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As factionalism becomes increasingly prominent within the Conservative Party, understanding the worldviews of the respective groupings has become key to understanding the party itself. This is especially true regarding the one nation group which is the most numerous in Parliament. From the Cameron era, the term 'one nation' expressed leaders' attempts to modernise the party, reckon with the Thatcherite social legacy, and carve out a distinct centre‐right identity which contained both socially liberal and distinctly conservative elements. However, reconciling 'modern' and 'conservative' views has been singularly difficult. Whilst bridging the two rhetorically and intellectually has been possible, leaders have struggled to translate such a synthesis into a viable governmental agenda that unites the party. Underlying this difficulty is fierce disagreement on immigration, sovereignty, nationhood and cosmopolitanism, resulting in one nation conservatism becoming a signal of intra‐party disagreement rather than unifying leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scottish Labour, once viewed as the most divided party in the UK, appears buoyant, the result of the growing popularity of its leader, Anas Sarwar, a more positive relationship with UK Labour, and most notably, significant gains in the polls. The party has sought to find a centre ground in a political system defined by opposing visions of Scotland's political future, a strategy which has previously left it squeezed between more assertive nationalist and unionist rivals. However, with little prospect of another independence referendum in the near term, this centre ground may yet prove fruitful. The party has an opportunity to position itself as a viable alternative in a dramatically changed political landscape. While Labour's optimism is not unfounded, its polling perhaps speaks more to the weaknesses of its political rivals than the strength of the party itself; and questions persist about Scottish Labour's political vision and constitutional offering in a political system which remains bifurcated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews myths about English identity, using 'myth' in a social scientific way, a truth held to be self‐evident; not something which is patently untrue. It argues that there must be three defining dimensions of English 'nationalism' if it is to be treated as such: first, whether there has been a significant increase in the proportion of people claiming 'English' as their national identity; second, how 'England' is treated as an 'imagined community'; and third, the degree to which the Conservative Party is the political vehicle for English nationalism. These dimensions are labelled the social, the cultural and the political. Only if there is sustained evidence for all three aspects might we consider English nationalism to be a significant phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article "Tocqueville's Dilemmas, and Ours: Sovereignty, Nationalism, Globalization" by Ewa Atanassow, the author explores the tensions between liberalism and democracy through the lens of Alexis de Tocqueville, a 19th-century French liberal thinker. Atanassow highlights Tocqueville's belief that a rich civic life of non-state associations could alleviate the tension between liberty and equality. However, she also emphasizes Tocqueville's alternative solution of a strong sense of nationhood. By examining Tocqueville's ideas on democratic nationhood, Atanassow aims to connect his theories to contemporary issues of illiberal democracy and exclusionary nationalism. The article delves into Tocqueville's background, his writings, and his views on democracy, equality, and the role of the nation. Atanassow concludes by discussing the challenges that nations and liberals face today, such as finding national cohesion in diverse societies, encouraging patriotism while discouraging jingoism, and navigating the survival of liberal nations in a non-liberal world. While Atanassow's study provides valuable insights, it also raises questions about the applicability of Tocqueville's thought to present-day challenges. [Extracted from the article]

The election to the Northern Ireland Assembly in May 2022 witnessed significant changes to the region's political balance. For the first time, a nationalist party became the largest, with Sinn Féin's new leading position allowing the party to provide the First Minister. The main party of unionism, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was relegated to second place. This runner-up position entitled the party to nominate the Deputy First Minister. However, in the immediate aftermath of the election, the DUP declined to do so, amid a crisis for the political institutions established under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. According to the DUP, it would return to power sharing with nationalists only upon removal of the European Union Protocol, agreed between the EU and UK government in 2019. The Protocol uniquely aligns Northern Ireland with EU rules and requires checks on goods travelling between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Alongside unionist versus nationalist rivalries, however, the election was also marked