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The article presents the authors' views in response to a comment on their paper "Patterns of Low and Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe," published in a 2004 issue of the journal "Population Studies." In their comment, the critics have argued that the cohort-fertility analysis in the aforesaid paper is weak on theoretical grounds and the empirical analysis is incomplete. The authors affirm that they agree with the comment that, as a society, the Netherlands differs from Southern Europe and even more from Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, from a contemporary global perspective, these differences should not be overemphasized. They say that in their analyses, they used the Netherlands as a reference case of a country with an extraordinary pattern of late childbearing that is not associated with lowest-low fertility levels. However, the critics believe that these unusual characteristics invalidate the use of the Dutch example in the paper. So, this criticism is misconceived. It is precisely the unusualness of the fertility pattern in the Netherlands that makes it a useful reference point in the study of low and lowest-low fertility.

The article presents the authors' comments on the paper entitled, "Patterns of Low and Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe," by Francesco C. Billari and Hans-Peter Kohler, published in a 2004 issue of the journal "Population Studies." In their comment, the authors argue that the original authors' comparison of cohort-fertility patterns in the lowest-low fertility countries of Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe with Dutch cohort patterns is weak on theoretical grounds and that the empirical analysis is incomplete. The empirical analysis demonstrates that in the young cohorts of Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe, childbearing may very well decline below the levels observed in the Netherlands and in other West European countries. This is already happening in Southern Europe. Moreover, the childbearing surplus in early adulthood is evaporating, and the recuperation that would be needed for completed cohort fertility in these countries to remain above that of many West European countries is of such magnitude that it is doubtful whether it could occur.

This paper examines social class differences in fertility, using longitudinal micro-level data for a regional sample in Sweden, 1922–2015. Using discrete-time event history models, we estimated the association between social class and parity-specific duration to next birth, adjusting for household income in separate models. Social class was associated with fertility quite independently from income and the association was both parity-dependent and sex-specific. For transitions to parenthood, higher class position was associated with higher fertility for men and lower fertility for women before 1970, but then converged into a positive association for both sexes after 1990. For continued childbearing, a weak U-shaped relationship before 1947 turned into a positive relationship for second births and a negative relationship for higher-order births in the period after 1990. These patterns likely reflect broader changes in work–family compatibility and are connected to profound shifts in labour markets and institutional arrangements in twentieth-century Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gender equity theories of fertility broadly predict that the lowest fertility in high-income settings will be seen in women facing a 'dual burden' of both paid and unpaid labour responsibilities, but that fertility will increase when male partners share domestic labour. Here we provide a critique of some gender equity theories of fertility in demography, and restate the hypothesis in terms of complementarity between partners. Further, we suggest authors use an interdisciplinary approach, such as integrating perspectives from evolutionary theory and the 'Traits-Desires-Intentions-Behaviour' framework, to provide some consistency to this diverse literature. Building on this theoretical synthesis, we perform a systematic review of 95 pieces of analysis. This broadly supports the idea that fertility will be low where women face a dual burden, which is particularly evident among macro-level studies, micro-level analyses investigating progression to subsequent children, and studies which do not use gender role attitudes as an independent variable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New data based on retrospective interviews with older informants enable us to review the history of contraceptive use among Spanish women over much of the twentieth century. This source is unique because it includes cohorts of women whose reproductive lives took place before, during, and after the baby boom. Traditional contraceptive methods (withdrawal and periodic abstinence) were central to the experience of the first set of women, while the last set made full use of modern as well as some traditional methods. For the first cohorts, traditional methods spearheaded the historic decline in fertility, while among the last set of women modern methods led to a precipitous decline towards the below-replacement fertility that continues in Spain today. There is no evidence that the modest increases in fertility during the baby boom in Spain were the result of a decline in the use of contraception among married women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Own Children Method (OCM) is an indirect procedure for deriving age-specific fertility rates and total fertility from children living with their mothers at a census or survey. The method was designed primarily for the calculation of overall fertility, although there are variants that allow the calculation of marital fertility. In this paper we argue that the standard variants for calculating marital fertility can produce misleading results and require strong assumptions, particularly when applied to social or spatial subgroups. We present two new variants of the method for calculating marital fertility: the first of these allows for the presence of non-marital fertility and the second also permits the more robust calculation of rates for social subgroups of the population. We illustrate and test these using full-count census data for England and Wales in 1911. