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When discussing Brexit and food, fisheries take a special place: first, because the fisheries sector punched far above its (economic) weight in the campaign leading up to the Brexit referendum; second, because of the promise of a bright future for the fishing industry—both by politicians promising to 'take back control of our waters' as well as by industry representatives auguring a 'sea of opportunities' for fishermen. As it is still far too soon to assess fully the effects of Brexit for the fishing industry and the market for fisheries products, this paper takes a step back and analyses the context within which the changes brought about by Brexit will be taking place. It analyses the complexity of the post‐Brexit fisheries context and its possible repercussions for food policy and the seafood sector. One of the central questions is whether Brexit could contribute to reviving the fisheries industry and enhancing food security in the UK. To explore this further, two other questions present themselves: when is fish UK fish? And what do UK consumers want? Finally, the paper looks at the structure of employment in the seafood industry and how that may present policy makers with difficult decisions. The paper concludes that the picture when it comes to the effect of Brexit on fisheries policy is expected to be mixed, and that both the potential benefits and costs of Brexit are likely to be unevenly distributed within the fisheries sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the state of the art of the Brexit negotiations in the area of financial services. It uses a two‐level game model to first explain the positions of UK and EU negotiators on the basis of the domestic constraints they face, and second, to consider the scope for final agreement based on the 'win‐set' of both sides. The paper analyses the preferences and power of three main groups of players within the UK and EU: the political authorities, financial regulators, and the financial industry. We argue that the scope for agreement on financial services has been severely hampered by political and regulatory constraints which forced UK and EU negotiators to adopt early hawkish negotiating positions, and by the absence of a unified position from the financial industry. After the 2017 general election, the position of the UK government and UK financial industry briefly converged, thereby narrowing the domestic win‐set, but also increasing the scope for agreement. However, the July 2018 'Chequers' deal represents a hardening of the UK government's position on financial services. We argue that this reflects the fact that the twin pressures facing UK negotiators—acute political constraints at home and bargaining weakness in Brussels—has become more, not less, acute over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports on a number of Eurobarometer surveys undertaken by the European Commission as a way of reflecting on Brexit and the challenges it poses to European identity. Our work with the surveys has been undertaken in the context of developing an educational game (RU EU?) which will explore European identity. European citizenship and identity have been strongly promoted by the EU but, while they appear to have been accepted at an elite level, the EU—and the UK in particular—have so far not constructed a narrative which has been supported by 'ordinary' citizens. Brexit has therefore exposed the failings of European elites in this regard. That said, there is some evidence that the complexities of Brexit have led to a strengthening of European identity in the other EU 27 countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

