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To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00785.x Byline: Damien French (1), Michael Laver (2) Abstract: We analyse a citizens' jury experiment held in Dublin on the 'hot-button' issue of waste incineration. The jury was a random sample drawn from the 2002 Irish Election Study (IES), and we compare jurors to non-jurors in the 2002 IES, and in 2003 and 2004 panel studies. Large opinion shifts were observed in a representative jury; these shifts remained observable nine months later. However, as a direct consequence of our choice of a contested issue, the jurors' verdict was framed by the unwillingness of key stakeholders to participate. Stakeholders who expect to be on the 'losing' side, including public representatives and officials, may obstruct and delegitimise citizens' juries by withholding participation. This informal gatekeeping power undermines the potential of citizens' juries to empower citizens. Author Affiliation: (1)Trinity College Dublin (2)New York University Article History: (Accepted: 29 July 2008)

The parable of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ can be applied to the international politics of outer space. The specific legal content of human activity on the Moon and in the geostationary orbit precludes a private appropriation, while the established role of private corporations in the economy of outer space makes the establishment of collective ownership unlikely. The tension between treaty law and customary law, and between rival legal interpretations of space activity, mirrors an underlying conflict between space powers and non-space powers. For the time being at least, the space powers have an incentive to maintain the legal regime most susceptible to tragedy, since this is the one that they can dominate most easily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumption. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an informal argument about the relationship between strategic interaction and ‘economic’ theories of political processes. It is concerned with interactions between small groups of rational actors, in which each knows the preferences of the others and is attempting to get the better of the others. In these circumstances, the outcome is usually determined by the strategic interaction involved and is often, therefore, rather unstable. Since formal models in themselves do not help us very much to interpret the processes involved, the bulk of the paper is concerned with an analysis of various aspects of strategic interaction. These include being sophisticated, lying, cheating and bluffing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explores the nature of the concept of loyalty based on the book "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty," by Albert Hirschman. Illustration of the reaction of consumers to the decline in a particular output; Choices faced by consumers; Examination of Hirschman's confusion over the social and individual bases of loyalty; Definitions of loyalty.

The article looks at the history of Proportional Representation (PR) and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) in Ireland. The authors state that PR had first been used in the election to the local corporation in Sligo. They also claim that STV was introduced in Northern Ireland at the same time as it had been adopted at a national level in the South. They explain that STV is designed to select a set of candidates taking into account the votes of as large a section of the electorate as possible.

The article presents an account of the book "The Economics of Wealth and Poverty," by Gordon Tullock. The book deals with the issues of charity and social redistribution from a public choice perspective. The relentless application of logic to a set of problems digs up many intriguing nuggets of insight that would otherwise remain deeply buried. It argues convincingly against the widespread double standards of those liberals who claim to be in favor of helping the poor but who, when given the chance, actually do very little to achieve this.

Presents the book "The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare," by Robert Sugden.