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hong Kong is characterized by very low fertility. However, over a period from 2000 to 2015, both the total number of births and the sex ratio at birth (SRB) increased and then declined dramatically. We analysed the increases in a 2013 paper in this journal, where we largely ascribed them to a rapid growth in the number of 'transient' mothers from Mainland China disproportionately giving birth to boys in the territory. In 2012, policies were implemented to halt this 'maternity migration'. Here, we explore the impact of these policies, both on births and the SRB in Hong Kong. We conclude that the rises and falls in births and SRBs in Hong Kong can, indeed, be broadly ascribed to the reproductive behaviour of transient Mainland mothers. However, the role of the Hong Kong government's policy interventions is much less clearly defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines causality and parameter instability in the long-run relationship between fertility and women's employment This is done by a cross-national comparison of macro-level time-series data from 1960 to 2000 for France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the USA. By applying vector error correction models (a combination of Granger-causality tests with recent econometric time-series techniques) we find causality in both directions. This finding is consistent with simultaneous movements of both variables brought about by common exogenous factors such as social norms, social institutions, financial incentives, and the availability and acceptability of contraception. We find a negative and significant correlation until about the mid-1970's and an insignificant or weaker negative correlation afterwards. This result is consistent with a recent hypothesis in the demographic literature according to which changes in the institutional context, such as changes in childcare availability and attitudes towards working mothers, might have reduced the incompatibility between child-rearing and the employment of women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The timings of historical fertility transitions in different regions are well understood by demographers, but much less is known regarding their specific features and causes. In the study reported in this paper, we used longitudinal micro-level data for five local populations in Europe and North America to analyse the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility during the fertility transition. Using comparable analytical models and class schemes for each population, we examined the changing socio-economic differences in marital fertility and related these to common theories on fertility behaviour. Our results do not provide support for the hypothesis of universally high fertility among the upper classes in pre- transitional society, but do support the idea that the upper classes acted as forerunners by reducing their fertility before other groups. Farmers and unskilled workers were the latest to start limiting their fertility. Apart from these similarities, patterns of class differences in fertility varied significantly between populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Part I of this paper (published in the previous issue) we outlined the major contrasts in demographic experience between almost all areas of Scotland and most of England during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We also demonstrated the existence of significant regional differences within Scotland. In Part II. interpretations are offered for these various contrasts in experience. Four Scottish regional case studies are examined, each of which shows a different combination of nuptiality, marital fertility and out-migration. In studying each case, stress is laid on the ways in which the prevailing demographic regime, if it is examined as an interrelated whole, can be seen as involving highly appropriate adjustments to the ecological, economic, and institutional contexts of the region. In this approach, `innovation' aspects of the fertility decline are therefore played down: instead, for some parts of the country in particular, continued very high fertility among those who married is seen as a highly rational response to particular local social and economic situations which also encouraged very low nuptiality, and moderate or high levels of out-migration. The much lower nuptiality in Scotland compared to England is explained in part by reference to constraints on access to housing and the very limited availability of any support from the Poor Law, and in part through limited economic opportunities in a more slowly growing economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In France, as in many other Western European countries, attitudes and behaviour regarding marriage have changed drastically over the past 20 years. One of the major changes has been the increasing propensity to begin one's matrimonial career outside marriage: two-thirds of first unions begun in 1983-85 were outside marriage. A special survey was carried out at the end of 1985 to collect detailed information on life-courses for a sample of 4,091 women and men aged between 21 and 44 years. In a previous paper, we focused on the characteristics and on the outcome of first unions,¹ with no account of interactions with fertility, which will be the guideline of the present paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper a combination of methods is used to investigate the determinants of birth- interval length in a single city in Burkina Faso. First, a multi-round survey provided accurate measurement of dates of reproductive events. Secondly, open-ended interviews with a sub-sample of women from the survey were tape-recorded and transcribed. In order to disentangle the direct and indirect biological and behavioural determinants of birth-interval length, seven series of hazards models were estimated. These results were compared with women's perceptions of the same relationships revealed in the in-depth