by the best-ever performance by a party of the centre ground subscribing to neither ideology, as Alliance more than doubled its Assembly seat tally. It was now possible to speak of three big pillars in Northern Irish politics: unionist, nationalist and non-aligned, each dominated by a single party. This article examines what happened at the election, assessing the key issues and party fortunes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of sovereignty has never been resolved in Scotland. The 1998 Scotland Act, creating the Scottish Parliament affirmed that the Westminster Parliament is sovereign, but this is disputed. In practice, the issue was left largely in abeyance as sovereignty was seen as an outdated concept. The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 and the UK Brexit referendum of 2016 both brought back the question of sovereignty in stark terms. Analysis of data from the British Election Study of 2019 with regard to (a) the right of Scottish self‐determination, and (b) the right of a UK‐wide majority to take Scotland out of the EU, allows us to identify 'sovereigntists' and 'unionists'. Sovereigntists, on both dimensions, now constitute a majority. A smaller group of unionists reject both positions. There remains a group of 'semi‐sovereigntists' who accept Scottish self‐determination, but also that the UK as a whole should decide on Brexit. Controlling for the social and political factors, Scots are increasingly polarised around issues of sovereignty, which have become central to contemporary Scottish politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Minds the Values Gap, a report published by The UK in a Changing Europe, highlights the poor alignment of the values expressed within the major parties by their MPs and their activists, with those voters who support them. Voters as a whole tend to the left on economic values, and to the authoritarian on social values. Although the data imply that it is the social authoritarianism that defines both Leave voters and Labour–Conservative switchers, this response argues that issues of national identity, democracy and sovereignty are neglected in that analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northern Ireland has always been a polity noted for its strong links between national identity, religion, and voting, and acute British unionist versus Irish nationalist divisions. The constitutional question of whether Northern Ireland should be part of the UK or a united Ireland dominates. Yet, recent surveys have suggested a sizeable and growing section of its electorate declares itself neither unionist nor nationalist. This development may have assisted the growth of the centrist Alliance Party, which rejects unionist and nationalist identities and claims to be neutral on Northern Ireland's constitutional status. Alliance doubled its vote across three elections in 2019 and is now the third largest party in the region. This article examines the importance of ideological dealignment relative to other factors, such as Alliance's opposition to Brexit, in explaining the rise of a non‐binary party in a divided society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demands for a second Scottish independence referendum have persisted since 2014. The Scottish government introduced the Referendums (Scotland) Bill at Holyrood in May 2019 to enable referendums within the competence of the Scottish parliament. The Scottish National Party (SNP) government presented this as a framework enabling a range of referendums. Opponents saw this as legislating for a second independence referendum. The act will form a large part of the legal framework and rules for any second independence referendum. Importantly, the legislation provides innovation in electoral law more generally. This article discusses the background to the bill, its initial contents, and debates around and amendments to the bill. It discusses its electoral law innovations, before considering its limitations and place as constitutional debates play out over a second independence referendum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the UK Labour Party's view of the EU single market over the last four decades, focussing on three case study periods when this issue was particularly salient: first, the time of the single market's introduction under Neil Kinnock's leadership; second, the A8 accession with Tony Blair as Labour Prime Minister; and third, between the 2016 European referendum and 2019 general election during Jeremy Corbyn's time as party leader. This historical narrative uses the theoretical approach of Harvard economist Dani Rodrik—of a 'trilemma' faced by national policy makers in response to globalisation—as a lens to describe a clear arc in Labour's policy towards the single market across the three case studies. A position of initial scepticism moved to support under Kinnock's leadership, and then active encouragement under Blair, before coming back again under Corbyn to uncomfortable non‐commitment. This arc directly correlates with the ebb and flow of the party's overall economic approach—first the Keynesian, national Alternative Economic Strategy at the time of the party's 1983 general election defeat; then, the deviation under Blair to a policy that actively encouraged