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The article discusses the coordination problem that has been affecting the foreign economic relations of North Korea. It provides an overview on the political dimensions of the coordination problem. It depicts the difficulty faced by the U.S. in mobilizing pressure in North Korea and also the difficulty that South Korea and China had in seeking to engage it.

An appendix is presented on the monthly export data of cereal and fuel in North Korea provided by the Korean International Trade Association (KITA) and the General Administration of Customs, People's Republic of China (PRC).

The article provides the three main points which emerge from the analysis of the efficacy of economic inducements and sanctions in North Korea. These include the country's domestic politics, the lack of efforts of the administration of former U.S. President George W. Bush, and the country's response to pressure and sanctions. The article notes how the political economy and the external relations of North Korea are remarkably insensitive to either sanctions or inducements.

The article discusses the involvement of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama in North Korea from 2009-2010. It indicates that the administration showed willingness to engage in North Korea through the Six Party Talks. Moreover, the article notes the response of the administration through pursuing a two-track policy and orchestrating wide-ranging multilateral sanctions against North Korea through the United Nation (UN) Security Council.

The article focuses on the economic diplomacy of North Korea and the economic inducements and sanctions played by the Six Party Talks under the administration of former U.S. President George W. Bush. It notes how Bush's narrative follows the work of Miroslav Nincic. It also indicates that an extensive body of analysis on North Korea by Leon V. Sigal considers whether inducements and constraints generate cooperative or uncooperative, escalatory responses.

An essay is presented on the condition of the domestic politics in North Korea and role of economic statecraft. It discusses the major components that could create a more fundamental strategic reorientation in the country's change in economic policy. It also provides an outline on the membership of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and offers an overview of domestic economic and political developments in the country.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the use of economic statecraft vis-à-vis North Korea, the collapse of the Six Party Talks, and the sanctions introduced in 2009 and the efforts to restart negotiations.

The article provides an overview on the efficacy of economic inducements and sanctions in Korea. It cites the three main points of a certain study which include the domestic politics in North Korea, the weakening of the Bush administration's efforts to pressure North Korea, and the response of North Korea to pressure and sanctions. It depicts how the political economy and external relations of North Korea are remarkably insensitive to either sanctions or inducements.

An appendix is presented on the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy or national security objectives.

An appendix is presented on the data provided by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) and the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) about North Korea's overall merchandise trade balance and a bilateral breaking down of North Korean trade.

An appendix is presented on the shipments of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to North Korea from 2007-2009.