interviews. The lesson we draw is that no single data-collection strategy can provide answers to all questions of interest. The multi-round survey provides accurate information on actual behaviour, but at great cost. The in-depth interviews enable the investigator to study norms and motivations, but this method is impractical for data collection for a large representative sample. Combining the two strategies can yield insights that may enhance the effectiveness of programme interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a new method for estimating the effect of child mortality on the total fertility rate (TFR). The method is based on discrete-time survival models of parity progression that allow construction of a multivariate multidimensional life table of fertility with four dimensions: woman's age, parity, duration in parity, and number of previous child deaths. Additional socio-economic variables are included in the set of predictor variables in the underlying survival models of parity progression. The life table yields a replacement rate, which measures the effect of one additional child death on the TFR. The method is illustrated by applying it to three Indian National Family Health Surveys. Major findings are that dead children are incompletely replaced, and that the replacement rate rises as the TFR falls, reflecting women's increasing ability to control their fertility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents estimates of the level and trend of the fertility of different ethnic minorities in the UK from the 1960s up to 2006. The fertility estimates are derived primarily from the Labour Force Survey using the Own-Child method, with additional information from the General Household Survey and vital registration data. Comparisons are made between the level of fertility of UK-born and immigrant mothers from minority groups, and the fertility of the populations in the country of origin. Total fertility in all groups has fallen from levels that were initially relatively high. That of some UK ethnic groups has already fallen to about the level of the UK national average (e.g., black Caribbean) or below it (e.g., Indian and Chinese). Only among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women does total fertility remain substantially above the national average despite a continuous decrease over the last 20 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inadequate data and apartheid policies have meant that, until recently, most demographers have not had the opportunity to investigate the level of, and trend in, the fertility of South African women. The 1996 South Africa Census and the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey provide the first widely available and nationally representative demographic data on South Africa since 1970. Using these data, this paper describes the South African fertility decline from 1955 to 1996. Having identified and adjusted for several errors in the 1996 Census data, the paper argues that total fertility at that time was 3.2 children per woman nationally, and 3.5 children per woman for African South Africans. These levels are lower than in any other sub-Saharan African country. We show also that fertility in South Africa has been falling since the 1960s. Thus, fertility transition predates the establishment of a family planning programme in the country in 1974. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a promising start some three decades ago, the application of micro-economic analysis to fertility studies has proved disappointing. It has not led to an increased understanding of fertility decisions nor to the policy insights which had been expected. This paper considers the reasons for this disappointment. It reviews briefly the development of the now dominant version of the economic approach to fertility analysis, the so-called "Chicago Model". It concludes that several basic conceptual and theoretical weaknesses of this approach have led it up a blind alley. The paper concludes with suggestions for new assumptions and approaches which may make the theory more relevant for policy programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews and interprets recent demographic trends and prospects in the two Irelands, North and South. We discuss both the influence of religion on demographic behaviour, and the impact of demographic trends on the distribution by religion. In the Republic of Ireland, we show that the long-standing gap in marital fertility between Catholics and others had virtually disappeared by the 1980s. In Northern Ireland the gap is still there in the 1990s, though considerably reduced. However, estimates of its size hinge on how the significant proportion of non-respondents to the census question on religion are allocated. We identify some peculiarities of the non-respondent population which imply that it was more `Catholic' in 1991 than first reports suggested. The Catholic share of Northern Ireland's population may accordingly be larger -42 to 43 per cent - than previously thought. In both communities, the future of the Catholic share depends less on fertility than on migration patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of the fertility desires of marital partners on subsequent fertility. In particular, we attempt to identify the role played by disagreement between the spouses in predicting the couple's fertility outcome. The results indicate that when husband and wife disagree about whether or not they want another child, the fertility desires of both partners are equally important in determining whether the couple actually have an additional birth. The dominance of men in sub-Saharan African societies tends to operate in the present study only in the initial stages of a couple's reproductive lives (associated with four or fewer children). This tendency is offset by the stronger influence of the wife's desire in the later stages. Thus, we conclude that fertility research in sub-Saharan Africa should solicit information from men and women, and any programme or policy that aims to promote fertility decline in the region must involve both sexes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Easterlin's