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Judicial intervention is often required to define the boundaries of executive power. Although many separation of powers analyses examine the interaction of courts and legislatures, few examine how the design of executive and judicial institutions affect judicial decision making in cases involving challenges to executive power in the U.S. context. I argue that the degree of judicial institutional vulnerability to executive retaliation will have a significant impact on judicial making. Using an original dataset of cases involving executive power challenges in the American states between 1980 and 2010, I find that courts are more likely to uphold executive power in environments where the threat of institutional retaliation from the executive is high. The results of this analysis indicate that the strength of judicial checks against executive power depends on broader relations of institutional authority, not just on constitutional doctrine or culture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The focus of this analysis is whether a strategic perspective provides a useful approach that enhances an understanding of broad patterns of judicial decision making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The authors examine whether it is reasonable in the majority of cases for appeals court judges to modify their behavior when necessary to avoid reversal by the Supreme Court. This assessment utilizes statistical analyses and interviews from twenty-eight judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Based on a three-part argument, the authors conclude that a strategic perspective is not helpful in understanding the decision calculus of appeals court judges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]