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Scottish Labour, once viewed as the most divided party in the UK, appears buoyant, the result of the growing popularity of its leader, Anas Sarwar, a more positive relationship with UK Labour, and most notably, significant gains in the polls. The party has sought to find a centre ground in a political system defined by opposing visions of Scotland's political future, a strategy which has previously left it squeezed between more assertive nationalist and unionist rivals. However, with little prospect of another independence referendum in the near term, this centre ground may yet prove fruitful. The party has an opportunity to position itself as a viable alternative in a dramatically changed political landscape. While Labour's optimism is not unfounded, its polling perhaps speaks more to the weaknesses of its political rivals than the strength of the party itself; and questions persist about Scottish Labour's political vision and constitutional offering in a political system which remains bifurcated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demands for a second Scottish independence referendum have persisted since 2014. The Scottish government introduced the Referendums (Scotland) Bill at Holyrood in May 2019 to enable referendums within the competence of the Scottish parliament. The Scottish National Party (SNP) government presented this as a framework enabling a range of referendums. Opponents saw this as legislating for a second independence referendum. The act will form a large part of the legal framework and rules for any second independence referendum. Importantly, the legislation provides innovation in electoral law more generally. This article discusses the background to the bill, its initial contents, and debates around and amendments to the bill. It discusses its electoral law innovations, before considering its limitations and place as constitutional debates play out over a second independence referendum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It was his clever remodelling of SNP fundamentals: austere social democracy should soften towards the Irish model of encouraging private enterprise in a "smart successful Scotland", while sovereignty should still leave Scotland in five "unions" - one of them the "social union" with England. What his vivid history of ideas shows, on the contrary, is how normal a European country Scotland is: late in the field, but examining the option of state independence sensibly and cautiously, as Norwegians or Czechs did in the past. Sillars transferred this "independence in Europe" policy to the Scottish National Party, when the SLP had perished. [Extracted from the article]

In the 1975 referendum England provided the strongest support for European integration, with a much smaller margin for membership in Scotland and Northern Ireland. By 2015 the rank order of 'national' attitudes to European integration had reversed. Now, England is the UK's most eurosceptic nation and may vote 'Leave', while Scotland seems set to generate a clear margin for 'Remain'. The UK as a whole is a Brexit marginal. To understand the campaign, we need to make sense of the dynamics of public attitudes in each nation. We take an 'archaeological' approach to a limited evidence-base, to trace the development of attitudes to Europe in England since 1975. We find evidence of a link between English nationalism and euroscepticism. Whatever the result in 2016, contrasting outcomes in England and Scotland will exacerbate tensions in the UK's territorial constitution and could lead to the break-up of Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the inter-related debates over Britain's relationship with the EU and that over the future of the UK. It argues that euroscepticism and Scottish independence are based on exceptionalist identities that now revolve around economic policy. Elite euroscepticism cleaves to a neoliberal vision of minimalist regulation, while advocates of Scottish independence claim Westminster's austerity policies make the British Union incompatible with social democracy. However, this presentation of the choice facing British voters ignores the serious contradictions that overhauling the current order entails. Both forms of exceptionalism fail to recognize the significant limitations of self-government outside and within the EU. If Conservatives can contain their neoliberal flirtation with EU withdrawal they are very well placed to prosper electorally. The dilemma of which union(s) to choose might thus constitute the prelude to the entrenchment of the economic and political order that gave rise to such contestation in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]