supply-demand framework for the determinants of fertility is widely accepted because it has brought conceptual clarity to the study of factors that underlie the childbearing process. This model has not, however, succeeded in quantifying the fertility determinants in a convenient and generally accepted manner. The variant of Easterlin's model presented in this paper aims to remove obstacles to empirical implementation. In addition to quantifying the supply and demand factors, a new variable, the degree of preference implementation, is introduced to measure the role of costs and benefits of fertility regulation. Applications of this alternative method, to data from surveys in 18 less developed countries indicate that recent declines in fertility have largely been due to reductions in the demand for births, and to increases in preference implementation. Changes in the supply of births appear to have played only a minor role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper information collected in the World Fertility Survey on durations of breastfeeding and postpartum abstinence and amenorrhoea is used. Rates of conception and of resumption of menstruation are presented for four breastfeeding states: full breastfeeding, partial breastfeeding, weaned, and never breastfed. The various patterns of breastfeeding affect resumption of menstruation in consistent and expected directions. Continued breastfeeding beyond the resumption of menstruation and of sexual relations exerts a considerable contraceptive effect in all twelve countries considered, although interesting differences also emerge. The consequences of these findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parity progression measures are uniquely suited to the study of fertility in China, because Chinese policies and programmes focus so closely on parity and birth order. In this paper we present period parity progression ratios for China and its urban and rural areas for the years 1955-81, using the birth history data from the one-per-thousand fertility survey of 1982. Our period parity progression ratios differ from those introduced by Henry in that they provide an overall level of fertility which may be compared with measures based on age-specific birth rates. We compare the two measures empirically for China, finding both similarities and divergences, and then analyse the relation between them. It is suggested that, where fertility is low and fluctuating, as in China, the parity-progression- based measures provide a substantially truer picture of fertility levels and trends than do age-based measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the widely held and influential view that the fertility transition is largely the consequence of changing parental demand for children brought about by changes in the economic costs and benefits entailed in childbearing. Using evidence from both historical and contemporary populations we argue that demand theories do not offer a plausible explanation of the fertility transition. Instead, we propose that ideational, rather than structural, economic change lies at the heart of the transition. In particular, we suggest that attitudes to birth control, broadly defined, play a crucial role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modernization of reproductive behaviour in the Netherlands was late and slow in comparison to other European countries. In this paper marital fertility (Ig) and nuptiality (Im) between 1850 and 1960 are described and analysed, in this way adding the Dutch case to the studies of the European Fertility Project. In the analysis a model is used in which economy, attitudes and infant mortality are the (clusters of) independent variables, and either Ig or Im is the dependent one. To avoid multicollinearity the interdependencies of the explaining factors are eliminated. An analysis is made of both the level and the development of fertility and nuptiality. The model used fits the data well, and the distinction between level and development is of great importance. If analyzed statistically the variance in Im and Ig between the provinces can for the most part be explained by the attitudinal factor, while when analyzing the changes in nuptiality and marital fertility the economic factor has the strongest explanatory power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As there has been a long tradition of Indian emigration to overseas countries, a study of the fertility trends of Indian communities overseas can provide an interesting illustration of the adaptation of migrants' fertility behaviour to new economic and social conditions. In this paper, statistics relating to the fertility of a number of overseas Indian communities are brought together, and it is shown that during the 1950s and 1960s the fertility of these communities tended to be higher than in the areas from which the migrants originated, but that it declined more quickly during the last 20 years and is now generally lower than in the areas of origin. The significance of these findings is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Earlier work by Page and Coale has estimated demographic indices of fertility and mortality for parts of Africa using the Sullivan modification of Brass's technique. The present paper presents modified and more accurate estimates of fertility and child mortality, not only for the sub-national units covered by Page and Coale but also for areas not covered by them. The present analysis which employs Trussell's refinement of Brass and Sullivan's techniques also includes improvements overlooked in earlier estimates. The salient finding that emerges is that while the Brass mortality technique is very powerful, his equally ingenious fertility technique is very weak and should not be relied on for estimating fertility parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brazilian period total fertility rate (PTFR) dropped to 1.8 in 2010 (1.5 among those with high education). Due to shifts in fertility timing, the PTFR may provide a misleading picture of fertility levels. The consequences of these changes for the cohort total fertility rate (CTFR)—a measure free from tempo distortions—and for educational differences