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More urgently than ever we need an answer to the question posed by the late Mick Moran in The Political Quarterly nearly two decades ago: 'if government now invests huge resources in trying to be smart why does it often act so dumb?'. We reflect on this question in the context of governmental responses to Covid‐19 in four steps. First, we argue that blunders occur because of systemic weaknesses that stimulate poor policy choices. Second, we review and assess the performance of governments on Covid‐19 across a range of advanced democracies. Third, in the light of these comparisons we argue that the UK system of governance has proved itself vulnerable to failure at the time when its citizens most needed it. Finally, we outline an agenda of reform that seeks to rectify structural weaknesses of that governance capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Labour Together review of the 2019 election brings together polling data, survey data, interviews, and submissions from across the Labour movement. An unpopular leader, tensions around the Brexit position, and a manifesto which was not seen as credible, are all found to have contributed to the scale of the defeat, but Labour's unexpectedly strong performance in 2017 also masked long‐term issues in its connection with the electorate and within the party's campaign organisation. The report attempts to move beyond simply diagnosing the difficulties the party faces, but some of the thorniest issues for the party to resolve are nonetheless left unresolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2019 general election gave prominence to tactical voting advice websites, particularly those projecting constituency‐level results using national polling data and sophisticated multi‐level regression and poststratification (MRP) polling models. We see tactical voting as an example of a coordination game and argue that polling‐model driven advice websites are disruptive to the existing focal points for strategic voting. Although such websites may well help identify the strongest candidate based on constituency demographics, the article argues they are unlikely to coalesce support behind that single candidate, a prerequisite for successful tactical voting. In practice, there are multiple competing models and websites as well as other key sources of information to voters. Furthermore, the heuristic of relying on tactical voting websites is vulnerable to strategic action by partisans. In short, it is argued that the emergence of these websites risks muddying the waters further for electors seeking to vote tactically, potentially splitting the tactical vote rather than unifying it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brexit referendum of 2016 brought a new concept to British politics, namely the 'people's will', one that is seemingly at odds with conventional notions of parliamentary sovereignty, even a threat to its very existence. This article argues that although the device of the referendum is relatively new, the kind of popular control over Parliament and the executive that it invokes has long been a part of British politics. Ranging over 200 years, examples are drawn from the recall and deselection of MPs, mass petitioning campaigns, the role of the Speaker, and the flourishing of independent parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of age on voting behaviour and political outcomes has become an issue of increasing interest, particularly in the UK. Age divides in voter turnout and political preferences have led to claims that age is the 'new class'. In this article, we contrast existing 'cultural backlash' and political economy explanations of the age divide in politics, and challenge the view that older people are predominantly 'left behind', culturally or economically. We show that older people have distinct material interests, related to housing wealth and pensions' income, that are visible in their political preferences. We argue for the development of a new political economy of age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social democratic politics in Britain requires compelling answers to three animating questions that Roy Jenkins posed in his landmark 1979 Dimbleby lecture. Firstly, how can the British system of democracy be reformed to develop a culture of political participation and pluralism that leads to more equitable economic and social policies? Secondly, how can the centre‐left and left unite to forestall long periods of Tory dominance in electoral politics, thereby avoiding calamities such as the 2016 referendum on EU membership? And, thirdly, how can a flourishing intellectual ecosystem be cultivated on the progressive left that generates radical ideas for economic and social reform, recognising the importance of concerted dialogue between political traditions? This article revisits Jenkins' 1979 lecture by considering the prospects for 'breaking the mould' of British politics in the 'new hard times' of Brexit and 'permanent austerity'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Scottish and European Questions have become intertwined over time. A European turn in Scottish politics became evident from the late 1980s when public opinion moved in favour of the European Communities/Union. The Scottish National Party (SNP) became a leading advocate of EC/EU membership with Europe's four freedoms allowing it to dismiss accusations of separatism. Scotland voted in favour of Remain in the Brexit referendum, adding to existing tensions in UK‐Scottish government relations. The institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations which were designed to cope with tensions are being tested as never before under devolution. The assertion of UK power in these relations has undermined claims