May 2019 marks twenty years since the first elections to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. This report discusses a paper published by the Institute for Government (IfG) that reflects on the experience to date of devolution, drawing on interviews with thirteen individuals who have served as ministers in the devolved governments. Reflecting the structure of the IfG paper, there are three main themes in this report: governing without a majority, institutional change, and—in the light of Brexit—relationships between the devolved governments, Westminster and the EU. The conclusion is that the report, although limited in coverage, provides a useful addition to the literature on devolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outcome of the UK referendum of June 2016 on the question of EU membership had and will continue to have a profound impact on Ireland, its membership of the EU and on British‐Irish relations, given the UK's choice of exit over voice. This paper analyses Brexit from the perspective of the island of Ireland. It adopts three analytic lenses: first, Brexit is analysed from a domestic Irish perspective; second, the negotiations between the EU and the UK and Ireland's position in these negotiations is analysed from a dynamic temporal perspective; third, the paper focuses on the all island dimension of Brexit and its implications for the Irish border. The Irish border will continue to play a pivotal role in the Brexit negotiations and will remain an unsettled issue long after the UK's exit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognised—by both Remainers and Leavers—that the quality of public debate in the lead‐up to the UK's 2016 referendum on EU membership was dismal. That was partly because of the nature of the referendum itself: it was on a broad proposal rather than a specific law; the government that called it did not support the change on the ballot paper and refused to prepare for the possibility of a vote for leaving the EU. It was also influenced by the nature of the campaign: both sides propagated misinformation; key issues were barely discussed; the public were often left dissatisfied and bewildered. This paper sets out evidence on these points and then analyses whether anything could be done to address them. Drawing on recent comparative research into referendums, it explores the importance of preparing for the decision to call a referendum. It then examines three possible approaches to improving political discourse during the campaign itself: exposing misinformation; providing high‐quality information; and promoting citizen deliberation. It finally considers how these could be applied to possible referendums on the issue of the UK's EU membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under Strand Three of the 1998 Belfast 'Good Friday' Agreement, institutions were set up to promote the 'harmonious and mutually beneficial development' of the 'totality of relationships' between the peoples and governments of Ireland and the UK, including its devolved administrations and Crown Dependencies. According to the text of the 1998 Agreement this 'east‐west' dimension was to have two elements with corresponding institutions: an intergovernmental one reflected in the British‐Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) and an interjurisdictional one reflected in the British‐Irish Council (BIC). These Strand Three institutions were designed to provide fora for, respectively, intergovernmental cooperation on 'non‐devolved Northern Ireland matters' in the case of the BIIC and information exchange and cooperation 'on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations' in the case of the BIC. Nowhere in the 1998 Agreement text is the concept of 'east‐west' used to refer to relations between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Yet, in the wake of Brexit, and in the midst of controversy over the implications of the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, relations between Great Britain and Northern Ireland (GB–NI) have been newly framed as 'east‐west'. The creation of this new discursive face of 'east‐west' relations marks an important, but little discussed, impact of Brexit on the political and constitutional landscape of the UK and Ireland. Against this backdrop, this article considers the impacts of Brexit, and the Protocol, on three faces of 'east‐west' relations—the BIIC, the BIC and, newly, GB–NI—and discusses their implications for the future of Strand 3 institutions and the 'totality of relationships' they represent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 2018, a coalition of UK trade unions and civil society organisations called a strike across the UK's fast food sector in support of a living wage, union recognition and the end to zero‐hour contracts in the sector. This paper takes the day of action—labelled the McStrike—as a starting point for an account of the place of the EU and Brexit in the campaign for fast food rights, as well as the contrasting political standpoints adopted by the different trade unions involved in the action. Brexit is used as a prism through which to analyse aspects of