cross‐border market liberalisation; and finally the return to an Alternative Economic Strategy‐style approach under Corbyn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Britain and across Europe, the social alliances that sustained progressive politics for a century are disintegrating. The financial crisis of 2007–8 showed that Labour and its 'third way' European followers had got the economics of modern capitalism wrong. With the mainstream left compromised, it has been the nationalist right that has benefitted, re‐defining politics around issues of nation, culture and identity. What is surprising is the number of influential voices across the centre and left of politics who have accepted much of this far‐right analysis and adopted its language and terminology. These trends, especially post‐Brexit, have crystallised in the UK around the label of 'Blue Labour'. This article examines the fallacies and flaws of the Blue Labour tendency in four key areas—class, economy, family and race—and suggests alternative ways forward, which seek to forge rather than disrupt alliances between the working class and new social movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the looming reality of Brexit drawing closer, it is the intention of this article to explore Theresa May's post‐referendum communicative behaviour on Brexit—the very issue that came to define her premiership agenda—and uncover what legacy it has left behind. Building upon, extending and updating the emerging literature on May's discourse, the inquiry helps us understand how May acted through language in order to influence and change other people's attitudes towards and ways of looking at Brexit. The article argues that there are at least seven ways, closely interrelated and feeding into each other, in which her discursive construction of Brexit has left a somewhat bitter legacy, contributing to the Brexit political paralysis and inspiring substantial levels of confusion and exasperation, both within the UK and abroad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The major impact of the Belfast Agreement was to engineer a peaceful coexistence between nationalism and unionism that involved each bloc recognising it had sufficient power to thwart the political ambitions of the other side, but not enough to push through its own agenda. This paper argues that Brexit seriously damages this peaceful coexistence and could trigger what is termed an Ulster war of attrition in which Northern Ireland becomes entrapped in a political stalemate where each side strives to triumph without having sufficient power to do so. It also argues that to restore internal political stability in Northern Ireland, and to indemnify against the risk of disorderly relationships between the British and Irish governments in the future, the strategic importance of Strand 3 of the Belfast Agreement requires strengthening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Gastronationalism' is the idea that there are distinctive and authentic national food cultures that are threatened by the forces of globalisation. It is a myth: there are no unique or authentically distinctive national culinary cultures. But the idea of gastronationalism is a powerful one that can have important political effects, as Brexit shows. In this article, I chart the rise of British food with regard to Britain's historical relationship with Europe and the EU. I consider how different understandings of British food culture—one more nativist, one more cosmopolitan—have played a symbolic role in the debate on Brexit, before considering the broader relationship between contemporary populist nationalism and gastronationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This lecture marks the seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) with an analysis of the Declaration's contemporary relevance. It considers whether, in today's turbulent and fractured political environment in which human rights abuses remain widespread, the UDHR still has a role to play. A case is made that the UDHR was, in fact, written precisely for a moment like now. The lecture starts by considering the important legal impact of the UDHR, whilst acknowledging that the legal enforcement of human rights sometimes overshadows the emotions of care and empathy that lie at the heart of both the Declaration and the whole concept of human rights. It then emphasises the significant role the UDHR has played in giving individuals a voice to hold states accountable. Finally, it explores the UDHR's ethical and inspirational vision that helped to create a baseline of norms and standards aimed at promoting diversity, mutual respect and peace. For all these reasons, the UDHR most certainly needs to be rejuvenated rather than retired. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on assertion of democratic rights by the separatists is met by the assertion of democratic rights by other Spaniards and suggests that democracy is both potent and promiscuous. Topics discussed include quality of democracy in great Britain, reinvention of democracy took the idea of the people ruling themselves with people ruling through their representatives and illiberal democracy of conservative nationalism that restricts freedoms and interferes with the courts.