made by David Cameron to pursue a 'respect agenda' and commitments made immediately after the independence referendum. But while this evidence of divergent views on such a significant matter creates potential challenges for the UK union, it also creates new challenges for the SNP. The prospect of a hard Brexit raises the issue of separatism once more, with a choice of either remaining in the EU but separate from the rest of the UK (rUK), or remain in a separatist UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the state of the art of the Brexit negotiations in the area of financial services. It uses a two‐level game model to first explain the positions of UK and EU negotiators on the basis of the domestic constraints they face, and second, to consider the scope for final agreement based on the 'win‐set' of both sides. The paper analyses the preferences and power of three main groups of players within the UK and EU: the political authorities, financial regulators, and the financial industry. We argue that the scope for agreement on financial services has been severely hampered by political and regulatory constraints which forced UK and EU negotiators to adopt early hawkish negotiating positions, and by the absence of a unified position from the financial industry. After the 2017 general election, the position of the UK government and UK financial industry briefly converged, thereby narrowing the domestic win‐set, but also increasing the scope for agreement. However, the July 2018 'Chequers' deal represents a hardening of the UK government's position on financial services. We argue that this reflects the fact that the twin pressures facing UK negotiators—acute political constraints at home and bargaining weakness in Brussels—has become more, not less, acute over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a preliminary assessment of the impact of the Brexit process—from the June 2016 referendum to June 2018—on the British political system. Drawing on the classic work of Arend Lijphart and the ensuing scholarship applying the Westminster model to Britain, it seeks to understand whether and to what extent Brexit has impacted on the majoritarian features of the system. Adapting Lijphart's criteria, it focuses on the electoral‐party dimension, the executive–legislative relations and the territorial power‐sharing arrangements. It argues that Brexit has brought to light several intertwined tensions that had been brewing inside British politics over the course of a number of years, and which are likely to continue unfolding for several years to come. Even if emerging trends tend to be fragile, complex, even contradictory, and the current uncertainty makes any long(er)‐term assessment futile, recent developments appear to signal a possible strengthening of the executive over the legislature and of the central over the devolved administrations, thus consolidating the majoritarian traits of the British political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this reply Michael Kenny identifies the distinctiveness of Ackerman's characterisation of Britishness and the case he makes for constitutional reform. But he queries the remedies that he advances and, in particular, the attempt to address the problem of asymmetry through a system of regional government in England. Kenny argues instead that any adequate approach to reform in this area needs to grasp the decline of existing forms of territorial statecraft in the UK and the specific character of, and underlying motivations for, the increasing sense of democratic self‐assertion among the English. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain, Bruce Ackerman argues, has 'muddled its way into a curious arrangement' of asymmetric devolution, which has dis‐united the Kingdom, disempowered a significant proportion of the populace, and disregarded the risks of what he describes as 'mono‐cultural rivalry'. However, whilst Ackerman's diagnosis is correct, his prescription of 'fully symmetric' federalism is unlikely to remedy this democratic malaise. As this response shows, there is limited political consensus as to where regional boundaries should fall and there is little public appetite for an additional layer of regional governance. Therefore, rather than bolting another layer of governance onto a flawed substructure, we should instead focus on its repair by reforming Westminster's electoral system and revitalising local government. These two proposals may be more modest than Ackerman's bold vision, but if implemented they would provide solid foundations for the development of a more deliberative and consensual way of doing politics that UK so sorely lacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has indicated that English identity was a strong predictor for a Leave vote in the referendum on membership of the European Union, and that it is an identity that is increasingly playing a role in British politics. In this paper, we explore whether Englishness affects even left‐right positioning of parties. Focusing on Labour, we find that it does, even controlling for other attitudinal and demographic variables. Alongside age and perceptions of the party leader, perceptions of immigration change and perceived lack of political efficacy also play a significant role. Given the potential electoral significance of this, we reflect on and propose a range of policy options that Labour could utilise to address this gap between English‐identifiers and the party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusess the effectiveness of Great Britain's sports policies. Topics discussed include views of Alan Tomlinson on international sports governance; relationship between government and sport; and an account of advantages of sports on social and economic benefits, and wellbeing of the country.