Britain's contemporary food politics, especially those pertaining to freedom of movement, workplace organisation, and the role of EU legislation in protecting workers' rights. In exploring the international dimensions of union organisation among the UK's fast food workers, other, more conceptual considerations regarding the changing nature of public and private food consumption and the incorporation of food‐to‐go into the gig economy are also broached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The enfranchisement of non‐resident citizens has always been controversial in the UK, where for historical reasons, voting rights are not as closely associated with citizenship as elsewhere. The introduction of 'overseas' voting in the 1980s by the Conservatives was contested by Labour as a form of 'international gerrymandering' since expatriates were widely assumed to be disproportionately wealthy and therefore more likely to vote Tory. Expatriate campaigners have been increasingly vocal in denouncing the 'electoral injustice' of the 'fifteen‐year rule' which disenfranchises them after fifteen years abroad, and the exclusion of so many from the EU referendum highlighted their cause. A recent private member's bill proposing 'votes for life' for UK expatriates aimed to meet their demands to abolish the time restriction, now considered anachronistic. But their arguments were hijacked by historically embedded attitudes and disputes driven by party politics, ending in a dramatic and bewildering filibuster which this paper elucidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focusses on the future of food in the UK in the context of Brexit. It examines the claims and promises made by Brexiteers before the referendum and juxtaposes these with the approach pursued by the Conservative‐led government since. The article argues that there is a clear dissonance between the two. This dissonance is the result of two important factors. First, the government is stuck in a non‐decision‐making mode, making it unable to pursue clear policies. Second, the food claims and promises made by Brexiteers are in opposition to what the vast majority of the public, food experts, farmers and food businesses want. Through exploring these two factors, and the Brexiteers' claims and promises, the article explains what leaving the EU might mean for the future of food in the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Both during and since the 2016 referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union, concerns were raised as to the absence of contingency planning within Whitehall. This situation was in direct contrast with 1975, when extensive planning took place for the possibility of a vote to leave the European Community. However, there has been little in the way of detailed analysis of the contingency planning undertaken in 1975. Using archival evidence of the Wilson government's preparations, this article highlights the complex challenge that withdrawal would have posed for the UK in 1975, the tensions that existed between the political imperative for a swift withdrawal, in the event of a leave vote, and the civil service's concerns as to whether such a withdrawal was deliverable. Finally, it shows how dependent the UK's position would have been on the approach taken by the other members of the EC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 2016 Brexit referendum a series of crises has gripped Northern Ireland's politics. This has had a destabilising effect across society, which has arguably been felt most acutely by political unionism. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA) of 1998 created a series of institutions to deal with political conflict in Northern Ireland, manage cross‐border cooperation and normalise relations between the UK and Ireland. However, many aspects of it have been sparingly and ineffectually deployed, most notably the second and third strands dealing with north/south and east/west relations respectively. In this article, the authors argue that regular use of the institutional arrangements created by the Agreement would help to deal with the challenges currently facing Northern Ireland and help address unionist anxieties over the Protocol. Use of the North‐South Ministerial Council (NSMC), the British Irish Council (BIC) and the British‐Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC) should be prioritised. The unresolved issues arising from Brexit require a recommitment to the intergovernmental logic at the heart of the 1998 Agreement, despite the obstacles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the party-political front, a nationalist party came first in the 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly election, and the vote share for parties that favour a united Ireland was slightly larger than the combined unionist electorate. £20.00 Brendan O'Leary's latest book is surely the most comprehensive answer to the questions posed in its subtitle - especially the second one - since the Brexit referendum of 2016 put the future of the United Kingdom on the table once again. Making Sense of a United Ireland: Should It Happen?. [Extracted from the article]

