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Long‐term declines in rates of internal migration have been widely documented in many developed economies. Accompanying this decline has been a proliferation in the everyday use of new technologies such as the internet. New communication technologies have been theorised to influence migration decisions, but the direction of this influence is ambiguous, with some studies finding that they decrease migration, others that they increase it. Using data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study, this paper assesses the relationship between internet use and preferences/expectations to change address as well as the decision to move. Although frequent users of the internet tend to be more mobile on average, longitudinal analysis offers no evidence that internet use influences migratory preferences and expectations or actual moves. This paper contributes to the literature by studying a developed country with high levels of internet penetration, by engaging not only with actual moves but also with preferences and expectations to move, and by drawing on longitudinal data to address unmeasured confounding in so far as possible. More broadly, it provides a reference point for future studies which might consider whether internet use plays a different role in the aftermath of the COVID‐19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis reported in this paper uses Google Mobility Reports to understand subnational trends in population spatial immobility/mobility in the United Kingdom during 2020 and 2021. Using multilevel modelling, it analyses how spatial mobility changed through time in response to the strictness of government lockdown and the annual seasonal cycle of public holidays, and between places in terms of their population composition as measured by the shares of the highly‐educationally qualified and the self‐employed. The results show that there are no consistent differences between the nations of the United Kingdom; that time spent at home increased with the severity of lockdown; that the share of highly qualified was also a good predictor of staying at home; and that there were major effects from public holidays. The analysis did not explain all the variation between places and dates; it is suggested that this is because of randomisation of the data by Google and unmodelled factors such as tiered restrictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic and religious differentials in labour market outcomes within many countries have been remarkably persistent. Yet one very well‐known differential—the Catholic/Protestant unemployment differential in Northern Ireland—has largely (although not completely) disappeared. This paper charts its decline since the early 1980s and examines potential explanations using Census data from 1991, 2001 and 2011 together with annual survey data. These data span the ending of The Troubles, the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the introduction of fair employment legislation, growth in hidden unemployment and major structural changes in Northern Ireland. We assess the potential impact of these changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Their paper considers a sample of 18 OECD countries from 1996 to 2018 using time series analysis in an econometric approach to investigate countries that were big migration-rate fallers and also those which had stable or increasing rates. In this regard, the same factors have led to a different outcome in Iceland than in migration-decline nations, suggestive of a distinctive Nordic migration regime. Population, Space and Place, 27 (7), e2331. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2331 4 Champion, T., Cooke, T., & Shuttleworth, I. (Eds.) Federal Reserve Board of Governors 19 Shuttleworth, I., Cooke, T., & Champion, T. (2019). [Extracted from the article]

The Nordic countries have higher rates of internal migration than most other Western societies and have not always shared in the declines noted in other countries. This paper examines migration in Iceland during the period 1986–2017 to add to the wider international literature on migration trends. Compared with its Nordic neighbours, Iceland has the highest rates of internal migration and currently also the greatest porosity in terms of international inflows and outflows. The main focus is on migration flows between the Reykjavík capital area—the only city in the country—the nearby exurban regions on the one hand and the more distant provinces at the other hand. We show that, despite continued high aggregate migration rates, there has been a slight but long‐term downward trend in all moves. We also indicate that migration rates are highly sensitive to cyclic economic fluctuations. Migration between the Reykjavík capital area and its surrounding exurban regions is characterised by increasing mobility during economic booms but the Great Recession starting in 2008 led to a fall in migration. However, the slight decline in overall internal migration in Iceland since the 1990s can almost exclusively be attributed to the decline in migration from the provinces to the Reykjavík capital area, which predates the 2008 Great Recession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis uses the Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study to explore migration trends from 2001 to 2015. Its contributions are to extend this analysis to the period after the 2011 Census, to use administrative data to measure migration not as a transition between places but as (potentially) multiple events over the full 2001–2015 period over different distance bands, to add to the UK evidence base on internal migration trends, and to show how long‐term trends appear to override economic cyclical effects. The results show that internal migration rates over all distance bands fell from 2001 onward, continuing a decline in migration between Super Output Areas recorded since 1981, the first date for which there are data. This indicates that Northern Ireland, despite its unique political and social history, has not been immune to the long‐term migration decline observed elsewhere in Great Britain and other countries such as the United States. The only caveat to this is that when moves from Northern Ireland to other places are included in the long‐distance band of 50 km or more then long‐distance migration returns to near its 2001–2003 level by 2013. The analysis also shows that the same personal characteristics as elsewhere are related to different frequencies and distances of moving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One explanation of the results of the UK EU Referendum and the US Presidential Election in 2016 has been as a triumph of citizens of 'somewhere'—localised and rooted—over the cosmopolitan and spatially mobile citizens of 'anywhere', placing residential mobility and its effects on political attitudes at the heart of debates about the causes of populist voting. This paper contributes to these debates by using Understanding Society1 to examine how residential mobility shaped Referendum voting intentions with a particular focus on the differential impacts of short‐ and long‐distance moves. It also explores how the effects of migration vary by age. It finds that for an all‐age sample, those respondents who made at least one address change of 50 km or more were less likely plan to vote 'Leave' relative to those who did not move at all. Restricting the analysis to those aged 25 or older, residential mobility became statistically insignificant; Brexit voting could be explained without reference to residential mobility. However, analysing only 16–24 year olds, long‐distance residential mobility was again statistically significant even in the fully specified model. It is concluded that residential mobility is most important and formative for the attitudes of younger people but has little or no impact on older sections of the population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Personality, as measured by the 'Big Five' dimensions of agreeableness, openness, extroversion, neuroticism and conscientiousness, has been explored in the social psychological literature as a predictor of migration but so far has received very little attention in the geographical literature, which is surprising given its predictive importance and also evidence that the selectivity of migration shapes area personality profiles. Using the Understanding Society1 data set, this paper analyses how personality influences whether a respondent moves or not over a 5‐year