In December 2016, the British Government banned National Action for being an extremist organisation. It was the first time in British history that membership of a far-right group was outlawed. While so, little is known about the group. This article responds to this lack of knowledge by setting out the origins of National Action and its leaders, its preference for a traditionalist Nazi ideology, and its penchant for stunts and demonstrations to gain media attention and publicity. The article concludes by considering whether proscription was rather more symbolic than serious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit and support for anti-establishment insurgencies suggest that British politics is moving away from the old left-right opposition towards a new divide between the defenders and detractors of progressive liberalism. As this article suggests, progressive liberalism differs significantly from both classical and new liberalism. It fuses free-market economics with social egalitarianism and identity politics. Both the hard left and the radical right reject this combination and want to undo a number of liberal achievements. British politics is also moving in a postliberal direction. In the economy, postliberalism signals a shift from rampant market capitalism to economic justice and reciprocity. In society, it signals a shift from individualism and egalitarianism to social solidarity and fraternal relations. And politically, it signals a shift from the minority politics of vested interests and balkanised group identity to a majority politics based on a balance of interests, shared identity and the embedding of state and market in the intermediary institutions of civil society. This article argues that postliberalism is redefining Britain's political centre ground in an age where neither progressive liberalism nor reactionary anti-liberalism commands majority support. First, it charts the ascendancy of progressive liberalism over the past quarter-century. Second, it contrasts anti-liberal reactions with postliberal alternatives, before exploring why earlier iterations of postliberalism failed to gain traction with the political mainstream. Third, it provides a discussion and critique of Theresa May's postliberal conservatism, notably the tension between free-market globalisation and free trade, on the one hand, and the support for national industry and the indigenous working class, on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What should be the position of democrats in response to the Brexit referendum? Many urge a duty to accept the result. This article argues the contrary. If someone is a UK citizen, has a belief that leaving the European Union will be damaging to the common good of the UK and is a convinced democrat, then that person has a duty to oppose Brexit. Neither of the two principal reasons for accepting the result-a claim of popular sovereignty or of parliamentary sovereignty-imply a duty not to continue to oppose. Arguments from political equality for simple majority rule do not apply when the alternatives are ill defined. More generally, popular sovereignty presupposes and does not replace constitutional democracy, and in a parliamentary democracy there is always a continuing right to oppose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the author talks about the industrial strategy published by the Great Britain's government that will bridge the gap between its productive companies, industries, places and people.

Legislative language is a crucial, yet somewhat overlooked element of British politics. So how has the language of British legislation changed over the past century? For this study, all 191,080 pages of legislation enacted between 1900 and 2015 were assessed for changes in the quantity of legislation, and 5,878 sections of legislation from 1920 to 2015 were analysed for changes to the quality of language. Parts of speech that affect the subject, object and verb of sentences were recorded, giving a novel long-term study of indeterminacy in legislative language. Findings show that interpreting legislation became increasingly dependent on circumstance and discretion after the war. Change further accelerated after 1975. This reflected a widening gap between public demands placed on government power and the difficulties faced in accommodating these demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses budget review from from the Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT), Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) and Institute for Government (IfG). It is noted that budgets are a mixture of politics and highly technical measures. Topics include planning of corporate taxes, development of tax policy, and appreciation of tradeoffs.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses articles in the issue on topics including the status of human rights, British politics and disadvantage of Britain's constitutional equilibrium.