A UK‐US free trade agreement has consistently been presented as the main prize from the UK's much touted post‐Brexit trade policy independence. The UK Prime Minister's admission that this was not going to be realised any time soon may have surprised media pundits, but it merely confirmed what had become increasingly apparent since the referendum: that a free trade agreement with the US was a long shot. Taken together with the short‐lived suggestion of the UK joining the United States‐Mexico‐Canada Agreement (USMCA), we argue that it is the desire to perform 'independence' from the European Union rather than policy content which is driving the UK's trade strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has the Conservative Party been such a successful political party? One of the reasons lies in the ability of its leaders to understand and navigate the pressure of the politics of power and the politics of support, adjusting to changing circumstances and being focussed on what is needed in order to gain and hold power in the particular circumstances of the British political system. Since the publication of The Conservative Nation in 1974 the party has reinvented itself twice, first under Thatcher and now under Johnson. The character of the remaking under Johnson is analysed together with some of the problems for pursuing a successful post‐Brexit statecraft, particularly delivering the 'levelling‐up' agenda and the 'global Britain' agenda in ways which will consolidate rather than fragment the new Conservative coalition, and preserve the Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits Andrew Gamble's book, Britain in Decline, and also revisits the geographies of state crisis. Drawing on the substantial archives of state theory, the article explores how Brexit emerged as a moment of crisis following the relative decline of the economy and the reshaping of the welfare state. Discussions of Brexit and the uneven geographies of advanced capitalism inevitably raise questions about the central tension between the free market and strong state within both political discourse and political activity. In considering these, the article extends Gamble's writing on the social, economic and political struggles within the Thatcherite project and explores the role of uneven development in perpetuating and transforming the contradictions of advanced capitalism. This allows for a more geographical reading of contradictions inside the state‐territory, which augments Gamble's understanding of the external challenges to Britain's postwar settlement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thatcherism was a very astute political project from the beginning—monetarism removed the need to do deals with trade unions in order to manage the economy and thus resolved the political problem which had dogged Conservatives through the 1970s. Andrew Gamble is right to identify a free economy and a strong state as complementary political principles—a credible economic policy was key to the difference between the Falklands and Suez. Now, the Conservative Party has once again shown its agility in responding to economic discontent by becoming a party of Brexit and assembling an election winning coalition of the excluded and the insulated. Age has replaced class as the crucial political divide. A political party can focus on older voters provided that it continues to recruit new voters as they go through the life cycle. But it is risky if it is actually an appeal to an ageing cohort of voters without recruiting from succeeding generations. The Conservative Party needs to appeal to younger voters, and offering the prospect of property ownership would be one way to do this. A belief in fairness between the generations unites different age groups [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article brings together over thirty on‐the‐record interviews with politicians and political strategists at the centre of British politics during the Brexit gridlock. Prompting political elites to retell their oral histories allows us to begin to understand areas of institutional change and continuity, with the aim of beginning the process of 'historicising' Brexit. These interviews demonstrate three areas where the norms of the UK political system were tested and challenged between June 2017 and January 2020: attempts at sustained cross‐party activity in the House of Commons, efforts to rebalance legislative‐executive relations, and the temporary fluidity of the UK's party system. Boris Johnson's ultimate success during this period of (what is now) British political history provides a salutary lesson in the durability of majoritarianism within Westminster, even in the face of sustained challenge on multiple fronts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the statecraft framework outlined by Andrew Gamble to analyse the Conservative government of Boris Johnson. It argues that under Johnson, the Conservative Party is pursuing its most far‐reaching statecraft strategy since the Thatcher era, aimed at re‐establishing the conditions for Conservative hegemony. At the heart of Johnson's statecraft lies Brexit itself, which serves as a national cause around which to organise the politics of support. Leaving the EU demands a renewal of the national community which, for the Conservatives, is framed as a narrow Anglo‐Britishness, centred on an essentially English understanding of the Union of the United Kingdom and of Britishness itself. This assertive politics of national identity shapes the party's approach to territorial statecraft and its ideological struggle to ensure that the dominant narratives of British politics are once again Conservative ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of sovereignty has never been resolved in Scotland. The 1998 Scotland Act, creating the Scottish Parliament affirmed that the Westminster Parliament is sovereign, but this is disputed. In practice, the issue was left largely in abeyance as sovereignty was seen as an outdated concept. The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 and the UK Brexit referendum of 2016 both brought back the question of sovereignty in stark terms. Analysis of data from the British Election Study of 2019 with regard to (a) the right of Scottish self‐determination, and (b) the right of a UK‐wide majority to take Scotland out of the EU, allows us to identify 'sovereigntists' and 'unionists'. Sovereigntists, on both dimensions, now constitute a majority. A smaller group of unionists reject both positions. There remains a group of 