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Abstract: Anthony King thought and wrote a great deal about British prime ministers and political leadership more generally. But in contrast to the way in which single papers embodied his contribution to our understanding of ‘government overload’, ‘executive‐legislative relations’ and ‘career politicians’, his contribution to our understanding of the prime ministership was defined by a body of work. This essay explores that body of work and identifies some of the themes that characterised it. It then relates King's work to claims about the ‘presidentialisation’ of the office, as well as the importance of the expectations surrounding contemporary prime ministers. As Britain grapples with the challenge of Brexit, we should all take note of his counsel against expecting too much in the way of ‘strong’ prime ministerial leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Devolution was almost universally regarded as heralding a fundamental shift in the nature of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. But, since the 2016 Brexit referendum, the UK government has become increasingly hostile—not only towards the Labour and SNP‐run administrations in Scotland and Wales, but to the very existence of devolution. Recent legislative changes—particularly the UK Internal Market Act—have given central government carte blanche to intervene in what were previously regarded as areas of devolved competence. The inevitable result has been to render the governance arrangements for the devolved countries more adversarial and less stable than was previously the case. One immediate consequence of 'the death of devolution' has been to trigger calls by devolutionists for more far‐reaching changes to the state than were achieved in the late 1990s. It is far from clear, however, that such changes are politically achievable, raising the prospect of an extended period of stasis in which the current arrangements persist, not because they have any real supporters, but rather, because no alternative is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is apparent that the consociational framework established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA) is under threat, while the UK's withdrawal from the EU poses major challenges for maintaining peace, prosperity and social cohesion in Northern Ireland (NI). The contributions to this special collection examine key elements of the post‐Brexit reality, with a particular focus on NI and the future of the intergovernmental bodies established by the B/GFA. The implications of the UK government's attempt unilaterally to disapply parts of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A UK‐US free trade agreement has consistently been presented as the main prize from the UK's much touted post‐Brexit trade policy independence. The UK Prime Minister's admission that this was not going to be realised any time soon may have surprised media pundits, but it merely confirmed what had become increasingly apparent since the referendum: that a free trade agreement with the US was a long shot. Taken together with the short‐lived suggestion of the UK joining the United States‐Mexico‐Canada Agreement (USMCA), we argue that it is the desire to perform 'independence' from the European Union rather than policy content which is driving the UK's trade strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parliamentary scrutiny assumes a dual willingness—a willingness of government to be scrutinised and a willingness of Parliament to scrutinise, alongside a singular capacity: the ability of Parliament to scrutinise. In the official Westminster view of scrutiny these principles and practicalities are aligned and serve to illuminate the processes and actions of government. There is, however, also a 'dark side': where the principles and practicalities of scrutiny are not aligned. While an aversion to parliamentary scrutiny has been hard‐wired into the 'executive mentality', the 'ministerial mindset', and the 'instincts of secrecy' shared by all contemporary UK governments, an examination of the first eighteen months of Boris Johnson's premiership—in the exceptionally turbulent times of 'getting Brexit done' and 'beating coronavirus'—reveals a distinct propensity of his Conservative government to walk on the dark side of parliamentary scrutiny in this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The survey addresses three key reform debates relating to devolution in Wales. These concern first, the case for the further devolution of powers, notably those over criminal justice and policing; second, the defence of Wales' devolved powers in the context of Brexit; and third, the rooting of devolution in new constitutional ideals, primarily the Welsh government's preferred model of the UK as a voluntary association of nations, or the alternative pressed by the independence movement. In each case, there are strong pressures within Wales for resolutions which sustain and develop devolution; and in the case of independence, have the potential, with reform debates elsewhere, to transform the UK Union. However, there are also grounds for reflecting on the contested nature of further change, the long road that a case for independence may yet have to travel, and the interests of UK government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Parliament (EP) elections have traditionally been described as 'second‐order national elections' in which campaigns are fought by national parties on national issues. We argue that the 2019 elections should instead be considered 'first‐order polity' elections. It is not EU‐level party politics or policy issues that are debated, but rather the legitimacy of the EU itself. Firstly, the EP elections have transformed into an EU 'blame game' in which national governments are punished or rewarded over their stance on European integration. Secondly, the 2019 election was about the EU's fundamental values, not only with respect to multiculturalism, but also gender equality and LGBTQ rights. Finally, these first‐order polity elections are driven in large part by traditional news and social media platforms. While this is a long way from the patterns of the early EP elections, they still fail in fulfilling the function of holding MEPs and European party groupings adequately to account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines uncertainties about nature of Great Britain's policies related to macroeconomics after Brexit. Topics discussed include British model of economic development that had finance and financial agglomeration; range of political and economic shocks to the structure of the economy; and challenges in making new trade agreements with countries outside the European Union.