in completed fertility remain unknown. Due to data limitations, CTFR forecasts in low- and middle-income countries are rare. We use Brazilian censuses to reconstruct fertility rates indirectly and forecast the CTFR for all women and by educational level. Four forecasting methods indicate that the CTFR is unlikely to fall to the level of the PTFR. Educational differences in the CTFR are likely to be stark, at 0.7–0.9, larger than in many high-income countries with comparable CTFRs. We show how the CTFR can be forecasted in settings with limited data and call for more research on educational differences in completed fertility in low- and middle-income countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses income accumulated over ages 20–60 to examine whether richer or poorer individuals have more children. Income histories are calculated using yearly administrative register data from contemporary Sweden for cohorts born 1940–70. Differences by parity and income distribution are examined separately by sex. There is a strong positive gradient between accumulated disposable income (and to a lesser extent earnings) and fertility for men in all cohorts and a gradual transformation from a negative to a positive gradient for women. In particular, accumulated incomes are substantially lower for childless men and women than those with children. For men, fertility increases monotonically with increasing income, whereas for women much of the positive gradient results from low fertility among women with very low accumulated incomes in later cohorts. Most of the positive income–fertility gradient can be explained by the high incomes of men and women with two to four children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fertility preferences have long played a key role in models of fertility differentials and change. We examine the stability of preferences over time using rich panel data on Kenyan women's fertility desires, expectations, actual fertility, and recall of desires in three waves over a nine-year period, when respondents were in their 20s. We find that although desired fertility is quite unstable, most women perceive their desires to be stable. Under hypothetical future scenarios, few expect their desired fertility to increase over time but, in fact, such increases in fertility desires are common. Moreover, when asked to recall past desires, most respondents report previously wanting exactly as many children as they desire today. These patterns of bias are consistent with the emerging view that fertility desires are contextual, emotionally laden, and structured by identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women's health status may affect their opportunities and preferences for children through various mechanisms. We examine the relationship between health and fertility using Norwegian registry data (2004–18). Measuring verifiable and persistent health problems, we use uptake of doctor-certified sickness absence and long-term health-related benefits as proxies for health. In contrast to the expectation that poor health limits women's opportunities for children, our results show that sickness absence is positively associated with transitions to parenthood. The uptake of long-term benefits is, however, negatively associated with fertility. The selection of healthy women into parenthood weakens the association for higher-order births. The impact of long-term health indicators on fertility is comparable in magnitude to that observed for more conventional predictors, such as education and income. With continued postponement of childbearing and thus higher maternal ages, the influence of health as a fertility determinant is likely to grow and further research appears warranted. Supplementary material for this article is available at: [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interplay between remarriage and fertility is among the most poorly documented subjects in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), despite remarriage being one of the fundamental aspects of marriage dynamics in this region. We use Demographic and Health Survey data from 34 countries in SSA to document the association between remarriage and fertility during the reproductive years and over the fertility transition. The findings show that in 29 countries, remarried women end up having fewer children than women in intact unions, despite attaining similar or higher levels of fertility at early reproductive ages. However, remarriage is found to have a positive effect on fertility in Sierra Leone. The effects of remarriage on fertility diminish as fertility declines, with smaller effects generally observed in countries that are relatively advanced in their fertility transition and larger effects found elsewhere. These findings shed light on the role that remarriage might play in country-level fertility declines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lowering desired family size is a necessary precondition for fertility declines in high-fertility settings. Although accumulated evidence links socio-economic developments to changing fertility desires, little research has disentangled the relative importance of key socio-economic determinants. Combining individual- and community-level data from Demographic and Health Surveys in 34 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, we compare the relative role of different socio-economic factors on fertility desires at the individual, community, and country levels. Results show that at the individual level, women's education has a stronger effect than household wealth and area of residence. The high levels of reported desired family size in rural parts of SSA are mainly a consequence of relatively lower levels of education. The relative impact of women's education is even stronger at the community level. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of fertility preferences and strengthen previous findings regarding the relationship between fertility and women's education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most research on trends in socio-economic fertility differences has focused on cohort total fertility and on women. This study aimed to analyse how cohort trends in parity-specific fertility differ across educational segments for men and women and what role multi-partner fertility plays in these trends. We used Finnish and Swedish register data on cohorts born in 1940–73/78. The main analyses used parity progression ratios, comparing ordinary ratios with similar ratios using births to first reproductive partners only. Among the low and medium educated, we observe strengthening parity polarization across cohorts, with increases in both childlessness and births of order three or higher, the latter largely reflecting increases in multi-partner fertility. Highly educated men and women more often have exactly two children. We demonstrate that cohort total fertility can mask significant parity-specific trends across educational groups and that changes in multi-partner fertility can play a part in cohort trends in socio-economic fertility differentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued in this paper that "perceptions" about the determinants of fertility and of fertility decline can be "politicized" by various special interest groups; that is, these perceptions can be used to push for policies and interventions which often have an ambiguous relationship to actual fertility, but are important because they already appear on the political agenda of these groups. Such politicization is facilitated by the near-universal consensus that fertility decline is a legitimate goal in the developing world, by the increasing evidence that there can be no grand theory of fertility decline, and by the willingness of scholars to attach a policy significance to all their findings. Two examples of such politicization in India are presented, one of which has a socially beneficial impact, whilst the other is potentially disruptive, to illustrate that such politicization is not without its dangers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the effect of Catholicism on fertility in the United States. It is shown that many studies on Catholicism and fertility are seriously flawed because of sample selection bias, which occurs because ex-Catholics prefer smaller families than non-Catholics. It has been found that religious activity has no effect on fertility if it is treated as an endogenous variable. Further, it is shown that the fertility transition in the United States is partly related to the changing effect of Catholic norms. Thus, the direct effect of economic variables, such as women's earnings, on fertility might have been overstated by economists. In this study, wife's schooling is used as a proxy for her earning ability, because the quality of data available on wife's earnings is low, and also because it is not possible to identify the relationship between wife's earnings and fertility with the data at hand. Thirdly, wife's schooling is an important determinant of her earning ability. It might also reduce fertility by increasing her ability to plan family size. It has been shown that current religion is not necessarily independent of fertility decisions. Results indicate that a positive effect of Catholicism on fertility is inflated, when current religious status is used as a measure. The study also explains the divergence between Catholic and non-Catholic fertility that has been claimed to have occurred during the `baby boom' period. This study also shows that the results are affected by whether the husband's or the wife's religion is used in the estimate. The results also indicate that Catholic norms have a highly significant positive effect on fertility for respondents born before 1920. Variations in fertility after this period are at best weakly related to a Catholic upbringing. This implies that changes in fertility over time are at least partly associated with changes in the influence of norms.

In this analysis, data from the Korean National Fertility Survey of 1974 are used to seek to explain differences in the pace of fertility in terms of differences in contraception, breastfeeding and other intermediate variables. Strong effects are found for these variables, particularly contraception. Nonetheless, virtually none of the effects of the socio-economic variables can be explained in our full model. Overall, our first models, which included only the socio-economic variables, contained 44 significant coefficients. With the introduction of the intermediate variables, only eleven of these coefficients became non-significant (while six others became significant). Thus, though using excellent data, we cannot begin to reproduce what theory predicts. The analysis suggests that this is a consequence of both measurement error and omitted intermediate variables, such as coital frequency. There are strong theoretical reasons for attempting to elucidate the mediating role of proximate variables by using individual data. Nonetheless, these findings, together with similar results obtained by others, strongly suggest that this is not likely to be a fruitful line of future endeavour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine pathways between indicators of fertility tempo/quantum and depressive symptoms among parents aged 55+ with at least two children, using three waves of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. Using standard regression approaches and path analysis within the structural equation framework, we also investigate whether fertility trajectories mediated the association between childhood disadvantage and later-life depression. Results provide limited support for direct influences of fertility trajectories on depression, but indicate indirect linkages for both women and men. Associations are mediated by partnership history, social support, wealth, later-life smoking, and functional limitation. Associations between childhood disadvantage and later-life depression are partially mediated by fertility stressors. Results confirm the influence of life course experiences on depression at older ages and demonstrate the interlinked role of family and other life course pathways on later-life well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Survey data on fertility preferences have played a central but controversial role in fertility research and advocacy