Party political interest in the so-called 'English Question' has grown in recent years, due to the enmeshing of constitutional issues with a growing political and public affiliation with and expression of English national identity and culture. More recently, attention has shifted to the decentralisation of government within England. The 'English Question' is thus defined by two interconnected but distinctive 'English Questions'. This article will assess whether, in seeking to find answers for these 'English Questions', the Conservatives and Labour are establishing a more distinctive 'politics of England'. It will first consider the extent to which the politicisation of English identity and civic society have stimulated a more nationally framed political culture and party politics, and then assess whether constitutional reforms undertaken in Westminster, especially the introduction of EVEL, and regional devolution initiatives within England might facilitate greater party political engagement with an emergent 'politics of England'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the extent to which devolution within England can address the general malaise that is often described as 'the English Question'. It considers how far the devolution genie might be considered out of the lamp. It takes as its basis three broad arguments for devolution-an economic case, a case concerning public service reform and a democratic argument for the decentralisation of power-and for each of these three it explores the theoretical underpinnings for the argument, how things are currently playing out in the current political context and what we might expect to see in the future. The article concludes with some suggestions as to how debates about the English Question might play out in the years ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the 2015 refusal by Great Britain's House of Lords to approve a tax credit statutory instrument that threatened to create a constitutional stand-off. Topics discussed include a review over the power of the Lords over statutory instruments called the Strathclyde review, parliamentary committees' reports in response to the review, and a study on the delegated legislation system in Great Britain.

The article discusses the reasons the Pre-Election Polls of the 2015 General Elections made incorrect predictions on the government coming to power in Great Britain. Topics discussed include polls predicting a hung parliament with many also predicting the Labour Party would be the largest party, the Conservative Party winning a small majority in the House of Commons, and an inquiry by the British Polling Council into what went wrong with the predictions.

The UK's negotiating position in the area of 'economic governance' started from the assumption that there is a deep dividing line between insiders and outsiders of the 'euro zone'. To protect the outsiders, the UK government did not ask for a veto, but for a safeguard mechanism that can postpone a decision in the euro area. This is exactly what David Cameron achieved in the negotiations with Council President Tusk. This article explains why the UK demands were so modest. Key is the peculiar situation of the UK being the major financial centre for a currency union to which it does not belong. Hence, the UK taxpayer needs protection from the City, and EU membership has helped to provide this. There is not much else a UK government could ask for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employment and labour market regulation initially appeared as one of the solid red lines in the UK's renegotiation of the country's place in the EU. The basic argument is that the UK's more deregulated labour market would sit uneasily in the more organised models, based on statutory instruments or collective bargaining, found on the continent. While there is a legitimate problem here, EU employment regulations appear manageable from the point of view of business, while unions see them as important tools for socially responsible economic restructuring. Most of UK employment case law is now deeply entangled with EU law; labour market regulations have, on the whole, become part of the way of doing business in the Single Market; and a simple cost-benefit analysis appears impossible because some costs are not quantifiable and the costs of others are reduced when taken as a bundle. Labour unions agree that transposition of European law needs to be done taking into account local sensitivities, while internationally oriented companies do not see EU regulations on the whole as detrimental to business. Importantly, though, the costs and benefits of EU employment regulations are not symmetrically distributed across different companies: large companies are better able to reap the rewards and accommodate the costs of operating in the Single Market than smaller companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research and higher education sectors have an exemplary place in the referendum debate. They were not part of the David Cameron renegotiation package, but stakeholders in favour of Remain have disrupted the consensus that in these sectors the EU's role is relatively unimportant and that the UK's achievements can be explained in national terms. The article seeks to explain, first, the change in political dynamics that has brought the EU connections out of the shadows in these sectors, and second, what these sectors risk losing by Brexit. It suggests that the campaign has made the case for a causal relationship between the UK's higher education and research achievements and its global reach and has shown how these sectoral policies are embedded in the EU's foundational principles of freedom of movement and non-discrimination. There are also signs that EU membership may come to matter to students, a politically important group, for reasons which range from freedom of movement to conflict prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The way in which free movement of people has become the central issue of the British government's renegotiation and referendum campaign on the UK's relationship with the European Union ( EU) risks obfuscating at least three central issues: why immigrants are coming to the UK; what impact EU migrants are having on the UK; and what can be done to effectively regulate such inflows. It is, however, not just the eurosceptics and the British government, but also 'in campaigners' and other EU member states, who risk perpetuating a number of widely