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Since the European Union referendum in 2016, UK net migration has increased to record levels. Despite the Leave campaign's promise to 'take back control'—and a Conservative government that has adopted increasingly negative rhetoric about immigration—growing numbers of workers and international students have migrated to the UK. This apparent puzzle can be explained by examining the political economy of immigration policy. The UK economy is structurally dependent on migrants who take up jobs that British citizens shun and who address skills shortages caused by under‐investment in training and education, as well as international students who help finance UK universities. As free movement came to an end, the Johnson government responded by liberalising immigration policy selectively. More recently, political pressure from the right has prompted the Sunak government to adopt policies that restrict the rights of migrant workers, international students and many British citizens to live with their families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often said that sovereignty is ever less meaningful in the modern world. Yet, sovereignty claims continue to proliferate. There are two elements: the subject of self‐determination (sovereignty) claims and the object. Scottish independence and Brexit are two examples, yet they differ in important ways. Brexit postulates that the British people are the subject and complete sovereignty is the object. The Scottish independence movement claims the Scottish people is the subject but now places the object (independence) in a European context of shared sovereignty. Analysis of questions placed in the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2021) shows that, in spite of Scottish politics being polarised around the issue of independence vs. union, voters show flexibility about what each of these actually means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2016, the UK government has outlined plans for 'Global Britain' as a framework for post‐Brexit foreign policy. Some criticise the idea as a vision of 'Empire 2.0', but it is rarely made clear exactly what form it takes or what its wider political implications are. This article argues that Global Britain constitutes not just an idea or a slogan, but a foreign policy narrative and, more specifically, the narrative of empire. Indeed, to appear reasonable its grand ambitions require pre‐existing knowledges of past imperial 'successes' and accepting images of empire among the British public. Yet Global Britain lacks efficacy: as a domestic rather than an international narrative, by being inherently regressive in its worldview, and for contradicting the preferences of international partners on which the UK heavily relies. These narrative flaws, it is argued, make Global Britain an actively problematic, rather than merely ineffective, component of UK foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has suggested that attitudes towards the European Union ( EU) are shaped by two sets of considerations-economic and cultural. Using data from the 2015 British Social Attitudes survey, this article assesses which matters more in shaping attitudes in Britain towards the EU as the country prepares to vote in a referendum on whether it should remain in or leave the European Union. It shows that while concern about the cultural consequences of EU membership is widespread, voters are inclined to think that membership is economically beneficial. This cultural concern underpins a widespread scepticism about Europe, but voters are only likely to want to leave the EU if they are also convinced of the economic case for doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Racism has been in sharp decline in recent decades yet the word, as accusation, is used more than ever. The word/idea needs to be more restrictively defined and kept for when it is really needed. When almost everyone is a racist, no one is. To this end we need to distinguish more clearly between the greater comfort people often feel among familiar people and places and active hostility towards outsider ethnic groups. We also need a more discriminating language to describe the spectrum of discrimination. Prejudice, clannishness-even in some instances discrimination itself-should be regarded as sentiments and behaviours that are distinct from proper racism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the debate about 'being British' is driven by the politics of the constitutional future of the United Kingdom. This has led to assertions about the declining impact of Britishness, and how, in the interests of the Union, it might be revived. Data from British and Scottish Social Attitudes surveys show that 'Britain' remains an important and meaningful frame of reference, even though people in England and Scotland may not define their prime national identity as British. The relationship between national identity and constitutional preferences is complex. Being 'strongly Scottish' is a weak predictor of constitutional preferences because almost all Scots are at the 'strong' end of the Scottish scale, whereas saying you are 'British' (or not) is a better guide. It is not a matter of choosing to be Scottish or English over being British, but recognising the complexity and inter-relationships of diverse territorial identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lion and the Eunuch challenges the failures of British politicians to adequately understand the complexities, and the subtleties, of British national identity, and goes on to define it for them. It also explains reasons for our current confusions over who we are in the world. In 1940 Orwell wrote The Lion and the Unicorn as a rallying cry for a richly identifying country that was still able to imagine itself, and re-imagine itself, as the need arose. This essay suggests that without a radical change of government policy and thought, that power will continue to decline with far reaching consequences for the peoples of these islands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern Britishness is widely seen to be based on shared values like 'fair play', 'tolerance', and respect for 'diversity'. Can such a 'values-based Britishness' be effective as a national binding agent in an era of devolution and globalisation? The idea that a uniquely 'British' character is based on shared values of some kind is not new. The contemporary debate is framed by decisions made over a century ago in the Victorian era-when the decisive shift occurred from a British identity based on religious difference to one based on shared moral values. Through political rhetoric, legislation, and the courts, Victorian governments shaped and changed the character of Britishness. The same tools remain available to contemporary lawmakers in shaping a twenty-first century Britishness that embraces modern universal values, but also defines some more uniquely British emotional connection points around which national identity can be built. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the concept of national identity as it pertains to Great Britain. It is attested that it is difficult to define a common identity of the British people due to elements such as the rise of the welfare state, black and Asian immigration, and the incorporation of the nation into the European Community. Rather than attempting to offer a specific definition, the author examines the potential for the concept of national identity to become a vehicle of authoritarian cultural engineering. Also discussed are ways to resolve differences that arise within the British population concerning shared values, common political goals, and views of British history.