'semi‐sovereigntists' who accept Scottish self‐determination, but also that the UK as a whole should decide on Brexit. Controlling for the social and political factors, Scots are increasingly polarised around issues of sovereignty, which have become central to contemporary Scottish politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The survey addresses three key reform debates relating to devolution in Wales. These concern first, the case for the further devolution of powers, notably those over criminal justice and policing; second, the defence of Wales' devolved powers in the context of Brexit; and third, the rooting of devolution in new constitutional ideals, primarily the Welsh government's preferred model of the UK as a voluntary association of nations, or the alternative pressed by the independence movement. In each case, there are strong pressures within Wales for resolutions which sustain and develop devolution; and in the case of independence, have the potential, with reform debates elsewhere, to transform the UK Union. However, there are also grounds for reflecting on the contested nature of further change, the long road that a case for independence may yet have to travel, and the interests of UK government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1980s identities have re‐emerged as a powerful factor shaping support for specific public policies, often doing so at the expense of prioritising the interests of future generations. Outside the United States a major causal factor has been the declining ability of many political parties to mobilise support for themselves and their policies. Consequently, considerations derived from the past can be at the expense of future citizens. This article analyses two major policies separated by a century—Prohibition in the US and Brexit. With both, the enacted policies featured limited previous public discussion about their likely consequences. Moreover, in both cases it was a 'hard' version that would be enacted, even though some supporters had favoured more moderate policy options. While not all policies driven by support from particular identities harm future generations, some do. This results from politicians in public utterances previously being insufficiently focussed in detail on the policy's consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Referendums are regularly criticised for reducing complex policy decisions to two maximally opposed options. This reduces opportunities for voter expression and can polarise debates. Alternative referendum designs which present more than two ballot options can offer innovative opportunities, but also raise new challenges. We can benefit by learning from previous experiences with multi‐option referendum voting. Discussions of such experiences are rare and have often focussed on a limited number of cases. This article provides an overview of over 100 multi‐option referendum experiences around the world. It discusses the topics on which they were held and the ballot options that were offered. It then analyses the variety in ballot design in terms of questions posed and voting methods applied. Drawing on the experiences of multi‐option referendums, the article concludes with lessons that can be learned in relation to initiating and designing these referendums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision to leave the EU provoked the biggest constitutional crisis of recent British history. The referendum—a device for circumventing the parliamentary process—was followed by conflict between a minority government and a majority of MPs unwilling to leave the EU without satisfactory alternative arrangements. The courts, drawn into this conflict, upheld conventions that sustain the authority of Parliament and restrain the despotic power of ministers. The reaction of members of the current government was to take disreputable and anti‐democratic positions against both the Speaker of the House of Commons and the courts. They now have a sufficient majority in Parliament to resume adherence to constitutional conventions and restore a political culture of debate and tolerance, but they show little sign of doing so, and there is a risk that they will do irreparable damage to the political culture that underpins democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares the use of referendums across political regimes over time in Europe. It does so on the basis of a new typology that differentiates between policy domains and degrees of abstraction. The analysis shows different patterns in referendum use between authoritarian regimes, countries in transition and democracies. In addition to the variation in policy domains, the findings indicate different institutional features within the polity types: the process of initiation, the turnout in referendums and the rate of approval. The empirical evidence draws on an original dataset of 620 referendums organised at national level in Europe between 1793 and 2017. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brexit referendum of 2016 brought a new concept to British politics, namely the 'people's will', one that is seemingly at odds with conventional notions of parliamentary sovereignty, even a threat to its very existence. This article argues that although the device of the referendum is relatively new, the kind of popular control over Parliament and the executive that it invokes has long been a part of British politics. Ranging over 200 years, examples are drawn from the recall and deselection of MPs, mass petitioning campaigns, the role of the Speaker, and the flourishing of independent parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 1975 Britain quarrelled about whether to hold a referendum on membership of the European Community. The Hansard Society organised an important debate about it between Enoch Powell, Geoffrey Howe, John Mackintosh and Keith Kyle. This is a report on that event drawn from a recently discovered recording. Many of the arguments deployed then are being repeated in today's debate about a 'people's vote'—including the long‐term effects on the UK's constitution of having recourse to the referendum device. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines uncertainties about nature of Great Britain's economic geography after Brexit. Topics discussed include British model of economic development that had finance and financial agglomeration; range of political and economic shocks to the structure of the economy; and relative advantages that different places offer to businesses, particularly knowledge-led businesses.