held misconceptions about free movement and immigration for political reasons. Buying into such myths risks undermining attempts to have a more honest and more evidence-based debate about immigration and migrant integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union ( EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy ( CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy ( CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a 'Leave' or 'Remain' outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key part of the debate about the UK's membership of the EU is concern about levels of migration and the impact upon security. This paper assesses how much impact EU membership has on each of these issues, and examines the likely impact of leaving the EU in each of these areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two issues currently dominate the UK's constitutional landscape: the UK's membership of the European Union ( EU) on the one hand; and the unsettled constitutional settlements between the UK and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on the other. This article considers these two issues in concert. It stresses the distinct relationships between the EU and the devolved territories within the UK-concerning both devolved and non-devolved policy areas-highlighting the salience of a devolved perspective in any consideration of UK- EU relations. Despite its importance, sensitivity to this has been lacking. The article explores the implications of a 'Leave' or 'Remain' outcome on the future of the internal territorial dynamics within the UK. While there are too many unknowns to be certain of anything, that there will be knock-on effects is, however, beyond doubt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU is divided between member states that have adopted the euro and those that have not. This article looks at the issue of differentiated integration with particular reference to eurozone integration and the euro-outsiders. I explore the recent public debate in the UK on euro-outsiderness, comparing this with debates in Denmark. The article highlights some striking differences between the UK and Denmark when it comes to the actual management of euro-outsiderness in Brussels as well as some of the dilemmas facing euro-outsiders such as the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Poland as the EU struggles to exit its crises. Finally, I discuss the future of two-speed European integration and the UK's possible exit from the EU. The UK cannot escape the dilemma of favouring either influence or autonomy; whether the UK remains in or leaves the EU, it will need to allow the eurozone to proceed in order to prevent further eurozone crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to the special issue which delves on the issues surrounding the European Union membership referendum in Great Britain and Gibraltar set for June 2016 is presented.

Previous research has suggested that attitudes towards the European Union ( EU) are shaped by two sets of considerations-economic and cultural. Using data from the 2015 British Social Attitudes survey, this article assesses which matters more in shaping attitudes in Britain towards the EU as the country prepares to vote in a referendum on whether it should remain in or leave the European Union. It shows that while concern about the cultural consequences of EU membership is widespread, voters are inclined to think that membership is economically beneficial. This cultural concern underpins a widespread scepticism about Europe, but voters are only likely to want to leave the EU if they are also convinced of the economic case for doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK has influenced some major EU policies, such as the creation of the single market and enlargement. But how influential are the UK government and British MEPs in the day-to-day EU legislative process? To answer this question, this article analyses recent data from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The evidence is mixed. In the Council, in recent years the UK government has been outvoted more often than any other EU government, yet UK officials remain well connected 'behind the scenes'. In the European Parliament, British MEPs are now more likely to be on the losing side than are the MEPs of any other member state, yet British MEPs still win key committee chairs and rapporteurships. The evidence suggests that if the UK votes to remain in the EU, Britain's political elites will need to re-engage with Brussels politics if the UK is to avoid becoming further marginalised from mainstream EU politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows that key to understanding the referendum outcome are factors such as a profoundly eurosceptic public, high levels of citizen uncertainty, divided mainstream political parties on the EU and lack of unity within the 'Leave' campaign. The Brexit referendum is more than just about domestic issues and government approval. Utilitarian concerns related to economic evaluations of EU integration coupled with support of or opposition to EU freedom of movement are very likely to influence vote choice. Those campaigns that focus on rational utilitarian arguments about the costs and benefits related to EU membership as a whole but also to EU freedom of movement are expected to swing voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The domestic scenario following a Brexit vote is likely to be characterised by high stakes, uncertainty and fissile political debate. No off-the-peg arrangement touted for Brexit-be it Norwegian, Swiss, Turkish or Canadian-was designed to engage with such a context. Nor does it seem wise to rush to medium-term commitments which might pre-empt democratic politics and wise choices. Far more important will be the legitimacy of any institutional settlement governing this arrangement, which will provide the context for its revision and development and the space for democratic reflection over how these policies are to be governed. It will be suggested that here there is much insight to be gained from looking at regional arrangements beyond the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Labour Party of Great Britain and party leader Jeremy Corbyn. Topics discussed include political leadership, politicians George Osborne and David Cameron and politics in Great Britain. Other topics which includes coalition governments, election and political campaigns are also discussed.