The article discusses the role of the Anglo-Saxon within the moral conflict created by the attempts of the German chancellor Adolf Hitler to wage wars and promote fascism within the world. The author particularly focuses upon British citizens and U.S. citizens as the factions that must stop the spread of Hitler’s political party, known as the Nazi Party. This moral conflict is reportedly framed within a played entitled “Thunder Rock,” which was written by playwright Robert Ardrey. A brief account of the history of Great Britain is presented as a means of discussing the characteristics of British citizens.

This article examines the self-perceived influence of the specified associated organisations and associated organisations within the Liberal Democrats. The analysis is set within the wider theoretical context of political party construction and the dichotomy between the elite and grassroots activists. The article tests the thesis that there is a hierarchical structure of ancillary organisations within the party and that this determines which organisations feel that they have any real influence. It takes a fresh look at the role of the Liberal Democrat ancillary organisations and questions whether or not their party-sanctioned status restricts their ability and willingness to influence the party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the third party in British politics, a compelling message is crucial for the Liberal Democrats. Overcoming a prevailing sense of a wasted vote is key—achieved by, we argue, demonstrating political potency. This article explores the synergy between the Liberal Democrat leader and the message; the relationship of each election message to the political reality in which the party finds itself; and the role of polling in messaging. We explore what is—and is not—a message, and the role of negative messaging by the Liberal Democrats since 1992. We consider the limitations of messaging and the lack of control that a third party has over its message. In conclusion, we reflect on what the lessons learnt by the Liberal Democrats over the last four elections may mean for the messaging at the next general election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to reclaim a credible place in the British two-party system, the Liberal Democrats have done much to establish their community credentials. Successfully contesting seats in local elections may offer the best opportunities for a party to exploit limited resources and nurture its grass-roots support. As a result, the party has been able to build up a reputation for optimising the so-called snowball effect. This article focuses on two aspects of the Liberal Democrats’ local nature. The first is electoral trends since 1997—in terms of gaining and maintaining council control—and the extent to which this may have acted as a springboard for success in Westminster elections. The second reflects upon the content of campaigning in the 2005 general election. To what extent did the Liberal Democrats prioritise local issues in constituency leaflets? It concludes that the importance of locality to a party like the Liberal Democrats can present a double-edged sword. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the recently conducted Oxford Internet Survey, most British people (61%) say that they frequently (22%) or every so often (39%) discuss politics with friends or family. But very few of them ever discuss politics with the people they elect to represent their interests and preferences. The task for politicians is to demonstrate that they really believe that what the public says matters and to prove to the public that their engagement in polylogical, consultative exercises can have meaningful effects.

The terms `postwar consensus' and `social democratic consensus' have been widely used as convenient shorthand definitions of postwar British politics. The Second World War is said to have ushered in a period of consensus in major areas of public policy, which lasted until the 1970s. After a period of crisis, particularly economic crisis, the consensus broke down and was replaced by a new `Thatcherite' framework. However, this consensus that there was a consensus has been challenged in the past fifteen years: revisionist accounts have tended to emphasise the adversarial nature of postwar British politics and the absence of continuity in the major areas of public policy.

The British constitution is often viewed either with scorn or with awe. Those who are sceptical of the capacity of an uncodified constitution to ensure standards of justice and fairness compatible with a representative liberal democracy may point to the lack of a clear separation of powers as supporting evidence. Those who are positive about the flexibility of the British constitution point to its ability to weather both threats to national security and dramatic change with minimal disruption, pointing to the stability of the constitution through the first forty years of the twentieth century as evidence of the former.

Explores public attitudes towards electoral reform from the mid-1970s to the present in Great Britain. Indication of shallow and inconsistent public support for electoral reform; Apprehension of the country's political and business elites about the capacity of the nation's constitutional arrangements to provide governmental and economic stability; Insufficiency of the Britain's political system to provide a solid base for their support for proportional representation.

Features the Arts Council in Great Britain. Responsibility of the council to taxpayers; Effort of Richard Hoggart to make the Council more democratic and accountable; Membership of the council.

The article discusses the support in Great Britain for the Liberal Party from the 1920s through 1962, including the support that the party receives in British elections. The British political parties the Conservative Party (which is also referred to as the Tory party) and the Labour Party are discussed. An overview of British voters, including the role that religion plays in their political activity, middle-aged women's support for the Liberal Party and the putative of lack of support among white-collar workers for the Labour Party, is provided. The relationship between social class and politics is also discussed.