The article discusses how post-Brexit era is likely to be critical juncture in the British jobs market. Topics discussed include ways in which governments allowed unemployment to rise in order to curb wage growth along with the emasculation of trade unions; use of wages to respond to inflation shocks; and impact of decline in lower-skilled migration on the wages of native workers.

The article examines uncertainties about nature of Great Britain's capitalism after Brexit. Topics discussed include British model of economic development that had finance and financial agglomeration; range of political and economic shocks to the structure of the economy; and challenges to growth of finance and a flexible labour market.

The article discusses how Brexit, and digital disruption are likely to reinforce each other. Topics discussed include economic consequences of Brexit; divergent paths of economic change due to continuing technological change; technology-driven disruption in amount of employment; and reduction in the scale of the market for British firms after Brexit.

Abstract: The political discourse is characterised by two opposing ideals of hard and soft Brexit. In this article, we present evidence of attitudinal types that map neatly onto these archetypal views. The hard Brexit view is defined by issues that eurosceptics prioritise, most prominently sovereignty. By contrast, europhiles prioritise cooperation with Europe in terms of scientific collaboration and market access. However, attitudinal types are not either/or in the minds of the British public, and many prioritise all or none of the issues. Further, the two opposing positions together account for 37 per cent of the public's view. That is, just over one‐third differentiate between the salient issues in ways congruent with political ideals. National identity plays a particular role in the sociodemographic profiles of these attitude types. Older people have a strong stance in any direction (sovereignty, cooperation, or both), but national identity is linked to differentiated positions (sovereignty only or cooperation only). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: There seems to be an emerging conventional wisdom that the Brexit vote resulted from specific domestic factors in Britain, such as divisions within the ruling Conservative party, the rise of UKIP, strong reaction to increased immigration, all set against the backdrop of globalisation and its adverse effects. The end result was a populist revolt. The argument presented here is somewhat different. Whilst accepting that the above factors were certainly very important, it is argued that it is important to examine the key role of the EU itself in the creation of the current crisis within the EU. The construction of an EU policy‐making state has run far ahead of what voters at the national level want, leading to a central paradox within the EU, namely that the European elite which runs the EU has introduced some very beneficial public policies, yet that elite has become increasingly out of touch with its peoples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The general elections of 2017 and 2010 produced hung parliaments in which no single party could command an overall majority; in May 2015 the UK only narrowly avoided that outcome. When a parliament is hung, more than one potential government can be viable, and the constitutional rules that determine who has the first right to form the government can thus have a decisive influence on which government forms. In the past, the UK has applied several potentially contradictory rules (based on conventions and principles), which do not all follow an equally democratic logic. This status quo is problematic because it can generate political controversy and uncertainty, in addition to jeopardising the Monarch's role in the government formation process. A reform that enables parliament to elect the leader who will be tasked with the formation of the next government would resolve these problems and provide constitutional clarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit and support for anti-establishment insurgencies suggest that British politics is moving away from the old left-right opposition towards a new divide between the defenders and detractors of progressive liberalism. As this article suggests, progressive liberalism differs significantly from both classical and new liberalism. It fuses free-market economics with social egalitarianism and identity politics. Both the hard left and the radical right reject this combination and want to undo a number of liberal achievements. British politics is also moving in a postliberal direction. In the economy, postliberalism signals a shift from rampant market capitalism to economic justice and reciprocity. In society, it signals a shift from individualism and egalitarianism to social solidarity and fraternal relations. And politically, it signals a shift from the minority politics of vested interests and balkanised group identity