for family planning. We summarize evidence from longitudinal studies in 28 Asian and African populations on the relationship between preferences and subsequent childbearing. While we found no consistent association between women's desire to delay childbearing and subsequent fertility, the baseline desire of women to stop childbearing was a powerful predictor of subsequent fertility in all populations and increased in strength as overall contraceptive use in the study populations rose. Partners' desire also exercised some influence but was of modest importance in most populations. However, the correspondence between desire to stop and behaviour was found to be far from perfect. Weak implementation of preferences by contraception is likely to be the major cause of this preference- behaviour discrepancy. Uncertainty and instability in preferences may also contribute to the discrepancy, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fertility decline in central and eastern Europe (CEE) since the fall of the communist regimes has been driven by both stopping and postponement of childbearing: two processes that have been related to crisis and economic development, respectively. In the Western Balkans these economic and political contexts followed each other in the form of a biphasic transition. I examine whether this sequence triggered fertility responses like those observed elsewhere. Relying on three independent data sources, I crossvalidate the levels of, and describe the trends in, union formation and fertility (by birth order) between 1980 and 2010. Results do not reveal widespread declines in fertility to lowest-low levels during the most acute period of crisis. The subsequent postponement of marriage and first birth was also limited, and the two-child family remains the norm. This relative resilience of childbearing patterns compared with other CEE countries is discussed with reference to the institutional context [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The low school attainment, early marriage, and low age at first birth of females are major policy concerns in less developed countries. This study jointly estimated the determinants of educational attainment, marriage age, and age at first birth among females aged 12–25 in Madagascar, explicitly accounting for the endogeneities that arose from modelling these related outcomes simultaneously. An additional year of schooling results in a delay to marriage of 1.5 years and marrying 1 year later delays age at first birth by 0.5 years. Parents’ education and wealth also have important effects on schooling, marriage, and age at first birth, with a woman's first birth being delayed by 0.75 years if her mother had 4 additional years of schooling. Overall, our results provide rigorous evidence for the critical role of education—both individual women's own and that of their parents—in delaying the marriage and fertility of young women. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the past, parents' sex preferences for their children have proved difficult to verify. This study used John Knodel's German village genealogies of couples married between 1815 and 1899 to investigate sex preferences for children during the fertility transition. Event history analyses of couples' propensity to progress to a fifth parity was used to test whether the probability of having additional children was influenced by the sex composition of surviving children. It appears that son preference influenced reproductive behaviour: couples having only girls experienced significantly higher transition rates than those having only boys or a mixed sibset. However, couples who married after about 1870 began to exhibit fertility behaviour consistent with the choice to have at least one surviving boy and girl. This result represents a surprisingly early move towards the symmetrical sex preference typical of modern European populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on recent European studies, we used the Survey of Income and Program Participation to provide the first analysis of fertility differences between groups of US college graduates by their undergraduate field of study. We used multilevel event-history models to investigate possible institutional and selection mechanisms linking field of study to delayed fertility and childlessness. The results are consistent with those found for Europe in showing an overall difference of 10 percentage points between levels of childlessness across fields, with the lowest levels occurring for women in health and education, intermediate levels for women in science and technology, and the highest levels for women in arts and social sciences. The mediating roles of the following field characteristics were assessed: motherhood employment penalties; percentage of men; family attitudes; and marriage patterns. Childlessness was higher among women in fields with a moderate representation of men, less traditional family attitudes, and late age at first marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Full Birth History has become the dominant source of estimates of fertility levels and trends for countries lacking complete birth registration. An alternative, the ‘Own Children’ method, derives fertility estimates from household age distributions, but is now rarely used, partly because of concerns about its accuracy. We compared the estimates from these two procedures by applying them to 56 recent Demographic and Health Surveys. On average, ‘Own Children’ estimates of recent total fertility rates are 3 per cent lower than birth-history estimates. Much of this difference stems from selection bias in the collection of birth histories: women with more children are more likely to be interviewed. We conclude that full birth histories overestimate total fertility, and that the ‘Own Children’ method gives estimates of total fertility that may better reflect overall national fertility. We recommend the routine application of the ‘Own Children’ method to census and household survey data to estimate fertility levels and trends. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We investigated associations between later-life health and fertility history for women and men, using the British Household Panel Survey. We modelled health and its rate of change jointly with sample retention over an 11-year period. For women, childlessness is associated with limitation of activity for health reasons and faster acquisition of the limitation. High parity (four or more children) is associated with poorer health for both women and men. For the parous, this association is also found when age at first birth is controlled. Early parenthood is associated with poorer health. For parents of two or more children, a birth interval of less than 18 months is associated with having a health limitation and an accelerated rate of acquiring it. We conclude that biosocial pathways link parenthood careers and the later-life health of both women and men, and that implications of closely spaced births for parents merit further attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explored the relation between fertility and the business cycle in Latin America. First, we used aggregate data on fertility rates and economic performance for 18 countries. We then studied these same associations in the transitions to first, second, and third births with DHS individual data for ten countries. The results show that in general, childbearing declined during economic downturns. The decline was mainly associated with increasing unemployment rather than slowdowns in the growth of gross domestic product, although there was a positive relationship between first-birth rates and growth. While periods of unemployment may be a good time to have children because opportunity costs are lower, in fact childbearing was reduced or postponed, especially among the most recent cohorts and among urban and more educated women. The finding is consistent with the contention that, during this particular period in Latin America, income effects were dominant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative research on the preferred sex of children in Western societies has generally focused on women only and ignored the role of gender equity and the need for children's economic support in old age. A multilevel analysis extends existing research by examining, for both men and women and across 24 European countries, the effect of the preferred sex-composition of offspring on whether parents have or intend to have a third child. Using the European Social Survey (2004/5), a multilevel (random coefficient) ordered logit regression of that intention (N=3,323) and a binary logistic multilevel model of the transition to a third child (N=6,502) demonstrate the presence of a mixed-sex preference. In countries with a high risk of poverty in old age, a preference for sons is found, particularly for men. In societies where there is lower gender equity, both men and women have a significant preference for boys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using aggregate time-series data from post-war Hungary, we investigated the effect of child-related benefits and pensions on overall fertility and fertility by birth order. The results indicate moderate effects that are robust across a wide range of specifications. According to our estimates, a 1-per-cent increase in child-related benefits would increase total fertility by 0.2 per cent, while the same increase in pensions would decrease fertility by 0.2 per cent. The magnitude of both effects increases by birth order; this is more robust for child-related benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poland experienced a rapid fertility decline after the end of the socialist regime in 1989. At the same time, it became much more difficult, especially for women, to act on their determination to find and keep paid employment. To investigate whether women postponed childbearing until they found a job, we undertook a simultaneous estimation of transitions to childbirth and entry to and exit from employment. The results reveal a strong incompatibility between childbearing and employment, but also that employment does not function as a barrier to childbearing but rather that it is an important precursor when women plan how to reconcile their intentions to work and to have children. We conclude that better prospects for women's employment could result in increased fertility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While lower fertility is commonly associated with women's reproductive autonomy, we demonstrate that the influence of men's education on reproductive decision-making increased during the first decade of rapid fertility decline in Ghana. Husband's education exerts a stronger influence on wife's fertility intentions than does her own education, and the magnitude of the effect of his education increased significantly from 1988 to 1998. Lower fertility in Ghana seems to be associated more with men's declining fertility desires than with women's increasing reproductive autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some indication that women's education may play a relatively greater role in reproductive decision-making as fertility decline progresses still further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of lowest-low fertility, defined as total fertility below 1.3, is now emerging throughout Europe and is attributed by many to postponement of the initiation of childbearing. Here an investigation of the case of Ukraine, where total fertility--1.1 in 2001--is one of the world's lowest, shows that there is more than one pathway to lowest-low fertility. Although Ukraine has undergone immense political and economic transformations in the past decade, it has maintained a young age at first birth and nearly universal childbearing. Analyses of official national statistics and the Ukrainian Reproductive Health Survey show that fertility declined to very low levels without a transition to a later pattern of childbearing. Findings from focus-group interviews are used to suggest explanations of the early fertility pattern. These include the persistence of traditional norms for childbearing and the roles of men and women, concerns about medical complications and infertility at a later age, and the link between early fertility and early marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]