The remedies provided in Prosperity and Justice: a Plan for the New Economy are less convincing than its diagnosis. It entails a substantial shift back towards selective industrial policies and resource allocation by the state rather than the market, with the ambition of changing the structure of the economy. Many economists are likely to be sceptical of some of the arguments put forward in the report. An obvious issue is the huge policy discretion to be given to government without effective constraints, and the significance of government failure is overlooked. It is a triumph of hope over experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the debate in this journal about the state of British democracy. I criticise the tendency to use a 'demand-supply' dichotomy in interpreting the strong distrust experienced by institutions and politicians, and especially the idea that all the blame for current problems is to be attributed to the inadequateness of the British political tradition (BPT). By referring to international data on democracy and to recent British trends in both public attitudes and institutional innovations, a more nuanced picture on the state of democracy emerges. I argue that the BPT is not incompatible with incremental changes that have already introduced innovations in the way politics works in Britain today, and that the task of empowering citizens is one of the most delicate aspects in this process of innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article constitutes a pointed theoretical intervention in the debate opposing Richards and Smith to Flinders on the question of citizen disengagement. Its main contention is that Richards and Smith offer a straw-man argument against Flinders by identifying him with positions he does not hold. It thus shows that Richards and Smith falsely identify Flinders with the following positions: (a) there is no need for a major overhaul in the UK's existing democratic and governance arrangements; (b) the problem of citizen disengagement is caused by the public's insatiable demand for democratic participation; and (c) the problem with British politics is that there is too much democracy and accountability. Finally, the article closes by identifying points of genuine tension between the Richards/Smith position and that defended by Flinders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the inter-related debates over Britain's relationship with the EU and that over the future of the UK. It argues that euroscepticism and Scottish independence are based on exceptionalist identities that now revolve around economic policy. Elite euroscepticism cleaves to a neoliberal vision of minimalist regulation, while advocates of Scottish independence claim Westminster's austerity policies make the British Union incompatible with social democracy. However, this presentation of the choice facing British voters ignores the serious contradictions that overhauling the current order entails. Both forms of exceptionalism fail to recognize the significant limitations of self-government outside and within the EU. If Conservatives can contain their neoliberal flirtation with EU withdrawal they are very well placed to prosper electorally. The dilemma of which union(s) to choose might thus constitute the prelude to the entrenchment of the economic and political order that gave rise to such contestation in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an examination of the rising prominence of House of Commons select committees during the 2010-2015 Parliament, which takes into account the impact of the Wright reforms. The new system of electing committee chairs and members is explored as a central reform that has burnished the autonomy, independence and credibility of the committees. In addition, the characteristics of the coalition government and circumstances entailed by a two-party executive are seen as factors that have made more robust the neutrality of the committees, which have been looked to ever more urgently as impartial scrutineers of government policy and personnel. As the system has been strengthened and received greater attention from the government, the public and the media, select committees have also come to present a platform upon which certain members and chairs have grown their profile. This phenomenon in turn has added to the desirability of roles on committees, which now present an alternative career route to the ministerial ladder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The low turnout of the 2012 police and crime commissioner ( PCC) elections have led to questions surrounding their legitimacy and have even led to the former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg describing the elections-elections his party helped to introduce-as a 'failed experiment'. Despite this, the election of a majority Conservative government in May 2015 appears to offer some longevity to the role of police and crime commissioners and cements next year's PCC elections in the political diary. Concerns in the immediate aftermath of the elections focused upon the costs of the elections. In this article I offer some suggestions as to what lessons could be learned from this experiment and, through exploring the attitudes of voters, political parties and the media, suggest that we can learn four lessons: (1) that spoilt ballots cannot be ignored; that (2) political parties and (3) the media's attitudes toward elections are important in encouraging people to vote; and (4) that high numbers of independent candidates cannot simply be welcomed at times of elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parliament's