to a majority politics based on a balance of interests, shared identity and the embedding of state and market in the intermediary institutions of civil society. This article argues that postliberalism is redefining Britain's political centre ground in an age where neither progressive liberalism nor reactionary anti-liberalism commands majority support. First, it charts the ascendancy of progressive liberalism over the past quarter-century. Second, it contrasts anti-liberal reactions with postliberal alternatives, before exploring why earlier iterations of postliberalism failed to gain traction with the political mainstream. Third, it provides a discussion and critique of Theresa May's postliberal conservatism, notably the tension between free-market globalisation and free trade, on the one hand, and the support for national industry and the indigenous working class, on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we explore the implications of Brexit for the UK and the EU's development policies and strategic directions, focusing on the former. While it is likely that the operational process of disentangling the UK from the various development institutions of the EU will be relatively straightforward, the choices that lie ahead about whether and how to cooperate thereafter are more complex. Aid and development policy touches on a wide range of interests-security, trade, climate change, migration, gender rights, and so on. We argue that Brexit will accelerate existing trends within UK development policy, notably towards the growing priority of private sector-led economic growth strategies and blended finance tools. There are strong signals that UK aid will be cut, as successive secretaries of state appear unable to persuade a substantial section of the public and media that UK aid and development policy serves UK interests in a variety of ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outcome of the 2017 general election-a hung parliament-defied most predictions. In this article, we draw on aggregate-level data to conduct an initial exploration of the vote. What was the impact of Brexit on the 2017 general election result? What difference did the collapse of UKIP make? And what was the relative importance of factors such as turnout, education, age and ethnic diversity on support for the two main parties? First, we find that turnout was generally higher in more pro-remain areas, and places with high concentrations of young people, ethnic minorities and university graduates. Second, we find that the Conservatives made gains in the sort of places that had previously backed Brexit and previously voted for UKIP. But, third, we find that the gains the Conservatives made from the electoral decline of UKIP were offset by losses in the sort of places that had previously supported the Conservatives, particularly areas in southern England with larger numbers of graduates. The implication of these findings is that while a Brexit effect contributed to a 'realignment on the right', with the Conservative strategy appealing to people in places that had previously voted for UKIP, this strategy was not without an electoral cost, and appears to have hurt the party in more middle class areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northern Ireland and Scotland could and should stay within the European Union while remaining inside the United Kingdom. This proposal need not prevent, and may facilitate, England and Wales in leaving the EU, and it is in accordance with the respective preferences of the peoples of the two Unions who voted in the advisory referendum held on 23 June 2016. Prime Minister May and her Cabinet should address carefully the question of whether to trigger Article 50, or instead to give notice that only parts of the UK-England and Wales-will be leaving the EU. The price of enforcing the entirety of the UK's exit from the EU may be lasting damage to the two Unions that make up the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about Norway's relationship with the European Union and how it is relevant to Great Britain. Topics discussed include the 2016 Brexit referendum, Norway's close association with the EU without being a member of the union, and the issue of sovereignty that led to the decision for Britain to leave the EU.

The article discusses some broad connections between the exit of Great Britain from the European Union (Brexit) and pluralism. Topics discussed include changes that will happen in Britain after the referendum being unclear, a possible fundamental remaking or dissolution of Britain, and the need for Britain to accept diverse forms of identity and citizenship.

The article discusses why the Brexit referendum of 2016 was a triumph of nostalgic democracy and a failure for democratic internationalism. Topics discussed include democratic autonomy requiring strong economic performance, the electoral system by which popular democratic control is qualified, and Great Britain's commitment to Ireland's peace process.