It was his clever remodelling of SNP fundamentals: austere social democracy should soften towards the Irish model of encouraging private enterprise in a "smart successful Scotland", while sovereignty should still leave Scotland in five "unions" - one of them the "social union" with England. What his vivid history of ideas shows, on the contrary, is how normal a European country Scotland is: late in the field, but examining the option of state independence sensibly and cautiously, as Norwegians or Czechs did in the past. Sillars transferred this "independence in Europe" policy to the Scottish National Party, when the SLP had perished. [Extracted from the article]

Abstract: This article treats Enoch Powell's ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech as an example of the epideictic rhetoric of blame and exclusion. Drawing on a framework proposed by Celeste Michelle Condit, the analysis explores the functions of the address for the speaker and for the audience. Of particular concern are Powell's self‐presentation as a statesman and prophet; his account of the impact and consequences of unrestricted immigration; and his portrayal of a community where ordinary, decent English people were being displaced and victimised by Commonwealth immigrants—a process in which he claimed the authorities were complicit. For the audience, the speech gave public expression to their concerns about immigration, though Powell's predictions of a dystopian future also aroused sentiments of anger and foreboding. Despite the controversy that ensued, the impact of ‘Rivers of Blood’ was far‐reaching, and its influence is still apparent in contemporary debates over immigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, and in several speeches in subsequent years, Enoch Powell claimed that immigration was an ‘issue of numbers’. Britain could not, he believed, accommodate a significant number of non‐white people without threatening the existence of the nation. I argue that Powell's opposition to immigration, and his numerical framing of it, rested upon his racialised conception of British, or English, nationhood. As he was shunned by political elites, Powell articulated an increasingly populist nationalism. Drawing repeated references to Britain's wartime experiences, Powell claimed that the British, or more often the English, were being attacked by an immigrant enemy without, and betrayed by an establishment enemy within. I conclude with some reflections on the similarities between Powellite nationalism and contemporary discourses about national identity during and since the European Union referendum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The political discourse is characterised by two opposing ideals of hard and soft Brexit. In this article, we present evidence of attitudinal types that map neatly onto these archetypal views. The hard Brexit view is defined by issues that eurosceptics prioritise, most prominently sovereignty. By contrast, europhiles prioritise cooperation with Europe in terms of scientific collaboration and market access. However, attitudinal types are not either/or in the minds of the British public, and many prioritise all or none of the issues. Further, the two opposing positions together account for 37 per cent of the public's view. That is, just over one‐third differentiate between the salient issues in ways congruent with political ideals. National identity plays a particular role in the sociodemographic profiles of these attitude types. Older people have a strong stance in any direction (sovereignty, cooperation, or both), but national identity is linked to differentiated positions (sovereignty only or cooperation only). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2016, the British Government banned National Action for being an extremist organisation. It was the first time in British history that membership of a far-right group was outlawed. While so, little is known about the group. This article responds to this lack of knowledge by setting out the origins of National Action and its leaders, its preference for a traditionalist Nazi ideology, and its penchant for stunts and demonstrations to gain media attention and publicity. The article concludes by considering whether proscription was rather more symbolic than serious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly election highlighted substantive issues within nationalism. Both the main nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and Labour Party ( SDLP) and Sinn Féin, recorded the worst combined vote for over 20 years. This article suggests that the downturn in nationalist support was years in the making and examines why nationalist voters might be turning away from the ballot box. It considers the various factors that underlined both parties' approach to consecutive electoral tests from 1998 until 2016, showing how Sinn Féin replaced the SDLP as the leading force within nationalism, and concluding that new leadership may yet halt the process of orderly decline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The three great Western political traditions (conservatism, liberalism, social democracy) incorporate three of the four possible combinations of the core political axes: traditional, unchanging authority versus the challenge of change, and egalitarianism versus inegalitarianism. The fourth possibility-egalitarian conservatism-has appeared in various guises, but has usually become submerged within the right, including its most authoritarian forms. Current xenophobic movements claiming to represent those suffering from excessive change-for example, those involved in the UK's EU referendum and Donald Trump's victory in the USA-are seeing an apparent resurgence of this neglected tradition. What are its implications for politics in general? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of political nationalism in the early twenty-first century threatens to subsume the 'progressive dilemma' as identified by David Marquand. The labourist tradition is collapsing culturally, the liberal tradition intellectually. In the face of a new politics of nativism across Europe and America, the labour movement needs to put the debate over the progressive dilemma behind it and find a new source of philosophical inspiration in the English radical tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that a return to the history of progressive political thought can help us to think afresh about what a renewed centre-left politics might look like today. The article identifies some significant aspects of this history that attracted little attention in earlier debates over the British progressive tradition-in particular, debates about social ownership, nationalism and distributism. This revisionist history of British progressivism points the way towards some common ideological ground that could provide a starting point for a new dialogue between different 'progressive' political parties and interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party political interest in the so-called 'English Question' has grown in recent years, due to the enmeshing of constitutional issues with a growing political and public affiliation with and expression of English national identity and culture. More recently, attention has shifted to the decentralisation of government within England. The 'English Question' is thus defined by two interconnected but distinctive 'English Questions'. This article will assess whether, in seeking to find answers for these 'English Questions', the Conservatives and Labour are establishing a more distinctive 'politics of England'. It will first consider the extent to which the politicisation of English identity and civic society have stimulated a more nationally framed political culture and party politics, and then assess whether constitutional reforms undertaken in Westminster, especially the introduction of EVEL, and regional devolution initiatives within England might facilitate greater party political engagement with an emergent 'politics of England'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1975 referendum England provided the strongest support for European integration, with a much smaller margin for membership in Scotland and Northern Ireland. By 2015 the rank order of 'national' attitudes to European integration had reversed. Now, England is the UK's most eurosceptic nation and may vote 'Leave', while Scotland seems set to generate a clear margin for 'Remain'. The UK as a whole is a Brexit marginal. To understand the campaign, we need to make sense of the dynamics of public attitudes in each nation. We take an 'archaeological' approach to a limited evidence-base, to trace the development of attitudes to Europe in England since 1975. We find evidence of a link between English nationalism and euroscepticism. Whatever the result in 2016, contrasting outcomes in England and Scotland will exacerbate tensions in the UK's territorial constitution and could lead to the break-up of Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many on the left hoped that the 2015 general election in Britain would prove a social democratic moment. Instead, it proved a nationalist moment, since the only parties radically to increase their vote were UKIP and the SNP. This mirrored trends on the Continent, where nationalist parties on the right and the left have been the beneficiaries of the financial collapse of 2008. These parties exploit a new social cleavage between those who benefit from globalisation and those left behind. The new parties exploit issues of identity rather than economics, and these issues-whether Britain remains in the European Union, whether mass immigration continues and whether Scotland remains in the United Kingdom-are likely to dominate the 2015 parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideas developed by the social democratic left have been brought together in Prosperity and Justice. Contributors from a wide spectrum of backgrounds have contributed to a new post neoliberal consensus. More attention needs to be paid to the global level of policy making. International capacity to act is declining just as the need for it grows. Political movements seeking to reassert nationalism against global collaboration are growing. Economic policies cannot be replaced without considering the global institutional structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the inter-related debates over Britain's relationship with the EU and that over the future of the UK. It argues that euroscepticism and Scottish independence are based on exceptionalist identities that now revolve around economic policy. Elite euroscepticism cleaves to a neoliberal vision of minimalist regulation, while advocates of Scottish independence claim Westminster's austerity policies make the British Union incompatible with social democracy. However, this presentation of the choice facing British voters ignores the serious contradictions that overhauling the current order entails. Both forms of exceptionalism fail to recognize the significant limitations of self-government outside and within the EU. If Conservatives can contain their neoliberal flirtation with EU withdrawal they are very well placed to prosper electorally. The dilemma of which union(s) to choose might thus constitute the prelude to the entrenchment of the economic and political order that gave rise to such contestation in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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