattern fertility was lowest. Component analysis showed that most of the differences between the total fertility rate of Australians and those of the other groups reflect the significantly higher marital fertility rates and proportions married among the foreign born groups. Overall fertility of immigrant women was higher in both 1971 and 1976 than for Australian-born women. But their marital fertility was similar and their non-marital fertility lower than that of their Australian counterparts. The discrepancies in these findings occur because proportionately more immigrants were married than non-immigrants.

This article explores the relationship between the age at first birth and the timing of subsequent fertility in Costa Rica and in four rural villages and two urban areas of Guatemala. Results from two national surveys in the United States indicate that women who have an early first birth tend to have subsequent births more rapidly than others. Costa Rica and Ladino Guatemalans have a similar cultural heritage, rates of female labor force participation are low, fertility high, and mean ages at first birth are low. Yet, they differ substantially in other respects: Costa Ricans enjoy a higher standard of living and better educational opportunities than Guatemalans. Fertility rates have declined dramatically during the past decade in Costa Rica and use of contraception is prevalent. By contrast, fertility remains fairly high in Guatemala, with a total fertility ratio of 5.74 children per woman in 1973, and use of contraception is minimal. The results indicate that, for Costa Rica, the age at first birth is significantly related to the tempo of subsequent births, and that this association, at least for the interval to second birth, remains significant when socioeconomic factors and marital status at the time of first birth are held constant.

The article focuses on emigration trends during 1831 from the British Isles to the United States. The trends are derived from the passenger lists available at sea ports of the U.S. These lists were maintained according to the Passenger Act of 1819, especially for English immigrants to the U.S. The migrants of this period consisted of the movement of family groups and they were in their main productive age. The number of children was quite large but men outnumbered women among the adult immigrants of over the age of 15. According to a researcher, the rural emigration was continuous and constant, the migrants were joined by skilled workers from the manufacturing cities, victims of cyclical unemployment.

The article discusses the relationship between women's employment and marital fertility in the United States during 1970-1975. The relationship was found to change with the change of time and space. Fertility is detected as a cumulative process that takes place in discrete steps each time on the birth of a child. The fertility rate was depressing in case of working women due to the mechanism of competition for personal resources of women. The conception rate was also detected to be low during the months when women were working. Also, the preference for employment and preference for long birth intervals go together.

The article focuses on fertility trends among the Old Order Amish population of the United States. The Old Order Amish constitute socially distinct communities throughout the United States. Their religious identity forbids the use of contraceptives. Amish immigrants began settling in Pennsylvania from 1727 to 1790, with a second wave of immigration from 1815 to 1860 taking them to the states of Ohio, New York, Indiana, and Illinois. In Europe they were regarded as heretical for their pacifist beliefs and their unwillingness to become members of the established state Churches. In all regions where the Amish live, families are grouped into "church districts" or congregations which serve as governing units. The Amish economic system is characterized by private enterprise with mutual assistance. Cultivation and care of the soil constitutes the key value within the hierarchy of Amish values and they have maintained a reputation as excellent farmers. The Amish have large families. They and the Hutterites (another Anabaptist but communal group) are believed to be among the fastest-growing populations in the world. With low infant mortality and increasing longevity they have experienced a much greater net population gain as compared to other contemporary societies.

The purpose of this research is to investigate trends in rural fertility during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Massachusetts. Utilizing census and vital records registrations from towns in Franklin County we are able to identify a decline in the mean completed family beginning as early as the 1780s. This decline is substantiated in a cohort analysis and reflected in a Variety of fertility measures. Evidence suggests that the decline in fertility was the result of at least some conscious effort at family limitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This initial study of a large computerized data base oft Utah Mormon genealogies consists of an analysis of the marriage and fertility behavior of more than 20.000 once-married Mormon families over a 100-year period beginning in 1820. The analysis is set within the framework of the interrelated historical development of the Mormon population and the colonization of the State of Utah This initial study focuses on age at marriage, period and cohort fertility rates, and the number of children ever born for women in nine marriage cohorts. These women generally experienced high levels of fertility and a relatively low age of marriage, and age of marriage is shown to be inversely related to marital cohort fertility rates. Both period and cohort marital fertility rates show a pattern of increase up to the mid- 1870s and thereafter show a pattern of decline. Highest fertility levels occur in women who married at younger ages. The decline in fertility first appears among the older reproducing women. The number of children ever horn is shown to be a function of age at marriage, and declines first in women married after age 25. The total marital fertility rates and the number of children ever horn for various marriage cohorts approximates the levels observed for a variety of populations with natural fertility. Nevertheless, the data also indicate that the demography of the Mormons was influenced by particular historical events, and unlike other high-fertility. non-Catholic religious groups identified as maintaining natural fertility, some measure of control began to emerge in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes changes in childlessness in the U.S. Utilizing data drawn from the 1960 and 1970 U.S. Public Use Samples, a social change model has been constructed to represent how concomitant changes in several primarily structural aspects of society have affected changes in marital childlessness. Although in recent years it has been noted that fewer women live through their childbearing years without giving birth, the trends in childlessness for the 1940-74 period are differentiated by age group. For women 30 years of age and over, a trend toward declining childlessness is apparent, and it has been the concentration on women who have completed childbearing that has lead some researchers to suggest that voluntary childlessness is nearly non-existent. Along with marital disruption, educational attainment is an important factor contributing to childlessness. Among the younger age cohorts, a possible explanation for increases in marital childlessness is the interrelationship between educational attainment and increased school enrolment. The findings concerning the impact of labor force participation on fertility suggest that working women have lower fertility than their non!working counterparts. Congruent with fertility research in general, childlessness is more prevalent in urban than rural areas.

Whether or not blacks in the United States desire a larger family size than whites is controversial. But the overall black-white differential in fertility is well established. Blacks not only exhibit higher fertility but also expect more births than whites. Basically, two views about excess Southern black fertility seem to emerge from the literature. According to the first which may be labelled "`assimilationist," it is suggested that "by the time non-white couples are one generation or more removed from the rural South, their fertility is very much like that of white population." It is assumed that socioeconomic inequality in the South is responsible for black-white differentials in fertility and as blacks move away from the Southern milieu and are exposed to a more open social structure their fertility will decline. The South differs from other regions in many respects. Southerners differ from Northerners not only socially and economically, but also in their personalities. Northern-born blacks have considerably higher self-esteem than those born in the South. They do not have a lower self esteem than whites. Possibly distinct patterns in family life developed both among blacks and whites in the South because of their geographical and cultural isolation from each other.