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This paper examines social class differences in fertility, using longitudinal micro-level data for a regional sample in Sweden, 1922–2015. Using discrete-time event history models, we estimated the association between social class and parity-specific duration to next birth, adjusting for household income in separate models. Social class was associated with fertility quite independently from income and the association was both parity-dependent and sex-specific. For transitions to parenthood, higher class position was associated with higher fertility for men and lower fertility for women before 1970, but then converged into a positive association for both sexes after 1990. For continued childbearing, a weak U-shaped relationship before 1947 turned into a positive relationship for second births and a negative relationship for higher-order births in the period after 1990. These patterns likely reflect broader changes in work–family compatibility and are connected to profound shifts in labour markets and institutional arrangements in twentieth-century Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gender equity theories of fertility broadly predict that the lowest fertility in high-income settings will be seen in women facing a 'dual burden' of both paid and unpaid labour responsibilities, but that fertility will increase when male partners share domestic labour. Here we provide a critique of some gender equity theories of fertility in demography, and restate the hypothesis in terms of complementarity between partners. Further, we suggest authors use an interdisciplinary approach, such as integrating perspectives from evolutionary theory and the 'Traits-Desires-Intentions-Behaviour' framework, to provide some consistency to this diverse literature. Building on this theoretical synthesis, we perform a systematic review of 95 pieces of analysis. This broadly supports the idea that fertility will be low where women face a dual burden, which is particularly evident among macro-level studies, micro-level analyses investigating progression to subsequent children, and studies which do not use gender role attitudes as an independent variable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New data based on retrospective interviews with older informants enable us to review the history of contraceptive use among Spanish women over much of the twentieth century. This source is unique because it includes cohorts of women whose reproductive lives took place before, during, and after the baby boom. Traditional contraceptive methods (withdrawal and periodic abstinence) were central to the experience of the first set of women, while the last set made full use of modern as well as some traditional methods. For the first cohorts, traditional methods spearheaded the historic decline in fertility, while among the last set of women modern methods led to a precipitous decline towards the below-replacement fertility that continues in Spain today. There is no evidence that the modest increases in fertility during the baby boom in Spain were the result of a decline in the use of contraception among married women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Own Children Method (OCM) is an indirect procedure for deriving age-specific fertility rates and total fertility from children living with their mothers at a census or survey. The method was designed primarily for the calculation of overall fertility, although there are variants that allow the calculation of marital fertility. In this paper we argue that the standard variants for calculating marital fertility can produce misleading results and require strong assumptions, particularly when applied to social or spatial subgroups. We present two new variants of the method for calculating marital fertility: the first of these allows for the presence of non-marital fertility and the second also permits the more robust calculation of rates for social subgroups of the population. We illustrate and test these using full-count census data for England and Wales in 1911. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hong Kong is characterized by very low fertility. However, over a period from 2000 to 2015, both the total number of births and the sex ratio at birth (SRB) increased and then declined dramatically. We analysed the increases in a 2013 paper in this journal, where we largely ascribed them to a rapid growth in the number of 'transient' mothers from Mainland China disproportionately giving birth to boys in the territory. In 2012, policies were implemented to halt this 'maternity migration'. Here, we explore the impact of these policies, both on births and the SRB in Hong Kong. We conclude that the rises and falls in births and SRBs in Hong Kong can, indeed, be broadly ascribed to the reproductive behaviour of transient Mainland mothers. However, the role of the Hong Kong government's policy interventions is much less clearly defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The timings of historical fertility transitions in different regions are well understood by demographers, but much less is known regarding their specific features and causes. In the study reported in this paper, we used longitudinal micro-level data for five local populations in Europe and North America to analyse the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility during the fertility transition. Using comparable analytical models and class schemes for each population, we examined the changing socio-economic differences in marital fertility and related these to common theories on fertility behaviour. Our results do not provide support for the hypothesis of universally high fertility among the upper classes in pre- transitional society, but do support the idea that the upper classes acted as forerunners by reducing their fertility before other groups. Farmers and unskilled workers were the latest to start limiting their fertility. Apart from these similarities, patterns of class differences in fertility varied significantly between populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses income accumulated over ages 20–60 to examine whether richer or poorer individuals have more children. Income histories are calculated using yearly administrative register data from contemporary Sweden for cohorts born 1940–70. Differences by parity and income distribution are examined separately by sex. There is a strong positive gradient between accumulated disposable income (and to a lesser extent earnings) and fertility for men in all cohorts and a gradual transformation from