The article examines uncertainties about nature of Great Britain's capitalism after Brexit. Topics discussed include British model of economic development that had finance and financial agglomeration; range of political and economic shocks to the structure of the economy; and challenges to growth of finance and a flexible labour market.

The article lists several topics discussed within issue of the periodical including European Central Bank, Brexit and generational politics.

The article examines uncertainties about nature of Great Britain's policies related to macroeconomics after Brexit. Topics discussed include British model of economic development that had finance and financial agglomeration; range of political and economic shocks to the structure of the economy; and challenges in making new trade agreements with countries outside the European Union.

The article examines uncertainties about nature of the Britain's international economic relations after Brexit. Topics discussed include British model of economic development that had finance and financial agglomeration; range of political and economic shocks to the structure of the economy; and ways in which economic and political developments like rising economic marginalization, trade wars, a weak world economy and new forms of globalization, affecting British economy.

The article examines the uncertainties about the nature of the Britain's international economic relations after Brexit, and argues whether knowledge-based economy can be grow post Brexit. Topics discussed include British model of economic development that has had finance and financial agglomeration; range of political and economic shocks to the transformation of the structure of the financial system; and views of political economist Peter Hall on the issue.

The article examines the uncertainties about the nature of the Britain's international economic relations after Brexit and discusses the role of the City of London as a financial centre. Topics discussed include British model of economic development that has finance and financial agglomeration; range of political and economic shocks to the transformation of the structure of the global financial system; and history of London with innovation and adaptation to change.

The article highlights the generational political divides and economic challenges in Great Britain due to Brexit. Topics discussed include difference in political preferences between young and old; Britain's generational economic challenges; share of vote by party and social class; and ways in which young people are experiencing capitalism.

The article argues how Brexit adds new challenges to policies related to Tax and Spending in Great Britain, and created a need of fundamental review of the role of the state in Great Britain. Topics discussed include challenges due to ageing population is putting growing pressure on health and social care spending tax; system's ability to raise revenue for taxation; and ways in which the financial crisis resulted in an increase in taxes.

The article discusses Brexit's consequences on the politics of housing in Great Britain. Topics discussed include British housing market that has undergone a rapid transformation; impact of advanced industrial economies and capitalism on real estate of the country; and ways in which housing markets also engender inequality in the daily lives of owners and renters.

The article discusses how short of a definitive constitutional settlement in Great Britain related to Brexit will keep territorial issues to be part of the politics of the country. Topics discussed include territorial politics of the country; ways in which Unionism thus stands out in Europe as a state ideology; and consideration of Great Britain as plurinational union of nations lacking in a unitary people.

The article discusses how Brexit, and digital disruption are likely to reinforce each other. Topics discussed include economic consequences of Brexit; divergent paths of economic change due to continuing technological change; technology-driven disruption in amount of employment; and reduction in the scale of the market for British firms after Brexit.

The article discusses how Brexit poses some immediate and direct challenges for the security and costs of energy supply. Topics discussed include development of the Internal Energy Market and the associated infrastructure in European Union (EU) member states; Great Britain dependence on energy imports, many of which come from or pass through the EU; and issues for energy and climate policy in a post-Brexit Britain.

This introduction highlights four themes about the politics of suburbia which are developed in the collection. First, what constitutes suburbia is multiple and constantly changing. This is reflected in diverse and evolving architectures and economic conditions. Second, the idea of the suburb as synonymous with the pinnacle of betterment is taking a battering as suburbs are now looking the worse for wear. 'Just about managing' families and the 'squeezed middle' are to be found in the suburbs. Third, in post‐2016 Britain, Brexit is the new political fault‐line where regional variations manifest themselves, and this is reflected in distinctive suburban politics, producing strange bedfellows spanning Surrey and Sunderland. Fourth, voting patterns reflect the dynamism of the modern suburb. The social and physical environment of the suburb may shape attitudes to some extent, but incomers have brought their politics with them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on surprising element of democracy which is designed to allow the voters regular opportunities to thumb their noses at their masters, by returning them answers. It mentions modern representative democracy also requires some degree of consistency and predictability in order to function effectively. It also mentions outcome of the general elections and the Brexit referendum and levels of education attainment.