International Development Committee made a powerful case this year that DFID should put more money into parliamentary strengthening in developing countries. Arguing that parliaments were central to tackling corruption, improving economic development and building stable political settlements, they recommended that parliaments should be at the 'heart of DFID's governance work'. The report, though, also touched on wider issues of how DFID commissions and monitors its political programmes, suggesting fundamental changes to both. DFID recognises these challenges, and offered either full or partial agreement with most of the recommendations. The challenge that remains, though, is moving from the rhetoric of 'engaging with politics' to a much improved form of political and parliamentary programming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is the retirement reflections of an MP of thirty-eight year's standing. The story is mainly one of the decline of the Commons, a decline in the number of 'big beasts' and in the calibre of members and the quality of debates to the level of five-minute harangues and the custard pie-throwing of Prime Minister's Question Time. The House has lost its functions of staging the national debate and checking the executive to the media but has gained a new role as a national audit of government's performance and policies through the select committee system. MPs are working harder. Fewer now have outside jobs. They are more focused on their constituencies and though they have fewer powers there, and nationally more and better staff, they also have less respect and less influence. Personally, the end of what has been a long-fighting national retreat from social democracy has been a rear-guard action against the emergence of a colder, harder, neoliberal world. Retirement means relegation to watching that from the sidelines, not ringside. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the distinction between self-rule and shared rule in multilevel states, this article argues that shared rule has been the neglected element of the UK devolution settlement. The ability of the devolved administrations to participate in, and influence, national decision making through shared rule mechanisms is very limited. The article argues that the lack of shared rule is especially problematic in light of the increasing complexity of the Scottish devolution settlement in the wake of the Scotland Act 2012 and the Smith commission report. Smith, in particular, seems set to increase both the power of the Scottish Parliament and its dependence on UK policy decisions in the areas of tax, welfare and the economy. Creating a more robust intergovernmental system which could manage these new interdependencies will be a significant challenge, and yet, without such a system, the new settlement will be difficult to sustain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The failure of the Coalition government's attempt to reform the House of Lords has by no means taken further reform off the political agenda. The commitment to installing an elected upper chamber is still widely shared across the political spectrum, on the basis of perceptions that the House of Lords lacks democratic legitimacy. Against this view, this article considers recent literature upon non-electoral representation, deliberative democracy and bicameralism, which together highlight the possibility of an unelected second chamber playing a legitimate role within a wider (democratic) system of government. The article then considers the House of Lords from this perspective, reflecting on changes in the upper chamber since the 1999 reforms and evaluating its role within the wider political system. The paper concludes by suggesting that political debate should focus upon small-scale reforms to ensure that the Lords becomes more effective, representative and legitimate, within the constraints of its present role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UK broadcasters came under fire for the amount of airtime UKIP and its leader Nigel Farage received after the party won the most votes in the 2014 EU election. Our content analysis of television news during the 2009 and 2014 campaigns found little bias in terms of soundbites, but in the more recent election Farage visually appeared in coverage to a greater degree than other party leaders. Moreover, two core UKIP policies--being in or out of Europe and immigration--dominated coverage in 2014. We suggest the 'UKIP factor' and the media's fascination with Nigel Farage help explain why the 2014 campaign was more visible on television news than was the case in 2009 and was largely reported through a Westminster prism. Although television news bulletins attempt to impartially report elections, the 2014 campaign agenda was largely contested on UKIP's ideological terrain and the party's electoral fortunes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses political attitudes to the union in England, Scotland and Wales after the Scottish independence referendum. Using public opinion data, we explore constitutional preferences and perceptions of national grievance, before examining the role that national identity plays in structuring preferences. Our evidence shows that considerable demand exists for nationally demarcated forms of government within the UK, although these constitutional preferences do not translate in support for policy diversity across the UK. We also find evidence that these constitutional preferences relate closely to national identity, but relate also to appeals to national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]