period and, if they do, how far they move. After controlling for individual sociodemographic characteristics, it is found (a) that those who score higher on conscientiousness and neuroticism are more likely to expect to move in the next year; (b) that only those who score highly on extroversion actually made at least one move during the 5‐year period; (c) that openness is positively associated with making a long‐distance move (≥50 km); and (d) that the pattern for (c) is reversed for short‐distance moves (<10 km). These findings are significant for two reasons. First, they show that personality should be more central in migration studies and that geography can usefully seek disciplinary insights from social psychology. Second, they help us take a step towards a better understanding of the relationships between geography, personality and spatial mobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Residential segregation is pervasive in many societies. People making residential moves in these divided contexts may increase or decrease segregation levels. In this paper, the divided society of Northern Ireland is used as an example to explore how residential mobility relates to residential segregation by religion. Survey evidence for this country consistently shows a preference for mixed neighbourhoods, yet actual patterns of geographical mobility suggest people move to same‐religion areas. The paper uses the Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study (NILS) to explore the individual and contextual factors that influence the destinations of internal migrants by religion between 2001 and 2011. How they move up or down the contextual 'religion ladder' of localities is modelled with reference to both their individual socio‐demographic and neighbourhood characteristics in 2001. It is found that there are still individual religious differentials in people's destinations. Catholics, for instance, are more likely than Protestants to move to more Catholic areas, suggesting that individual religion remains important despite the Peace Process. Some possible reasons for this are considered with a partial explanation being found in the geographical patterning of the population. Existing patterns of residential segregation constrain moves in religious space for the majority of people. It is concluded, nevertheless, that an individual's religion remains a considerable factor contrary to expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A common presumption is that the widespread adoption of advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs) over the last several decades enhances residential mobility and migration. This research critically evaluates this presumption from the perspective of the long‐term decline in residential mobility and migration in many developed countries and concludes that ICTs are capable of both enhancing and impeding residential mobility and migration. Estimates from an instrumental variable model of residential mobility and migration using data from the Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study indicate a large negative effect of ICTs on residential change and smaller negative effect on migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is prompted by the widespread acceptance that the rates of inter-county and inter-state migration have been falling in the USA and sets itself the task of examining whether this decline in migration intensities is also the case in the UK. It uses annual inter-area migration matrices available for England and Wales since the 1970s by broad age group. The main methodological challenge, arising from changes in the geography of health areas for which the inter-area flows are given, is addressed by adopting the lowest common denominator of 80 areas. Care is also taken to allow for the effect of economic cycles in producing short-term fluctuations on migration rates and to isolate the effect of a sharp rise in rates for 16-24 years old in the 1990s, which is presumed to be related to the expansion of higher education. The findings suggest that unlike for the USA, there has not been a substantial decline in the intensity of internal migration between the first two decades of the study period and the second two. If there has been any major decline in the intensity of address changing in England and Wales, it can only be for the within-area moves that this time series does not cover. This latter possibility is examined in a companion paper using a very different data set. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expectations of migration and mobility steadily increasing in the longer term, which have a long currency in migration theory and related social science, are at odds with the latest US research showing a marked decline in internal migration rates. This paper reports the results of research that investigates whether England and Wales have experienced any similar change in recent decades. Using the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study of linked census records, it examines the evidence provided by its 10-year migration indicator, with particular attention to a comparison of the first and latest decades available, 1971-1981 and 2001-2011. This suggests that, as in the US, there has been a marked reduction in the level of shorter-distance (less than 10 km) moving that has involved almost all types of people. In contrast to this and to US experience, however, the propensity of people to make longer-distance address changes between decennial censuses has declined much less, largely corroborating the results of a companion study tracking the annual trend in rates of between-area migration since the 1970s (Champion & Shuttleworth, ). Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Internal migration, because of its selectivity, has been recognised in Britain, Europe, and the USA as a major influence on geographical patterns of ethnic and social segregation. Despite this, and despite its history of communal division, plus accounts which have emphasised population moves as a cause of segregation, far less academic attention has been paid to dynamic migration processes in understanding the evolution of spatial population patterns in Northern Ireland (NI). This paper attempts to address this gap by considering how far internal migration - defined as address changes - has redistributed the population with regard to (a) religion and (b) social deprivation between 2001 and 2007. Using data from the Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study (NILS), the paper finds that Catholics and Protestants move from and to the same sorts of places with regard to deprivation but that there was some evidence of differential mobility behaviour with regard to individual community affiliation and other individual socio-demographic characteristics. However, there is no evidence for increases in either communal or social segregation. It is suggested that this is because relatively few people move, they move only short distances, and the current net redistributive impact of migration is therefore small. It is hypothesised that a much more dynamic population with regard to migration is needed to increase or decrease segregation. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores why internal migration rates fell in England and Wales between 1971 to 1981 and 2001 to 2011. It considers all‐address changing rates, short‐distance migration (address changes involving moves of 10 km or less) and long‐distance migration (moves of 50 km or more). It does so by using the Blinder–Oaxaca method to decompose the differences between the 2 time periods into a compositional component (changes in the aggregate migration rate attributable to increases or decreases in more or less migratory groups of the population) and a rate component—the extent to which these population groups behave differently in the 2 time periods. The analysis finds that changing population structure since the 1970s does not fully account for the observed decreases. Instead, it seems that changed migratory behaviour and in particular, a large general downward effect that cuts across all population groups are the most important component. The greater decrease in address changing observed for all moves and those of less than 10 km (compared with longer distance moves) points the search for further explanations in the direction of factors known to be associated with short‐distance moves such as the housing market, and this is identified as an avenue for more research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]