For decades, the politics of the North East and its suburbs have been frozen. Ever since the decline of the Tories in the region in the 1980s, it has served as a 'solid North' for Labour, but recent evidence suggests that this might well be changing. North Eastern suburbs have suffered because of the emphasis that has been placed on regenerating city centres, and the suburbs in the region haven't been immune to the economic dislocation that emerged from deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s. They have also been impacted by the banking crash and, in particular, the collapse of Northern Rock. They have also seen growing political disengagement and a diminution of affection with the Labour party. All these factors contributed to many suburbs in the North East supporting Brexit in 2016. Talk of a realignment at the 2017 election was over‐egged, however, as the Conservatives failed to understand some of the key drivers of voting behaviour in the region. All evidence suggests that the North East is entering a period of more competitive politics and political parties that show greater ambition for the region and its economy will be in a strong position to take advantage of this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Scottish and European Questions have become intertwined over time. A European turn in Scottish politics became evident from the late 1980s when public opinion moved in favour of the European Communities/Union. The Scottish National Party (SNP) became a leading advocate of EC/EU membership with Europe's four freedoms allowing it to dismiss accusations of separatism. Scotland voted in favour of Remain in the Brexit referendum, adding to existing tensions in UK‐Scottish government relations. The institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations which were designed to cope with tensions are being tested as never before under devolution. The assertion of UK power in these relations has undermined claims made by David Cameron to pursue a 'respect agenda' and commitments made immediately after the independence referendum. But while this evidence of divergent views on such a significant matter creates potential challenges for the UK union, it also creates new challenges for the SNP. The prospect of a hard Brexit raises the issue of separatism once more, with a choice of either remaining in the EU but separate from the rest of the UK (rUK), or remain in a separatist UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a preliminary assessment of the impact of the Brexit process—from the June 2016 referendum to June 2018—on the British political system. Drawing on the classic work of Arend Lijphart and the ensuing scholarship applying the Westminster model to Britain, it seeks to understand whether and to what extent Brexit has impacted on the majoritarian features of the system. Adapting Lijphart's criteria, it focuses on the electoral‐party dimension, the executive–legislative relations and the territorial power‐sharing arrangements. It argues that Brexit has brought to light several intertwined tensions that had been brewing inside British politics over the course of a number of years, and which are likely to continue unfolding for several years to come. Even if emerging trends tend to be fragile, complex, even contradictory, and the current uncertainty makes any long(er)‐term assessment futile, recent developments appear to signal a possible strengthening of the executive over the legislature and of the central over the devolved administrations, thus consolidating the majoritarian traits of the British political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author response to the article by Bruce Ackerman published within the issue on the constitutional choices confronting post-Brexit Britain and elected Constitutional Convention. Topics discussed include self-evidently decrepit institutions of democracy and inmates taking over the asylum of the main political parties, ideology and philosophy of a modern democracy and political leadership sign with previous projects.

In this article, the author response to the article by Bruce Ackerman published within the issue on Great Britain profound political crisis that it needs a constitutional convention to determine the framework for its political future. It mentions proposals emerging from such a convention assembly be put to a referendum after a country-wide process of deliberation. It also mentions unrestricted sovereignty of Great Britain Parliament creates anxiety in the smaller nations.

The Citizens' Assembly on Brexit was a major exercise in deliberative public engagement conducted in autumn 2017. It brought together fifty randomly selected members of the public for two carefully structured weekends of listening, learning, reflecting and discussing. Assembly members considered what post‐Brexit arrangements the UK should pursue, focusing on trade and migration. On trade, most members wanted the UK to pursue a bespoke arrangement with the EU and rejected the option of leaving the EU with no deal. On migration, most wanted the UK to maintain free movement of labour while using already available policy levers to reduce immigration numbers. These findings provide unique insight into informed public opinion on vital, pressing policy questions. The Assembly also illustrates the valuable role that such deliberative exercises could play in UK democracy. We suggest they could be particularly helpful for unlocking progress on issues such as the future of social care, that are often felt to be 'too difficult' to handle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article examines the potential implications of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (so‐called ‘Brexit’) for the success and survival of the country's flagship climate policy, the Climate Change Act 2008. The impact of a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ Brexit for the main features of the Climate Change Act are assessed, building on documentary evidence and elite interviews with key policy‐makers and policy‐shapers. The article argues that the long‐term viability of the Climate Change Act was being threatened even before the EU referendum, and that Brexit will do little to improve this situation. Even though the existence of the Climate Change Act is not under immediate threat, a range of issues presented by Brexit risk undermining its successful implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: It is becoming increasingly accepted, not least by the Prime Minister and opposition leadership, that the negotiation of a comprehensive trade relationship with the EU is necessary to prevent the UK economy falling off a ‘cliff edge’. This concern is shaping the UK's strategy towards negotiations with the EU and has provided at least part of the motivation for the UK to consider requesting a transition period to facilitate the Brexit process. But how accurate are these fears? What evidence is there for the existence of a ‘cliff edge’? How disastrous would it be for the UK to revert to trading with the EU on the same basis as most other countries in the world, namely according to World Trade Organisation rules? This article seeks to address these issues and it highlights a number of implications for policy makers which flow from understanding the available evidence a little more clearly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]