a negative to a positive gradient for women. In particular, accumulated incomes are substantially lower for childless men and women than those with children. For men, fertility increases monotonically with increasing income, whereas for women much of the positive gradient results from low fertility among women with very low accumulated incomes in later cohorts. Most of the positive income–fertility gradient can be explained by the high incomes of men and women with two to four children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brazilian period total fertility rate (PTFR) dropped to 1.8 in 2010 (1.5 among those with high education). Due to shifts in fertility timing, the PTFR may provide a misleading picture of fertility levels. The consequences of these changes for the cohort total fertility rate (CTFR)—a measure free from tempo distortions—and for educational differences in completed fertility remain unknown. Due to data limitations, CTFR forecasts in low- and middle-income countries are rare. We use Brazilian censuses to reconstruct fertility rates indirectly and forecast the CTFR for all women and by educational level. Four forecasting methods indicate that the CTFR is unlikely to fall to the level of the PTFR. Educational differences in the CTFR are likely to be stark, at 0.7–0.9, larger than in many high-income countries with comparable CTFRs. We show how the CTFR can be forecasted in settings with limited data and call for more research on educational differences in completed fertility in low- and middle-income countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fertility preferences have long played a key role in models of fertility differentials and change. We examine the stability of preferences over time using rich panel data on Kenyan women's fertility desires, expectations, actual fertility, and recall of desires in three waves over a nine-year period, when respondents were in their 20s. We find that although desired fertility is quite unstable, most women perceive their desires to be stable. Under hypothetical future scenarios, few expect their desired fertility to increase over time but, in fact, such increases in fertility desires are common. Moreover, when asked to recall past desires, most respondents report previously wanting exactly as many children as they desire today. These patterns of bias are consistent with the emerging view that fertility desires are contextual, emotionally laden, and structured by identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women's health status may affect their opportunities and preferences for children through various mechanisms. We examine the relationship between health and fertility using Norwegian registry data (2004–18). Measuring verifiable and persistent health problems, we use uptake of doctor-certified sickness absence and long-term health-related benefits as proxies for health. In contrast to the expectation that poor health limits women's opportunities for children, our results show that sickness absence is positively associated with transitions to parenthood. The uptake of long-term benefits is, however, negatively associated with fertility. The selection of healthy women into parenthood weakens the association for higher-order births. The impact of long-term health indicators on fertility is comparable in magnitude to that observed for more conventional predictors, such as education and income. With continued postponement of childbearing and thus higher maternal ages, the influence of health as a fertility determinant is likely to grow and further research appears warranted. Supplementary material for this article is available at: [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interplay between remarriage and fertility is among the most poorly documented subjects in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), despite remarriage being one of the fundamental aspects of marriage dynamics in this region. We use Demographic and Health Survey data from 34 countries in SSA to document the association between remarriage and fertility during the reproductive years and over the fertility transition. The findings show that in 29 countries, remarried women end up having fewer children than women in intact unions, despite attaining similar or higher levels of fertility at early reproductive ages. However, remarriage is found to have a positive effect on fertility in Sierra Leone. The effects of remarriage on fertility diminish as fertility declines, with smaller effects generally observed in countries that are relatively advanced in their fertility transition and larger effects found elsewhere. These findings shed light on the role that remarriage might play in country-level fertility declines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lowering desired family size is a necessary precondition for fertility declines in high-fertility settings. Although accumulated evidence links socio-economic developments to changing fertility desires, little research has disentangled the relative importance of key socio-economic determinants. Combining individual- and community-level data from Demographic and Health Surveys in 34 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, we compare the relative role of different socio-economic factors on fertility desires at the individual, community, and country levels. Results show that at the individual level, women's education has a stronger effect than household wealth and area of residence. The high levels of reported desired family size in rural parts of SSA are mainly a consequence of relatively lower levels of education. The relative impact of women's education is even stronger at the community level. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of fertility preferences and strengthen previous findings regarding the relationship between fertility and women's education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most research on trends in socio-economic fertility differences has focused on cohort total fertility and on women. This study aimed to analyse how cohort trends in parity-specific fertility differ across educational segments for men and women and what role multi-partner fertility plays in these trends. We used Finnish and Swedish register data on cohorts born in 1940–73/78. The main analyses used parity progression ratios, comparing ordinary ratios with similar ratios using births to first reproductive partners only. Among the low and medium educated, we observe strengthening parity polarization across cohorts, with increases in both childlessness and births of order three or higher, the latter largely reflecting increases in multi-partner fertility. Highly educated men and women more often have exactly two children. We demonstrate that cohort total fertility can mask significant parity-specific trends across educational groups and that changes in multi-partner fertility can play a part in cohort trends in socio-economic fertility differentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine pathways between indicators of fertility tempo/quantum and depressive symptoms among parents aged 55+ with at least two children, using three waves of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. Using standard regression approaches and path analysis within the structural equation framework, we also investigate whether fertility trajectories mediated the association between childhood disadvantage and later-life depression. Results provide limited support for direct influences of fertility trajectories on depression, but indicate indirect linkages for both women and men. Associations are mediated by partnership history, social support, wealth, later-life smoking, and functional limitation. Associations between childhood disadvantage and later-life depression are partially mediated by fertility stressors. Results confirm the influence of life course experiences on depression at older ages and demonstrate the interlinked role of family and other life course pathways on later-life well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Survey data on fertility preferences have played a central but controversial role in fertility research and advocacy for family planning. We summarize evidence from longitudinal studies in 28 Asian and African populations on the relationship between preferences and subsequent childbearing. While we found no consistent association between women's desire to delay childbearing and subsequent fertility, the baseline desire of women to stop childbearing was a powerful predictor of subsequent fertility in all populations and increased in strength as overall contraceptive use in the study populations rose. Partners' desire also exercised some influence but was of modest importance in most populations. However, the correspondence between desire to stop and behaviour was found to be far from perfect. Weak implementation of preferences by contraception is likely to be the major cause of this preference- behaviour discrepancy. Uncertainty and instability in preferences may also contribute to the discrepancy, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fertility decline in central and eastern Europe (CEE) since the fall of the communist regimes has been driven by both stopping and postponement of childbearing: two processes that have been related to crisis and economic development, respectively. In the Western Balkans these economic and political contexts followed each other in the form of a biphasic transition. I examine whether this sequence triggered fertility responses like those observed elsewhere. Relying on three independent data sources, I crossvalidate the levels of, and describe the trends in, union formation and fertility (by birth order) between 1980 and 2010. Results do not reveal widespread declines in fertility to lowest-low levels during the most acute period of crisis. The subsequent postponement of marriage and first birth was also limited, and the two-child family remains the norm. This relative resilience of childbearing patterns compared with other CEE countries is discussed with reference to the institutional context [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The low school attainment, early marriage, and low age at first birth of females are major policy concerns in less developed countries. This study jointly estimated the determinants of educational attainment, marriage age, and age at first birth among females aged 12–25 in Madagascar, explicitly accounting for the endogeneities that arose from modelling these related outcomes simultaneously. An additional year of schooling results in a delay to marriage of 1.5 years and marrying 1 year later delays age at first birth by 0.5 years. Parents’ education and wealth also have important effects on schooling, marriage, and age at first birth, with a woman's first birth being delayed by 0.75 years if her mother had 4 additional years of schooling. Overall, our results provide rigorous evidence for the critical role of education—both individual women's own and that of their parents—in delaying the marriage and fertility of young women. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the past, parents' sex preferences for their children have proved difficult to verify. This study used John Knodel's German village genealogies of couples married between 1815 and 1899 to investigate sex preferences for children during the fertility transition. Event history analyses of couples' propensity to progress to a fifth parity was used to test whether the probability of having additional children was influenced by the sex composition of surviving children. It appears that son preference influenced reproductive behaviour: couples having only girls experienced significantly higher transition rates than those having only boys or a mixed sibset. However, couples who married after about 1870 began to exhibit fertility behaviour consistent with the choice to have at least one surviving boy and girl. This result represents a surprisingly early move towards the symmetrical sex preference typical of modern European populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on recent European studies, we used the Survey of Income and Program Participation to provide the first analysis of fertility differences between groups of US college graduates by their undergraduate field of study. We used multilevel event-history models to investigate possible institutional and selection mechanisms linking field of study to delayed fertility and childlessness. The results are consistent with those found for Europe in showing an overall difference of 10 percentage points between levels of childlessness across fields, with the lowest levels occurring for women in health and education, intermediate levels for women in science and technology, and the highest levels for women in arts and social sciences. The mediating roles of the following field characteristics were assessed: motherhood employment penalties; percentage of men; family attitudes; and marriage patterns. Childlessness was higher among women in fields with a moderate representation of men, less traditional family attitudes, and late age at first marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]